I do not follow your logic.
Of course expending munitions in any sort of conflict will consume resources, however the value of the targets that you are expending your munitions against is what matters.
The whole point of this discussion is that in a conflict, China's MIC facilities would be vulnerable to attack from the US, while US MIC facilities will not be vulnerable to attack from China.
How can China "replenish losses quicker" when their MIC production facilities are under being targeted and disrupted while US MIC production facilities remain unmolested?
Firstly, munitions is only part of the equation. The cost of launching such a campaign includes the man-hours of work needed to keep your delivery system in operational condition, the fuel and supplies needed to repair any damage of your assets and the risk of losing your strike platforms. Think of it this way, the Battle of Britain was not purely won by UK counter-bombing Germany.
As for the problem of threatening American MIC, I disagree with you. Firstly, cyberwarfare, space assets and even saboteurs can be used to delay or destroy American assets. Potential targets include power generation, water supply and transport infrastructure. For example, orbital bombers/FOB systems can be used to bomb major power plants to disrupt the supply chain. Sure, the F-35 production plant maybe very secured with multiple redundancies built in, but that is not helpful if the workers are starving at home because food cannot be delivered to Walmart.
Secondly, China can use the existing divides of American society. The US is currently suffering from racial and class tensions and by disrupting civilian production (which is far less secured than military production), China can indirectly incite more unrest, riots and violence in general. The goal is not to threaten the American military production directly. Rather, threaten the survival/safety of the workers to reduce their efficiency.
As for Chinese MIC facilities under attack from the US, the increasing sophistication of AA systems and higher social cohesion can help China in rebuilding more quickly. Again, strategic bombing by itself cannot defeat a great power. You can do so to Yugoslavia (somewhat controversial but let's say that's the case) but a power like China has enough strategic depth and industrial capacity to rebuild quickly. Put it this way, you can try to beat a boss in a video game but the boss is regenerating faster than you can deal damage to it.
Furthermore, the impression that China has an "edge in industrial production" is far too general of a statement.
Because in many domains of high end military assets, China does not have an edge and is in fact, behind.
In terms of aerospace production of stealth fighters, of large tanker aircraft, of stealthy strike missiles, helicopters, China is quite far behind.
In production of advanced nuclear submarines and carriers, China is also behind.
In producing advanced powerplants like high end turbofans, nuclear propulsion, China is also behind.
Yes, China does have certain strengths, such as shipbuilding for certain ship types, and it's aerospace production is advancing in qualitative technology.
But it is very incorrect to say that China has an advantage in industrial production in context of general military industrial capabilities.
1. Stealth fighters. I do agree actually. However, what can you do with stealth fighters when all your forward air bases are destroyed? Realistically, you can only field a certain number of planes based on the logistical train that you can support. In the West Pacific, the US is faced with a lot more challenges than China. Harassment from missiles and subs, Chinese cyber attacks and jamming, and just pure distance means that it is very difficult for the US to sustain such a large air fleet. In other words, the strength of American stealth fighter production is great for defense, not for offensives.
2. Large Tankers. C-17 production lines are closed. C-5 lines are also closed. There is no US edge in CURRENT production.
3. Stealthy strike missiles. This is about doctrine. China has way more supersonic cruise missiles than the US. It is not about the US having better tech. Rather, it is about the US having a different military theory than China.
4. Helicopters. I agree. However, just like stealth fighters, what can you do with them?
5. Nuclear submarines. I do agree on that point. I think American submarines will be the biggest concern of the PLAN and Chinese shipping.
6. Engines. Yes China is behind. However, I don't think engines by itself will be able to win a war. Again, it is definitely a weakness, but current China can already make-do to an extent.
No one is saying that a US blockade from the Indian Ocean will be costless to US allies or that China could not try to frustrate a US blockade.
What I am saying is that having air and naval forces in positions to control of SLOCs is important and if one suffers from a compromised SLOC, then it will adversely affect a nation's ability to wage a war of attrition.
How big of an effect? Is it worth losing multiple carriers over?
Even if we try to suggest that the US will not be able to perfectly carry out a blockade or that the US blockade will also adversely affect their allies in the western Pacific, well that doesn't solve the problem that China's SLOCs will remain hindered while US SLOCs are unhindered.
The global supply chain will be disrupted. Originally, Japan and South Korea can produce consumer electronics for the US. This allows the US to mobilize more of its workers in military production. If American allies can no longer do that due to supply shock, the US will have to slow its pace in mobilization or risk additional unrest.
Also, if South Korea and Japan folds, it will be very beneficial for China to immediately acquire their military production. The US most likely wants to stop that by supporting its allies. Furthermore, other American allies (eg Europe) will have doubts on the US if it is so willing to just sacrifice its allies.
Heck, this entire issue is could be simply evaded where the US could simply require shipping going to allied nations to have some government or military representative on board to check in with them and any ship lacking it will be boarded and/or simply sunk. How many nations would choose to quickly comply with US demands rather than risk military seizure or destruction of their shipping?
You still need to sink them if they don't have your officers onboard. So you will be sending a bunch of surface ships and subs to the area regardless. Also, what if the Chinese jam communications in the area? Do you sink whatever you see risking destroying an Australian cargo ship?
Also, states in the SEA will likely receive cheap cargo ships from China. They don't care if the US starts sinking their ships.
The idea of China being able to track US CSGs operating in the Andamans and being able to provide sufficient targeting data for an AShBM strike is also fanciful. The AShBM is not a silver bullet, and it should be considered as one element of a multidomain package.
ASBMs are not silver bullets. Which is why air power is still going to be used. Regardless, why do you think China cannot track a carrier in Andaman sea if Myanmar is opening (voluntarily or otherwise) its airspace to China? If China can track a carrier in the first island chain, it can do the same in Andaman sea since the distance is roughly similar. Again, launching dozens of bombers from Yunnan is just as easy as launching IRBMs from there so there is no need to rely on ASBMs.
Acting alone, unsupported, I do not expect AShBMs to be capable of defeating the defenses of a CSG unless they are somehow literally able to spam many dozens of missiles as part of a single strike.
1. There are also bombers and attack aircraft in the area, as mentioned above.
2. A KZ-1 rocket is just a modified DF-21. It costs around $4 million to launch. So let's say a DF-21 is around $5 mil, 100 missiles are just 500 million. If they managed to get a carrier kill, it will still be a net gain for China. Not to mention the crew losses to the US. As for operational implementation, each missile is an independent unit. As long as the carrier's position is roughly known, a missile strike can be carried out.
Now, if it was part of a coordinated strike with SSGNs, a couple of CSGs worth of strike fighters and EW, coordinated with stealthy HALE UAVs and a formation of LEO satellites and a high resolution GEO satellite or two, then that's an entirely different question.
As I said, such an attack is not carried out by one asset only. Which is why flying over Myanmar or Thailand is needed.