PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Temstar said:

I actually agree with this in the sense that "Taiwan alone" is not a worthwhile goal to kick off AR, a worthwhile goal would be something like "causing US hegemony in western pacific to collapse". Had US remained ambiguous about their support for ROC then to them the option of "doing nothing and pretend they didn't even care about Taiwan to start with" remains open. However in recent years US has increasingly been taking up a position of supporting Taiwan independence, to the point of staking their hegemony on this. This is a "fish has taken the bait" situation and now means a successful reunification could indeed case their hegemony to collapse in a self-fulfilling prophecy. This greatly sweetens the deal for reunification.

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This is becoming increasingly ambitious -- so not only do you think that China has been planning to actively initiate AR against Taiwan in the year 2027, but that such a conflict would be of a scale and consequence such that they would be capable of collapsing US hegemony as well?

Don't you think such an expansive hypothesis or suggestion -- even if it was made only in jest -- should require a massive, comprehensive evidence base beyond mere circumstantial indicators and generic continued PLA advancement of capabilities?

Temstar said:

I feel that beyond 2027 US would have some new platforms coming online that will decrease PLA's chance of success, even if only temporarily. The most immediate thing that comes to mind is US pushing DDGX out to 2030s while taking a program to retrofit SPY-6 to Arleigh Burke flight IIA. This sounds to me like US is also feeling immediate capability is more important than long term and even Arleigh Burke flight III cannot come soon enough. And of course Americans themselves have been throwing 2027 around.

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Both the US and China likely feel that the period from 2025-2030 is a risky one due to the balance of geopolitical power and military power shifting in that era -- that is highly different to both sides knowing (in China's case, "planning") for an active conflict to occur specifically in the year 2027.
In fact, in terms of PLA watching I have said for the last couple of years that I believe China's procurement from the early 2020s to late 2020s is one of caution, to focus on deliverable capabilities that can be operationalized relatively quickly, so as to have more operational/ready forces in case conflict ensued. That is specifically because many people view the risk of conflict in 2025-2030 to be among the highest in recent memory.

But again, making procurements and planning to be able to best respond to a military crisis or conflict in a given period of time, is very different to actively preparing for multiple preceding years to initiate a conflict in a specific given year.


If you were to rephrase your statement to one of "China/PLA is actively preparing if a contingency were to occur in the second half of this decade relating to Taiwan and/or the region at large," then I would actually agree with you without a problem.
But the idea that they have been actively preparing for multiple years to initiate a conflict in a given year, simply does not track at all.



And even with the US, if you actually read the specific statements about 2027, we can see that they are a lot more specific than often portrayed. Expand the quoted parts below to see my emphasis.

For example most recently a month ago:

The Chinese president “has stated publicly that he has challenged the People’s Liberation Army to develop the military capability to unify Taiwan with China by 2027,” he said. “So he didn’t say, ‘I’ve decided to attack and invade’.”


General Milley, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that there is a “very subtle distinction” in ordering the general to develop the capabilities and making a firm decision.

“You want to make sure that every single day President Xi wakes up and says today’s not that day, and that decision never comes,” General Milley said.

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And even if we go back to 2021 by the same general:

China wants the ability to invade and hold Taiwan within the next six years but might not intend to do so in the near term, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told Congress today.
Milley said congressional testimony earlier this year from former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander Adm. Phil Davidson and current INDOPACOM commander Adm. John Aquilino that China was preparing to take Taiwan within the next six years was based on comments Chinese leader Xi Jinping made to the People’s Liberation Army.

“Their assessment is based off a speech by President Xi that challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027… If Adm Aquilino and Adm. Davidson said that China had an intent, has made a decision, and they intend to invade and seize Taiwan then I do disagree with that. I see no evidence of that actual intent or decision-making. What I’m talking about is capability,” he said in response to Rep. Elaine Luria (D-Va.) during the hearing.
“It’s a capability, not an intent to attack or seize. My assessment is an operational assessment. Do they have the intent to attack or seize in the near-term defined as the next year or two. My assessment of what I’ve seen right now is no, but that could always change. Intent is something that could change quickly. “

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The difference between intent and capability/preparedness is entirely what my last few posts have been about -- by saying that you think China has been preparing to conduct AR/conflict in 2027, is you saying that you think China has at the highest levels of government made an order and is intent on doing so at that date.


But that is very different to seeking to attain the best capabilities/preparedness to do so by said date.

Temstar said:

I feel that beyond 2027 US would have some new platforms coming online that will decrease PLA's chance of success, even if only temporarily. The most immediate thing that comes to mind is US pushing DDGX out to 2030s while taking a program to retrofit SPY-6 to Arleigh Burke flight IIA. This sounds to me like US is also feeling immediate capability is more important than long term and even Arleigh Burke flight III cannot come soon enough. And of course Americans themselves have been throwing 2027 around.

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At the same time, China is building up its military faster than the US can.

We can see that PLAAF and PLAN annual procurement of major platforms is equal or significantly higher than the US eg.

