PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

zyklon

Junior Member
Registered Member
China isn’t Russia. It’s not going to tolerate US recon and C&C assets functioning as part of Taiwan’s kill chain with impunity. Nor will it be so pathetically passive as to allow the US to build up in peace and give them full say on when and how they might intervene.

China absolutely isn't Russia, and Taiwan isn't Ukraine: Taiwan is not only not a (3rd-tier) sovereign state, but far more isolated (there's a reason why Western media is so terrified about underwater fiber cables getting cut and also why Taipei is so interested in LEO communications satellites).

Moreover, unlike their Russian counterparts, the PLA is heavily invested in and focused on executing system warfare, which emphasizes targeting critical nodes or components essential to sustaining enemy operations. Think prioritized effects against C4ISR systems until hostile forces are "blind, deaf and mute" as a functional enterprise.

China can always force US’ hand by taking out radar stations on the Japanese islands near the Taiwan Island using whatever excuse they can come up with, making US get involved before they gathered enough strength in the theatre.

In the event of a full scale conflict across the Taiwan Strait, one would expect anything and everything that constitute primary, secondary, contingency and emergency communications between ROC and US forces to be disrupted, degraded and destroyed into irrelevance.

A few American contractors situated in Taiwan might become casualties in the process as well, but there's a reason why the USG likes to hire contractors: no one really notices or makes a fuss when next of kin has to be notified. However, beyond that, there isn't necessarily a need to overtly target US assets in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Guam or anywhere else.

What good will those resources be to Taipei's kill chain in particular or Taipei in general if they can't be reasonably accessed?
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
From the looks of it, we in fact agree on more than we disagree.

However, where we diverge might be how we expect an armed seizure of Taiwan by the PLA to play out, especially in terms of where there's most escalatory risk, and just how manageable escalatory risk will be.



In the event the CMC directs the PLA to seize Taiwan by force, the declaration of a No Fly Zone (NFZ) and a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) will not be probable or likely, but absolutely certain to occur. Moreover, the declaration of a NFZ and MEZ shouldn't been seen as extremely aggressive or even aggressive at all, so much as what responsible great powers do when they go to war and to be expected.

Once we get to that point, what the PLA will render upon Taiwan will make the "Shock and Awe" that Iraq experienced in 2003 look like a Sunday picnic (unless ROC personnel surrender, defect and/or desert en masse), and while this isn't something the average 11B or even member of Congress will necessarily expect, this is something the INDOPACOM J2 absolutely knows will happen. The airspace above and surrounding Taiwan will be the most non-permissive environment imaginable. Not something anyone walks into by accident or even willingly.

In fact, I fully expect GOs/FOs at the Pentagon to push back in private against challenging any such NFZ or MEZ immediately with crewed assets if directed to do so by the White House. They'll insist on mustering forces prior to any such attempt: no one wants to be accused of sending their men into harm's way without first giving them the resources to fight and win or at least going through the motions.

With that said, if the elected US political leadership gets reckless enough to test the waters (without first mustering forces which will give the PLA time to achieve a fait accompli) despite the advice they'll receive from their own generals, admirals and SES, there'll be no reason for the Chinese authorities to have any delusions or misapprehensions about the White House's intentions.



NGL "accidentally" shooting down a RQ-180 or some other high end unmanned asset may do more good than harm: "We understand your RQ-180 accidentally violated our NFZ due to technical difficulties (that of course had nothing to do with our EW systems), and unfortunately we were unable to intervene before our highly automated IADS detected and destroyed one of your most expensive and sophisticated stealth assets. Please fly more cautiously moving forward."

Who knows if such a scenario will actually occur, but it could actually be arguably ideal as it'll give both sides an opportunity to reassess their capabilities and reason for avoiding further escalation. Knowing Trump, he might even receive it as a sign from God to walk away so long as the Chinese agree to buy the USAF some even bigger and shinier drones as a face saving gesture for his administration . . .

