PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
About the topic of 2027, recently for 1st of August (anniversary for formation of PLA) this segment was shown in a PLA PR video:
008k1Segly1hghljwmkyhj31yp1007qv.jpg
"We have an appointment for the 100th anniversary of formation of PLA"

008k1Segly1hghljwr29vj31yl0zw7wh.jpg"To create even greater glory"

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"The other side of the strait"

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"I wish to go and have a look"

PLA was formed on 1st of August 1927, so 2027 will be the 100th anniversary. I think this constitutes the most clear and most official signal so far that 2027 is indeed a point for possible reunification.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
About the topic of 2027, recently for 1st of August (anniversary for formation of PLA) this segment was shown in a PLA PR video:
View attachment 116743
"We have an appointment for the 100th anniversary of formation of PLA"

View attachment 116742"To create even greater glory"

View attachment 116741
"The other side of the strait"

View attachment 116740
"I wish to go and have a look"

PLA was formed on 1st of August 1927, so 2027 will be the 100th anniversary. I think this constitutes the most clear and most official signal so far that 2027 is indeed a point for possible reunification.


Or it could just be a generic statement indicating PLA resolve and preparedness in context of current and future cross strait tensions.

I'm not sure if you legitimately believe that the China and the PLA are actively planning for 2027 as a year where they want to wage conflict and AR on their own initiative (as opposed to responding to provocation in a manner where their hand is forced), or if you're just memeing here and on Reddit because the idea of the PLA dunking on the ROC military is amusing.


However the gravity and the seriousness of "they are actively preparing for to initiate a conflict in XYZ year" is not something that can or should be just handwaved on circumstantial half referential public relations statements or materials that can be interpreted in other equally or more reasonable manners.
This is the sort of claim that needs to be able to be defended to the hilt with comprehensive evidence, rather than being thrown out as a fun idea that can be floated for the lulz.
 

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
I legitimately believe 2027 is the year that PRC will go for reunification, proactively if an opportunity doesn't naturally present itself. The PLA video aside I'll present one more evidence:
md-8c2c26436a774a3689888188912c7b6f.jpg
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Here there's a railway link across the strait to Taipei. If such a cross strait link is to be completed by 2035 it would seem to me that latest point that reunification needs to be completed would be 2027, to allow 8 years to surveying and construction of the link. Here's details from the state council about this plan specifically mentioning a Fujian to Taipei link:
1691046643103.png
These plans were released in 2021.

But when it comes to defending this I do ask myself "am I seeing things because I want them to be there?" and I'm not sure if there's a good answer to this. Before 24/02/2022 for example my feeling on Ukraine-Russia was something like "war seems unlikely but I wouldn't rule it out". There were plenty of people here on this forum that held the opposite opinion and they were sure that Russia was about to invade and they could present evidence like Russia building field hospitals near the border and transporting blood supplies there. Yet others could easily argue that by making exercises seem more "real" Russia is applying pressure in order to fool people into thinking they're about to start a war and so get favourable outcome during negotiation.

When the shoe is on the other foot and I think reunification is likely in 2027, I also realize that any evidence I present could also be waved off as "China is bluffing to try to get Taiwan to come to the negotiation table" and I just don't think there's a way to defend it in a way that someone will say "okay I agree, you've removed all doubt in my mind" until the day it actually happens.
 
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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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I legitimately believe 2027 is the year that PRC will go for reunification, proactively if an opportunity doesn't naturally present itself. The PLA video aside I'll present one more evidence:
View attachment 116744
This is state council's plan for national transportation backbone, to be completed by 2035. Here there's a railway link across the strait to Taipei. If such a cross strait link is to be completed by 2035 it would seem to me that latest point that reunification needs to be completed would be 2027, to allow 8 years to surveying and construction of the link. Here's details from the state council about this plan specifically mentioning a Fujian to Taipei link:
View attachment 116745
These plans were released in 2021.

But when it comes to defending this I do ask myself "am I seeing things because I want them to be there?" and I'm not sure if there's a good answer to this. Before 24/02/2022 for example my feeling on Ukraine-Russia was something like "war seems unlikely but I wouldn't rule it out". There were plenty of people here on this forum that held the opposite opinion and they were sure that Russia was about to invade and they could present evidence like Russia building field hospitals near the border and transporting blood supplies there. Yet others could easily argue that by making exercises seem more "real" Russia is applying pressure in order to fool people into thinking they're about to start a war and so get favourable outcome during negotiation.

