What does "ready" even mean? There will always be a bit more time China could wait to be able to kick the US's ass epsilon harder. If you define it as simply a resounding victory in a Taiwan/1IC conflict, well, you compiled all of Patchwork's posts, you should know very well they're more than capable of that already, and my own opinion is the PLA can also be confident of a decisive victory in a broader conflict within the 2IC in a couple years time. Even US copium peddlers admit the US will be at a vulnerable "nadir" of capability in the late 2020s (they're just wrong about where the trend goes after that).
China has a date. Hard deadline is 2049 which is the centenary of the People's Republic of China. That's a hard deadline where national rejuvenation will be complete. If you read just a tiny deeper, there is no complete rejuvenation without reunification with the Taiwan Province.
Any attempt by the Party to sell the idea that rejuvenation has been achieved without Taiwan would be ridiculed by even the most leftist communists. So, the leadership, the Party, the People, the PLA, everyone has a deadline. 2049
However that's the latest, I actually think that Xi's third (+ possibly more) term mandate is to deal with Taiwan. Either complete reunification or to so significantly improve PRC's operational position wrt Taiwan, that it will more or less look like an inevitability that there will be a reunification in the following years after he steps down.
And while I agree that delaying for the best shot is always a good idea, some times, very rare opportunities come that they shouldn't be missed. Late 2020s, US Military will have big capability gaps against the PLA while also having the "art of the deal" Trump in charge. I think that would be a rare opportunity that Xi could/should push to exploit to make advances on Taiwan
Deadline of 2027 on the PLA to have the capability and capacity to invade Taiwan if ordered, even if US and pets intervene.
I think the main area of divergence between our views is that while you seem to think that America can still be dissuaded from directly getting involved in the fight for Taiwan, and views avoidance of direct full scale military clashes between China and America as a primary objective and consideration. I am of the more pessimistic view that such a full clash is all but inevitable and as such, places little value in actively trying to dissuade the Americans and believe that the PLA’s primary focus and strategy would be how to comprehensively and overwhelmingly defeat the US in open full scale combat operations.
The main practical implications are that your strategy places prominence in delaying forcing America to show its cards and prioritises concluding armed reunification of Taiwan ASAP to try and end the war before America can get involved. Whereas my preferred strategy is to force America to commit to the fight before it is ready and defeat American forces and eject them from the entire Asia Pacific region.
The benefit of your strategy is that there is a chance you can avoid fighting America. But the downside is that if deterrence fails, the bulk of the fighting will be done in and around China, with the inevitable fallout and collateral damage that will ensue.
My strategy involves taking the fight to the Americans and their vassals, so the bulk of the fight and damage will be done over their territory. There is even a reasonable chance that if the PLA victory over the Americans is overwhelming enough, that Taiwan will surrender without putting up much, if any fight, thereby saving countless Chinese lives on Taiwan island, and also means China takes Taiwan back large intact instead of as a bombed out ruin.
Imagine the Taiwan contingency as a spectrum, from "total independence" to "total reunification". The cost-benefit analysis varies for each type of action depending on its position along the spectrum. What Patch wrote describes actions the PRC might take if "total independence" were imminent (evidently, deterrence exists). However, he never claimed these are the actions the PRC
would take in transitioning from the status quo to "total reunification". Note the difference between "China can" vs "China will".
To put this simply, first strike on US and Japanese bases is damn crazy lol (yes, I fully understand the reasoning behind it and agree that in some scenarios this is the "correct" option). It would incur
significant costs and risks to China. At the present time and in the foreseeable future, as long as Taiwan's status doesn't shift too far towards the "total independence" end, the risks associated with first strike remain unacceptable to the PRC and CCP.
I think this part should be obvious. The Taiwan question should be solved at a minimal cost to the PRC,
which means no first strike and instead relying solely on A2/AD and deterrence. This changes the entire calculus:
China can beat the US with first strike vs China can beat the US without first strike are two very different propositions.
As such, I would define militarily "ready" as the point when China can achieve this while keeping the associated risks and costs acceptable to the PRC and CCP.
This would mean being ready for a total war with the US with the assumption that the US will "fight until the last American", without pulling a modern Pearl Harbour. It means largely matching the US on every step of the escalation ladder and establish ample deterrence. Given that even the Fujian is still years away from reaching IOC, China is far from this readiness.
I recommend reading a convo here that happened 3 years ago where Rick talked a lot about US v China in a war of attrition.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
Sidenote and to support my above points, I see some have brought up the 2049 date. Yes, Taiwan is a key part of the great rejuvenation, but let's not forget that it's not the only part. Is it "great rejuvenation" if it means the country's GDP declines by 10-20% or more as a result of a proactive reunification? Is it "great rejuvenation" if China gets bogged down in a prolonged conflict ending in a pyrrhic victory? Is it "great rejuvenation" if the war causes large-scale social unrest and political turmoil? As long as Taiwan's status quo remains relatively acceptable (of course, the default direction is heading towards the independence end), it's a no brainer to wait longer and reduce these risks,
even if it means going beyond the 2049 date (though I think this is very unlikely to happen). This is not to say that China isn't in a hurry; we clearly are.