The subs would not need to achieve a "profitable" outcome in terms of targets destroyed to force the opponent to drastically change the deployments of their assets and the overall calculus of their strategy. Like others have mentioned, the mere knowledge of the subs' ability to strike the opposing nation's home territory would necessitate the redeployment of some of that nation's forces from the frontline back to the home front.Im not sure the many new subs are supposed to operate land attack on US, China faces much the same issues as US does with China's mainland when it comes to attacking the US' mainland. Namely how can you ensure the salvos are profitable/destroy more than it costs to bring them there?
US doesn't have much air defenses deployed at this moment at home, but assuming they won't have any in wartime is just doing the same mistake as someone assuming China wouldn't surge systems to the Myanmar border during wartime either.
Instead I think China often looks to historical ideas for their own strategies, because why not reuse proven ideas that work? The subs could be meant to conduct an anti surface campaign behind US' main lines, in the style of the ww2 USN submarine campaign against the IJN.
This is not to say that the development of the 09IIIB is meant to bring a potential war to the US homeland, but if such capability is provided but these platforms, this is IMHO how such a notional strike would be carried out.
Another example: if Taiwan's new SSK managed to hit a military airfield on the mainland, that too would necessitate the redeployment of some of the PLAN's assets that would otherwise be engaged on the Taiwanese front.