PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

grulle

Junior Member
Registered Member
Guys I just realized something, to wage war you need bases. but there are no US bases anywhere near Taiwan. How is the US gonna help? by operating from their ships off China's coast? lol.

in all previous wars the US had access to bases, ex gulf war.
 

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
Guys I just realized something, to wage war you need bases. but there are no US bases anywhere near Taiwan. How is the US gonna help? by operating from their ships off China's coast? lol.

in all previous wars the US had access to bases, ex gulf war.
They have bases in Japan that they could use, but then again such bases are well within range of DF missiles.
 

Suetham

Senior Member
Registered Member
They have bases in Japan that they could use, but then again such bases are well within range of DF missiles.
I really imagine that in a scenario of war in Taiwan, due to the proximity dependence of US bases in Japan, I don't know to what extent the Japanese will let the US operate to intervene against China knowing that their bases will be attacked.

Also, if the bases in Japan are attacked, how will the US be able to sustain the war? Even the USAF has few tankers to sustain a high-intensity war against China in the western Pacific even if the US applies the ACE concept. The US Navy's reliance on CVNs is clearly claimed for the US to be able to sustain a high-intensity air war against China, but ASBMs make this task even more arduous.
 

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
I really imagine that in a scenario of war in Taiwan, due to the proximity dependence of US bases in Japan, I don't know to what extent the Japanese will let the US operate to intervene against China knowing that their bases will be attacked.

Also, if the bases in Japan are attacked, how will the US be able to sustain the war? Even the USAF has few tankers to sustain a high-intensity war against China in the western Pacific even if the US applies the ACE concept. The US Navy's reliance on CVNs is clearly claimed for the US to be able to sustain a high-intensity air war against China, but ASBMs make this task even more arduous.
PLARF's main strategy to counter ACE seems to be missiles that could launch very quickly to target time sensitive targets,
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. So ACE seems like it's hardly a silver bullet.
 

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
Yes, of course the PLA has been orienting itself to deter and engage the US military in event of a Westpac conflict.

My point is that if the US chose to intervene in a PLA operation against Taiwan, then the PLAs priority is no longer about "how do we prosecute our Taiwan invasion" but rather "how do we prosecute the large scale Westpac conflict that had just been initiated"
I think their priority will remain constant "how do we get the island assuming US/JP will start firing at us at some point". therefore PLA operational plan remains the same no matter what - in case US decide not to intervene, PLA just dont invoke certain module in their plan.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
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I think their priority will remain constant "how do we get the island assuming US/JP will start firing at us at some point". therefore PLA operational plan remains the same no matter what - in case US decide not to intervene, PLA just dont invoke certain module in their plan.

... My point is that in event of US or JPN intervention, then the PLA's priority for conducting a proper invasion of Taiwan falls significantly, and that instead the conflict over general air and sea control in the overall western Pacific would be one of priority.

If you are asking how the PLA will hedge their forces to deter an intervention in event of a Taiwan invasion, well sure, of course the PLA will likely reserve the majority of its overall forces to be able to most aptly respond to a third party intervention -- but if a third party intervention occurs, then it likely the PLA will rapidly shift gears and abandon an invasion to prosecute the war over regional air and sea control.

That is to say -- if foreign intervention occurs in the middle of an invasion, I expect the PLA to place the majority of its focus on asserting regional air and sea control against the foreign intervention. If the invasion has yet to really get underway with only minimal forces landed, I expect they would cut their losses and focus on the more important goal first before returning to focus on the island. If they have substantial forces on the island worth resupplying, then naturally they would have to dedicate some forces to maintain and guard a logistics line while also conducting that same war of regional air and sea control.
 

FriedButter

Colonel
Registered Member
... My point is that in event of US or JPN intervention, then the PLA's priority for conducting a proper invasion of Taiwan falls significantly, and that instead the conflict over general air and sea control in the overall western Pacific would be one of priority.

If you are asking how the PLA will hedge their forces to deter an intervention in event of a Taiwan invasion, well sure, of course the PLA will likely reserve the majority of its overall forces to be able to most aptly respond to a third party intervention -- but if a third party intervention occurs, then it likely the PLA will rapidly shift gears and abandon an invasion to prosecute the war over regional air and sea control.

