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As for the scorched earth policy, there is no way to disregard Taiwan's readiness to retaliate against a Chinese invasion, which contrary to what they make it seem, they have several underground shelters and mountains to withstand Chinese bombers, as well as secret bases in the middle of the jungle. One of the defense policies is for all reservists to take refuge in the mountains with predictions that would last a long time, which would allow for a considerable human war effort prolonged over months.
It has a mountain range called Yu Shan, 3,900m high, whose flanks are truffled with camouflaged fortresses, whose exit gates are made of steel. I would say that half of Taiwan's strength is the army, the other half is the mountains and valleys. One is not worth the other. In addition to the tunnels created by Chiang Kai-sheks.
Consequently, Taipei's strategy shifted to deterrence in terms of the human, military, financial and political costs that a war would inflict on China. This thought was confirmed in Taiwan's Quadrennial Defense Review 2021, recently published inclusive.
Taipei's defense plan is based on a hybrid warfare strategy - what is known as the "hedgehog doctrine", or better "porcupine doctrine". This ranges from conventional warfare tactics to “running away from enemy forces and exploiting their weaknesses” and a growing set of options that recognize China's proximity to Taiwan's coast. The idea, according to the defense review, is to use means to "resist the enemy on the opposite bank, attack him at sea, destroy him on the coast, annihilate him at the head of the beach and shoot them down in large quantities in the air" .
Several studies and simulations concluded that Taiwan may contain at least one or 3 Chinese military incursions on the island. In short, Taiwan's porcupine doctrine has three defensive layers. The outer layer deals with intelligence and reconnaissance to ensure that the defense forces are fully prepared, is based on a set of fixed infrastructures and mobile radars and sensors, which are protected by short-, medium- and long-range anti-aircraft systems.
Behind that come surveillance plans at sea with air support from US-supplied E-2 aircraft. The innermost layer depends on the geography and demography of the island. The ultimate goal of this doctrine is to survive and inflict losses against an air offensive good enough to organize a "wall of fire" that will prevent the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) from easily invading the island and securing air and air superiority win without a high cost.
Looking at these layers one by one, over the years, Taiwan has developed and maintained a sophisticated air early warning system to buy time should China launch an invasion. The aim is to ensure that Beijing does not have troops and transport ships ready to cross the Taiwan Straits in a surprise offensive. As a result, China would have to initiate any invasion with a long-range missile-based offensive aimed at eliminating Taiwan's radar installations, aircraft runways and missile batteries.
If this succeeds, China will have to break through the second layer of Taiwan's defense plan so that its troops can safely sail to the island. But when trying to cross the straits, China's navy would face a guerrilla campaign at sea - what is known as the "flea war". This would be accomplished using small agile ships armed with missiles and SSK submarines, supported by ASW helicopters and ground anti-ship missile launchers. There would be huge losses.
But breaking this layer will not guarantee a safe landing for the PLA on Ilha Formosa. Geography and population are the backbone of the defensive third tier. The PLA has the ability to mount a full-scale bombing campaign on the Taiwanese island, but landing on it and deploying as soon as possible is another matter.
Taiwan's short west coast, just 400 km long, has only a handful of beaches suitable for landing troops, meaning that Taipei's military strategists would have a reasonably easy job when it comes to figuring out where the PLA would try. to land – especially with the sophisticated reconnaissance technology it acquired from its ally in the United States and with its anti-aircraft artillery, there would soon be huge losses, mainly of Chinese air-mobile brigades and of air-dropped parachute brigades. This is Taiwan's main deterrent. In the same way that China is a deterrent against the US with less budget, the same is true for Taiwan, the issue is being deterrent, not having total superiority or chance of victory (even with big losses).
This would allow the Taiwanese army to set up a deadly shooting gallery to prevent PLA amphibious forces from entering the island. Even after the Chinese boots were on Taiwanese soil after the destruction of much of the AAe artillery, the island's mountainous topography and urbanized environment would give defenders an edge when it comes to preventing the progress of a ground invasion via ATGMs, particularly in urban areas and in the jungle.
The defense review also called for the development of a locally produced, ground-missile-based long-range attack capability, part of an ongoing move toward self-sufficiency for Taiwan's defense forces.