PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

bustead

Junior Member
Registered Member
I do not follow your logic.
Of course expending munitions in any sort of conflict will consume resources, however the value of the targets that you are expending your munitions against is what matters.

The whole point of this discussion is that in a conflict, China's MIC facilities would be vulnerable to attack from the US, while US MIC facilities will not be vulnerable to attack from China.
How can China "replenish losses quicker" when their MIC production facilities are under being targeted and disrupted while US MIC production facilities remain unmolested?

Firstly, munitions is only part of the equation. The cost of launching such a campaign includes the man-hours of work needed to keep your delivery system in operational condition, the fuel and supplies needed to repair any damage of your assets and the risk of losing your strike platforms. Think of it this way, the Battle of Britain was not purely won by UK counter-bombing Germany.

As for the problem of threatening American MIC, I disagree with you. Firstly, cyberwarfare, space assets and even saboteurs can be used to delay or destroy American assets. Potential targets include power generation, water supply and transport infrastructure. For example, orbital bombers/FOB systems can be used to bomb major power plants to disrupt the supply chain. Sure, the F-35 production plant maybe very secured with multiple redundancies built in, but that is not helpful if the workers are starving at home because food cannot be delivered to Walmart.

Secondly, China can use the existing divides of American society. The US is currently suffering from racial and class tensions and by disrupting civilian production (which is far less secured than military production), China can indirectly incite more unrest, riots and violence in general. The goal is not to threaten the American military production directly. Rather, threaten the survival/safety of the workers to reduce their efficiency.

As for Chinese MIC facilities under attack from the US, the increasing sophistication of AA systems and higher social cohesion can help China in rebuilding more quickly. Again, strategic bombing by itself cannot defeat a great power. You can do so to Yugoslavia (somewhat controversial but let's say that's the case) but a power like China has enough strategic depth and industrial capacity to rebuild quickly. Put it this way, you can try to beat a boss in a video game but the boss is regenerating faster than you can deal damage to it.

Furthermore, the impression that China has an "edge in industrial production" is far too general of a statement.
Because in many domains of high end military assets, China does not have an edge and is in fact, behind.
In terms of aerospace production of stealth fighters, of large tanker aircraft, of stealthy strike missiles, helicopters, China is quite far behind.
In production of advanced nuclear submarines and carriers, China is also behind.
In producing advanced powerplants like high end turbofans, nuclear propulsion, China is also behind.
Yes, China does have certain strengths, such as shipbuilding for certain ship types, and it's aerospace production is advancing in qualitative technology.
But it is very incorrect to say that China has an advantage in industrial production in context of general military industrial capabilities.

1. Stealth fighters. I do agree actually. However, what can you do with stealth fighters when all your forward air bases are destroyed? Realistically, you can only field a certain number of planes based on the logistical train that you can support. In the West Pacific, the US is faced with a lot more challenges than China. Harassment from missiles and subs, Chinese cyber attacks and jamming, and just pure distance means that it is very difficult for the US to sustain such a large air fleet. In other words, the strength of American stealth fighter production is great for defense, not for offensives.

2. Large Tankers. C-17 production lines are closed. C-5 lines are also closed. There is no US edge in CURRENT production.

3. Stealthy strike missiles. This is about doctrine. China has way more supersonic cruise missiles than the US. It is not about the US having better tech. Rather, it is about the US having a different military theory than China.

4. Helicopters. I agree. However, just like stealth fighters, what can you do with them?

5. Nuclear submarines. I do agree on that point. I think American submarines will be the biggest concern of the PLAN and Chinese shipping.

6. Engines. Yes China is behind. However, I don't think engines by itself will be able to win a war. Again, it is definitely a weakness, but current China can already make-do to an extent.

No one is saying that a US blockade from the Indian Ocean will be costless to US allies or that China could not try to frustrate a US blockade.

What I am saying is that having air and naval forces in positions to control of SLOCs is important and if one suffers from a compromised SLOC, then it will adversely affect a nation's ability to wage a war of attrition.

How big of an effect? Is it worth losing multiple carriers over?

Even if we try to suggest that the US will not be able to perfectly carry out a blockade or that the US blockade will also adversely affect their allies in the western Pacific, well that doesn't solve the problem that China's SLOCs will remain hindered while US SLOCs are unhindered.

The global supply chain will be disrupted. Originally, Japan and South Korea can produce consumer electronics for the US. This allows the US to mobilize more of its workers in military production. If American allies can no longer do that due to supply shock, the US will have to slow its pace in mobilization or risk additional unrest.

