Imagine the Taiwan contingency as a spectrum, from "total independence" to "total reunification". The cost-benefit analysis varies for each type of action depending on its position along the spectrum. What Patch wrote describes actions the PRC might take if "total independence" were imminent (evidently, deterrence exists). However, he never claimed these are the actions the PRC
would take in transitioning from the status quo to "total reunification". Note the difference between "China can" vs "China will".
To put this simply, first strike on US and Japanese bases is damn crazy lol (yes, I fully understand the reasoning behind it and agree that in some scenarios this is the "correct" option). It would incur
significant costs and risks to China. At the present time and in the foreseeable future, as long as Taiwan's status doesn't shift too far towards the "total independence" end, the risks associated with first strike remain unacceptable to the PRC and CCP.
I think this part should be obvious. The Taiwan question should be solved at a minimal cost to the PRC,
which means no first strike and instead relying solely on A2/AD and deterrence. This changes the entire calculus:
China can beat the US with first strike vs China can beat the US without first strike are two very different propositions.
As such, I would define militarily "ready" as the point when China can achieve this while keeping the associated risks and costs acceptable to the PRC and CCP.
This would mean being ready for a total war with the US with the assumption that the US will "fight until the last American", without pulling a modern Pearl Harbour. It means largely matching the US on every step of the escalation ladder and establish ample deterrence. Given that even the Fujian is still years away from reaching IOC, China is far from this readiness.
I recommend reading a convo here that happened 3 years ago where Rick talked a lot about US v China in a war of attrition.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
Sidenote and to support my above points, I see some have brought up the 2049 date. Yes, Taiwan is a key part of the great rejuvenation, but let's not forget that it's not the only part. Is it "great rejuvenation" if it means the country's GDP declines by 10-20% or more as a result of a proactive reunification? Is it "great rejuvenation" if China gets bogged down in a prolonged conflict ending in a pyrrhic victory? Is it "great rejuvenation" if the war causes large-scale social unrest and political turmoil? As long as Taiwan's status quo remains relatively acceptable (of course, the default direction is heading towards the independence end), it's a no brainer to wait longer and reduce these risks,
even if it means going beyond the 2049 date (though I think this is very unlikely to happen). This is not to say that China isn't in a hurry; we clearly are.