PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Blitzo said:

The problem isn't whether it has/lacks APS or integrated drone counter measures specifically, the problem is more about everything else -- whether they have air superiority, scale of signature/concealment, extent of mobility, and the overall manner/stage in which they would be usable in a conflict with the PLA (i.e.: under what circumstances and stage of a conflict would the PLA conduct a landing to begin with).

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Sometimes we see so many trees in a forest, that we forget what we came for in the first place.

Bluefor coastal screen just lost point A(say, hill), which establishes security of fresh redfor landing and compromises blue defense. It can't retake it by itself, and by the time it will be able to prepare an attack - redfor will reinforce the point A.

"You" are fresh roc reserve with orders to immediately retake it. Air superiority, scale of signature, extent of mobility and quantum physics are not your concern, you're probably going to die too soon.

The only way to retake such position swiftly (without deploying into battle order and doing things at infantry infiltration speeds) is armored counterattack. And here, you either have the means or you don't.
I don't think there's a need to bring in higher realms when we're talking about a rather basic tactical task.

Starting position A, target position B. Maneuver/Attack is necessary, otherwise the landing perimeter will be established and the whole defense will be compromised.
Attack may fail, sure, but without attack - the failure on a far larger scale is already here.

Because all the smart assymetry with javelins, stingers and drones won't give you that hill.

Gloire_bb said:

Sometimes we see so many trees in a forest, that we forget what we came for in the first place.

Bluefor coastal screen just lost point A(say, hill), which establishes security of fresh redfor landing and compromises blue defense. It can't retake it by itself, and by the time it will be able to prepare an attack - redfor will reinforce the point A.

"You" are fresh roc reserve with orders to immediately retake it. Air superiority, scale of signature, extent of mobility and quantum physics are not your concern, you're probably going to die too soon.

The only way to retake such position swiftly (without deploying into battle order and doing things at infantry infiltration speeds) is armored counterattack. And here, you either have the means or you don't.
I don't think there's a need to bring in higher realms when we're talking about a rather basic tactical task.

Starting position A, target position B. Maneuver/Attack is necessary, otherwise the landing perimeter will be established and the whole defense will be compromised.
Attack may fail, sure, but without attack - the failure on a far larger scale is already here.

Because all the smart assymetry with javelins, stingers and drones won't give you that hill.

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I'm not sure how this relates to my previous point.

It seems you are describing a mission/scenario in which AFVs are needed and useful -- the question is why does the mission/scenario exist in the first place? Why are you being asked to swiftly retake a position, in context of your overall military strategy?

Putting it all another way -- why is your military strategy one where you have a number of AFVs and MBTs to act as important counter-attack elements, in the first place?

Blitzo said:

I'm not sure how this relates to my previous point.

It seems you are describing a mission/scenario in which AFVs are needed and useful -- the question is why does the mission/scenario exist in the first place? Why are you being asked to swiftly retake a position, in context of your overall military strategy?

Putting it all another way -- why is your military strategy one where you have a number of AFVs and MBTs to act as important counter-attack elements, in the first place?

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Like, formal logic goes as:
Redfor stated goal is landing.
Can Bluefor guarantee to prevent it?
No.
Then they begin planning next stage, what to do when PLA just landed, and what can be done with it.

Then there's going to be land combat. You can't fight land combat without AFVs (hamas/hesbollah style doesn't work for Taiwan for very obvious reasons), because direct infantry attack even against weak positions is usually a meh idea.

The best bet for bouefor to prevent/contain beachheads thus is armored counterattack.

Tank is not an optional for land warfare, it's a must. ROC buying them means they accept the reality that they won't be able to fight PLA off with magic wands.
It's almost impossible to imagine a scenario where tank will be useless to ROC. It's very possible they will be countered before making impact - but that's the nature of tank warfare since 1916.

Gloire_bb said:

Like, formal logic goes as:
Redfor stated goal is landing.
Can Bluefor guarantee to prevent it?
No.
Then they begin planning next stage, what to do when PLA just landed, and what can be done with it.

Then there's going to be land combat. You can't fight land combat without AFVs (hamas/hesbollah style doesn't work for Taiwan for very obvious reasons), because direct infantry attack even against weak positions is usually a meh idea.

The best bet for bouefor to prevent/contain beachheads thus is armored counterattack.

Tank is not an optional for land warfare, it's a must. ROC buying them means they accept the reality that they won't be able to fight PLA off with magic wands.
It's almost impossible to imagine a scenario where tank will be useless to ROC. It's very possible they will be countered before making impact - but that's the nature of tank warfare since 1916.

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I'm not sure if the PLA objective is even landing tbh. Seems much more about overwhelming ISR and fires dominance, aimed at Taiwan's energy, water, and telecom systems, to compel some kind of negotiated outcome

Gloire_bb said:

Like, formal logic goes as:
Redfor stated goal is landing.
Can Bluefor guarantee to prevent it?
No.
Then they begin planning next stage, what to do when PLA just landed, and what can be done with it.

Then there's going to be land combat. You can't fight land combat without AFVs (hamas/hesbollah style doesn't work for Taiwan for very obvious reasons), because direct infantry attack even against weak positions is usually a meh idea.

The best bet for bouefor to prevent/contain beachheads thus is armored counterattack.

Tank is not an optional for land warfare, it's a must. ROC buying them means they accept the reality that they won't be able to fight PLA off with magic wands.
It's almost impossible to imagine a scenario where tank will be useless to ROC. It's very possible they will be countered before making impact - but that's the nature of tank warfare since 1916.