Also, if South Korea and Japan folds, it will be very beneficial for China to immediately acquire their military production. The US most likely wants to stop that by supporting its allies. Furthermore, other American allies (eg Europe) will have doubts on the US if it is so willing to just sacrifice its allies.
Heck, this entire issue is could be simply evaded where the US could simply require shipping going to allied nations to have some government or military representative on board to check in with them and any ship lacking it will be boarded and/or simply sunk. How many nations would choose to quickly comply with US demands rather than risk military seizure or destruction of their shipping?

You still need to sink them if they don't have your officers onboard. So you will be sending a bunch of surface ships and subs to the area regardless. Also, what if the Chinese jam communications in the area? Do you sink whatever you see risking destroying an Australian cargo ship?

Also, states in the SEA will likely receive cheap cargo ships from China. They don't care if the US starts sinking their ships.

The idea of China being able to track US CSGs operating in the Andamans and being able to provide sufficient targeting data for an AShBM strike is also fanciful. The AShBM is not a silver bullet, and it should be considered as one element of a multidomain package.

ASBMs are not silver bullets. Which is why air power is still going to be used. Regardless, why do you think China cannot track a carrier in Andaman sea if Myanmar is opening (voluntarily or otherwise) its airspace to China? If China can track a carrier in the first island chain, it can do the same in Andaman sea since the distance is roughly similar. Again, launching dozens of bombers from Yunnan is just as easy as launching IRBMs from there so there is no need to rely on ASBMs.
Acting alone, unsupported, I do not expect AShBMs to be capable of defeating the defenses of a CSG unless they are somehow literally able to spam many dozens of missiles as part of a single strike.

1. There are also bombers and attack aircraft in the area, as mentioned above.
2. A KZ-1 rocket is just a modified DF-21. It costs around $4 million to launch. So let's say a DF-21 is around $5 mil, 100 missiles are just 500 million. If they managed to get a carrier kill, it will still be a net gain for China. Not to mention the crew losses to the US. As for operational implementation, each missile is an independent unit. As long as the carrier's position is roughly known, a missile strike can be carried out.

Now, if it was part of a coordinated strike with SSGNs, a couple of CSGs worth of strike fighters and EW, coordinated with stealthy HALE UAVs and a formation of LEO satellites and a high resolution GEO satellite or two, then that's an entirely different question.

As I said, such an attack is not carried out by one asset only. Which is why flying over Myanmar or Thailand is needed.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
A few things from comments above.

In the event of a Taiwan conflict, China will need to be quite confident that it can take Taiwan quickly. As such, it needs to continue to:
- train joint force operations that gets larger and larger.
- normalize such operations so that neither Taiwan nor US know when they will attack
- demoralize Taiwan military so that they will want to not continue fighting. Make a Chinese takeover feel inevitable.
- do this without expanding much of its ballistic missiles, J-20s and B-20. Keep in mind of aircraft and pilot fatigue factors. Too many sorties to subdue Taiwan
- plug in certain areas needed for a quick and successful amphibious landings. That means more UCAVs, attack helicopter, transport helicopters, large amphibious ships.
We need to see a lot more of this
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Aside from that, it needs sufficient deterrent of a US retaliation. That means it needs H-20 that can take out military bases like Okinawa, Guam, Japan and surrounding area. Keep in mind that no country's population wants a prolonged war. The top thing to do is to make US intervention as undesirable to the American public as possible. The quicker and more painless (fewer civilian casualty/destruction) a Taiwan invasion is, the less appetite there will be in US military and US public for an intervention. The longer and more civilian casualties on TV, the more likely US will intervene. You do not need to conquer the entire island for Taiwan to give up. Take over the primary government/media buildings in Taipei (and maybe Taichung and Kaohsiung), Taiwan will give up. I've spent some time in Taiwan. People have a very comfortable life style. They are not looking for a permanent destruction of that.

In order to take Taiwan quickly, you will not only need more weapons for amphibious landings. You will also need options to attack Taipei from the mountainous side. That's where all the transport helicopters and Lynx ATV comes in. Basically, the largest PLA investment in the recent years have been the attack and transport helicopters. Being able to enter Taipei from mountainous regions in the north and in the East is very important. I was struck listening to Shilao's podcast on how much PLA emphasized those Lynx ATVs. Besides Tibet and southwest China, Taiwan is the most likely reason that PLA really favors them.

