PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

FriedButter

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To be fair, ROC warplanners know these conscripts are not war fighting machines, so when it comes to facing the PLA the plan is to use them ala Nazi Germany's Volkssturm. They're going to issue them each a simple anti tank missile and get them to be meat shield and man the line, no fancy manoeuvre warfare. I personally think that sort of formation won't last long under fire and won't be able to hold the line worth a damn.

This article is 2 years old but if what he said is accurate then this milita may actually be equipped worst than the Volkssturm during Berlin + useless officers.

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The established practice of Taiwan’s Reserve Command, according to Huang, is not to send reservists back to their previous units but to lump everyone together into the newly activated reserve infantry brigades that possess no specialty, no vehicles, and no equipment except rifles (often older types) and are led by called-up reservist officers who have little experience commanding such ad hoc units.

James Huang = Retired Taiwanese Lt. Colonel according to this article. Suppose image of him with chief Jörg Vollmer. (Idk if James is real)


“Show me 2 million rifles in the stockpile, and I will believe Taiwan has a 2-million-strong reserve force,” Huang said
China could be generous and send them 1-2 million Brown Bess Muskets + a red coat uniform for every strawberry. So they are properly equipped for urban room to room, street, and mountain fighting.
 

Blitzo

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I differ in thinking that China will have largely destroyed Taiwan's air defences before it attempts to land a large invasion force.
At a minimum multiple teams will have been inserted by boat/helicopter and would already be supported by HALE UAV overhead, which can't be reached except by fighter aircraft or large, high performance SAMs.
And once you have HALE UAV overhead, it's not a big stretch to start deploying inexpensive MALE UAVs.
I expect SEAD aircraft to be permanently over Taiwan anyway.

I see this as trading UAVs for less of a "vulnerability phase" during main force beach landings.
A CH-4 is only $4Mn. In comparison, a single ZBD-05 amphibious vehicle looks like $5M.
If the 6 Army Amphibious Assault Brigades each have 300 ZBD-05 vehicles, that is 1800 in total.
And they fully expect many ZBD-05 vehicles to be destroyed during any campaign.

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It looks like a J-16 costs $80Mn, so let's say a JH-7A costs the same.
And that it realistically has a loiter time of 3hours over Taiwan.
So you need 8 JH-7A (costing $480Mn) to provide 24 hour coverage with 12x 250kg bombs

In comparison, a CH-4 drone is $4Mn so you can buy 20 for the cost of a J-16/JH-7A.
And let's say you need 3 CH-4 to provide 24hour coverage.

So for the same procurement cost to have a single JH-7A on station over Taiwan, you can have 6-7 CH-4 in orbit at any time.
That could comprise 2 with a SAR + 5 for attack.

Plus those 5 attack CH-4 could carry 36 x50kg bombs in total. Alternatively, it could be 72x 20kg AR-2 missiles. That is respectively 3x and 6x as many targets.
Yes, the individual bombs are smaller, but a 50kg bomb or 20kg missile is more than adequate for any armoured vehicle.

That should result in much better overall coverage and responsiveness.

At some point, any remaining Taiwanese air defences will have to reveal themselves and fire, otherwise there is no point in them being there at all. So you might as well start flying inexpensive CH-4 type drones (or CH-3s) over Taiwan before any invasion, and hoping Taiwanese air defences reveal themselves.

So, first of all your numbers are very off. A single CH-4 has a payload of 350kg yes, but that includes the EO payload. Once you account for that, the armament payload is far less. there's a reason why CH-4s typically are only shown with 2-4 maximum.
Five CH-4s could carry 20 weapons between them, and only ATGM or 50kg weight class PGMs at that.

Second of all, we don't know how much a J-16 costs exactly -- but lol no, a JH-7A most certainly does not cost as much as a J-16. Sure, a JH-7A obviously costs more than a CH-4, but there's no need to make out of bounds suggestions like it costs as much as a J-16.

