If things are as dire as you describe, why doesn't the US concoct some outrage and launch a war on China now, especially given that it will not have that option in a decade or two's time as you mentioned?
Given this glaring asymmetry in conventional forces, the nuclear deterrent will have to do a lot of heavy lifting in this dangerous intervening period while China builds up its conventional capacity. How close do you think the Yumen, Hami, and Ordos fields are to initial operational capability?
Well, if what we're discussing holds true, then the real question is not whether China should retake Taiwan or not, but why wouldn't the United States do a pre-emptive end of civilization strike to cripple China, while they still have a chance.
China cannot track a carrier in the Andamans because they will not be able to operate the same extent of air power over the Andamans region as they can over the First Island Chain -- even if Myanmar or Thailand choose to open their airspace to China, the US is not going to sit idly by -- they will quite happily declare war on Myanmar and Thailand to wipe out their puny air forces from carriers and bases in Singapore and Australia and deploy a minor fighter presence in that region to easily shoot down any puny UAVs that China deploys to try to search for US carriers in the Andamans.
This is describing the vast difficulty in targeting Chinese military assets with missiles, without any interception capability from the SAMs and discounting the entire PLAN and PLARF... Just looking at missile stockpiles vs air defense and targets.Yes, of course targeting priority will be military forces such as command/control, long range radar, air defenses and air bases.
However, the US is not required to literally defeat every command/control center, radar station, air defense site, and air base to make targeting production facilities worthwhile, because those facilities are fixed and the ability to reposition their effects requires time.
Concentration of strikes to key radar stations, air defenses and air bases at certain regions followed up by a brisk targeted strikes against specific specialized production facilities, will be very likely, all the while the US will continue to wage strikes against military targets in the general region as well as appropriate.
What will result is specific, temporary crippling of defenses in certain regions (alongside strikes against general military HVTs such as command/control etc), which will allow for a gradual degradation of specific Chinese production capabilities.
Rinse and repeat that cycle over months and years, all while China is only able to target US bases and carriers in the region and unable to target US production capabilities, and you get a war of attrition that they will not favour them.
At the end of the day, what I'm writing should not be controversial at all -- the nature of the current balance of forces and the geography of said forces, means that a war of attrition inevitably means that the wartime production capability will favour the US simply because US production facilities will remain unmolested while Chinese production facilities will be more vulnerable and more degraded the longer that the war occurs, especially when considering US ability to threaten Chinese SLOCs while China cannot do the same to US SLOCs.
If one wants to talk about conditions whereby a war of attrition is favourable to China, it requires China to have a force that is capable of wiping out US ability to threaten Chinese production facilities AND a force that is capable of starting to threaten US production facilities.... AND a force that is capable of threatening US SLOCs while defending Chinese SLOCs.
This is describing the vast difficulty in targeting Chinese military assets with missiles, without any interception capability from the SAMs and discounting the entire PLAN and PLARF... Just looking at missile stockpiles vs air defense and targets.
Even for a Taiwan scenario, the PLARF has stockpiled 2000+ SRBMs and N cruise missiles to disable Taiwanese air defense long enough for a follow up strike with PGMs and hit critical civil infrastructure for a region FAR smaller than all of China, and this is for a scenario that doesn't require a naval battle (as Taiwan's navy is negligible vs the PLAN), refueling, worrying about your own bases, etc.
When you take into account the need for a naval battle and tankers to even get to the point where missile strikes against ground targets inside China are possible there would already be significant attrition of strike assets... If they win the naval battle without horrible losses at all.
Conclusion: they don't attempt a war of attrition because the math doesn't work out in their favor.
Which ain’t remotely necessary and ain’t nowhere near gon’na happen.So the conclusion of all these debates are that in order for China to fully integrate Taiwan, without leaving its success to any actions or decisions of its enemies, China together with its allies, might as well be ready for and be capable of winning World War 3.
Basically to retake Taiwan, China must be able to subdue the whole world.
But since given current peacetime trajectories in development, China might very well able to amass the allies and capabilities required to do just that.
Then shouldn't we be more worried about WW3 started by China's enemies to pre-empt such a scenario, than a puny island that is Taiwan?
Seems to be this is more like a true "Tianxia" Unification War of the 21st Century Warring States period, than just a simple Chinese reunification.
If things are as dire as you describe, why doesn't the US concoct some outrage and launch a war on China now, especially given that it will not have that option in a decade or two's time as you mentioned?
Given this glaring asymmetry in conventional forces, the nuclear deterrent will have to do a lot of heavy lifting in this dangerous intervening period while China builds up its conventional capacity. How close do you think the Yumen, Hami, and Ordos fields are to initial operational capability?
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