Sending Chinese carrier groups to Japan or Hawaii are possibly the worst ideas. That will make US public feel like they are under attack and need to participate. More importantly, Chinese carrier groups will be sitting ducks without land based air protection or diesel submarine/underwater hydrophone protection from very very quiet American nuclear submarines.

Do not think of just military conflict here. Nobody wants the supply chain disruptions, the economic warfare, the financial market attacks and cyber warfare that would be just as unpleasant. Those are the kind of things you would want threaten US and Japanese officials with. Basically, most Americans don't care about Taiwan. They also don't want to see ugly photos of Chinese bombers killing a bunch of Taiwanese civilians. They also want their supply chain to be restored as soon as possible. You want to limit this as much as possible. The more detached that American public feels from PLA invasion, the less they are inclined to support an intervention.

Also, you cannot keep Japanese/US bases offline with ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. There is not enough of them. They can't do enough damage that the repair crew won't be able to fix up. PLAAF will have to rely on H-20 to keep those bases offline.
TV will not be allowed to be broadcast in such a scenario. the absolute first thing to do is to cut the undersea cables and start jamming satellite links to create a total media blackout. in the follow up campaign the grid will be targetted to permanently silence their communication infrastructure.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
US public is not looking for an all out war with China (aside from few fringe extremist elements). Don't turn this into one. Keep conflict localized and don't do permanent damage with your largest trade partner.
largest trading partner is ASEAN. they'll end up fine.

if they aren't looking for an all out war then they have nothing to worry about from a larger strategic deterrent and additional global targetting assets. all these do nothing until they fire the first shot.
 

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
1. In the West Pacific, the US is faced with a lot more challenges than China. Harassment from missiles and subs, Chinese cyber attacks and jamming, and just pure distance means that it is very difficult for the US to sustain such a large air fleet.
This point you highlighted should be the focus of any analysis of the war scenario in the Western Pacific.

The logistical burden for the US is 3 times more difficult to intervene against China in the Pacific Ocean than the US had against the Soviets in the Atlantic Ocean in the Cold War.

It is not just the USAF's limitation in the Pacific Ocean scenario, the US Navy itself, which should be the most capable force in this environment, also finds limitations due to its deficient and scarce support fleet.

The USAF is not even safe in Guam, the advanced bases, however much they have a solid defensive capability, in an eventual intervention against China, these air and naval bases will be attacked and the Americans know this, that's why this inclination to operate in remote locations, rapidly deployable and dispersed - this has a disadvantage that it will limit American actions in the theater of operations, there can be no accumulation of forces under these conditions and this includes naval and air forces.

The US in Europe during the Cold War against the Soviets had the entire European continent as a territory of strategic contestation, there was territory capable of housing large air and naval forces, it simply had plenty of territory to deploy bases and that was necessarily a force multiplier for NATO forces.

In the Pacific, the scenario changes. As China has the PLARF/PLAAF to neutralize the advanced bases of the US and allied forces, it will push all enemy forces to the sea, where it would not be able to implement large naval and air bases. The strategic contestation territory in the Pacific is simply a force multiplier for China, which as it deploys advanced bases in the SCS, increases the range of conventional ballistic missiles, improves the quality of the air and naval force, pushing the entire enemy force away in inhospitable territories.

Just as the US Navy has the inability to logistically support itself in a war against China in the Pacific, due to the inefficient support fleet, the USAF also incurs great problems in logistically supporting its aircraft due to the small fleet of tank aircraft - remembering that the fleet of tank aircraft is insufficient for the Pacific scenario, where distances are simply greater than any other scenario on the planet.

I find it very funny when consider that the US has the full logistical capability to support a war in the Pacific when reality simply belies that narrative.
 

supersnoop

Major
Registered Member
I'm going to break down my reply in parts.

1. I never said that the US would be able to "permanently take out" hundreds of Chinese factories. What I said was that the US would have the capability to strike at Chinese production facilities while China would not have the capability to do the same to the US.