Third, there absolutely is a difference between HALE and MALE UAVs.
Being capable of successfully deploying HALE UAVs for a standoff ISR mission does not mean you are able to deploy MALE UCAVs for a strike mission. Your MALE UCAVs will still need to get within 10-15 kilometers of the target to release a hellfire class ATGM weapon.

Fourth, I do not believe that the by the time the PLA conducts an amphibious assault, that the ROC military's air defenses will be sufficiently attrited to be considered a permissive environment for MALE UCAVs to operate in a strike role. Or rather, I do not think the PLA will have the luxury of time to wait for the ROC's air defenses to be attrited to that degree before starting their amphibious assault phase.
Long range air defenses and early warning radars, sure, they'll probably be gone. But I fully expect medium range and short range air defense systems to likely still be in operation in dispersed units, and modern medium range systems are more than sufficient to defeat MALE UCAVs.

Fifth, the beauty of buying PGMs and SAR pods is that you already have all of the aircraft platforms and infrastructure and personnel to deploy them, which is the most expensive part of the total package. Buying a bunch of UCAVs means you are committed to not only buying the aircraft and their support systems and personnel to operate them, but the weapons for them as well.

Sixth, speed. The ability to dynamcially reposition against new, time sensitive targets is something that MALE UCAVs simply cannot achieve for strike missions.

Seventh, payload/airframe ratio. The idea of dispersing a large payload over a large number of "cheap" UCAVs sounds nice until you realize have to deconflict the airspace during the important parts of the operation where you have to go out and defeat the inevitable ROC military counter attack and shove a whole bunch of MALE UCAVs into the same small battlespace.
I believe that in terms of strike payload capacity, during the "vulnerable phase" of the amphibious assault operation, there should be 8 strike fighters orbiting over the strait (outside of ROC air defenses) each loaded with 12x 250kg bombs each, and backed up by two H-6K bombers each with 36x 250kg bombs with wing/range extension kits.
So that's 42 tons of loitering PGMs, which I think would be a safe airborne on watch strike capacity during the 24-48 hours of the initial amphibious assault phase where the odds of a successful ROC counter attack is highest.
How many CH-4s would be needed to carry 42 tons equivalent of munitions?



Now, I don't have any issues against MALE UCAVs for longer endurance closer in ISR and limited strike missions in more permissive environments over a long duration. They are well suited for such a mission.

But we are talking about a phase of conflict that is likely to be high intensity, requiring survivability, firepower capacity, and speed, over a limited time period of 24-48 hours.
There's really no need to be fancy and pursue a "novel" solution like buying MALE UCAVs for conducting an intensive strike on call mission profile over a short time period in a non-permissive environment. MALE UCAVs just aren't appropriate for that kind of mission.
Strike fighters already exist, and the PLA already have the most expensive part of that package -- the aircraft and the pilots. They just need to commit to buying a hundred or so SAR pods and commit to procurement of a family of 250kg and 100kg PGMs, and with the requisite addition of the training syllabus, they'll have a ready made solution with the same current orbat footprint without requiring a major expansion of manpower or novel support systems.



Personally I think they've already comfortable surpassed the minimum number of 071 and 075 required.



Ok. Then let's go back to something like the existing VP-4 series of vehicles, which have a driver or can be remote controlled.
You can realistically operate these as resupply vehicles for infantry in urban and mountainous areas in Taiwan, unlike other vehicles.

UGVs are not at that state of maturity.
Frankly I think it would be better just to ignore UGVs for the purpose of discussion due to their relative immaturity and the experimentation and doctrine development and systems development that would be needed for just general use purposes, let alone perfecting them for a Taiwan contingency.

Remember, the systems I described were all ones that were mature enough to already be in PLA service in some form, or so technologically mature and doctrinally mature among the rest of the world that the PLA could easily adopt it.
 
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Blitzo

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All great points. I have to say that I'm not as convinced of the ability of Taiwan to conduct effective defense after the initial wave where all its military bases, naval ports, command centers and fighter jets are destroyed. I'm mainly curious to see how well the PLAAF EW and ELINT aircraft will perform. I was listening to shilao's podcast recently and he mentioned that in the 90s, USN EA-6B confused PLA air defense so much that the radar thought there was a large group of aircraft invading China and that the command center got fooled even more to the point that it thought the invading aircraft group was even larger. At the same time, he also said China found in the EP-3 incident that US was collecting intelligence on stuff that China thought they were hiding really well.

