PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

caohailiang · Dec 25, 2021

i am looking at all these discussion on a2g minition cost, but i believe that will be of least concern to the pla strategist.
here is another angle: for the plaaf sorties to deliver cheap munitions safely, there will need to be fighter CAP missions securing air superiority, against US INDOPACOM. for each additional day that air superiority is needed, there could be few dozen more lost of fighter aircrafts, how about the cost of that?
imho, the best strategy is to employ all possible delivery methods and disable tw defense asap without considering too much on munition cost. and get those troops across the strait asap, achieve fait accompli, and that will also be the cheapest strategy.

zxy_bc · Dec 26, 2021

supersnoop said:
This is why the recent discussion is focused primarily on speed and cost. The longer they can hold out, the more likely outside intervention becomes. Any occupation is basically game over.

Again the most relevant question becomes how well can Patriot and TK SAMs survive the ballistic missile salvo. It is inevitable that these will be launched regardless of cost. They are a sunk cost, and in any scenario, there is no point in holding them back.

Holdout in where exactly? Cause they certainly could not and would not holdout on the beach. In the metropolitan regions? That’s a possibility, and the most “considered” option by the ROC military. (Since they always advertised “ready to turn Taipei into a second Grozny”) But that would require to concentrate considerable capable forces in Taipei and other metropolitan areas dug in and wait for the PLA, which would give the PLA a free reign on the various beachheads. (Taipei is only currently delegated to a ROC marine brigade (which is capable) and MP units (capability unknown and unlikely to match the marines) specifically, as all mobile and mechanized units are pre-placed along the highways and near beachheads to anticipate possible PLA pushes)

Simply put, ROC ground troops do not have adequate number of capable reserves to respond to unexpected axis of attack from the PLA.

As for the SAM sites, their radars are more likely to subject to hard/soft attack from PLA’s EW capabilities than the batteries themselves during the 1st wave, as well as their precious few E2Cs. Without them, ROC cannot organize an effective AA network between its various missile batteries.

zxy_bc · Dec 26, 2021

caohailiang said:
i am looking at all these discussion on a2g minition cost, but i believe that will be of least concern to the pla strategist.
here is another angle: for the plaaf sorties to deliver cheap munitions safely, there will need to be fighter CAP missions securing air superiority, against US INDOPACOM. for each additional day that air superiority is needed, there could be few dozen more lost of fighter aircrafts, how about the cost of that?
imho, the best strategy is to employ all possible delivery methods and disable tw defense asap without considering too much on munition cost. and get those troops across the strait asap, achieve fait accompli, and that will also be the cheapest strategy.

First wave would be the fiercest one, combining PLAGF, RF, PLAAF and PLAN firepower with EW capabilities from PLASF. It must be fast and violent, crippling ROC defences and turning them into blind and deaf. Thus the use of precision munitions and smart munitions is definitely reasonable.

plawolf · Dec 26, 2021

caohailiang said:
i am looking at all these discussion on a2g minition cost, but i believe that will be of least concern to the pla strategist.
here is another angle: for the plaaf sorties to deliver cheap munitions safely, there will need to be fighter CAP missions securing air superiority, against US INDOPACOM. for each additional day that air superiority is needed, there could be few dozen more lost of fighter aircrafts, how about the cost of that?
imho, the best strategy is to employ all possible delivery methods and disable tw defense asap without considering too much on munition cost. and get those troops across the strait asap, achieve fait accompli, and that will also be the cheapest strategy.

And from where would these US fighters magically appear from?

The US will absolutely not get involved in the fight on day one even if they ultimately fully intend to get involved as that will only result in them getting curbstomped immediately.

They will need to spend considerable time marshalling their forces first, to feel like they have a fighting chance, and will in all likelihood wait until the PLA launches its main amphibious landings to attack to maximise effect and put pressure on China to fire the first shot if it doesn’t want to take that risk.

By not getting involved in the fighting directly initially, they will also be able to fly their recon assets far closer to Taiwan than they will have any right to hope for if they were actively engaged, and most likely try to provide intel, comms support and targeting data for Taiwan’s imported US weapons.

This is why the PLA will not have the luxury of just targeting radar and comms relays and not bother hunting down all the missile launchers.

I think the ROC will do what Saddam did during the second gulf war and pull as much of their SAMs and other high value targets into urban population centres as they can and use Taiwan’s civilian population as human shields against PLA missile attacks.

