PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Blitzo

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tphuang said:
We need to see the following with PLA:
- Overwhelming dominance and control of air space of Taiwan. That requires ability to sustain large aircraft formations for long period of time. (this is the most important)
- Large fleet of Y-20s able to drop a lot of troops and tanks into Taiwan.
- More LHDs and LPDs able to transport a lot of amphibious combat vehicles, troops into Taiwan
- A lot more helicopters - both of attack and transport variety. Need to see Type 075s with a large horde of attack helicopter.
- UCAVs that can take out Taiwanese armored vehicle when given complete air control
All of the above can be achieved in the next few years.
Click to expand...

I think the threat of SAMs, all the way down to even MANPADs, means that I can't see Y-20s playing a significant role until much later in any Taiwan contingency after the island has been relatively sanitized of military opposition.

Given the trajectory of cross strait military balance, I think the ability of the PLA to defeat ROCAF and ROCN symmetric forces (fighters, navy surface combatants, large fixed sites such as air bases C4I centers and large depots etc) and significantly suppress ROC SAM capabilities, is not really much of a question anymore.

But a vulnerable phase will remain based on the current systems the PLA have procured (or rather not procured), specifically at the actual "amphibious assault/invasion" phase of the operation.


Crossposting and paraphrasing from CDF, something I wrote a little while ago:


I think there are 5 systems that the PLA needs to prioritize to either induct in service, or induct service in larger numbers, to build on their current likely Taiwan oriented orbat/TOE, which would ensure a higher chance of success.
Specifically, I think at this stage the greatest point of weakness for the PLA is the initial amphibious assault phase of the invasion and the establishment of the beach head, where ROC forces are orienting many of the procurement to organize a counter attack. Needless to say, if initial landed forces can be hampered or even if amphibious assault ships can be struck during the assault phase, that could cripple the actual ability to carry out an invasion, even if the PLA had already defeated the ROCN and ROCAF prior.
This phase of the scenario is likely the greatest "vulnerable phase" that remains, where the ROC military has the best chance of crippling the invasion and where the current structure of PLA forces is not ideally suited to guarantee.


In order of priority, I think the top 5 systems that are all well within industry capability (and only dependent on military commitment and procurement), with the greatest potential to mitigate if not reverse the "vulnerable phase" will be:
1. Stand-off range synthetic aperture radar pods
2. Direct attack PGMs of 250kg and 100kg weight classes with MERs
3. More amphibious assault ships
4. Better MR SAM capability
5. Multirole naval helicopters

These are all systems that are either in service, or very much accessible to the PLA if they deemed them a requirement.

1. stand-off range synthetic aperture radar pods.
You need to be able to see what you want to destroy, and you need to be able to see in all weather, aboard multiple different platforms if possible (in a redundant way so that they are dynamic and difficult to attrit). At present the PLA's major airborne SAR platforms is the Tu-154Ms, which are okay, but somewhat limited in number, relatively vulnerable, and ageing. A podded system like the US AN/ASQ-236 Dragon Eye can be fitted onto fighter aircraft, and while they are much smaller than something like the PLA's Tu-154M and the US 707 based E-8 JSTARS, what the podded system does offer is that you can have multiple fighter aircraft in the air with SARs, that are far more survivable and able to defend itself if needed, and able to move to quickly cover areas of interest as they pop up.
Obviously such a system would be networked with airborne and ground based command platforms and nodes.
Multiple SAR pods in the air will be particularly important during the initial amphibious assault phase of the invasion, whereby the ROC Army would likely try to organize their remaining forces for a counter attack, and it would be important that the PLA have the high quality GMTI of all of the surrounding 50+ kilometers (if not more) outside of the initial beach to rapidly detect, identify and interdict reinforcement columns, in all weather conditions.


2. Direct Attack PGMs in the 250kg and 100kg categories, with multi-ejector racks.
This sort of goes without saying. Currently the PLA's smallest air launched DA PGM in mainline service is the 500kg LGB (maybe newer variants have satellite guidance augmentation). They need weapons that are smaller to allow a single sortie to engage more targets, to increase magazine size. These PGMs would be important not only for striking air bases, depots, and other facilities after SEAD/DEAD, but also is vital to allow for dynamic interdiction of ROCA ground forces to support initial landed amphibious/marines units.
Flankers, JH-7/As, J-10s, H-6Ks with multi ejector racks with 250kg or 100kg bombs, with satellite and/or laser guidance, and wing extension kits, are of course nothing new to the Chinese aero industry, it's just a matter of the PLA feeling comfortable enough with achieving air superiority to put a bit of money into a modern and robust DA PGM arsenal.