With all the ELINT and EW aircraft that pass by Taiwan every day, I'd expect them to be fairly tuned up to the communicating bands and are able to manipulate them. Once the Taiwanese air defense gets suppressed at the start of the war, I'd expect J-16Ds, Y-8 planes and local spies to know exactly Taiwanese military command is thinking and sow confusion along the way. Jam all the wireless communication layers, destroying the main communication towers and such. It would confuse island defense on where the attack is coming and breed signs of despair/hopelessness. The goal of PLA is to pressure Taiwan to just give up. There is already a view in large part of Taiwanese society that a mainland takeover is inevitable or are indifferent to it. Ideally, they never get to the point where a lot of civilians are threatened.

I do think more modern amphibious ships, helicopters and UCAVs are needed. Doubling of the LPD/LPH fleet would allow them to deploy several hundred amphibious IFVs over defended landing area. That along is probably not enough, but they'd be supported by air cover and a lot of helicopters and UCAVs. I'd be curious to see what they do with Z-10s. In Shilao's podcast recently, he mentioned that Z-10s has unusual long range for an attack helicopter. In fact, only Apaches at low loads have similar range. So even though Z-10s are not being carried on Type 071/075s, they can probably takeoff from across the straits and have reasonable loiter time in supporting the invasion. They could concentrate on attacking the areas where they do plan the landing. I think they already have a reasonable high number of helicopters now. With Z-20s in production and AC-313A military version coming, their air lift and attack should improve quite a bit more in the next few years. They may find that it's easier to have the transport helicopters to drop soldiers and lynx ATVs on the mountainous side to surprise Taiwan defense. If they can get in and take over the Taipei government buildings pretty quickly, I think Taiwan will just give up.

I think getting enough helicopters, UCAVs and amphibious ships will probably take 5 or 6 years still. It generally lands with my assessment that PLA will be able to quickly take Taiwan near the end of this decade.

EW/EA, ELINT/ESM are of course the unspoken high grounds of any conflict scenario including this one. But no one can really speculate as to the true competitive and relative efficacy of two sides, so it is just left in the background.

But once all that is left aside, I think the most important part of any PLA operation against Taiwan, one where the ROC military has the best chance of countering a PLA operation in general, is in the amphibious assault phase.

The five key systems I described in post 891 is basically tailored for that specific phase, because everything before the amphibious assault phase is one where the PLA can basically be guaranteed a victory, and everything after the amphibious assault phase requires a successful amphibious assault to occur in the first place.

A successful amphibious assault would ideally allow you to have multiple advantages in the specific battlespace:
1. Outmass the enemy -- your landed forces should out number and be more capable than the enemy in the vicinity that you're landing at.
2. Outshoot the enemy -- the battlespace you are landing at should be able to have superior firepower to the enemy, to defeat the enemy that is in the vicinity as well as to interdict any reinforcements coming to back up the enemy.
3. Outsee/ISR the enemy -- you want to know what is going on in the vicinity and in the surrounding region to be able to allocate your supporting fires and your landed forces in the best way possible.

Now, what I described above can be applied for virtually any generic conflict or combat environment in any domain (land, air, sea etc), but I think they are also especially true in an amphibious assault, over the specific period when the beachhead is being fought for and established.

You outmass the enemy by having more amphibious assault ships to deliver more mechanized formations onto the beach and by having the ability to defend your amphibious assault ships from last ditch attacks by submarines, AShMs or lingering mines.
You outshoot the enemy by having prompt, repositionable, on call precision fires of a large capacity that in the current era is still best delivered by orbiting fixed wing strike aircraft carrying PGMs. (Could be supplemented by long range MLRS, attack helicopters, and perhaps to a degree by UCAVs).
You outsee/ISR the enemy by having distributed, all weather sensing, attritible and survivable sensor platforms that can promptly reposition to new targets and areas.