When the shoe is on the other foot and I think reunification is likely in 2027, I also realize that any evidence I present could also be waved off as "China is bluffing to try to get Taiwan to come to the negotiation table" and I just don't think there's a way to defend it in a way that someone will say "okay I agree, you've removed all doubt in my mind" until the day it actually happens.

Again, that is at best circumstantial and could be reflective of any sort of aspiration at the time in which they hoped political circumstances could allow Chinese high speed rail to have spread to Taiwan.


This may be a reflection of my own caution in interpreting intent versus preparedness, but fundamentally the question we are testing is:
"Is there evidence that there has been an active Chinese government plan for multiple years to seek to proactively initiate a conflict over Taiwan in the year 2027?"


It is one thing to advance their military capability in a manner to be able to best deal with a conflict over Taiwan and/or the region if it occurred in the future.
And it is also another thing for public relations and political statements and/or plans to espouse aspirational hopes around general cross-strait resolve or aspirations for the distant future.

And it is another thing yet again, for China to be actively preparing for multiple years to initiate conflict of their own accord with preparations and planning for it being undertaken since the early 2020s if not earlier (by your own hypothesis). Frankly speaking, if they had been planning to wage a Taiwan conflict of their own initiative by the 2027 year, then all of their political, economic and military planning, posturing and procurement and priorities up to this point would be stupid and inane, at the national level. Their behaviour is one of a nation hoping for peace but preparing to be able to use military force if that is the only option left -- it is not of a nation that has been actively planning and preparing for multiple years to use military conflict of their own initiative.


The comparison with Russia and Ukraine is worth mentioning in relation to this, only in the specific comparison that one could not make the argument that Russia was actively intending to wage a conflict in Ukraine of this scale in the specific year 2022 starting multiple years before, but rather that it was geopolitical circumstances in the years leading up to it which in many ways forced their hand in which the use of military force was seen as the least bad option available to them. However, if you were in the year 2015, one could hardly suggest that a conflict in 2022 of the scale we saw last year to now as being one that was preordained and intended by Russia. Large scale exercises in the years leading up to 2022 is exactly that -- large scale exercises intended to prepare for contingencies if they occurred.


It is possible that a conflict occurs in 2027 due to a combination of geopolitical factors forcing China's hand in a similar way, and yes in that context naturally the Chinese government and the PLA at large would try to prepare the best for a variety of contingencies and eventualities if they occurred.
After all, many of us have considered for multiple years that the period from 2025-2030 would be one of significant risk and concern due to the shifting balance of geostrategic power, the balance of military power, and political circumstances in Taiwan and the US, and chances are the PLA have extensively prepared for such a situation if a conflict was forced upon them in that time period.

But that is very different to China and the PLA actively intending to initiate a conflict of their own initiative in given year XYZ.
Frankly, if that is what they intended to do in the year 2027, then for the last few years we should have been seeing much more disciplined, targeted and larger scale procurement focused on shorter term projects and more Taiwan oriented capabilities. Additionally, we should be seeing large scale societal and civil defense hardening and preparedness even if it was in the form of "routine exercises. Most prevalent, would be a significant shift and urgency in a change of economic and military priorities.

Let's say at some point in the future, hypothetically the PLA accures the capabilities to roflstomp and comprehensively defeat the ROC military in 24 hours and also to deter the US and co from intervening. Having that capability still would not entail an active intent to initiate a conflict on XYZ year or date, as it would still require the political decision to do so. What a high level of capability and preparedness does offer, is the freedom to make decisions or respond accordingly in the best way possible.



Distilling it all down, my point is that geostrategic preparedness and military readiness to be able to react on contingencies forced upon a nation, is very very different to having long term active intent and preparations for conflict on a nation's own time/schedule.


For our purposes, both on this forum but especially on Reddit where you are active, frankly I do not see there is any basis to make claims that China has been preparing to initiate a conflict in the year 2027 and is certainly something I will challenge when I see it.

I would encourage people to carefully consider whether their interpretation of evidence for a hypothesis as massive as "China's been preparing to initiate war of their own accord since the early 2020s for 2027" is being influenced by personal desires to see the Taiwan question solved and/or to see the ROC military defeated.



