Armed reunification.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
China has the pieces to win but it depends on how they use them. If China uses Russian strategy on Taiwan, it will be a bloody war on China's side.
China only have one chance to make this right. There is no second chance
If China uses U.S strategy on the Iraq or Afghan war, then it won't be as bloody on China's side. U.S basically bombed everything included pocket of resistance before sending troops in.
or If China uses Israel's super safe strategy, it minimized troop causalities on China's side.
China only have one chance to make this right. There is no second chance
If China uses U.S strategy on the Iraq or Afghan war, then it won't be as bloody on China's side. U.S basically bombed everything included pocket of resistance before sending troops in.
or If China uses Israel's super safe strategy, it minimized troop causalities on China's side.
lcloo
Captain
How many hours or days can ROC Navy withstand onslaught of PLA/PLAN/PLAAF?
ROC Navy has 4 major bases, 2 of which are in the North of Taiwan (Keelung 基隆 and Suao 苏澳), 1 at Penghu islands (Magong 马公), and another at the South of Taiwan island (Zuoying 左营).
List of major combat ships (other ships not included)
Destroyers -
4X Keelung class built in 1978, displacement 9,600 tons. Originally built for Iran.
Frigates -
10X Cheng Kung Class (based on Oliver Hazard Perry class), commissioned 1993 - 2004, fully loaded 4,300 tons.
2X second hand Oliver H Perry class, ex-USS Taylor and ex-USS Gary (both ships commissioned in USN in1984).
6X Kangding class, commissioned in 1996-1998, displacement 3,800 tons based on La Fayette class.
6X Chi Yang class (Ex-Knox class built in 1971, 1972 and 1974), 4,260 tons.
Corvettes -
6X Ching Chiang class 500 tons (delivered in 1999-2000)
7X Tuo Chiang class (total planned 12), commisionned 2014-2024, 600 tons
FAC -
30X Kuang Hua VI class 2003-2022, displacement 171 tons.
Submarine -
2X Chien Lung class (based on Dutch Zwaardvis class), 1982-1986, displacement 2,660 tons submerged.
2X Trench class (training only), built in 1944-1951, 2,460 tons submerged.
Hai Lung class - not in service yet, 1 built, 7 planned, 2,500 tons.
ROC Navy has 4 major bases, 2 of which are in the North of Taiwan (Keelung 基隆 and Suao 苏澳), 1 at Penghu islands (Magong 马公), and another at the South of Taiwan island (Zuoying 左营).
List of major combat ships (other ships not included)
Destroyers -
4X Keelung class built in 1978, displacement 9,600 tons. Originally built for Iran.
Frigates -
10X Cheng Kung Class (based on Oliver Hazard Perry class), commissioned 1993 - 2004, fully loaded 4,300 tons.
2X second hand Oliver H Perry class, ex-USS Taylor and ex-USS Gary (both ships commissioned in USN in1984).
6X Kangding class, commissioned in 1996-1998, displacement 3,800 tons based on La Fayette class.
6X Chi Yang class (Ex-Knox class built in 1971, 1972 and 1974), 4,260 tons.
Corvettes -
6X Ching Chiang class 500 tons (delivered in 1999-2000)
7X Tuo Chiang class (total planned 12), commisionned 2014-2024, 600 tons
FAC -
30X Kuang Hua VI class 2003-2022, displacement 171 tons.
Submarine -
2X Chien Lung class (based on Dutch Zwaardvis class), 1982-1986, displacement 2,660 tons submerged.
2X Trench class (training only), built in 1944-1951, 2,460 tons submerged.
Hai Lung class - not in service yet, 1 built, 7 planned, 2,500 tons.
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Check the latest results from the Palestine war. China would do well to thoroughly analyse the cause of how a tiny nation could in the end best a (relative) military giant. If we waive moral arguments and only look at force balance, this Palestine conflict is the CCW preview.
Some points:
Israel's fire support was nearly exclusively from A2A fighter jets carrying glide bombs, not artillery, drones and loitering bombers. Probably this led to scenarios where soldiers could not have on demand fire support, but had to wait for planes to take off (at which point the Palestinians would be in hiding). And the number of munitions dropped can't be too high if you don't have dedicated bombers and/or rocket artillery.
The use of conscripts: many had poor training and moral caliber, making occupation an unnecessary struggle. Not only that, but using them caused economic impact. In contrast, Russia using well paid volunteers instead has avoided a significant economic loss, through their training is not necessarily better than Israeli counterparts. China needs top tier training programs for career soldiers, while less important rear line tasks could conceivably be left to Russian style volunteers. And conscription is perhaps better off avoided altogether.
Israel allowed other nations around Palestine to support it and didn't commit signficant retaliation even against violent blockades being imposed. This put the leadership on a timer. If a second nation plays Ansarallah or Iran against Chinese products and shipping during a restart of the CCW, China must not only do a few symbolic raids or retaliate with covert actions only, but fully counterattack.
The entitlement of Israeli officials in trying to access their allies was a pure shot in the foot. They could have cast the conflict in a more positive light with soft propaganda, but insisted on ham fisted tactics like buying corrupt politicians into censoring the public. Imagine if Russia insisted to police average Chinese people for anti-Ukraine war sentiment and demand every last bit of it being scrubbed.