When we look at all of the phases of a PLA contingency against the ROC military, the amphibious assault phase where they are establishing the beachhead is by far the part where they are most squishy and vulnerable, at this point. And it is a situation where the PLA have only really one, maybe at most two chances to really properly make a serious attempt to establish a beachhead.

I think significant attention and a moderate amount of finances would be well used to ensure it is significantly enhanced and hardened, to the point that any ROC military counter attacks during this phase would not only be able to be repelled, but to be shattered to such a degree even if the PLA only rolled a "one" rather than a "six" on the dice of favour for the given day.

After a beachhead is secure and Ro-Ro ships are capable of bringing in regular heavy PLAGF units and their associated ground based fires systems and supporting recce and logistics and mechanized infantry, then it becomes a situation that is nigh impossible to reverse by the ROC military themselves.
But securing the beachhead in the first part will be important in the first place, and I think the PLA would benefit from looking at ways to pursue systems that would make the likelihood of "successfully securing a beachhead" in the same category as "successfully neutralizing ROCAF combat aircraft fleet" or "successfully neutralizing ROCN major surface combatants".
 

Blitzo

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None of these scenarios that suppose an amphibious invasion are plausible unless PLAAF has established near complete air-domination to ~600 km out from the eastern strait. USAF’s primary method of attempting to prevent/hinder such an invasion will be B-1-Bs and B-52-Hs launching salvos (24 and 20, each, respectively) of LRASM from about that distance. I’m neither promoting nor extolling either the efficacy or superiority of the LRASM; I’m simply expressing a strategic concern.

None of these scenarios consider US involvement in the first place, because once US involvement occurs, then it immediately doesn't become a Taiwan invasion contingency but immediately a large scale regional conflict with a rather short and unpredictable series of escalations that get close to the nuclear threshold.

If China conducts an amphibious assault of Taiwan and the US uses bombers to launch AShMs against PLAN ships in the strait... the PLA isn't going to simply limit itself to defending against those AShMs en route.
The PLA's priority at that point wouldn't be "how to defend their amphibious assault ships from LRASMs" lol..
 

caohailiang

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None of these scenarios consider US involvement in the first place, because once US involvement occurs, then it immediately doesn't become a Taiwan invasion contingency but immediately a large scale regional conflict with a rather short and unpredictable series of escalations that get close to the nuclear threshold.

If China conducts an amphibious assault of Taiwan and the US uses bombers to launch AShMs against PLAN ships in the strait... the PLA isn't going to simply limit itself to defending against those AShMs en route.
The PLA's priority at that point wouldn't be "how to defend their amphibious assault ships from LRASMs" lol..
But isnt "US intervening in Taiwan" the main scenario PLA has been preparing throughout the 2 decade military modernization?

If such a conflict breaks out in the way james smith described (which i think is very plausible), what in your opinion would be PLA's priority? i suppose large scale strike against US/Japan military infra and ships is in order, but how would it go from there? Politically speaking, it is only logical both sides (China & US) hinge on the matter of taking control/repel invasion of Taiwan, so i think what james smith said "how to defend amphibious assault ships from AShM" would not be all their moves but would be at least one of their priorities, vise versa, sinking those ships would also be US priority, imho

wrt the nuclear threshold, i think no one can say for sure whether that threshold will be breached or not, but playing out that war game with conventional weapon only is still very meaningful and interesting, isnt it?
 

Maikeru

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But isnt "US intervening in Taiwan" the main scenario PLA has been preparing throughout the 2 decade military modernization?

