PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Bltizo said:

That is to say -- if foreign intervention occurs in the middle of an invasion, I expect the PLA to place the majority of its focus on asserting regional air and sea control against the foreign intervention. If the invasion has yet to really get underway with only minimal forces landed, I expect they would cut their losses and focus on the more important goal first before returning to focus on the

Click to expand...

lets say hyperthetically, the conflict is initiated by 10*b1 launching ashm at PLA amphibious ships and then return to conus base, and prior to that US has evacuated guam, kadena & yokoauka as precaution to PLARF strike

if as you predicted, PLA suspend their invasion, then what objective would PLA turn to? full scale attack on JPN? seems too much considering JPN at this point is not even in the action. Attack US bases? sure, but wont get much result considering they are empty already.

forgive my ignorance, but seems to me almost all PLA capability is developed to counter US intervention, which is to stop PLA invasion of taiwan.

but if PLA suspend their invasion just because of a US air strike, then US can simply suspend their intervention, hence there is nothing for PLA to counter...

if at this point PLA resume their invasion, then US will just send in another bomber strike.

so seems to me, giving up the invasion due to US internene, even just temparorily, is to surrender the initiative to the opponent

solarz said:

I don't see how China can or need to "shift focus" in the middle of a reunification campaign. If anything, ground force and supply transportation will be accelerated while the air force and navy provide the necessary cover.

By fortifying Taiwan as quickly as possible, it defeats the purpose of the US launching a war against China in the first place, and provides a strategically critical location for any operations.

This said, any speculation on US intervention is meaningless without considering the wider geological climate. Russia, NK, and Iran are not going to sit still while the US is fighting China.

Click to expand...

The ability to successfully invade, neutralize, occupy and fortify Taiwan is fundamentally materially dependent on a sufficient and capable logistics train from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, which will rely on mostly seaborne resupply and reinforcement but also a small degree of aerial resupply and reinforcement.

In event of a third party intervention by the US and/or Japan, can you consider how the variety of forces and air and naval and strike power that the US and/or Japan could bring to bear to Taiwan, might be able to degrade if not cripple the PLA's ability to conduct the necessary sealift and airlift to either resupply and reinforce their forces on Taiwan, or to degrade or cripple the PLA's ability to conduct an amphibious assault of Taiwan in the first place?

That is to say, do you believe that the PLA can conduct a successful sealift and airlift between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan for an invasion/sustain an invasion when US and Japanese air bases, carrier groups, naval forces, and future long range missile/hypersonic weapons bases remain operational and unmolested ?

solarz said:

China can mobilize the labor and resources of the entire country in the blink of an eye to fight covid. It can turn into a total war economy just as quickly.

A war against the US comes down to attrition. China can flood the region in Type 55 and J-20s if necessary, while the US would need to send their reinforcements across the entire Pacific ocean, and their manufacturing capability isn't even a fraction of China's.

Click to expand...

Yeah, that isn't going to be the case.

During a longer war of attrition, the pre-conflict positions of US forces in the region and greater US maneuver capability of air and naval forces means that the US has the capability to strike at Chinese production facilities on the Chinese mainland, while China does not have the same capability to strike as US production facilities.
This is not to mention the greater capability of the US to control SLOCs outside of the western pacific to limit Chinese importation of resources.

People on this forum have recently talked about how China could use long range conventional hypersonic weapons to strike at US production facilities in CONTUS for this specific reason, specifically because China has no meaningful way of striking at US production facilities while the US has significant capability of striking that of China's.

A war of attrition as it currently is would not be a desirable outcome for China, because it would suffer from having much more vulnerable production facilities and much more vulnerable resource supply lines.

caohailiang said:

lets say hyperthetically, the conflict is initiated by 10*b1 launching ashm at PLA amphibious ships and then return to conus base, and prior to that US has evacuated guam, kadena & yokoauka as precaution to PLARF strike

if as you predicted, PLA suspend their invasion, then what objective would PLA turn to? full scale attack on JPN? seems too much considering JPN at this point is not even in the action. Attack US bases? sure, but wont get much result considering they are empty already.

forgive my ignorance, but seems to me almost all PLA capability is developed to counter US intervention, which is to stop PLA invasion of taiwan.

but if PLA suspend their invasion just because of a US air strike, then US can simply suspend their intervention, hence there is nothing for PLA to counter...

if at this point PLA resume their invasion, then US will just send in another bomber strike.

so seems to me, giving up the invasion due to US internene, even just temparorily, is to surrender the initiative to the opponent

Click to expand...