100+ J-20
? Flanker airframes
1 Carrier (every 5 years)
4 Destroyers
4 Frigates
2-3 SSNs

Given the procurement situation with the PLAAF and PLAN, we can also expect Chinese procurement of munitions to be at least equal. And when you look at US munitions procurement and configure a Chinese equivalent, you end up with some truly mind-boggling numbers of Chinese munitions for use in the Western Pacific.

For example, the US is buying 106K GMLRS at a cost of $24 Bn. These are short-ranged missile which aren't useful in the Western Pacific. Instead, China could buy 200K munitions in the JDAM glide bomb or Shaheed-136 category. That would only cost $4 Bn, which is 6x less money.

Much of this 2027 deadline talk is the US Military Industrial Complex milking the US taxpayer for as much money as possible.
And talk of the US regaining military advantage after 2027 is hopium which doesn't bear any resemblance to reality, if you look at what China is already doing or is likely to do.

Blitzo said:

Exactly, this is sort of what I am getting at in terms of emphasizing the difference between comprehensive preparedness and readiness to be able to contend with a variety of contingencies -- versus having an active long term plan and intent to act on given arbitrary year XYZ.

The thing is that if there was active long term plans and intent to act on arbitrary year XYZ (and indeed, 2027 is arbitrary in the scale of things regardless of being the 100th anniversary of who-cares-about-it), then the actual preparation for it would be anything but arbitrary and instead would be focused, large scale and nigh impossible to hide, unless the balance of capabilities were such that all negative or risky eventualities and outcomes are assessed as so trivial and unlikely against one's own capabilities, that there is no need for any preparation in the multiple years leading up to the given date. And I think we can all agree that China and the PLA certainly have not reached that balance in a cross-strait (thus regional, thus global) manner.


At some point in the future if China and the PLA felt like it were appropriate to carry out conflict in an AR manner out of their own initiative, then sure, it could occur. But there's nothing to suggest there is an active long term plan, preparation or prediction by China as a state that it will occur in 2027.

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That would be at odds with the point of having an overarching multi-year plan, since the whole point of a such a long term procurement plan is to spread the build-up over a much longer timeframe such that the increased procurement levels just become the new normal, and you don’t need to have a last minute dash that would be so easily detected.

Besides, the PLA should have already stockpiled enough munitions for AR, so everything they are adding is just gravy once age-expired replacements are covered.

There is talk of the PLA significantly revising up
their expectations for their munitions needs in light of the Ukraine war, so who’s to say a massive increase in PLA munitions procurement is for that, or for imminent AR? Hell, just how much insight does even foreign intelligence have in terms of how much munitions the PLA orders in a normal year to start with?

plawolf said:

That would be at odds with the point of having an overarching multi-year plan, since the whole point of a such a long term procurement plan is to spread the build-up over a much longer timeframe such that the increased procurement levels just become the new normal, and you don’t need to have a last minute dash that would be so easily detected.

Besides, the PLA should have already stockpiled enough munitions for AR, so everything they are adding is just gravy once age-expired replacements are covered.

There is talk of the PLA significantly revising up
their expectations for their munitions needs in light of the Ukraine war, so who’s to say a massive increase in PLA munitions procurement is for that, or for imminent AR? Hell, just how much insight does even foreign intelligence have in terms of how much munitions the PLA orders in a normal year to start with?

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I am not specifically talking about munitions in terms of military procurement and preparedness, but rather a whole of nation approach to hardening and preparing the nation for war and the potential secondary outcomes/escalation after AR itself.

My point being that if there was actually an active intent and plan to carry out conflict of their own initiative in 2027 over the last few years, then in the last few years to now we should be seeing much more than what they've done so far.


What you are describing makes sense for general readiness and preparedness, but if they have a specific year in mind to initiate military action then we would be seeing a consistent pattern and wave of activity intended to be optimized and peak for said given year.

Edit: an absence of visible indicators of national preparedness while still aiming to rationalize it as relating to preparing for AR in 2027, is if the argument is one of "we cannot prove that they don't plan on initiating conflict in 2027".

I'm not suggesting that is your position, more just making a general observation, and for something as significant as "China is planning to initiate AR in 2027" we should aim for quite a bit more than "we cannot prove they aren't intending to do so".

I think the US is planning to initiate the war, not China and it can be proven. I think the US will start x10 their provocations after US and Taiwan elections.

The US would want the war by 2025, however, China will respond to provocations only in 2027. China would want reunification in 2035, or 2050, but why does it matter when they will be forced?

As for the evidence, just take statements from the US leaders in general always speaking about 2025 or 2027, preparing their population.

Also keep in mind the exponential trend of their provocations, if this trend continues, in 2025 more serious stuff than Pelosi visiting is coming.

At this point those who deny that the US wants and is actively preparing for a war with China are delusional. They are literally saying it to your face all day.

They are not stupid, if you all here understand where China will be in 2035 and 2050, and where will they be, it is normal to strike earlier when their chances are better.