3. More amphibious assault ships.
This one is also pretty simple -- more amphibious assault ships, means the larger the first assault wave. The larger the first assault wave, the greater the chance of establishing a successful beachhead.
More 071s, more 075s, more LSTs.


4. Better MR SAM capability -- either quad pack MR SAM (3-5), and/or enhanced 054As with enhanced HQ-16 variants, and/or 054B, to escort said amphibious assault ships.
The ROC military would likely exploit this vulnerable phase where the PLAN's amphibious assault ships are less than a dozen km off the coast, to blindly launch as many AShMs in the general direction as possible. Some people have argued that ROC AShMs are useless without OTH guidance (which the PLA would have largely destroyed) -- and that is only partially true.
The nature of AShMs is that they all have terminal guidance, meaning they can be launched "blind" so long as you know that enemy ships are in a general direction, and program the terminal guidance to activate in a general area.
If a sufficient mass of AShMs can be launched at once in that way, they could still prove to be deadly threats.
While I'm sure PLA aerial AEW&C and fighter CAP would be able to provide significant warning and reduce their numbers, the last line of defense would be the frigates and medium destroyers escorting the amphibious assault ships providing area air defense -- and it is MR SAMs that would do the brunt of that work.
(Needless to say, multi-domain networking between airborne assets and surface and naval air defenses would be somewhat expected and assist to increase the effectiveness of the SAMs, but possessing a large magazine of multi-simultaneous targeting capable SAMs is still needed, and I think modern quad packable MR SAMs are probably the best option for this.)


5. Multirole naval helicopters (ASW, minehunting, anti surface) -- basically Z-20F
Again, goes without saying. The importance to do ASW, to hunt mines, and conduct anti surface/ship missions against FACs is very important during an invasion in the "vulnerable phase".


Other worthy mentions, if I was to extend this to top 10, would also include more 370mm MLRS, MALE UAVs/UCAVs (WL-2 pattern), J-16D, J-20, transport helicopters.
 
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AndrewS

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Bltizo said:
I think the threat of SAMs, all the way down to even MANPADs, means that I can't see Y-20s playing a significant role until much later in any Taiwan contingency after the island has been relatively sanitized of military opposition.

Given the trajectory of cross strait military balance, I think the ability of the PLA to defeat ROCAF and ROCN symmetric forces (fighters, navy surface combatants, large fixed sites such as air bases C4I centers and large depots etc) and significantly suppress ROC SAM capabilities, is not really much of a question anymore.

But a vulnerable phase will remain based on the current systems the PLA have procured (or rather not procured), specifically at the actual "amphibious assault/invasion" phase of the operation.


Crossposting and paraphrasing from CDF, something I wrote a little while ago:


I think there are 5 systems that the PLA needs to prioritize to either induct in service, or induct service in larger numbers, to build on their current likely Taiwan oriented orbat/TOE, which would ensure a higher chance of success.
Specifically, I think at this stage the greatest point of weakness for the PLA is the initial amphibious assault phase of the invasion and the establishment of the beach head, where ROC forces are orienting many of the procurement to organize a counter attack. Needless to say, if initial landed forces can be hampered or even if amphibious assault ships can be struck during the assault phase, that could cripple the actual ability to carry out an invasion, even if the PLA had already defeated the ROCN and ROCAF prior.
This phase of the scenario is likely the greatest "vulnerable phase" that remains, where the ROC military has the best chance of crippling the invasion and where the current structure of PLA forces is not ideally suited to guarantee.


In order of priority, I think the top 5 systems that are all well within industry capability (and only dependent on military commitment and procurement), with the greatest potential to mitigate if not reverse the "vulnerable phase" will be:
1. Stand-off range synthetic aperture radar pods
2. Direct attack PGMs of 250kg and 100kg weight classes with MERs
3. More amphibious assault ships
4. Better MR SAM capability
5. Multirole naval helicopters

These are all systems that are either in service, or very much accessible to the PLA if they deemed them a requirement.