Finally, with minimal industry, Israel does not really have a way to replenish munitions quickly. Especially not IADS. That might be a contributor to why the war has to end soon. China can avoid this rather easily.
Imho the Israel war will be a significant event for China to analyse, but it is far from a prediction that the PLA will be insufficient to hold Taiwan, because China is not subject to the same types of pitfalls, despite the on paper power balance having some resemblance.
That's my take on the soon ending conflict and what it teaches China.
solarz
Brigadier
If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.
Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.
The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.
Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.
Kinmen isn't enough. It is like 3 km off the coast of Xiamen, it provides no advantage and only serves as a warning + excuse for sanctions.
No. Russia thought in the same way with Crimea.
No. There is no part-AR or half measures. it's either gray zone warfare or full-AR time. No half jobs
Like others have said, Kinmen or other coastal islands currently under ROC control have close to no military value. All that does would be to spur a more firm western alliance against further military actions.
Pascadores, on the other hand, is probably the most strategic area to take. It would serve as the perfect springboard for many aspects of a full on invasion down the road. Just from a purely military and geopolitical perspecive, taking Kinmen and Matsu would be a liability, where as the Pascadores would be a significant coup, that renders further operations much easier (if enough infrastructures can be built there in the meantime) and more likely to succeed.
Considering China is unlikely to make a bolt-from-the-blue attack when armed reunification begins, these bases would probably be mostly empty when the conflict begins. Taiwan's strategy is to disperse everything to the east of the island if a crisis occurs. These bases could be expected to last about as long as any other major Taiwanese military base; all would be subjected to bombardment and neutralization (IMO probably not destruction, as the PLA may have an interest in using the bases after Taiwan is occupied) in the opening days of the campaign.
These are big traditional surface combatants. Way back when they were initially bought/built by Taiwan, they would have been effective against the then PLA Navy, which had destroyers of loosely similar design and similar (maybe smaller?) number.
I can't see these being effective at all in the present day. Especially with so many VLS-equipped vessels, China can bring to bear many more anti-ship missiles than Taiwan can, as well as many more SAMs. Coupled with the numerous diesel-electric subs that can be expected to begin operating around Taiwan in the weeks before the conflict begins, they would likely be sunk quickly (a very generous maximum estimate for their survival would be half a week). Note that while conducting searches over a much greater area with a much more unsophisticated force, the Imperial Japanese Navy managed to sink the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse within a few days of the Pacific War starting. The ROC's big surface combatants don't stand a chance against China's sophisticated naval search and strike systems.
These might survive longer than the big surface combatants just because they are so numerous and relatively small. That said, I am skeptical they could do any damage. Not much information is available in English, but my understanding of Taiwan's anti-ship strike complex is that it primarily relies on a large number of coastal radars to find targets. Their locations are probably well known to the PLA and would be hit quickly. Without them, they would be forced to either turn on their radars or approach PLA ships within visual range, allowing them to be spotted and quickly destroyed.
Because of their large number the destruction of the actual boats would be a bit more time consuming than finding and sinking the big surface combatants. Assuming the Taiwanese central command is quickly destroyed, finding and destroying surviving boats might loosely resemble the Scud hunting of the Gulf War (albeit much easier and completely successful). The Taiwanese plan is apparently to disperse the Kuang Hua VI class in small coastal fishing ports. I would expect them to have some sort of camouflage in mind. If they don't their destruction would come even faster.
Excluding the Tench class boats, in theory these would be the most survivable and effective parts of the ROC Navy. How long they survive depends on the aggressiveness of the boats' commanders and just what exactly their mission is. If they are tasked with crossing the median line and trying to attack PLA ships in mainland coastal waters, they will probably not last long. If they are instead instructed to pull back to more distant locations (somewhere in the Western Pacific maybe?) and then attack the PLA amphibious fleet when it eventually approaches, their destruction depends on whether Taiwanese communications infrastructure actually survives long enough for them to be given that order, and when the amphibious assault begins. Once they do attempt attacks or come close to PLA vessels, they will probably be destroyed quickly.
That said, compared to surface vessels, the submarines have a much higher prospect for survival if they were to flee to a different country's port. Depending on the political inclinations of the commanders of each boat and the crew, I can imagine some either surrendering to Chinese forces or, on the other hand, fleeing to Japan to either seek asylum (if Japan and the US remain not directly involved) or integrate with US-Japanese forces (if the conflict has become a wider war).
And on another note, depending on the coverage Chinese diesel-electric subs can give of the waters around Taiwan, it is possible they will be found long before hostilities even begin, tracked, and then sunk immediately once the campaign begins.
Note that this whole analysis, for the most part, does not take into account China's ability to degrade Taiwan's communications infrastructure, nor does it factor in weather, which if favorable would increase the effectiveness of China's maritime surveillance network. In this case, a generous maximum estimate for the survival of Taiwan's navy would be measured in hours and not days.
The small ships and boats will be hunted down by MALE drones.