Uhh, so you are saying that the US has evacuated its air bases in the region?
And you don't mention any carrier battle groups in the region as well?
Okay.

So you are saying the US has no capability to assert air or sea control in the western pacific region?
Okay.

Then please re-read my posts -- if the PLA has air and sea control in the western pacific region, they will have far greater freedom to successfully continue with their amphibious assault in earnest.

Because without US air bases and carriers in the western pacific, then China's would naturally deploy air and naval forces to deny the US the capability to conduct such a strike in the first place
If the US was able to conduct such a strike, then the PLA would naturally seek to attrit and degrade their capability to repeat such an operation, such as striking air bases in Hawaii, and to deploy naval forces in a more extensive longer range screen in the western pacific, including PLA carrier forces.

All while that is going on, the PLA would naturally continue with their amphibious assault, because they have air and sea control in the western pacific.



But frankly, the idea that the US would vacate Guam and only conduct a single air strike against PLA amphibious ships is ludicrous.
Any such operation by the US would obviously have multiple carrier groups supporting in the region, with multiple air bases in the region also stocked with US air power as well.
That is to say, the idea of the US conducting a CONTUS ranged bomber strike against China and PLA ships in the Taiwan strait without US having operational air bases and carriers in the region to project US air and sea power, is very very very unlikely.

If the US did try to attempt it, then I think China would greatly welcome it.

Edit: I was prepared for a few possibilities, but "US conducting CONTUS ranged bomber mission while having no air bases and carriers in western pacific at all" was not one of them.

Bltizo said:

Please consider my words carefully "contesting air and sea control" after the US has carried out an intervention, means a general PLA air, naval and missile operation against US forces in the western pacific to deny their ability to assert air and sea control in the region to the greatest practical extent possible. Pausing a Taiwan invasion to carry out such a mission would certainly not allow the west time to "build up and launch a huge offensive against and possibly into China," because the whole point of such an operation would be to degrade and deny their ability to carry out air and naval operations in the region in general.

Click to expand...

i think all the forces needed to "degrade and deny US ability to carry out air and naval operations" wil be on standby while the invasion is being executed by other units

specifically, i see substaintial portion of the J11b/J16/J20/H6 units reserved for potential offensive towards targets other than Taiwan, for their longer range, while J10 units mostly used for CAP mission over Taiwan air space, and JH7a and Su30 units used for strike mission on Taiwan.

in terms of PLARF, all MRBM/IRBM units will be on standby for couter intervention while SRBM units busy striking tarets on Taiwan.

in PLAN, i actually see a very large portion of modern destroyers (052d/055) dedicated to air defense in the strait, mainly against US bmber strike

caohailiang said:

i think all the forces needed to "degrade and deny US ability to carry out air and naval operations" wil be on standby while the invasion is being executed by other units

specifically, i see substaintial portion of the J11b/J16/J20/H6 units reserved for potential offensive towards targets other than Taiwan, for their longer range, while J10 units mostly used for CAP mission over Taiwan air space, and JH7a and Su30 units used for strike mission on Taiwan.

in terms of PLARF, all MRBM/IRBM units will be on standby for couter intervention while SRBM units busy striking tarets on Taiwan.

in PLAN, i actually see a very large portion of modern destroyers (052d/055) dedicated to air defense in the strait, mainly against US bmber strike

Click to expand...

That all goes without saying, and in fact I've already described it as so in a previous post, in #916:

Bltizo said:

If you are asking how the PLA will hedge their forces to deter an intervention in event of a Taiwan invasion, well sure, of course the PLA will likely reserve the majority of its overall forces to be able to most aptly respond to a third party intervention -- but if a third party intervention occurs, then it likely the PLA will rapidly shift gears and abandon an invasion to prosecute the war over regional air and sea control.