1. stand-off range synthetic aperture radar pods.
You need to be able to see what you want to destroy, and you need to be able to see in all weather, aboard multiple different platforms if possible (in a redundant way so that they are dynamic and difficult to attrit). At present the PLA's major airborne SAR platforms is the Tu-154Ms, which are okay, but somewhat limited in number, relatively vulnerable, and ageing. A podded system like the US AN/ASQ-236 Dragon Eye can be fitted onto fighter aircraft, and while they are much smaller than something like the PLA's Tu-154M and the US 707 based E-8 JSTARS, what the podded system does offer is that you can have multiple fighter aircraft in the air with SARs, that are far more survivable and able to defend itself if needed, and able to move to quickly cover areas of interest as they pop up.
Obviously such a system would be networked with airborne and ground based command platforms and nodes.
Multiple SAR pods in the air will be particularly important during the initial amphibious assault phase of the invasion, whereby the ROC Army would likely try to organize their remaining forces for a counter attack, and it would be important that the PLA have the high quality GMTI of all of the surrounding 50+ kilometers (if not more) outside of the initial beach to rapidly detect, identify and interdict reinforcement columns, in all weather conditions.


2. Direct Attack PGMs in the 250kg and 100kg categories, with multi-ejector racks.
This sort of goes without saying. Currently the PLA's smallest air launched DA PGM in mainline service is the 500kg LGB (maybe newer variants have satellite guidance augmentation). They need weapons that are smaller to allow a single sortie to engage more targets, to increase magazine size. These PGMs would be important not only for striking air bases, depots, and other facilities after SEAD/DEAD, but also is vital to allow for dynamic interdiction of ROCA ground forces to support initial landed amphibious/marines units.
Flankers, JH-7/As, J-10s, H-6Ks with multi ejector racks with 250kg or 100kg bombs, with satellite and/or laser guidance, and wing extension kits, are of course nothing new to the Chinese aero industry, it's just a matter of the PLA feeling comfortable enough with achieving air superiority to put a bit of money into a modern and robust DA PGM arsenal.


3. More amphibious assault ships.
This one is also pretty simple -- more amphibious assault ships, means the larger the first assault wave. The larger the first assault wave, the greater the chance of establishing a successful beachhead.
More 071s, more 075s, more LSTs.


4. Better MR SAM capability -- either quad pack MR SAM (3-5), and/or enhanced 054As with enhanced HQ-16 variants, and/or 054B, to escort said amphibious assault ships.
The ROC military would likely exploit this vulnerable phase where the PLAN's amphibious assault ships are less than a dozen km off the coast, to blindly launch as many AShMs in the general direction as possible. Some people have argued that ROC AShMs are useless without OTH guidance (which the PLA would have largely destroyed) -- and that is only partially true.
The nature of AShMs is that they all have terminal guidance, meaning they can be launched "blind" so long as you know that enemy ships are in a general direction, and program the terminal guidance to activate in a general area.
If a sufficient mass of AShMs can be launched at once in that way, they could still prove to be deadly threats.
While I'm sure PLA aerial AEW&C and fighter CAP would be able to provide significant warning and reduce their numbers, the last line of defense would be the frigates and medium destroyers escorting the amphibious assault ships providing area air defense -- and it is MR SAMs that would do the brunt of that work.
(Needless to say, multi-domain networking between airborne assets and surface and naval air defenses would be somewhat expected and assist to increase the effectiveness of the SAMs, but possessing a large magazine of multi-simultaneous targeting capable SAMs is still needed, and I think modern quad packable MR SAMs are probably the best option for this.)


5. Multirole naval helicopters (ASW, minehunting, anti surface) -- basically Z-20F
Again, goes without saying. The importance to do ASW, to hunt mines, and conduct anti surface/ship missions against FACs is very important during an invasion in the "vulnerable phase".


Other worthy mentions, if I was to extend this to top 10, would also include more 370mm MLRS, MALE UAVs/UCAVs (WL-2 pattern), J-16D, J-20, transport helicopters.
Click to expand...

I'd actually bump up the MALE UAVs/UCAVs to priority number 1.

You can mount SAR pods on them, and also decent amounts of smaller 50kg/25kg LGBs which are still good enough to take out any vehicle.

MALE UAV/UCAVs have much more endurance than a fighter, are much less expensive and also expendable.
So you can flood the extended battlespace.

---

On amphibious ships, my view is that higher quantities of smaller Type-072 LSTs are better. They are very inexpensive compared to the equivalent in large, expensive Type-071 LPD or Type-075 LHD.