That is to say -- if foreign intervention occurs in the middle of an invasion, I expect the PLA to place the majority of its focus on asserting regional air and sea control against the foreign intervention. If the invasion has yet to really get underway with only minimal forces landed, I expect they would cut their losses and focus on the more important goal first before returning to focus on the island. If they have substantial forces on the island worth resupplying, then naturally they would have to dedicate some forces to maintain and guard a logistics line while also conducting that same war of regional air and sea control.
I think it’s a horrible idea to abandon an invasion if a 3rd party interferes. The moment that happens then this no longer becomes a conventional war but a war of attrition and I doubt the US is going to stop after losing a couple hundred jets or a couple dozen warships.

1) It gives Taiwan more time to conscript / train civilians

2) Likely boost morale in Taiwan and result in more resistance

3) Allows the US/Allies/West time to build up their forces

4) The US has the advantage of deciding where to fight and concentrate their forces.

Delays will only result in giving the West time to build up and to launch a huge offensive aganist and possibility into China. I don’t see any mainland industrial assets surviving in a prolong conflict if all China does is sit defensively and hopes the US/allies eventually runs of warplanes and ships. US neocons will never accept surrender as long as Taiwan stands.
 

Blitzo

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I think it’s a horrible idea to abandon an invasion if a 3rd party interferes. The moment that happens then this no longer becomes a conventional war but a war of attrition and I doubt the US is going to stop after losing a couple hundred jets or a couple dozen warships.

1) It gives Taiwan more time to conscript / train civilians

2) Likely boost morale in Taiwan and result in more resistance

3) Allows the US/Allies/West time to build up their forces

4) The US has the advantage of deciding where to fight and concentrate their forces.

Delays will only result in giving the West time to build up and to launch a huge offensive aganist and possibility into China. I don’t see any mainland industrial assets surviving in a prolong conflict if all China does is sit defensively and hopes the US/allies eventually runs of warplanes and ships. US neocons will never accept surrender as long as Taiwan stands.

As I wrote, whether an invasion of Taiwan is temporarily suspended or not, depends on how much the PLA has already committed troops onto the ground on the island.

However -- and let me be categorically clear -- in event of third party intervention, an invasion cannot successfully happen in a circumstance where the PLA does not have the ability to at least contest air and sea control in the general western pacific region, therefore the first priority will be contesting said air and sea control first.
Put the horse in front of the cart. Don't do it the other way around.

Please consider my words carefully "contesting air and sea control" after the US has carried out an intervention, means a general PLA air, naval and missile operation against US forces in the western pacific to deny their ability to assert air and sea control in the region to the greatest practical extent possible. Pausing a Taiwan invasion to carry out such a mission would certainly not allow the west time to "build up and launch a huge offensive against and possibly into China," because the whole point of such an operation would be to degrade and deny their ability to carry out air and naval operations in the region in general.


The cessation of hostilities after third party intervention has already occurred, on the part of the US will depend on exhausting their capability to wage war, and/or will to wage war.
But the idea that the US will cease hostilities against China if China is able to successfully invade Taiwan and force terms of surrender on Taiwan, is very unlikely to me.


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The alternative of not prioritizing air and sea control in the western pacific after third party intervention, would be to have China to continue and carry out an invasion of Taiwan under circumstances where the US is capable of openly conducting air and naval operations between the first and second island chains, where they will not only be able to conduct strikes against PLAN ships operating around Taiwan (including amphibious assault ships), but also against PLA aircraft operating over Taiwan and against PLA bases on China's coastal provinces in general -- not to mention to conduct strikes against PLA positions in Taiwan itself.

Sure, the PLA will do its best to combat US forces in those areas, but that is exactly the kind of war of attrition the PLA will definitively lose, because the sortie and force generating forces of the US in the region (air bases, carriers, logistics centers) will remain operational.
 

solarz

Brigadier
... My point is that in event of US or JPN intervention, then the PLA's priority for conducting a proper invasion of Taiwan falls significantly, and that instead the conflict over general air and sea control in the overall western Pacific would be one of priority.

I don't see how China can or need to "shift focus" in the middle of a reunification campaign. If anything, ground force and supply transportation will be accelerated while the air force and navy provide the necessary cover.

By fortifying Taiwan as quickly as possible, it defeats the purpose of the US launching a war against China in the first place, and provides a strategically critical location for any operations.

This said, any speculation on US intervention is meaningless without considering the wider geological climate. Russia, NK, and Iran are not going to sit still while the US is fighting China.
 

solarz

Brigadier
China can mobilize the labor and resources of the entire country in the blink of an eye to fight covid. It can turn into a total war economy just as quickly.

A war against the US comes down to attrition. China can flood the region in Type 55 and J-20s if necessary, while the US would need to send their reinforcements across the entire Pacific ocean, and their manufacturing capability isn't even a fraction of China's.
 
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