Click to expand...

......

But what you are describing is the US for some reason vacating its air bases in the western pacific and not deploying carrier battle groups in the region, and conducting CONTUS ranged bomber missions without organic air and naval forces in the western pacific.

Such a course of action is immensely unlikely from the US -- but sure, in the unlikely and illogical event that the US chose such a course of action, then China could certainly continue its amphibious invasion, because in such a course of action, the US has no capability to assert or contest air and sea control in the western pacific.

That means the PLA will be much more capable of effectively defending against this confusing and questionable US choice to conduct unsupported CONTUS ranged bomber raids towards Taiwan -- the equivalent of the US fighting with both hands tied around its back and hopping on one foot for good measure.
The PLA will be able to strongly project air and sea control out beyond the first island chain into the second island chain in your scenario, so by all means they can continue with an invasion even after a half hearted US bomber raid.



However, what I envisioned for a third party intervention, is that the US will surge deploy 3-4 or more CSGs and perhaps a few LHD/LHAs configured as F-35B carriers into the western pacific, as well as reinforce their existing air bases in the region with fighters and force multipliers, as well as set up multiple temporary short term dispersed air bases in the second island chain with fighter aircraft, and of course deploy multiple SAGs and a large number of SSNs between the first and second island chains -- all of which would of course in turn be supported by US bomber raids from CONTUS and/or Hawaii. Oh, and in the next decade or so I expect a decent number of long range US hypersonic weapons bases dispersed in the western pacific as well.
And that any such US intervention would involve not only striking PLAN amphibious assault ships in the Taiwan strait.
But after doing that, they would would strike PLA air bases going at least 500km deep from China's coast, to try to locate and defeat PLAN surface ships in general operating in the western pacific, and to conduct missile strikes against Chinese command and control centers, logistics centers, and maybe even Chinese factories and shipyards to partially degrade their ability to replenish Chinese forces.

But hey, even if the US doesn't try to do all that, well they will still be capable of putting PLA sealift and airlift resupply of Taiwan under great threat with the forces I described.... and that is why I said that if the US carried out third party intervention, the PLA's priority will be to try to contest and secure air and sea control in the western pacific in general -- because I was operating under the assumption the US would actually carry out a third party intervention with a frontloaded surged forward deployed capability that is not only very capable and comprehensive, but also dispersed and networked.

I was not assuming that the US would for some reason vacate its airbases in the region, not deploy any carrier battle groups in the westpac region, and conduct unsupported CONTUS ranged bomber raids.

Bltizo said:

That is to say, the idea of the US conducting a CONTUS ranged bomber strike against China and PLA ships in the Taiwan strait without US having operational air bases and carriers in the region to project US air and sea power, is very very very unlikely.

Click to expand...

i agree and thank you for pointing out the error in my description.

i guss what i am saying is, US side does not really need contest for air control of long duration, but only several short windows a day to open air corridor for their cruise missile strikes, no matter from bombers or naval ships.

to do that, they will disperse their ground based aircrafts across the 3 dozen military airports all over JPN and second island chain instead of concentrating assets on Kadena & Guam

caohailiang said:

i agree and thank you for pointing out the error in my description.

i guss what i am saying is, US side does not really need contest for air control of long duration, but only several short windows a day to open air corridor for their cruise missile strikes, no matter from bombers or naval ships.

to do that, they will disperse their ground based aircrafts across the 3 dozen military airports all over JPN and second island chain instead of concentrating assets on Kadena & Guam

Click to expand...

Look, I'll put it simply -- the priority and focus of the PLA on continuing and supporting a Taiwan invasion, has a positive relationship with the the extent of air and sea control they can assert in the western pacific.... and an inverse relationship with the extent of air and sea control that the US can assert in the western pacific.


I'm not sure why you are coming up with these half measure US interventions, because what you are doing is actually just making the conflict scenario more favourable to the PLA.
Naturally if the US deploys less forces to the western pacific and chooses to only operate from dispersed air bases (rather than a combination of dispersed air bases and major air bases and carriers), then the extent of air and sea control that the PLA will be able to contest will be greater than if the US frontloaded a major surge operation in the region.
So sure, in your scenario, the PLA might deem it their own forces to be sufficiently capable of defeating the relatively smaller US presence in the region and protecting their amphibious assault ships from CONTUS ranged bomber raids.