You reduce the impact of losing any single ship, plus have a follow-on resupply/reinforcement capability over the beach which is not reliant on a port.

---

I'd also add the development and fielding unmanned ground vehicles generally.
It's going to be an infantry / small unit battle, because there are so many urban or mountainous areas right next to the coast.

So UGVs carrying supplies for Infantry Platoons will be very useful for example.
These small UGVs are inexpensive and can vastly increase the mobility and endurance of Infantry units.
It's relatively easy to transport these supply UGVs with large numbers of infantry as well.
 
Blitzo

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AndrewS said:
I'd actually bump up the MALE UAVs/UCAVs to priority number 1.

You can mount SAR pods on them, and also decent amounts of smaller 50kg/25kg LGBs which are still good enough to take out any vehicle.

MALE UAV/UCAVs have much more endurance than a fighter, are much less expensive and also expendable.
So you can flood the extended battlespace.

---

On amphibious ships, my view is that higher quantities of smaller Type-072 LSTs are better. They are very inexpensive compared to the equivalent in large, expensive Type-071 LPD or Type-075 LHD.

You reduce the impact of losing any single ship, plus have a follow-on resupply/reinforcement capability over the beach which is not reliant on a port.

---

I'd also add the development and fielding unmanned ground vehicles generally.
It's going to be an infantry / small unit battle, because there are so many urban or mountainous areas right next to the coast.

So UGVs carrying supplies for Infantry Platoons will be very useful for example.
These small UGVs are inexpensive and can vastly increase the mobility and endurance of Infantry units.
It's relatively easy to transport these supply UGVs with large numbers of infantry as well.
Click to expand...

There's a reason why I do not think MALE UAVs/UCAVs are that high priority or in my top five -- limited payload, relatively slow speed, and vulnerability to SAMs.
MALE UAVs/UCAVs is good for longer endurance closer in ISR and striking out individual targets of opportunity once air defenses have been much more thoroughly defeated.
However, I do not think they are useful in the "vulnerable phase" that I described -- i.e.: during the amphibious assault/beachhead phase.
During that phase of the operation, I expect ROC IADS would be heavily degraded but some SAM systems would likely still remain and I MALE UAVs are easy targets. More importantly, MALE UAVs lack the speed to quickly reposition against new ground contacts -- you want your aerial assets to be able to quickly respond to new identified targets in a time sensitive manner.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, MALE UAVs/UCAVs lack the payload of strike fighters. Carrying 8 KD-10 sized ATGMs or the equivalence in weight of 50kg PGMs is nice, but a strike fighter like JH-7A can carry twelve 250kg bombs on two MERs AND three external fuel tanks, AND a targeting pod, AND a couple of SRAAMs and a self defense jamming pod to boot. KD-10 sized ATGMs are useful for "tank plinking" -- but to break the back of any ROC Army counter attacks against landed PLA forces will require the ability to interdict multiple formations as they are detected.

The reason I think it is important to place SAR pods on fighter aircraft is for a similar reason -- fighter aircraft lack the endurance of MALE UAVs, but they can fly faster to reposition themselves faster, their superior kinematic properties means they can also fly closer missions while having the ability to evade or defeat SAMs that would otherwise be capable of taking down a UAV.
You can also use HALE UAVs as synthetic aperture radar platforms, which I'm not opposed to, but I see them as supplementing SAR pods mounted on fighter aircraft, because HALE UAVs also lack the speed and survivability of fighter aircraft.
SAR pods on fighters also mean you are not limited to individual airframes for being dedicated ISR aircraft -- so long as an SAR pod is integrated and qualified for a fighter type, then the entire fleet of that given fighter type can operate in the role as needed.

After a beach head has been established, secured, and counterattacks repulsed, then MALE UAVs/UCAVs could certainly be much more useful to assist in prolonged ISR and smaller scale strikes of opportunity, but by then the PLA would have passed and weathered the "vulnerable phase" I described.


===

I agree that a larger number of 072 pattern LSTs are probably more useful than 071/075s, but I do think having a minimum number of 071s and 075s may be necessary, but supplemented by a large fleet of 072s.
My point is that more amphibious assault ships in general would be desirable so as to maximize the first wave size.


===

UGVs are still some years away from maturing and I was focused on describing systems that the PLA either already had in service, or systems that were very mature and easily within the Chinese military industry's capabilities.
 
