Some considerations:
In Desert Storm, 92% of spent ammo was unguided. Assuming that this tonnage contributed to the successful outcome of the entire campaign - at the very least, allowing near continuous attacks against ground force and strategic targets for 38 days - it is clear that the same campaign achievements would have been difficult or impossible with the aircraft crash with the comparatively small number of precision guided munitions (PGM).
Although only 8 percent of the ammunition used against planned targets was targeted, they represented approximately 84 percent of the total ammunition cost. The cost difference between various types of guided and unguided munitions was quite substantial: the unguided munitions and the single bombs used in the air campaign cost an average of $649 each, while the average LGB (laser-guided bomb) costs more than $30,000 each - a 1:47 ratio. The AGM-65 Maverick missiles cost about $102,000 each - a cost ratio to unguided bombs of 1:157.
Although the cost relationships between guided and unguided weapon systems used in Desert Storm can be easily calculated, data on the accuracy or effectiveness of systems in Desert Storm is limited and often ambiguous. For example, guided and unguided ammunition were often used against the same targets. Therefore, given the deficiencies, an accurate probability of death for ammunition could not be determined in most cases. However, the CNA found a small number of data where conditions allowed an assessment of effectiveness. These data show that substantially more unguided bombs than LGBs or AGM-62 Walleye were required to successfully destroy military assets and the cost of the guided munitions used was substantially higher.
Cost appears to have been a factor in Desert Storm ammunition selection. For example, some drivers
Respondents were instructed to use LGBs and Mavericks only against high-value targets such as tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery (instead of trucks or other targets). If they could they wouldn't hit those targets, but they weren't able to use those ammo. They could, however, drop unguided bombs at other targets before returning to base. Likewise, the employment of TLAMs has been terminated after February 1st. Not to mention the fact that General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief of CENTCOM, did not approve of any additional TLAM attacks because daylight television coverage of the military strikes in central Baghdad proved unacceptable to Washington (let's ignore this irony) and its use was considered very expensive, given the TLAM's with relatively small warheads and high cost. Thus, this expensive ammunition was not used during the last two-thirds of the war.
Increasing the proportion of the US weapons stockpile made up of high-cost munitions has potential implications for the future effectiveness and employment of airpower. First, for a given level of resources, much higher costs limit the number of weapons that can be purchased. With fewer weapons, the priority placed on the survival and successful employment of each high-cost bomb is likely to be high, as demonstrated in Desert Storm. Second, Desert Storm revealed that the focus on increasing the survivability of the aircraft and the pilot may have reduced the mission's effectiveness, thus increasing the number of ammo needed to destroy or damage a target. Third, in Desert Storm it showed that commanders were less willing to allow widespread use of very expensive ammunition; the target value had to be enough to justify the cost of a guided weapon.
Depending on the platforms involved, unguided delivery munitions (in some cases, but not all) would require more sorties from aircraft than the delivery of guided munitions. This would increase the cost of unguided delivery, and expose a greater number of aircraft for defenses. However, guided ammunition delivery requires more direct and predictable flight times and increased pilot workload, thus making guided ammunition aircraft vulnerable to defences. In summary, the cost and survivability between guided and unguided munitions is not straightforward, and the cost difference, if any, can only be assessed based on specific delivery circumstances.
Back then, the USAF boasted 134 fighter squadrons, compared to just 55 today, the USAF aims to increase by 74 squadrons, which includes 7 fighter squadrons, increasing the squadron number to 62.
Plans include the following squadron additions by the 2025 to 2030 time frame:
1 airlift squadron, out of a total of 54.
5 bomber squadrons, out of a total of 14.
9 combat search and rescue squadrons, out of a total of 36
22 command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance squadrons, out of a total of 62, by far the largest increase.
7 fighter squadrons, out of a total of 62.
2 strike/reconnaissance remotely piloted aircraft squadrons, for a total of 27.
7 space squadrons, out of a total of 23.
7 special operations forces squadrons, out of a total of 27.
14 tanker squadrons, out of a total of 54.
Cyber and missile squadron totals would remain at 18 and nine, respectively, according to an Air Force chart; they would require “modernization … with no size increase,” per the chart.
In the Gulf War, coalition air forces formed against Iraq for Desert Storm totaled 2,430 aircraft, of which 1,300 were deployed by the US, including Navy and Marine Corps aircraft operating on aircraft carriers in the Red Sea and in the Mediterranean Sea. So large was the number of available aircraft that wing commanders complained, some analysts claimed they could have done what they did in Desert Storm with half what they employed.
Making up for the smaller number of platforms today is its greater capacity, especially in precision attacks. The vast majority of munitions the USAF employs today are precision guided. In Desert Storm, only 8 percent of all coalition weapons, by tonnage, were precision guided, and only 4.3 percent were laser-guided bombs, although LGBs represented 75 percent of destroyed strategic targets. (The rest of the PGMs were missiles like Maverick or HARM.)
What strategists learned in 1991 was that precision is a force multiplier. The USAF moved quickly to develop weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Ammunition (JDAMs), which use GPS guidance, as well as laser seekers in some variants.
Taiwan:
Desert Storm also saw the first application of stealth in combat. The USAF F-117 has proven that low observation aircraft can pass a good air defense system to attack the enemy's most valuable targets.
Tactics are just as important as the technologies that make aircraft difficult to detect and track. Eventually, if the PLA takes action against Taiwan, stealth will have to come in as another force multiplier, in addition to the guided munitions issue.
Iraq believed it was safe because of the KARI air defense system. KARI has assembled more than 150 Iraqi air defense missile batteries and anti-aircraft artillery, and more than 700 combat-capable fixed-wing tactical aircraft. Iraq had thousands of surface-to-air missiles as well as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons.
Modern air defense systems like Patriot can detect threats at a far greater range than those of the Desert Storm era. Stealth remains essential, making low observability a basic requirement for operating against a threat with a good IADS architecture like Taiwan.
Another force multiplier is EW aircraft.
Following Desert Storm, the USAF retired the F-4G Wild Weasel Enemy Air Defense Suppression/Destruction aircraft and the EF-111 Spark Vark warfare/electronic interference aircraft. The F-16s took over the SEAD/DEAD mission and the Navy took over the escort lockdown mission with their EA-6B Prowlers and later the EA-18G Growlers.
Have dedicated aircraft that can interfere from extremely low frequencies down to 3 Hz through detection bands and radio bands, radar bands like X, Ku and Ka bands, all the way through the spectrum, even ultraviolet wavelengths along with with advances in 5G, quantum computing, space and cybernetics, they will be able to effectively use EMS to break the enemy's IADS.