I think the main area of divergence between our views is that while you seem to think that America can still be dissuaded from directly getting involved in the fight for Taiwan, and views avoidance of direct full scale military clashes between China and America as a primary objective and consideration. I am of the more pessimistic view that such a full clash is all but inevitable and as such, places little value in actively trying to dissuade the Americans and believe that the PLA’s primary focus and strategy would be how to comprehensively and overwhelmingly defeat the US in open full scale combat operations.

The main practical implications are that your strategy places prominence in delaying forcing America to show its cards and prioritises concluding armed reunification of Taiwan ASAP to try and end the war before America can get involved. Whereas my preferred strategy is to force America to commit to the fight before it is ready and defeat American forces and eject them from the entire Asia Pacific region.

The benefit of your strategy is that there is a chance you can avoid fighting America. But the downside is that if deterrence fails, the bulk of the fighting will be done in and around China, with the inevitable fallout and collateral damage that will ensue.

My strategy involves taking the fight to the Americans and their vassals, so the bulk of the fight and damage will be done over their territory. There is even a reasonable chance that if the PLA victory over the Americans is overwhelming enough, that Taiwan will surrender without putting up much, if any fight, thereby saving countless Chinese lives on Taiwan island, and also means China takes Taiwan back large intact instead of as a bombed out ruin.
 

zyklon

Junior Member
Registered Member
I think the main area of divergence between our views is that while you seem to think that America can still be dissuaded from directly getting involved in the fight for Taiwan, and views avoidance of direct full scale military clashes between China and America as a primary objective and consideration.

The Trump administration appears far more cognizant of the limitations of American hard power than those of his predecessors. It's one of the principal reasons as to why Trump is so insistent on resolving and exiting the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

He knows China is far more dangerous and capable than Russia in terms of conventional military capabilities. At a minimum, one would expect Trump to be more reluctant to intervene than his predecessors should the PLA seek to seize Taiwan by force.

This reality shouldn't surprise anyone given the direction that the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait has been moving towards.

The main practical implications are that your strategy places prominence in delaying forcing America to show its cards and prioritises concluding armed reunification of Taiwan ASAP to try and end the war before America can get involved. Whereas my preferred strategy is to force America to commit to the fight before it is ready and defeat American forces and eject them from the entire Asia Pacific region.

While I wouldn't characterize that as my outlook, as there's only so much China can do to delay America should it decide to intervene militarily in such a Taiwan scenario, as well as given how visible America's cards tend to be, I would say that the two approaches you've highlighted are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Pushing America into a skirmish where it'll be decisively and promptly defeated with negligible casualties, assuming the skirmish is containable, is in fact one way to (permanently) delay, if not deter American entry into a larger war with potential nuclear implications.

However, I would advise against pushing America into a full scale war, lest they resort to nuclear weapons should things go poorly, especially close to or at home, which would include Guam.

But the downside is that if deterrence fails, the bulk of the fighting will be done in and around China, with the inevitable fallout and collateral damage that will ensue.

My strategy involves taking the fight to the Americans and their vassals, so the bulk of the fight and damage will be done over their territory. There is even a reasonable chance that if the PLA victory over the Americans is overwhelming enough, that Taiwan will surrender without putting up much, if any fight, thereby saving countless Chinese lives on Taiwan island, and also means China takes Taiwan back large intact instead of as a bombed out ruin.

This is why it sounded like you support pre-emptive strikes against US forces in Guam, Okinawa and possibly elsewhere.

You're obviously a Chinese patriot, so I understand why you'd want to "take the fight" to the Americans to save Chinese lives on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Your love for and commitment to those of your own blood is commendable.

However, does the PLA really have the capacity to "take the fight" to the Americans, especially considering that the vast majority of US forces aren't even located on the 1IC?
 
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peekaboo

Just Hatched
Registered Member
"According to the Washington Post, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has signed a memo, ordering senior leaders at the Pentagon and across the U.S. Military to develop plans to cut roughly 40% of the defense budget by 2030, in increments of 8% per year for the next five years. The United States’ defense budget in 2025 was nearly $850 billion, having drastically grown since the mid-2010s due to threats from both China and Russia, who also both continue to increase their annual defense spending. The memo ordered that the proposed cuts be drawn up by February 24th, with only 17 categories of defense spending being prohibited from the cuts by the Trump Administration, which include operations at the U.S-Mexico Border, the modernization of nuclear weapons and missile defense system, and the acquisition of submarines, one-way attack drones and other munitions."