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SAC

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Many people rush to the kinetic, but important activities happen before that phase:


The initial actions in a Taiwan Conflict won’t be kinetic, they will actually be more important.

An exemplar of this phase can be seen in the current Russia - Ukraine situation.

China wants as little kinetic warfare as possible, why destroy something you want to have?
 
A

AndrewS

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Bltizo said:
There's a reason why I do not think MALE UAVs/UCAVs are that high priority or in my top five -- limited payload, relatively slow speed, and vulnerability to SAMs.
MALE UAVs/UCAVs is good for longer endurance closer in ISR and striking out individual targets of opportunity once air defenses have been much more thoroughly defeated.
However, I do not think they are useful in the "vulnerable phase" that I described -- i.e.: during the amphibious assault/beachhead phase.
During that phase of the operation, I expect ROC IADS would be heavily degraded but some SAM systems would likely still remain and I MALE UAVs are easy targets. More importantly, MALE UAVs lack the speed to quickly reposition against new ground contacts -- you want your aerial assets to be able to quickly respond to new identified targets in a time sensitive manner.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, MALE UAVs/UCAVs lack the payload of strike fighters. Carrying 8 KD-10 sized ATGMs or the equivalence in weight of 50kg PGMs is nice, but a strike fighter like JH-7A can carry twelve 250kg bombs on two MERs AND three external fuel tanks, AND a targeting pod, AND a couple of SRAAMs and a self defense jamming pod to boot. KD-10 sized ATGMs are useful for "tank plinking" -- but to break the back of any ROC Army counter attacks against landed PLA forces will require the ability to interdict multiple formations as they are detected.
Click to expand...

Bltizo said:
The reason I think it is important to place SAR pods on fighter aircraft is for a similar reason -- fighter aircraft lack the endurance of MALE UAVs, but they can fly faster to reposition themselves faster, their superior kinematic properties means they can also fly closer missions while having the ability to evade or defeat SAMs that would otherwise be capable of taking down a UAV.
You can also use HALE UAVs as synthetic aperture radar platforms, which I'm not opposed to, but I see them as supplementing SAR pods mounted on fighter aircraft, because HALE UAVs also lack the speed and survivability of fighter aircraft.
SAR pods on fighters also mean you are not limited to individual airframes for being dedicated ISR aircraft -- so long as an SAR pod is integrated and qualified for a fighter type, then the entire fleet of that given fighter type can operate in the role as needed.

After a beach head has been established, secured, and counterattacks repulsed, then MALE UAVs/UCAVs could certainly be much more useful to assist in prolonged ISR and smaller scale strikes of opportunity, but by then the PLA would have passed and weathered the "vulnerable phase" I described.
Click to expand...

I differ in thinking that China will have largely destroyed Taiwan's air defences before it attempts to land a large invasion force.
At a minimum multiple teams will have been inserted by boat/helicopter and would already be supported by HALE UAV overhead, which can't be reached except by fighter aircraft or large, high performance SAMs.
And once you have HALE UAV overhead, it's not a big stretch to start deploying inexpensive MALE UAVs.
I expect SEAD aircraft to be permanently over Taiwan anyway.

I see this as trading UAVs for less of a "vulnerability phase" during main force beach landings.
A CH-4 is only $4Mn. In comparison, a single ZBD-05 amphibious vehicle looks like $5M.
If the 6 Army Amphibious Assault Brigades each have 300 ZBD-05 vehicles, that is 1800 in total.
And they fully expect many ZBD-05 vehicles to be destroyed during any campaign.

---

It looks like a J-16 costs $80Mn, so let's say a JH-7A costs the same.
And that it realistically has a loiter time of 3hours over Taiwan.
So you need 8 JH-7A (costing $480Mn) to provide 24 hour coverage with 12x 250kg bombs

In comparison, a CH-4 drone is $4Mn so you can buy 20 for the cost of a J-16/JH-7A.
And let's say you need 3 CH-4 to provide 24hour coverage.

So for the same procurement cost to have a single JH-7A on station over Taiwan, you can have 6-7 CH-4 in orbit at any time.
That could comprise 2 with a SAR + 5 for attack.

Plus those 5 attack CH-4 could carry 36 x50kg bombs in total. Alternatively, it could be 72x 20kg AR-2 missiles. That is respectively 3x and 6x as many targets.
Yes, the individual bombs are smaller, but a 50kg bomb or 20kg missile is more than adequate for any armoured vehicle.