2. In any sort of serious westpac conflict, the US will frontload its airbases in the region with aircraft yes (at both major air bases and dispersed air bases), and also have multiple CSGs in the region. Additionally, the US would deploy a large fraction of its SSN fleet (most if not all of which can launch LACMs) to the region, as well as additional surface combatants as part of surface action groups (SAGs) -- and those SSNs and SAGs of course can carry Tomahawk LACMs capable of quite long ranged strike. Furthermore, the US will be capable of launching long range bomber raids carrying long range ALCMs from Hawaii and CONTUS. And in the future, basing of IRBM/hypersonic weapons in the region during wartime is virtually a given as well.
Taking all of those capabilities together at a system of systems level, versus what the PLA can field in the near future at a system of systems level, I do not see the PLA having the capability to robustly and quickly smash US westpac capabilities and mobile units (CSGs and naval forces) in the region in a manner that will permanently cripple US capability to project air and naval power in the region, which would be the prerequisite for China to be capable of robustly protecting its key military industrial complex facilities from US attack.

3. The production pipeline for modern weapons systems is much more fragile than we often believe. Think about various key subsystems that modern fighters, warships, and missiles cannot function without. The most obvious are key avionics systems like radars, and the other are powerplants. Think about how many factories there are which are able to produce those key subsystems. If I were a competent adversary, I would focus my strikes on the small number of key production sites that produce those key subsystems, and sure maybe I'll launch some strikes against final assembly/production factories as well. Those together would greatly hinder and delay China's ability to replace losses of many military systems. Sure, over time we can argue that China will be able to build replacement factories, distribute their operations, and so on -- but over that same period of time the US will be able to greatly expand its production facilities in CONTUS and in Europe -- all on top of continuing to run its unmolested existing production facilities. Meaning that in a prolonged conflict, the US will almost certainly end up being able to outproduce China the longer that time goes on.

4. China has no capability in the foreseeable future to realistically to strike US production facilities that the US uses for the production of its military assets. Fairly simple.

5. SLOCs -- sure one can argue that in a "wartime economy" China might be self-sufficient in energy and materials. But you are talking about a war of attrition. In such a conflict, the side with secure SLOCs and superior resource lines will hold a significant advantage.


All of which, brings me back to the point I wrote in my previous post -- as the current balance of military power stands, a war of attrition would be unfavourable to China and the PLA.

That is simply because of two things:
1. The pre-positioning of US forces in westpac (air bases, facilities) and mobile US forces (CSGs, naval forces) are in close proximity to the Chinese mainland where they are capable of striking production facilities of China, while the PLA has no way of realistically doing so to the US. That combined with the US having greater freedom to rely on global SLOCs for maintaining its resources and denying those SLOCs to China, means that the longer a war goes on, the worse it is for the PLA.
2. The degree of military power the PLA holds is not sufficient to defeat and annihilate said US forces (both pre-positioned and mobile) described above, in a sufficiently comprehensive and rapid manner to allow the PLA to cripple US capability to project power in the western pacific and allow the PLA to take the strategic initiative in the pacific in general, and also to allow the PLA to secure its SLOCs in the key important area/s of the western pacific and Indian Ocean.


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Directed to everyone in general:

Now, let me describe a degree of PLA military power whereby a "war of attrition" might actually be a positive for them:
Such a PLA force (let's call it PLA XYZ) would be capable of doing two things:
1. Defeating a massive combined US force (including both their based forces and their mobile naval/air forces, which would make up over half of total US global forces) in the western pacific in relatively quick order (such that the US has no chance to wear down PLA defenses of the mainland let alone robustly strike at Chinese production facilities), AND
2. After the action described in 1., the remaining surviving PLA forces (air and naval) that they have, are able to significantly quantitatively and qualitatively outnumber the remaining surviving US forces in the world, enabling the PLA to take strategic advantage in the pacific in general (i.e.: not just the western pacific, rather including the central and eastern pacific) as well as in the Indian Ocean.

By achieving that, the PLA will be able to:
A. Secure the production facilities of their own home turf and to be capable of expanding production robustly
B. Secure SLOCs for efficient, expansive transport of resources in a way that provides both redundancy and capacity
C. Have a globally sufficient and quantitative balance of forces capable of placing the US on the geostrategic defensive, by placing Hawaii and Alaska at serious risk and also to have the capability to conduct a degree of strikes against the US western seaboard and force the US to reposition and suboptimize their own production facilities on CONTUS.


Needless to say, PLA XYZ would need to be very large and very powerful to be able to achieve such a mission -- at minimum it would require PLA XYZ's total high end military capability to be quantitatively larger than that of the US's total global force and to be at minimum qualitatively equal if not qualitatively superior.
Such an operation would require the PLA XYZ to be able to robustly defeat a frontloaded US force (composing of over half, or at least a major fraction of US total global forces in existence) in the western pacific while suffering minimal losses on its own, to result in the PLA having a quantitative correlation of forces on the scale of something like at least 3:1 against the US's total globally available forces that still survive.