But what is more likely is that the US will send multiple CSGs, will have its major air bases fully stocked, AND will have many multiple dispersed air bases operational as well, AND have a number of LHD/LHAs operating as F-35B carriers, AND have a large number of surface combatants and submarines operating as standoff LACM launch platforms, AND have bombers from Hawaii and CONTUS operating.
Against such a force, do you really think the PLA will not seek to prioritize the ability to conduct a major operation to significantly degrade US air and sea power projection capabilities in the region first, while significantly deprioritizing their Taiwan airlift and sealift operations?

Bltizo said:

Look, I'll put it simply -- the priority and focus of the PLA on continuing and supporting a Taiwan invasion, has a positive relationship with the the extent of air and sea control they can assert in the western pacific.... and an inverse relationship with the extent of air and sea control that the US can assert in the western pacific.


I'm not sure why you are coming up with these half measure US interventions, because what you are doing is actually just making the conflict scenario more favourable to the PLA.
Naturally if the US deploys less forces to the western pacific and chooses to only operate from dispersed air bases (rather than a combination of dispersed air bases and major air bases and carriers), then the extent of air and sea control that the PLA will be able to contest will be greater than if the US frontloaded a major surge operation in the region.
So sure, in your scenario, the PLA might deem it their own forces to be sufficiently capable of defeating the relatively smaller US presence in the region and protecting their amphibious assault ships from CONTUS ranged bomber raids.

But what is more likely is that the US will send multiple CSGs, will have its major air bases fully stocked, AND will have many multiple dispersed air bases operational as well, AND have a number of LHD/LHAs operating as F-35B carriers, AND have a large number of surface combatants and submarines operating as standoff LACM launch platforms, AND have bombers from Hawaii and CONTUS operating.
Against such a force, do you really think the PLA will not seek to prioritize the ability to conduct a major operation to significantly degrade US air and sea power projection capabilities in the region first, while significantly deprioritizing their Taiwan airlift and sealift operations?

Click to expand...

i expect US will deploy their full strength the the theater, unlike some might think only a portion of it due to commitments in other part of the world. Excluding national guard and training units, for USAF alone i count 12 f22/f35 squadrons and 8 F15 squadrons to be deployed. plus the 3~4 CSG and their CVWs, plus all available F35B loaded into LHAs, plus all their bomber fleet operating from Hawaii.

I think land based aircrafts will be their main strength, i dont consider disperse deployment a half measure because i dont think it will limit the combined strength as stated above, it is merely a measure to evade missile strikes from PLA (ballistic missile inventory + 1000 daily cruise missiles strike). I have counted some 40 military airfields in JPN alone, even if we exclude those in Ryukyu which are too exposed, there are still 30+. There should be enough space to accommodate USAF withhout stacking up aircrafts in Misawa or Anderson - makes them too juicy to hit

caohailiang said:

i expect US will deploy their full strength the the theater, unlike some might think only a portion of it due to commitments in other part of the world. Excluding national guard and training units, for USAF alone i count 12 f22/f35 squadrons and 8 F15 squadrons to be deployed. plus the 3~4 CSG and their CVWs, plus all available F35B loaded into LHAs, plus all their bomber fleet operating from Hawaii.

I think land based aircrafts will be their main strength, i dont consider disperse deployment a half measure because i dont think it will limit the combined strength as stated above, it is merely a measure to evade missile strikes from PLA (ballistic missile inventory + 1000 daily cruise missiles strike). I have counted some 40 military airfields in JPN alone, even if we exclude those in Ryukyu which are too exposed, there are still 30+. There should be enough space to accommodate USAF withhout stacking up aircrafts in Misawa or Anderson - makes them too juicy to hit

Click to expand...

So, in such a scenario, let me repeat my question -- against your self described force, do you really think the PLA will not seek to prioritize the ability to conduct a major operation to significantly degrade US air and sea power projection capabilities in the region first, while significantly deprioritizing their Taiwan airlift and sealift operations?