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How does this affect the PLA's timelines? Is it a sign that the US will not engage in an AR scenario?
 

Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
The problem is that the other side may or may not be capable of accurately recognizing and evaluating the strength and power of the PLA, especially in a rational fashion relative to their own military capabilities.

It's kind of like breaking up with an especially determined, yet delusional girl who thinks you're in love with her and that the two of you are destined to be. You can convince a judge to issue a TRO, but that's not going to stop her from texting you.

The reality is recent speeches and panels in Munich have made it abundantly clear that the West is in a state of psychosis. We can try to pretend otherwise, but that's not going to get anyone anywhere or otherwise prevent said delusions from colliding with reality in rather kinetic and bloody ways . . . :)
Case in point: see @Neurosmith post boldy asserting (without an iota of evidence, historical or otherwise) that Chinese leadership are quaking in their collective boots at the thought of provoking a war with almighty U.S.
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
Pushing America into a skirmish where it'll be decisively and promptly defeated with negligible casualties, assuming the skirmish is containable, is in fact one way to (permanently) delay, if not deter American entry into a larger war with potential nuclear implications.

However, I would advise against pushing America into a full scale war, lest they resort to nuclear weapons should things go poorly, especially close to or at home, which would include Guam.
Don’t ever restart the civil war if you are afraid of American’s nuclear weapons. The only way to prevent the Americans from using their nuclear weapons is to build a bigger nuclear arsenal which is what China is doing.
 

GulfLander

Captain
Registered Member
Don’t ever restart the civil war if you are afraid of American’s nuclear weapons. The only way to prevent the Americans from using their nuclear weapons is to build a bigger nuclear arsenal which is what China is doing.
How many n*ke capable submarines does CN now operates? And under construction?
 

00CuriousObserver

Junior Member
Registered Member
What does "ready" even mean? There will always be a bit more time China could wait to be able to kick the US's ass epsilon harder. If you define it as simply a resounding victory in a Taiwan/1IC conflict, well, you compiled all of Patchwork's posts, you should know very well they're more than capable of that already, and my own opinion is the PLA can also be confident of a decisive victory in a broader conflict within the 2IC in a couple years time. Even US copium peddlers admit the US will be at a vulnerable "nadir" of capability in the late 2020s (they're just wrong about where the trend goes after that).

China has a date. Hard deadline is 2049 which is the centenary of the People's Republic of China. That's a hard deadline where national rejuvenation will be complete. If you read just a tiny deeper, there is no complete rejuvenation without reunification with the Taiwan Province.

Any attempt by the Party to sell the idea that rejuvenation has been achieved without Taiwan would be ridiculed by even the most leftist communists. So, the leadership, the Party, the People, the PLA, everyone has a deadline. 2049

However that's the latest, I actually think that Xi's third (+ possibly more) term mandate is to deal with Taiwan. Either complete reunification or to so significantly improve PRC's operational position wrt Taiwan, that it will more or less look like an inevitability that there will be a reunification in the following years after he steps down.


And while I agree that delaying for the best shot is always a good idea, some times, very rare opportunities come that they shouldn't be missed. Late 2020s, US Military will have big capability gaps against the PLA while also having the "art of the deal" Trump in charge. I think that would be a rare opportunity that Xi could/should push to exploit to make advances on Taiwan

Deadline of 2027 on the PLA to have the capability and capacity to invade Taiwan if ordered, even if US and pets intervene.

I think the main area of divergence between our views is that while you seem to think that America can still be dissuaded from directly getting involved in the fight for Taiwan, and views avoidance of direct full scale military clashes between China and America as a primary objective and consideration. I am of the more pessimistic view that such a full clash is all but inevitable and as such, places little value in actively trying to dissuade the Americans and believe that the PLA’s primary focus and strategy would be how to comprehensively and overwhelmingly defeat the US in open full scale combat operations.