.... Or, putting it another way, I believe for a "war of attrition" to be plausibly desirable for China, will require the PLA to at least be 50% larger than the US military in key mobile air-naval forces, and to have massive regional/westpac advantages to be capable of robustly defeating a forward deployed US force (composing of 50-60% of total US global forces) in the western pacific while suffering minimal PLA losses of its own, to seek a correlation of naval and air forces that is at least 3:1 in the PLA's favour by the time that the dust settles in the western pacific phase of the conflict.
Just to clarify...
Is this mega-sized PLA your version of the "no-doubter 450 foot Home Run" scenario?
If so, then sure, otherwise it doesn't really make sense.

Off the bat, if the US is willing to level factories in mainland China in the way you described, you've triggered a world war. Can anyone imagine the US launching thousands of Tomahawks into China and North Korea and Russia sitting idly by and awaiting their turn? On top of that, you've no doubt unleashed the full force of the PLARF onto US assets all over Asia, so Japan and South Korea.

Taking into a political angle, the only way this kind of scenario could happen is if PRC suddenly decided to launch an unprovoked conquest of Taiwan like North Korea or North Vietnam. Otherwise, it would be extremely hard to justify mainland strikes in the case of a Taiwanese declaration of independence, almost impossible if such a declaration was made illegally beyond the Republic of China Constitution (i.e. unilaterally by an extremist DPP administration outside the auspices of the Legislative Yuan).

If we look at anyone of your scenarios paired with the latter above, there would be a heavy price to be paid for the US. How would the administration sell the loss of so many lives the actual monetary cost of supporting an illegal revolution?

This isn't even considering the chaos that would undoubtedly occur within Taiwan island itself as posited above. Kinmen and Matsu would likely secede themselves. Also, technically if the declaration is illegal, the ROC military's duty would be to remove the administration from power.

Of course this is the military strategy thread, so I'm trying to limit the amount of politics to only the relevant bits.
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
1. I never said that the US would be able to "permanently take out" hundreds of Chinese factories. What I said was that the US would have the capability to strike at Chinese production facilities while China would not have the capability to do the same to the US.
...
4. China has no capability in the foreseeable future to realistically to strike US production facilities that the US uses for the production of its military assets. Fairly simple.
...
All of which, brings me back to the point I wrote in my previous post -- as the current balance of military power stands, a war of attrition would be unfavourable to China and the PLA.

That is simply because of two things:
1. The pre-positioning of US forces in westpac (air bases, facilities) and mobile US forces (CSGs, naval forces) are in close proximity to the Chinese mainland where they are capable of striking production facilities of China, while the PLA has no way of realistically doing so to the US. That combined with the US having greater freedom to rely on global SLOCs for maintaining its resources and denying those SLOCs to China, means that the longer a war goes on, the worse it is for the PLA.
...

China is working on solving that issue by ramping up the amount of strategic weapons they have. The expansion in production of nuclear submarines and fissile material is in progress. Once China has thousands of nuclear warheads they can easily strike not just major US cities like it can today, but also the entire US energy infrastructure and strategic production targets.
You assume the US can attack China by using the Pacific Rim nations as launch bases. But this assumes China wouldn't strike those with IRBMs like the DF-26 and other medium strike weapon systems like the H-6K with cruise missiles. I think this is overly optimistic in your part. China has enough space reconnaissance capabilities they can easily spot any major US troop movements and attack the concentration of forces. They can also declare a policy of exclusion of US forces from the Pacific Rim and threaten nations which host US forces with retaliation in case they retain US forces in their soil. Their conventional and nuclear weapons are enough to do it. If the US then insists and attacks mainland China I would expect China to escalate by striking major US cities and the US to escalate back. It would not be a good ending for either.
 

sinophilia

Junior Member
Registered Member
China needs to be able to threaten the US homeland in the same way that it is being threatened. The only way to do this with the same volume and capability as the US is to have forces stationed within a couple hundred miles of the American mainland.

China should begin establishing agreements for basing and whatnot with Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and any country that will take them. If you want to destroy Chinese production ability, then we will destroy yours too should be the thought.
 

bustead

Junior Member
Registered Member
China needs to be able to threaten the US homeland in the same way that it is being threatened. The only way to do this with the same volume and capability as the US is to have forces stationed within a couple hundred miles of the American mainland.

