I actually agree with this in the sense that "Taiwan alone" is not a worthwhile goal to kick off AR, a worthwhile goal would be something like "causing US hegemony in western pacific to collapse". Had US remained ambiguous about their support for ROC then to them the option of "doing nothing and pretend they didn't even care about Taiwan to start with" remains open. However in recent years US has increasingly been taking up a position of supporting Taiwan independence, to the point of staking their hegemony on this. This is a "fish has taken the bait" situation and now means a successful reunification could indeed case their hegemony to collapse in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This greatly sweetens the deal for reunification.
This is becoming increasingly ambitious -- so not only do you think that China has been planning to actively initiate AR against Taiwan in the year 2027, but that such a conflict would be of a scale and consequence such that they would be capable of collapsing US hegemony as well?
Don't you think such an expansive hypothesis or suggestion -- even if it was made only in jest -- should require a massive, comprehensive evidence base beyond mere circumstantial indicators and generic continued PLA advancement of capabilities?
I feel that beyond 2027 US would have some new platforms coming online that will decrease PLA's chance of success, even if only temporarily. The most immediate thing that comes to mind is US pushing DDGX out to 2030s while taking a program to retrofit SPY-6 to Arleigh Burke flight IIA. This sounds to me like US is also feeling immediate capability is more important than long term and even Arleigh Burke flight III cannot come soon enough. And of course Americans themselves have been throwing 2027 around.
Both the US and China likely feel that the period from 2025-2030 is a risky one due to the balance of geopolitical power and military power shifting in that era -- that is highly different to both sides knowing (in China's case, "planning") for an active conflict to occur specifically in the year 2027.
In fact, in terms of PLA watching I have said for the last couple of years that I believe China's procurement from the early 2020s to late 2020s is one of caution, to focus on deliverable capabilities that can be operationalized relatively quickly, so as to have more operational/ready forces in case conflict ensued. That is specifically because many people view the risk of conflict in 2025-2030 to be among the highest in recent memory.
But again, making procurements and planning to be able to best respond to a military crisis or conflict in a given period of time, is very different to actively preparing for multiple preceding years to initiate a conflict in a specific given year.
If you were to rephrase your statement to one of "China/PLA is actively preparing if a contingency were to occur in the second half of this decade relating to Taiwan and/or the region at large," then I would actually agree with you without a problem.
But the idea that they have been actively preparing for multiple years to initiate a conflict in a given year, simply does not track at all.
And even with the US, if you actually read the specific statements about 2027, we can see that they are a lot more specific than often portrayed. Expand the quoted parts below to see my emphasis.
For example most recently a month ago:
The Chinese president “has stated publicly that he has challenged the People’s Liberation Army to develop the military capability to unify Taiwan with China by 2027,” he said. “So he didn’t say, ‘I’ve decided to attack and invade’.”
General Milley, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that there is a “very subtle distinction” in ordering the general to develop the capabilities and making a firm decision.
“You want to make sure that every single day President Xi wakes up and says today’s not that day, and that decision never comes,” General Milley said.
And even if we go back to 2021 by the same general:
China wants the ability to invade and hold Taiwan within the next six years but might not intend to do so in the near term, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told Congress today.
Milley said congressional testimony earlier this year from former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander Adm. Phil Davidson and current INDOPACOM commander Adm. John Aquilino that China was preparing to take Taiwan within the next six years was based on comments Chinese leader Xi Jinping made to the People’s Liberation Army.
“Their assessment is based off a speech by President Xi that challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027… If Adm Aquilino and Adm. Davidson said that China had an intent, has made a decision, and they intend to invade and seize Taiwan then I do disagree with that. I see no evidence of that actual intent or decision-making. What I’m talking about is capability,” he said in response to Rep. Elaine Luria (D-Va.) during the hearing.
“It’s a capability, not an intent to attack or seize. My assessment is an operational assessment. Do they have the intent to attack or seize in the near-term defined as the next year or two. My assessment of what I’ve seen right now is no, but that could always change. Intent is something that could change quickly. “
The difference between intent and capability/preparedness is entirely what my last few posts have been about -- by saying that you think China has been preparing to conduct AR/conflict in 2027, is you saying that you think China has at the highest levels of government made an order and is intent on doing so at that date.
But that is very different to seeking to attain the best capabilities/preparedness to do so by said date.