Armed reunification.What's AR? Armoured Raid?
Armed reunification.What's AR? Armoured Raid?
Check the latest results from the Palestine war. China would do well to thoroughly analyse the cause of how a tiny nation could in the end best a (relative) military giant. If we waive moral arguments and only look at force balance, this Palestine conflict is the CCW preview.China has the pieces to win but it depends on how they use them. If China uses Russian strategy on Taiwan, it will be a bloody war on China's side.
China only have one chance to make this right. There is no second chance
If China uses U.S strategy on the Iraq or Afghan war, then it won't be as bloody on China's side. U.S basically bombed everything included pocket of resistance before sending troops in.
or If China uses Israel's super safe strategy, it minimized troop causalities on China's side.
never, they will liberate the main island directly and swiftly.
Kinmen isn't enough. It is like 3 km off the coast of Xiamen, it provides no advantage and only serves as a warning + excuse for sanctions.If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.
Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.
The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.
Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.
No. Russia thought in the same way with Crimea.If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.
Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.
The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.
Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.
If we treat TW as a purely military matter, then game theory inevitably points to direct military confrontation between China and the US. For example, if we imagine, hypothetically, China launches an all out attack on TW tomorrow. The US would be forced to respond militarily, otherwise its hegemony would be shattered. This is something neither China nor the US wants.
Therefore, more important than the military aspect of TW is the political aspect. As I mentioned previously, the goal of the US is to contain or reverse China's growth while maintaining their own growth (and by growth I mean economic, military, and technological). The best way to achieve this is to embroil China in a costly war while the US sits back and watch, much like what it is currently doing to Russia in Ukraine. As such, they must take steps to provoke China into attacking TW all the while being able to keep themselves from getting embroiled in the war directly. They believe they can accomplish this by successfully portraying China as a regional threat and therefore rallying Japan, SK, Philippines, and Australia for use as cannon fodder. With that kind of buffer, the US could just sit back and supply weapons and mercenaries while China would be forced to fight a war of attrition. Although I believe China would win even in such a scenario, I would posit that this is the worst outcome for China short of MAD.
The ideal outcome for China in an AR scenario is having the PLA quickly pacify TW resistance while none of the aforementioned actors interfere in the process. For Japan, SK, and Philippines, this can be accomplished by convincing them that TW is not their core interest. As long as these countries do not feel threatened by China's launch of AR, they will remain neutral, as they have the most to lose otherwise. If those three countries refuse to be used by the US to attack China, then odds are the US will not be willing to fight China directly over Taiwan.
Therefore, the annexation of Kinmen becomes a logical retaliatory measure for a sufficiently severe provocation from the US. Taking over Kinmen while not launching AR against TW shows China's restraint and gives China a real strategic advantage when AR does happen. Similarly, seizing Penghu as part of a justifiable retaliatory measure will give China a chokehold on TW while leaving the US with sufficient face to back down.