China should begin establishing agreements for basing and whatnot with Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and any country that will take them. If you want to destroy Chinese production ability, then we will destroy yours too should be the thought.
I don't think a few bases will be helpful because in a major conflict the US can still destroy them with relative ease. Rather, I think new technology will be a lot more important.

1. Long range UAVs. Unmanned bombers really. As long as they can reach CONUS from China, it will suffice. They don't really have to return as well.

2. Orbital bombers. Space based attacks are more difficult to defend against and range is not as much of an issue here.

3. Nuclear subs. Sneak into 1000-2000 km of CONUS and fire cruise missiles. Alternatively, attack lone American ships (or coast guard vessels) to demoralize their military.

4. Cyberwarfare/propaganda to further destabilize the US.
 

9dashline

Captain
Registered Member
I don't think a few bases will be helpful because in a major conflict the US can still destroy them with relative ease. Rather, I think new technology will be a lot more important.

1. Long range UAVs. Unmanned bombers really. As long as they can reach CONUS from China, it will suffice. They don't really have to return as well.

2. Orbital bombers. Space based attacks are more difficult to defend against and range is not as much of an issue here.

3. Nuclear subs. Sneak into 1000-2000 km of CONUS and fire cruise missiles. Alternatively, attack lone American ships (or coast guard vessels) to demoralize their military.

4. Cyberwarfare/propaganda to further destabilize the US.
With AI, even nuclear subs with MIRVs can be fully autonomous and unmanned, the benefit would be without a crew to feed it can operate alone hidden out of sight for decades... can even be a sort of mobile deadhand/perimeter to guarantee China gets vengence/retaliation one way or another...
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Just to clarify...
Is this mega-sized PLA your version of the "no-doubter 450 foot Home Run" scenario?
If so, then sure, otherwise it doesn't really make sense.

I'm not sure what that means.

Off the bat, if the US is willing to level factories in mainland China in the way you described, you've triggered a world war. Can anyone imagine the US launching thousands of Tomahawks into China and North Korea and Russia sitting idly by and awaiting their turn? On top of that, you've no doubt unleashed the full force of the PLARF onto US assets all over Asia, so Japan and South Korea.

I never said that the US would be willing to "level factories in mainland China".
I said the US would conducted targeted strikes against key elements of China's military industrial chain that will allow them to greatly hinder China's production and replacement of military assets.

Of course in any such conflict I expect China and US to use missile systems against each other in the western pacific (as well as aerial strike systems), that is the entire basis of my reasoning for why China's production capabilities are vulnerable and why it would be detrimental to China at the present moment if a war of attrition occurs.

Due the nature of pre-conflict positioning and geography, China can only target US bases/staging areas in the western pacific, whereas the US can target China's bases/staging areas on the mainland and key Chinese production facilities.


Taking into a political angle, the only way this kind of scenario could happen is if PRC suddenly decided to launch an unprovoked conquest of Taiwan like North Korea or North Vietnam. Otherwise, it would be extremely hard to justify mainland strikes in the case of a Taiwanese declaration of independence, almost impossible if such a declaration was made illegally beyond the Republic of China Constitution (i.e. unilaterally by an extremist DPP administration outside the auspices of the Legislative Yuan).

If we look at anyone of your scenarios paired with the latter above, there would be a heavy price to be paid for the US. How would the administration sell the loss of so many lives the actual monetary cost of supporting an illegal revolution?

This isn't even considering the chaos that would undoubtedly occur within Taiwan island itself as posited above. Kinmen and Matsu would likely secede themselves. Also, technically if the declaration is illegal, the ROC military's duty would be to remove the administration from power.

Of course this is the military strategy thread, so I'm trying to limit the amount of politics to only the relevant bits.

The victory conditions for a nation during a war can be generally defined in two ways:
1. Defeating the enemy's resolve to fight -- i.e.: the enemy may or may not have the material capabilities to continue a conflict, but due to morale, psychological, cultural, social reasons, they do not choose to continue to fight.
2. Defeating the enemy's capability to fight -- i.e.: the enemy may or may not have the morale/psychological/cultural/social reasons to continue to fight, but that regardless of whether they choose to continue to fight, due to the sheer loss/lack of material capabilities they have faced, they are unable to fight.


In terms of force planning and procurement, it is ideal and prudent to pursue a flexible, comprehensive force that should be oriented to defeating the enemy's capability to fight, rather than hoping that one's force procurement is sufficient to defeat the enemy's resolve to fight.
 
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