PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

bebops

Junior Member
Registered Member
China has the pieces to win but it depends on how they use them. If China uses Russian strategy on Taiwan, it will be a bloody war on China's side.

China only have one chance to make this right. There is no second chance

If China uses U.S strategy on the Iraq or Afghan war, then it won't be as bloody on China's side. U.S basically bombed everything included pocket of resistance before sending troops in.

or If China uses Israel's super safe strategy, it minimized troop causalities on China's side.
 

lcloo

Captain
How many hours or days can ROC Navy withstand onslaught of PLA/PLAN/PLAAF?

ROC Navy has 4 major bases, 2 of which are in the North of Taiwan (Keelung 基隆 and Suao 苏澳), 1 at Penghu islands (Magong 马公), and another at the South of Taiwan island (Zuoying 左营).
Screenshot 2025-01-17 103812.jpg


List of major combat ships (other ships not included)
Destroyers -
4X Keelung class built in 1978, displacement 9,600 tons. Originally built for Iran.

Frigates -
10X Cheng Kung Class (based on Oliver Hazard Perry class), commissioned 1993 - 2004, fully loaded 4,300 tons.
2X second hand Oliver H Perry class, ex-USS Taylor and ex-USS Gary (both ships commissioned in USN in1984).
6X Kangding class, commissioned in 1996-1998, displacement 3,800 tons based on La Fayette class.
6X Chi Yang class (Ex-Knox class built in 1971, 1972 and 1974), 4,260 tons.

Corvettes -
6X Ching Chiang class 500 tons (delivered in 1999-2000)
7X Tuo Chiang class (total planned 12), commisionned 2014-2024, 600 tons

FAC -
30X Kuang Hua VI class 2003-2022, displacement 171 tons.

Submarine -
2X Chien Lung class (based on Dutch Zwaardvis class), 1982-1986, displacement 2,660 tons submerged.
2X Trench class (training only), built in 1944-1951, 2,460 tons submerged.
Hai Lung class - not in service yet, 1 built, 7 planned, 2,500 tons.
 
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Biscuits

Colonel
Registered Member
China has the pieces to win but it depends on how they use them. If China uses Russian strategy on Taiwan, it will be a bloody war on China's side.

China only have one chance to make this right. There is no second chance

If China uses U.S strategy on the Iraq or Afghan war, then it won't be as bloody on China's side. U.S basically bombed everything included pocket of resistance before sending troops in.

or If China uses Israel's super safe strategy, it minimized troop causalities on China's side.
Check the latest results from the Palestine war. China would do well to thoroughly analyse the cause of how a tiny nation could in the end best a (relative) military giant. If we waive moral arguments and only look at force balance, this Palestine conflict is the CCW preview.

Some points:

Israel's fire support was nearly exclusively from A2A fighter jets carrying glide bombs, not artillery, drones and loitering bombers. Probably this led to scenarios where soldiers could not have on demand fire support, but had to wait for planes to take off (at which point the Palestinians would be in hiding). And the number of munitions dropped can't be too high if you don't have dedicated bombers and/or rocket artillery.

The use of conscripts: many had poor training and moral caliber, making occupation an unnecessary struggle. Not only that, but using them caused economic impact. In contrast, Russia using well paid volunteers instead has avoided a significant economic loss, through their training is not necessarily better than Israeli counterparts. China needs top tier training programs for career soldiers, while less important rear line tasks could conceivably be left to Russian style volunteers. And conscription is perhaps better off avoided altogether.

Israel allowed other nations around Palestine to support it and didn't commit signficant retaliation even against violent blockades being imposed. This put the leadership on a timer. If a second nation plays Ansarallah or Iran against Chinese products and shipping during a restart of the CCW, China must not only do a few symbolic raids or retaliate with covert actions only, but fully counterattack.

The entitlement of Israeli officials in trying to access their allies was a pure shot in the foot. They could have cast the conflict in a more positive light with soft propaganda, but insisted on ham fisted tactics like buying corrupt politicians into censoring the public. Imagine if Russia insisted to police average Chinese people for anti-Ukraine war sentiment and demand every last bit of it being scrubbed.

Finally, with minimal industry, Israel does not really have a way to replenish munitions quickly. Especially not IADS. That might be a contributor to why the war has to end soon. China can avoid this rather easily.

Imho the Israel war will be a significant event for China to analyse, but it is far from a prediction that the PLA will be insufficient to hold Taiwan, because China is not subject to the same types of pitfalls, despite the on paper power balance having some resemblance.

That's my take on the soon ending conflict and what it teaches China.
 

solarz

Brigadier
never, they will liberate the main island directly and swiftly.

If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.

Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.

The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.

Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.

Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.

The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.

Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.
Kinmen isn't enough. It is like 3 km off the coast of Xiamen, it provides no advantage and only serves as a warning + excuse for sanctions.
 

Overbom

Brigadier
Registered Member
If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.

Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.

The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.

Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.
No. Russia thought in the same way with Crimea.

No. There is no part-AR or half measures. it's either gray zone warfare or full-AR time. No half jobs
 

HardBall

New Member
Registered Member
If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.

Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.

The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.

Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.

Like others have said, Kinmen or other coastal islands currently under ROC control have close to no military value. All that does would be to spur a more firm western alliance against further military actions.

Pascadores, on the other hand, is probably the most strategic area to take. It would serve as the perfect springboard for many aspects of a full on invasion down the road. Just from a purely military and geopolitical perspecive, taking Kinmen and Matsu would be a liability, where as the Pascadores would be a significant coup, that renders further operations much easier (if enough infrastructures can be built there in the meantime) and more likely to succeed.
 
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