This is why the PLA’s big and growing drone fleet is going to be very important. It can and will use its drones to hunt out the hidden SAM launchers in the cities and also keep them pinned down and suppressed while the manned platforms focus on clearing the beachheads.

Once the PLA are ashore in force, the resistance in the cities will melt away. Or they will get rooted out and eradicated. The outcome will be the same, the only difference will be cost and time. But at that point, with PLA radar and missile batteries operating on Taiwan’s East coast, its game over as not even the most rabid America-First nut job has any delusions about the outcome of an attempted US amphibious assault against a PLA held Taiwan.

caohailiang · Dec 26, 2021

plawolf said:
And from where would these US fighters magically appear from?

Kadena is obviously out of the question. Those on the Kyushu are also too close to mainland.
But airbases such as Hamamatsu, Iwo Jima or Andersson are still relatively safe

plawolf said:
They will need to spend considerable time marshalling their forces first, to feel like they have a fighting chance, and will in all likelihood wait until the PLA launches its main amphibious landings to attack to maximise effect and put pressure on China to fire the first shot if it doesn’t want to take that risk.

i think you are right.
and i think US does not need continuous air superiority, they only need to temporarily open a corridor every now and then so the long range cruise missile salvo can goes in to sink large number of PLAN transport ships. Given current disparity between USAF and PLAAF, that is not impossible.
and yes, targeting info in the strait is a very difficult problem, if i were PLA commander, that is where i will pay a lot of attention.

AndrewS · Dec 26, 2021

caohailiang said:
i am looking at all these discussion on a2g minition cost, but i believe that will be of least concern to the pla strategist.
here is another angle: for the plaaf sorties to deliver cheap munitions safely, there will need to be fighter CAP missions securing air superiority, against US INDOPACOM. for each additional day that air superiority is needed, there could be few dozen more lost of fighter aircrafts, how about the cost of that?
imho, the best strategy is to employ all possible delivery methods and disable tw defense asap without considering too much on munition cost. and get those troops across the strait asap, achieve fait accompli, and that will also be the cheapest strategy.

Perhaps I should make it more clear.

If your weapons cost less, it means you can buy a lot more of them for the same budget.
Or spend the money elsewhere.

---
Plus you need to consider the stages of any Taiwan scenario. Until recently, the Chinese Air Force and Missile Force couldn't obtain air superiority over Taiwan. But today, after few first days of hostilities, we can already expect the Chinese Air Force to have something close to air superiority for the vast majority of the time (the exception being when the USAF decides to mount a brief incursion by massing its forces to reach Taiwan)

So the next stage is to degrade the ability of Taiwan to resist an invasion, which requires a large number of Air-to-Ground weapons targeted all over Taiwan. With glide-bombs launched by fighter bomber aircraft, I see very little risk of the aircraft being shot down by SAMs. In any case, these aircraft/bombs force any Taiwanese SAMs and aircraft to engage and expose themselves.

As part of this, the general Taiwanese economy will be crippled, along with the mobilisation and sustainment of Taiwan's military reserves. Around Week 3, I see hunger starting to be an issue in Taiwan.

I see the earliest that China could mount an amphibious assault in force as being in 3 weeks, so there's at least 3 weeks of operations where guided glide-bombs can be launched by planes. And a prerequisite for any Taiwan invasion is for Chinese surveillance/attack drones to be flying constantly over Taiwan's airspace. Given that is the case, we can assume that low-cost bombs can be dropped with impunity over Taiwan. Note that I see low-cost surveillance/attack drones flying constantly over Taiwan. I don't expect larger manned fighter-bombers to spend much (if any) time over Taiwan.

The money saved by using short-range bombs (instead of expensive missiles) can be redirected to the next phase, which is the actual invasion and preventing any outside interference.

Plus if you want a fait-accompli, you do actually have to put enough forces ashore in Taiwan to make it obvious.
And the terms of a political settlement should to be generous eg. Taiwan can keep its armed forces, currency, etc etc
Ongoing, the Chinese military only really wants the 2 mountain airbases facing the Pacific and a single naval base in Taiwan.

zxy_bc · Dec 26, 2021

AndrewS said:
Perhaps I should make it more clear.

If your weapons cost less, it means you can buy a lot more of them for the same budget.
Or spend the money elsewhere.

