The original point was about how US intervention during a Taiwan invasion would require the PLA to significantly shift gears to allow them to achieve a degree of regional air and sea control for the airlift and sealift of a Taiwan invasion to continue and to succeed.
i have been thinking about this after our discussion few days back, i wonder how does this a2ad concept play into this general war scenario.
To my understanding, a2ad means "exploiting strategic benefit of being on the defensive and sitting on a continent, find a way to fend off sea/island based US power projection into first island chain, when China's own power is still far inferior to that of US, so that taiwan can be recovered"
However -- and let me be categorically clear -- in event of third party intervention, an invasion cannot successfully happen in a circumstance where the PLA does not have the ability to at least contest air and sea control in the general western pacific region, therefore the first priority will be contesting said air and sea control first.
Put the horse in front of the cart. Don't do it the other way around.
Please consider my words carefully "contesting air and sea control" after the US has carried out an intervention, means a general PLA air, naval and missile operation against US forces in the western pacific to deny their ability to assert air and sea control in the region to the greatest practical extent possible.
In terms of contesting air/sea control, i do think PLA as of now has substaintial capability to do that WITHIN the first island chain, which means i cannot see how can US aircraft conduct direct attack over tw island or in the strait, or US sink PLA ships in the strait with relative ease. and i think PLA has the capability to maintain that status for at least a few weeks or even months.
Beyond first island chain, PLA capability deteriorate pretty quickly.
The result is US strike against mainland/tw will be limited to standoff weapon from outside the first island chain mainly, the intensity of which is far less than being able to conduct direct attack.
my calculation is on average each day US may deliver ~1000 missiles from bombers and ~200 missiles from naval ships.
For PLA's counter offensive to disrupt US action, i think that is where H6 and PLARF come in place, and their capacity, according to my calculation, is also about 1000+ missiles towards targets in island chains.
so this is the picture we would see:
1, both sides conduct massive standoff strike with similar scale
2, the air/sea control around tw island remain contested
with above as overall situation , is it possible for PLA to some how concentrate its ASW/AAW/ASuW capability to create a relatively safe passage for its amphibious forces to cross the strait, and resupply it as needed? i think this is the orginal question. and i dont think it is impossible.
But the idea that the US will cease hostilities against China if China is able to successfully invade Taiwan and force terms of surrender on Taiwan, is very unlikely to me.
this part is becoming a bit political in nature so everyone could have different view.
but to me, the problem at hand for PRC/PLA leadership is: how can we prevent tw from breaking away even with US intervention.
i think they probably will not initiate that military action unless there is clear/unmistakable political gesture on the tw side to declare independence. So it is not really a choice but more of a if...then decision, so to speak.
At the beginning of everything, lets say if Chinese leaders share your view that they will lose a war of attrition eventually, then what is the only chance to avoid the dire consequence of government total collapes when that day come? is to somehow managed to recovered the island during the process.
i guess above logic is why i didnt agree with you on China suspend invasion in case of US intervention, it is politically not viable at all, which means they will be looking for a different military solution
as to US, if they can prevent China from taking tw, of course that is the best outcome for them. But if not, the prolonged action is to what end? re-liberate tw? unthinkable to me. to punish China? maybe, but to what extend, i mean China is a nuclear power, you cannot expect a total surrender like ww2. and if it goes too far, there is always risk of escalation.
The alternative of not prioritizing air and sea control in the western pacific after third party intervention, would be to have China to continue and carry out an invasion of Taiwan under circumstances where the US is capable of openly conducting air and naval operations between the first and second island chains, where they will not only be able to conduct strikes against PLAN ships operating around Taiwan (including amphibious assault ships), but also against PLA aircraft operating over Taiwan and against PLA bases on China's coastal provinces in general -- not to mention to conduct strikes against PLA positions in Taiwan itself.
Sure, the PLA will do its best to combat US forces in those areas, but that is exactly the kind of war of attrition the PLA will definitively lose, because the sortie and force generating forces of the US in the region (air bases, carriers, logistics centers) will remain operational.
like i described above, not really a choice
This is why I typically don't participate deeply in Taiwan contingency threads, because it usually becomes a thread about a generalized westpac high intensity conflict involving the US.
i thank you for leading this civil discussion given how extremely sensitive it is