Edit: I would also add, that if as of August 2023 that if I entertain the idea of China actually wanting to initiate a conflict over Taiwan in the year 2027 for the purposes of AR, then right now I think they are woefully underprepared in almost all domains and have not undertaken the massive comprehensive national scale economic, civil defense, industrial hardening, and reallocation of military and economic priorities that would be needed to ensure a victory that is not pyrrhic or compromising their medium to long term geopolitical prospects after the conclusion of an AR situation.
 
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plawolf

Lieutenant General
For something as fundamentally important to China as reunification with Taiwan, it’s not something Beijing would get arbitrary deadlines on years in advanced.

Beijing will demand the PLA have the capability to enact AR immediately, but the precise timing of if and when to go will be made by the highest levels of government when they feel the time is right, barring some catalytic external event that leaves them no alternative. Hence why the PLA needed to have been good-to-go years ago, which they have been, and every year since has been about improving the odds of success while also reducing the price to the PLA in blood and hardware for that victory.

There may/probably have also been a lot of mission creep as the external international environment has changed, such that I personally think the PLA’s remit for AR is now far broader than merely retaking Taiwan island itself.

At a minimum, China will now want the ability to impose its own peace in the region whereby it can win so decisively and devastatingly that the other (external) side simply will no longer have the military capability to keep fighting around China’s neighbour in the short to medium term, with a buffer created to protect Taiwan from external attack. It may also wish to make an example of a certain US vassal to teach the world the cost of going to war against modern China, and also to repay some historic debts.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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For something as fundamentally important to China as reunification with Taiwan, it’s not something Beijing would get arbitrary deadlines on years in advanced.

Beijing will demand the PLA have the capability to enact AR immediately, but the precise timing of if and when to go will be made by the highest levels of government when they feel the time is right, barring some catalytic external event that leaves them no alternative. Hence why the PLA needed to have been good-to-go years ago, which they have been, and every year since has been about improving the odds of success while also reducing the price to the PLA in blood and hardware for that victory.

There may/probably have also been a lot of mission creep as the external international environment has changed, such that I personally think the PLA’s remit for AR is now far broader than merely retaking Taiwan island itself.

At a minimum, China will now want the ability to impose its own peace in the region whereby it can win so decisively and devastatingly that the other (external) side simply will no longer have the military capability to keep fighting around China’s neighbour in the short to medium term, with a buffer created to protect Taiwan from external attack. It may also wish to make an example of a certain US vassal to teach the world the cost of going to war against modern China, and also to repay some historic debts.

Exactly, this is sort of what I am getting at in terms of emphasizing the difference between comprehensive preparedness and readiness to be able to contend with a variety of contingencies -- versus having an active long term plan and intent to act on given arbitrary year XYZ.

The thing is that if there was active long term plans and intent to act on arbitrary year XYZ (and indeed, 2027 is arbitrary in the scale of things regardless of being the 100th anniversary of who-cares-about-it), then the actual preparation for it would be anything but arbitrary and instead would be focused, large scale and nigh impossible to hide, unless the balance of capabilities were such that all negative or risky eventualities and outcomes are assessed as so trivial and unlikely against one's own capabilities, that there is no need for any preparation in the multiple years leading up to the given date. And I think we can all agree that China and the PLA certainly have not reached that balance in a cross-strait (thus regional, thus global) manner.


At some point in the future if China and the PLA felt like it were appropriate to carry out conflict in an AR manner out of their own initiative, then sure, it could occur. But there's nothing to suggest there is an active long term plan, preparation or prediction by China as a state that it will occur in 2027.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
I legitimately believe 2027 is the year that PRC will go for reunification, proactively if an opportunity doesn't naturally present itself. The PLA video aside I'll present one more evidence:
View attachment 116744
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
Here there's a railway link across the strait to Taipei. If such a cross strait link is to be completed by 2035 it would seem to me that latest point that reunification needs to be completed would be 2027, to allow 8 years to surveying and construction of the link. Here's details from the state council about this plan specifically mentioning a Fujian to Taipei link:
View attachment 116745
These plans were released in 2021.