---
Plus you need to consider the stages of any Taiwan scenario. Until recently, the Chinese Air Force and Missile Force couldn't obtain air superiority over Taiwan. But today, after few first days of hostilities, we can already expect the Chinese Air Force to have something close to air superiority for the vast majority of the time (the exception being when the USAF decides to mount a brief incursion by massing its forces to reach Taiwan)

So the next stage is to degrade the ability of Taiwan to resist an invasion, which requires a large number of Air-to-Ground weapons targeted all over Taiwan. With glide-bombs launched by fighter bomber aircraft, I see very little risk of the aircraft being shot down by SAMs. In any case, these aircraft/bombs force any Taiwanese SAMs and aircraft to engage and expose themselves.

As part of this, the general Taiwanese economy will be crippled, along with the mobilisation and sustainment of Taiwan's military reserves. Around Week 3, I see hunger starting to be an issue in Taiwan.

I see the earliest that China could mount an amphibious assault in force as being in 3 weeks, so there's at least 3 weeks of operations where guided glide-bombs can be launched by planes. And a prerequisite for any Taiwan invasion is for Chinese surveillance/attack drones to be flying constantly over Taiwan's airspace. Given that is the case, we can assume that low-cost bombs can be dropped with impunity over Taiwan. Note that I see low-cost surveillance/attack drones flying constantly over Taiwan. I don't expect larger manned fighter-bombers to spend much (if any) time over Taiwan.

The money saved by using short-range bombs (instead of expensive missiles) can be redirected to the next phase, which is the actual invasion and preventing any outside interference.

Plus if you want a fait-accompli, you do actually have to put enough forces ashore in Taiwan to make it obvious.
And the terms of a political settlement should to be generous eg. Taiwan can keep its armed forces, currency, etc etc
Ongoing, the Chinese military only really wants the 2 mountain airbases facing the Pacific and a single naval base in Taiwan.

3 weeks of preparation? May I ask how did you come by this time frame, and what are the factors you’ve considered that would have prolong the preparation phase? And if your estimate are correct then why are the US military even bothering to “express their concern” of not being able to reinforce Taiwan in time. (Because US estimate of its military’s maximum time needed to assemble the first task force and reaching Taiwan is 17 days)

For USAF to challenge air superiority, its bases of choice are severely limited due to the geography. And it would require them to concentrate large number of aircrafts to less than 5 air bases, which is exactly what the US had been avoiding to do.

zxy_bc · Dec 26, 2021

AndrewS said:
Plus if you want a fait-accompli, you do actually have to put enough forces ashore in Taiwan to make it obvious.
And the terms of a political settlement should to be generous eg. Taiwan can keep its armed forces, currency, etc etc
Ongoing, the Chinese military only really wants the 2 mountain airbases facing the Pacific and a single naval base in Taiwan.

This is a view that’s shared by some of the analysts in Pentagon as well, citing that PLA would pause their operation to wait for political settlement. What I don’t understand is what are the basis of such view? To mainland China, Taiwan is sovereign territory of the PRC. Why would they pause in the middle of military operation to let the enemy and traitors to recuperate and gather more strength, instead of continuing liberating the Island. They have the claim and the support of the mainland population. Why would they even consider pause during an extremely time-sensitive military operation that hours of difference could determine the entire outcome?

Overbom · Dec 26, 2021

zxy_bc said:
This is a view that’s shared by some of the analysts in Pentagon as well, citing that PLA would pause their operation to wait for political settlement. What I don’t understand is what are the basis of such view? To mainland China, Taiwan is sovereign territory of the PRC. Why would they pause in the middle of military operation to let the enemy and traitors to recuperate and gather more strength, instead of continuing liberating the Island. They have the claim and the support of the mainland population. Why would they even consider pause during an extremely time-sensitive military operation that hours of difference could determine the entire outcome?

Taiwan is a far more complex matter than China simply attacking it. It has era-changing consequences which could be a reason why China could possibly like a political settlement.

Complex problems usually require complex solutions

zxy_bc · Dec 26, 2021

Overbom said:
Taiwan is a far more complex matter than China simply attacking it. It has era-changing consequences which could be a reason why China could possibly like a political settlement.

Complex problems usually require complex solutions

But what he suggested of “PLA wanting a few military bases” on Taiwan does not make much sense either. It defeated the whole purpose of reunification, if ROC is permitted to exist with its own military and not commanded by CMC. I could see turning Taiwan into another SAR with limited policing capabilities as it was the desired solution of PRC leadership during the 80s, but leaving the ROC military untouched option itself is a political dynamite, for both PRC and ROC.

PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

caohailiang

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zxy_bc

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zxy_bc

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plawolf

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caohailiang

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AndrewS

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zxy_bc

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zxy_bc

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Overbom

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zxy_bc

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