If such a conflict breaks out in the way james smith described (which i think is very plausible), what in your opinion would be PLA's priority? i suppose large scale strike against US/Japan military infra and ships is in order, but how would it go from there? Politically speaking, it is only logical both sides (China & US) hinge on the matter of taking control/repel invasion of Taiwan, so i think what james smith said "how to defend amphibious assault ships from AShM" would not be all their moves but would be at least one of their priorities, vise versa, sinking those ships would also be US priority, imho

wrt the nuclear threshold, i think no one can say for sure whether that threshold will be breached or not, but playing out that war game with conventional weapon only is still very meaningful and interesting, isnt it?
I suspect PRC would give US/Japan some other things to worry about before it commenced a Taiwan operation, such as moving troops into NK and placing CVBGs East of Japan in order to threaten Northern Japan or maybe even Hawaii or Alaska. Such moves would need to be countered, drawing US/JP forces away from Taiwan. PLA would adopt purely defensive posture vs India in such a scenario.
 

clockwork

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None of these scenarios that suppose an amphibious invasion are plausible unless PLAAF has established near complete air-domination to ~600 km out from the eastern strait. USAF’s primary method of attempting to prevent/hinder such an invasion will be B-1-Bs and B-52-Hs launching salvos (24 and 20, each, respectively) of LRASM from about that distance. I’m neither promoting nor extolling either the efficacy or superiority of the LRASM; I’m simply expressing a strategic concern.

^ cont’d

It seems, to me, that, because of ever-increasing launch-ranges, the time when attempting to target launch-platforms is quickly passing (or has already passed) and the time has come to focus on targeting the launched systems, ideally at varied stages of their flight course, but most-certainly during their terminal phases.

Additionally, in the age of “stealth”, in which this modality will ultimately be generalized to many platforms and weapon systems intended to penetrate contested spaces, the threat of “stealth” cruise missiles, and particularly those that travel sub-sonically, i. e., LRASM, requires a defensive response based on a dedicated EO/IRST guided, short to medium-ranged missile system/network.

Although J-7s and J-10s could, if need be, tasked with shooting LRASMs down, there would still be a need for longer-ranged dedicated EO/IRST platforms similar to the radar-based AWAC platforms to provide wide-field coverage (as wide a field as EO/IRST is capable of, that is) in order to direct and coordinate those shoot-down missions.
Where would those bombers even take off from? I don't see why the PLA will have much trouble annihilating USAF bases in the region, out to and including Andersen AFB.
 

Blitzo

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But isnt "US intervening in Taiwan" the main scenario PLA has been preparing throughout the 2 decade military modernization?

If such a conflict breaks out in the way james smith described (which i think is very plausible), what in your opinion would be PLA's priority? i suppose large scale strike against US/Japan military infra and ships is in order, but how would it go from there? Politically speaking, it is only logical both sides (China & US) hinge on the matter of taking control/repel invasion of Taiwan, so i think what james smith said "how to defend amphibious assault ships from AShM" would not be all their moves but would be at least one of their priorities, vise versa, sinking those ships would also be US priority, imho

wrt the nuclear threshold, i think no one can say for sure whether that threshold will be breached or not, but playing out that war game with conventional weapon only is still very meaningful and interesting, isnt it?

Yes, of course the PLA has been orienting itself to deter and engage the US military in event of a Westpac conflict.

My point is that if the US chose to intervene in a PLA operation against Taiwan, then the PLAs priority is no longer about "how do we prosecute our Taiwan invasion" but rather "how do we prosecute the large scale Westpac conflict that had just been initiated"
 

FriedButter

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Just wondering but is there a PLAAF thread for Taiwan? If not should there be?

The potential scope and range of the PLAAF operations/strategies will be the focal point of everything on Taiwan. From US/JP/others intervention, airforce strength, paratroopers, bombers, South China Sea, interceptions etc.

Would be a good place to discuss recent news of Western forces and foreign actors that may involve the usage of PLAAF.
 

Paulo R Siqueira

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I suspect PRC would give US/Japan some other things to worry about before it commenced a Taiwan operation, such as moving troops into NK and placing CVBGs East of Japan in order to threaten Northern Japan or maybe even Hawaii or Alaska. Such moves would need to be countered, drawing US/JP forces away from Taiwan. PLA would adopt purely defensive posture vs India in such a scenario.
If the US and Japan are willing to intervene in Taiwan, the Chinese response would be on the Korean peninsula.
 
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