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Prior to Patchwork's departure, he mentioned that it would take too much time to organise a brigade-level armoured counter-attack. There would be enough time for overhead UAVs to identify and then strike the vehicles as they prepared.

Since then, we've seen what is happening in Ukraine.

So I think that the side with control of the air (and therefore overhead drones) has made massed tank warfare infeasible.

leibowitz said:

I'm not sure if the PLA objective is even landing tbh. Seems much more about overwhelming ISR and fires dominance, aimed at Taiwan's energy, water, and telecom systems, to compel some kind of negotiated outcome

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That would be the preference.

But suppose a negotiated outcome between China-Taiwan isn't possible?

So they still have to plan for a landing and invasion.

And having the capability to do this, will influence the negotiations

15-10 years ago, when the PLA lacked long-term ground reconnaissance and strike capabilities, the M1A2 ensured its survivability by repeatedly maneuvering between firing positions and bunkers, but times have changed.

AndrewS said:

So I think that the side with control of the air (and therefore overhead drones) has made massed tank warfare infeasible.

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This was well known since the Easter Offensive in 1972. A theoretical solution is the development of a strong, multi-tiered battlefield air defense system similar to that the Soviets possessed since the late 1960s, but Taiwan is restricted by its reliance on a lot of American equipment. The US doesn't have a good counterpart to the 23mm or 30mm anti-aircraft guns that the Soviets had, nor does it have any mobile SAM system akin to the Strela-10 or 2K12 Kub.

A weakness of the American emphasis on joint warfare is that if you put the air defense/air control mission on fighter aircraft, if those fighter aircraft are destroyed your ground forces are completely exposed. The Americans themselves have a massive logistical capability and in Europe, possessed the first echelon of air divisions in West Germany backed up by a second echelon of air divisions in Britain. And of course, falling back on nuclear threats if those too are destroyed. Thus when viewed through a wider lense, army mobile air defense would play a smaller role in a war and would (and indeed did) become a target of defense spending cuts.

Taiwan, as a battlefield and armed entity, doesn't have those features. The US, ever since cancelling the Sergeant York SPAAG, has relied on MANPADS for its troops to defend themselves: with the major caveat that most of the enemy aircraft are going to be shot down by fighters. If Taiwan's air force can't be expected to survive the fight, it is extremely ill-minded on their planners'/theoreticians' part to rely on MANPADS alone for air defense.

It should be noted that even if Taiwan was to indigenously develop SPAAG and medium-range mobile SAMs, in efforts to direct money into the air force and navy, it has cut funding to the army's logistical forces. Because of this, it is questionable if this hypothetical, army-controlled air defense network could be properly supplied for long enough to hold of a sustained PLA air campaign against Taiwan.

A self proclaimed retired military officer's instructional video.
Strictly speaking, it is a video that harshly criticizes optimistic tendencies. It is extremely dangerous to imagine landing operations as an easy task, as there have been no revolutionary changes in landing technology to this day, and the transport capacity of landing ships is very limited. Moreover, there are not many suitable landing locations, and the enemy can be fully prepared.

Although those unmanned weapons (such as robotic dogs) look cool, they are not mature and more like tanks from World War I, which can only play a limited role under specific conditions. The cost of using those powerful long-range rocket launchers is high, and there is a risk of damaging the landing site.

Those amateur military enthusiasts tend to convey optimism to the audience, but ignore the risks involved in all military actions.

I am not a military officer who has received vocational education, so I cannot evaluate his views.
His political views are relatively 'official', believing that if the landing operation suffers setbacks, there is a risk of US military intervention. The best way is to wait for the decline of the United States.
But I cannot agree with this because the United States' "Ukrainization" plan is further reducing the possibility of peace.

zhangjim said:

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A self proclaimed retired military officer's instructional video.
Strictly speaking, it is a video that harshly criticizes optimistic tendencies. It is extremely dangerous to imagine landing operations as an easy task, as there have been no revolutionary changes in landing technology to this day, and the transport capacity of landing ships is very limited. Moreover, there are not many suitable landing locations, and the enemy can be fully prepared.

Although those unmanned weapons (such as robotic dogs) look cool, they are not mature and more like tanks from World War I, which can only play a limited role under specific conditions. The cost of using those powerful long-range rocket launchers is high, and there is a risk of damaging the landing site.

Those amateur military enthusiasts tend to convey optimism to the audience, but ignore the risks involved in all military actions.

I am not a military officer who has received vocational education, so I cannot evaluate his views.
His political views are relatively 'official', believing that if the landing operation suffers setbacks, there is a risk of US military intervention. The best way is to wait for the decline of the United States.
But I cannot agree with this because the United States' "Ukrainization" plan is further reducing the possibility of peace.

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i remember, you are the same person who was bragging about Japanese industrial might on Chinese entertainment thread.

this guy is nobody. neither his views are official. LOOL



just look at the Map of Taiwan island.

About 90 percent of Taiwan's population lives on the west coast of the island. The west coast is made up of plains and grasslands, while the eastern two-thirds of the island is dominated by mountain ranges. west coast is very suitable for landing.

nobody is denying the difficulty but the landing ship capacity of PLAN is not very limited. guy used the word ''very limited''.. PLAN has the second largest fleet of landing ships(LHDs and other ships) after USA and keep growing. we have yet to count civilian fleet.

and who told you ?? PLAN will try to land on island in case of armed reunification.. initial task will perform by PLAAF/PLARF..

looks like you just do this deliberately or you are poorly illinformed. please start reading