That should result in much better overall coverage and responsiveness.

At some point, any remaining Taiwanese air defences will have to reveal themselves and fire, otherwise there is no point in them being there at all. So you might as well start flying inexpensive CH-4 type drones (or CH-3s) over Taiwan before any invasion, and hoping Taiwanese air defences reveal themselves.


Bltizo said:
===

I agree that a larger number of 072 pattern LSTs are probably more useful than 071/075s, but I do think having a minimum number of 071s and 075s may be necessary, but supplemented by a large fleet of 072s.
My point is that more amphibious assault ships in general would be desirable so as to maximize the first wave size.
Click to expand...

Personally I think they've already comfortable surpassed the minimum number of 071 and 075 required.

Bltizo said:
===

UGVs are still some years away from maturing and I was focused on describing systems that the PLA either already had in service, or systems that were very mature and easily within the Chinese military industry's capabilities.
Click to expand...

Ok. Then let's go back to something like the existing VP-4 series of vehicles, which have a driver or can be remote controlled.
You can realistically operate these as resupply vehicles for infantry in urban and mountainous areas in Taiwan, unlike other vehicles.
 
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tphuang

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All great points. I have to say that I'm not as convinced of the ability of Taiwan to conduct effective defense after the initial wave where all its military bases, naval ports, command centers and fighter jets are destroyed. I'm mainly curious to see how well the PLAAF EW and ELINT aircraft will perform. I was listening to shilao's podcast recently and he mentioned that in the 90s, USN EA-6B confused PLA air defense so much that the radar thought there was a large group of aircraft invading China and that the command center got fooled even more to the point that it thought the invading aircraft group was even larger. At the same time, he also said China found in the EP-3 incident that US was collecting intelligence on stuff that China thought they were hiding really well.

With all the ELINT and EW aircraft that pass by Taiwan every day, I'd expect them to be fairly tuned up to the communicating bands and are able to manipulate them. Once the Taiwanese air defense gets suppressed at the start of the war, I'd expect J-16Ds, Y-8 planes and local spies to know exactly Taiwanese military command is thinking and sow confusion along the way. Jam all the wireless communication layers, destroying the main communication towers and such. It would confuse island defense on where the attack is coming and breed signs of despair/hopelessness. The goal of PLA is to pressure Taiwan to just give up. There is already a view in large part of Taiwanese society that a mainland takeover is inevitable or are indifferent to it. Ideally, they never get to the point where a lot of civilians are threatened.

I do think more modern amphibious ships, helicopters and UCAVs are needed. Doubling of the LPD/LPH fleet would allow them to deploy several hundred amphibious IFVs over defended landing area. That along is probably not enough, but they'd be supported by air cover and a lot of helicopters and UCAVs. I'd be curious to see what they do with Z-10s. In Shilao's podcast recently, he mentioned that Z-10s has unusual long range for an attack helicopter. In fact, only Apaches at low loads have similar range. So even though Z-10s are not being carried on Type 071/075s, they can probably takeoff from across the straits and have reasonable loiter time in supporting the invasion. They could concentrate on attacking the areas where they do plan the landing. I think they already have a reasonable high number of helicopters now. With Z-20s in production and AC-313A military version coming, their air lift and attack should improve quite a bit more in the next few years. They may find that it's easier to have the transport helicopters to drop soldiers and lynx ATVs on the mountainous side to surprise Taiwan defense. If they can get in and take over the Taipei government buildings pretty quickly, I think Taiwan will just give up.

I think getting enough helicopters, UCAVs and amphibious ships will probably take 5 or 6 years still. It generally lands with my assessment that PLA will be able to quickly take Taiwan near the end of this decade.
 