But when it comes to defending this I do ask myself "am I seeing things because I want them to be there?" and I'm not sure if there's a good answer to this. Before 24/02/2022 for example my feeling on Ukraine-Russia was something like "war seems unlikely but I wouldn't rule it out". There were plenty of people here on this forum that held the opposite opinion and they were sure that Russia was about to invade and they could present evidence like Russia building field hospitals near the border and transporting blood supplies there. Yet others could easily argue that by making exercises seem more "real" Russia is applying pressure in order to fool people into thinking they're about to start a war and so get favourable outcome during negotiation.

When the shoe is on the other foot and I think reunification is likely in 2027, I also realize that any evidence I present could also be waved off as "China is bluffing to try to get Taiwan to come to the negotiation table" and I just don't think there's a way to defend it in a way that someone will say "okay I agree, you've removed all doubt in my mind" until the day it actually happens.
Actively forcing a conflict and responding to one is very different. it really depends on what the government's ambitions are, and IMO, I think the government's ambitions range far beyond Taiwan alone. If you only get 1 chance to militarily strike, better make it worth it, and I don't think Taiwan alone is worth it, especially if it involves what is basically WW3.

If some country intervenes, then the prize can't be just Taiwan. They don't get to call it quits after losing and keep everything else ex Taiwan while putting total sanctions on China and attacking Chinese forces, they're going to have to removed from the entirety of Southeast Asia, East China Sea and WestPac at the minimum.

That sort of goal is quite a bit more ambitious than Taiwan alone.
 

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
Actively forcing a conflict and responding to one is very different. it really depends on what the government's ambitions are, and IMO, I think the government's ambitions range far beyond Taiwan alone. If you only get 1 chance to militarily strike, better make it worth it, and I don't think Taiwan alone is worth it, especially if it involves what is basically WW3.

If some country intervenes, then the prize can't be just Taiwan. They don't get to call it quits after losing and keep everything else ex Taiwan while putting total sanctions on China and attacking Chinese forces, they're going to have to removed from the entirety of Southeast Asia, East China Sea and WestPac at the minimum.

That sort of goal is quite a bit more ambitious than Taiwan alone.
I actually agree with this in the sense that "Taiwan alone" is not a worthwhile goal to kick off AR, a worthwhile goal would be something like "causing US hegemony in western pacific to collapse". Had US remained ambiguous about their support for ROC then to them the option of "doing nothing and pretend they didn't even care about Taiwan to start with" remains open. However in recent years US has increasingly been taking up a position of supporting Taiwan independence, to the point of staking their hegemony on this. This is a "fish has taken the bait" situation and now means a successful reunification could indeed case their hegemony to collapse in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This greatly sweetens the deal for reunification.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
I legitimately believe 2027 is the year that PRC will go for reunification, proactively if an opportunity doesn't naturally present itself. The PLA video aside I'll present one more evidence:

Suppose it is the Year 2025 and then you quantitively model the future to 2030.
The economic, military and technological balances shift significantly in China's favour.

Then suppose it's the Year 2030 and you model to 2035.
Again, the balances move significantly in China's favour.

Any war will have significant costs and will disrupt China's development.
For example, there are still hundreds of millions who still have to reach the middle-income levels in China and this will take until 2035 at the earliest.

So why set 2027 as a deadline to start a war?

EDIT. There are still 600 million people whose incomes are less than $2 per day. Yet if they become middle-high income, they would add more economic activity than an entire USA. Also note that it is now official US government policy to keep China technologically backward and therefore prevent China becoming a high-income country.
 
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Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
Suppose it is the Year 2025 and then you quantitively model the future to 2030.
The economic, military and technological balances shift significantly in China's favour.

Then suppose it's the Year 2030 and you model to 2035.
Again, the balances move significantly in China's favour.

Any war will have significant costs and will disrupt China's development.
For example, there are still hundreds of millions of who still have to reach the middle-class in China and this will take until 2035 at the earliest.

So why set 2027 as a deadline to start a war?
I feel that beyond 2027 US would have some new platforms coming online that will decrease PLA's chance of success, even if only temporarily. The most immediate thing that comes to mind is US pushing DDGX out to 2030s while taking a program to retrofit SPY-6 to Arleigh Burke flight IIA. This sounds to me like US is also feeling immediate capability is more important than long term and even Arleigh Burke flight III cannot come soon enough. And of course Americans themselves have been throwing 2027 around.
 
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