The main practical implications are that your strategy places prominence in delaying forcing America to show its cards and prioritises concluding armed reunification of Taiwan ASAP to try and end the war before America can get involved. Whereas my preferred strategy is to force America to commit to the fight before it is ready and defeat American forces and eject them from the entire Asia Pacific region.

The benefit of your strategy is that there is a chance you can avoid fighting America. But the downside is that if deterrence fails, the bulk of the fighting will be done in and around China, with the inevitable fallout and collateral damage that will ensue.

My strategy involves taking the fight to the Americans and their vassals, so the bulk of the fight and damage will be done over their territory. There is even a reasonable chance that if the PLA victory over the Americans is overwhelming enough, that Taiwan will surrender without putting up much, if any fight, thereby saving countless Chinese lives on Taiwan island, and also means China takes Taiwan back large intact instead of as a bombed out ruin.

Imagine the Taiwan contingency as a spectrum, from "total independence" to "total reunification". The cost-benefit analysis varies for each type of action depending on its position along the spectrum. What Patch wrote describes actions the PRC might take if "total independence" were imminent (evidently, deterrence exists). However, he never claimed these are the actions the PRC would take in transitioning from the status quo to "total reunification". Note the difference between "China can" vs "China will".

To put this simply, first strike on US and Japanese bases is damn crazy lol (yes, I fully understand the reasoning behind it and agree that in some scenarios this is the "correct" option). It would incur significant costs and risks to China. At the present time and in the foreseeable future, as long as Taiwan's status doesn't shift too far towards the "total independence" end, the risks associated with first strike remain unacceptable to the PRC and CCP.

I think this part should be obvious. The Taiwan question should be solved at a minimal cost to the PRC, which means no first strike and instead relying solely on A2/AD and deterrence. This changes the entire calculus: China can beat the US with first strike vs China can beat the US without first strike are two very different propositions.

As such, I would define militarily "ready" as the point when China can achieve this while keeping the associated risks and costs acceptable to the PRC and CCP.

This would mean being ready for a total war with the US with the assumption that the US will "fight until the last American", without pulling a modern Pearl Harbour. It means largely matching the US on every step of the escalation ladder and establish ample deterrence. Given that even the Fujian is still years away from reaching IOC, China is far from this readiness.

I recommend reading a convo here that happened 3 years ago where Rick talked a lot about US v China in a war of attrition. PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Sidenote and to support my above points, I see some have brought up the 2049 date. Yes, Taiwan is a key part of the great rejuvenation, but let's not forget that it's not the only part. Is it "great rejuvenation" if it means the country's GDP declines by 10-20% or more as a result of a proactive reunification? Is it "great rejuvenation" if China gets bogged down in a prolonged conflict ending in a pyrrhic victory? Is it "great rejuvenation" if the war causes large-scale social unrest and political turmoil? As long as Taiwan's status quo remains relatively acceptable (of course, the default direction is heading towards the independence end), it's a no brainer to wait longer and reduce these risks, even if it means going beyond the 2049 date (though I think this is very unlikely to happen). This is not to say that China isn't in a hurry; we clearly are.
 
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lcloo

Captain
I believe this quote from Mao Ze Dong is still relevant today. This is one of his strategy of winning the civil war against KMT. And when China is ready, they will only need the correct timing regardless of any dateline.

Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.

The area that China is still lacking is nuclear deterence as in the number of warheads and long range delivery vehicles. Once this area is covered, China is practically untouchable unless someone wants a global nuclear war. In conventional non-nuclear war the only peer is USA but they will face logistic problem if they choose to fight at China's door steps.

US will have quantitative disadvantage in manpower and equipment, the Pacific ocean is an obstacle as the travel time to reach East China seas from Pearl Harbor, Guam, Darwin and Alaska is long. While bases in South Korea, Japan proper, Okinawa and Philippine are within Mainland China's missile and bomber strike range.

AR could be less bloody in future than now, do expect a lot of AI combat machines will die fighting in place of human soldiers.
 
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