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Paulo R Siqueira

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CHINA EYES ‘ARMED UNIFICATION’ WITH TAIWAN BY 2027: KEY ACADEMIC​

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Chinese President Xi Jinping will employ force to unify Taiwan with China by 2027, an influential Chinese academic who advises Beijing on foreign policy told Nikkei.
Jin Canrong, a professor in Renmin University’s School of International Studies, notes that the People’s Liberation Army already has a posture superior to that of the U.S. to deal with a contingency involving Taiwan.
He is known as one of China’s most vocal hawks, and his online comments are followed by many.
Xi has set Taiwan unification as a goal but has not indicated a timeline. Jin said: “Once the National Congress of the Communist Party of China is over in the fall of 2022, the scenario of armed unification will move toward becoming a reality. It is very likely that the leadership will move toward armed unification by 2027, the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s founding.”
This echoed a view expressed in March 2021 by Adm. Phil Davidson, the since-retired commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, who told the Senate Armed Services Committee with regard to Taiwan: “I think the threat is manifest during this decade — in fact, in the next six years.”
On whether the U.S. would have a military response to a Chinese move to take the island, Jin said that “China already has the capability to unify Taiwan by force within one week” and that “the PLA can defeat any U.S. force within 1,000 nautical miles of the coastline.”
The PLA is believed to have a strategy of keeping U.S. naval vessels out of the waters around China — and thus refining its ability to launch missile attacks against American forces there.
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Jin Canrong is known for his hawkishness on the U.S. and advises the Chinese government on foreign policy. (Photo by Tsukasa Hadano)
Jin pushed back against the view in Japan that, in the words of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “a Taiwan emergency is a Japan emergency.”
“Japan should absolutely not intervene in a Taiwanese emergency,” he said. “The U.S. already cannot win against China on this. If Japan intervenes, China will have no choice but to defeat Japan as well. [Japan] must realize that a new change is occurring.”
Jin is skeptical that peaceful unification can be achieved, saying: “It will difficult with Democratic Progressive Party President Tsai Ing-wen in power. If [an opposition] Kuomintang candidate wins the presidential election in 2024, relations will improve, but the Kuomintang has no support.”
As for what Taiwan should do, Jin said it should enter into discussions on unification: “The only choice they have is to talk to mainland China as soon as possible. The longer it takes, the more disadvantageous it becomes for Taiwan,” he said.
On Sino-American relations this year, Jin was pessimistic.
“It will be a more difficult year than 2021,” he said. “China will have its party congress in the fall, and the U.S. will have its midterm elections in November. With such a weighty political schedule, the rivalry between the countries is likely to be very clear.”
In addition, Taiwan will hold local elections in November. “China could be a target of criticism during those elections,” Jin said. “This will also affect China-U.S. relations.”
The U.S., the U.K. and others have announced diplomatic boycotts of the Winter Olympics, which begin this week in Beijing. But Jin dismissed this as unimportant. “Every country, including the U.S., is sending players,” he said. “Many foreign companies are sponsoring the event. The fact that some countries are not sending high-ranking officials is not an issue.”
In 2022, China and Japan will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations. Jin criticized the Japanese side, saying: “The Chinese government hopes to stabilize relations on the 50th anniversary. However, Japan has become too conservative, including former Prime Minister Abe’s comments on the Taiwan issue, and the situation has become difficult.”
The economy will be the top issue at the National People’s Congress in March, said Jin, who expects the government’s annual growth target to remain at 6%.

“There is a very important party conference this year,” he said. “It does not look good to have low goals.”




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james smith esq

james smith esq

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Registered Member
None of these scenarios that suppose an amphibious invasion are plausible unless PLAAF has established near complete air-domination to ~600 km out from the eastern strait. USAF’s primary method of attempting to prevent/hinder such an invasion will be B-1-Bs and B-52-Hs launching salvos (24 and 20, each, respectively) of LRASM from about that distance. I’m neither promoting nor extolling either the efficacy or superiority of the LRASM; I’m simply expressing a strategic concern.

^ cont’d

It seems, to me, that, because of ever-increasing launch-ranges, the time when attempting to target launch-platforms is quickly passing (or has already passed) and the time has come to focus on targeting the launched systems, ideally at varied stages of their flight course, but most-certainly during their terminal phases.

Additionally, in the age of “stealth”, in which this modality will ultimately be generalized to many platforms and weapon systems intended to penetrate contested spaces, the threat of “stealth” cruise missiles, and particularly those that travel sub-sonically, i. e., LRASM, requires a defensive response based on a dedicated EO/IRST guided, short to medium-ranged missile system/network.

Although J-7s and J-10s could, if need be, tasked with shooting LRASMs down, there would still be a need for longer-ranged dedicated EO/IRST platforms similar to the radar-based AWAC platforms to provide wide-field coverage (as wide a field as EO/IRST is capable of, that is) in order to direct and coordinate those shoot-down missions.
 
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