I think a general US defeat within the 1IC (even if they can still operate within the 2IC) will be the end of US hegemony. Literally everywhere you go people spread the bs "OMFGGG US SPEND MORE THAN 2000 COUNTRIES COMBINED" and if they are seen as unable to defeat China then they will be seen as a paper tiger and it will come across as a shock to most.

Blitzo said:

I am not specifically talking about munitions in terms of military procurement and preparedness, but rather a whole of nation approach to hardening and preparing the nation for war and the potential secondary outcomes/escalation after AR itself.

My point being that if there was actually an active intent and plan to carry out conflict of their own initiative in 2027 over the last few years, then in the last few years to now we should be seeing much more than what they've done so far.


What you are describing makes sense for general readiness and preparedness, but if they have a specific year in mind to initiate military action then we would be seeing a consistent pattern and wave of activity intended to be optimized and peak for said given year.

Edit: an absence of visible indicators of national preparedness while still aiming to rationalize it as relating to preparing for AR in 2027, is if the argument is one of "we cannot prove that they don't plan on initiating conflict in 2027".

I'm not suggesting that is your position, more just making a general observation, and for something as significant as "China is planning to initiate AR in 2027" we should aim for quite a bit more than "we cannot prove they aren't intending to do so".

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Well, as I said, I don’t think China has set itself any deadlines for AR.

However, it’s still worth noting a number of pertinent factors you do not seem to be considering, or which you seem to be viewing from an American prospective and model, rather than Chinese.

In terms of general national preparedness and manufacturing consent, one could easily argue that America is doing all the heavy lifting for Beijing.

If we ignored all of America’s precipitating actions and just list out all of China’s responses since the Trump years and compare that to a checklist of the core preparations China would need to undertake before launching AR and I think you will find a shocking amount of overlap, and that is very much not by chance. China has been very careful and deliberate in which provocations to respond to, and how it does so.

The second important factor you are not appearing to consider is that even in the event of China launching AR proactively, it is extremely probable that Beijing will still frame it as a reactionary move. Again, America has already given China more than enough material to play the straw-that-broke-the-canal’s-back route to escalate any tiny move into full blown AR.

This is important from both an international, but more critically, internal political POV.

Irrespective of the military outcome, the political and economy results from AR would be a watershed movement for China, and the lives of almost everyone living in China, and people of Chinese or even Asian descent and appearance worldwide will change significantly if not fundamentally as a result.

As such, I think Beijing would be keen to demonstrate to its own people and the world (especially the global south) that this was not a choice made lightly or even that this was a choice Beijing proactively made at all. Rather, I think Beijing will do everything in its power to frame this as something forced upon it by external forces, and that it was forced to act against its own wishes because it no longer has any room left to give to avoid the conflict. This is almost a polar opposite of how America and the west would typically try to manufacture consent, but it is the most logical play for Beijing, because for China, Taiwan isn’t a far away war of choice, it’s a war of existential importance for China right on its doorstep. One does not want to show oneself as overeager to trigger such a war.

If we look back at history, this has basically been the standard template for China to justify going to war all the way back to the Korean War. It would frankly be incredible for China to break with this pattern for Taiwan.

2027 is an American date, and to try to make any sense of it or find meaning in it is to try to make sense of a schizophrenic's word salad. The US government/IC/think tanks have next to no insight about China's capabilities and absolutely zero insight into its intentions. The only thing that matches their level of ignorance about China is their level of delusion about their own military-industrial capabilities.

Why would China initiate a conflict in 2027 or even respond to escalating provocations? The logic is extremely simple: Why would China start a fight it has a 50% (or 60-70% if you're feeling optimistic) chance of winning when it can postpone the fight for a decade or more when its chance of winning is north of 95%?

There was a map published not long ago about a potential Chinese HSR rail extension to Taiwan in 2035.

While it nowhere implies even 1C2S type of reunification, it's interesting because it highlights China's ambitions with Taiwan by 2035.

TBH with regards to AR or no AR, I don't think that there is a complete divide between mutually consensual reunification and full on AR. The PRC in it's early days managed to reclaim Xinjiang, Tibet and later Hong Kong using a combination of military pressure and diplomatic savvy. It should come as no surprise that AR would not be attempted unless all other forms of coercion would fail. For example, let's say PRC has a couple of J-20 fly over to Taipei and drop a bunch of leaflets promising a temporary 1 RMB - 2 NTD conversion rate if reunification talks begin. What would be reaction to that?
So why would China start a war if it has plenty of salami slicing and other cards to play well before that? Time is on China's side, thus better to exhaust all other options before going into war.
And on some level the CCP probably realizes that, thus hedging their bets on a hybrid style of reunification instead of all out preparing for an armed conflict.
If CCP is going to get into an armed conflict at this point, Taiwan is just the beginning. Instead of being the goal, Taiwan is the excuse to smash the US-led order in WestPac. Taiwan alone could probably be forced into negotiations by a combination of promises, military pressure, and economic pressure.

Temstar said:

I legitimately believe 2027 is the year that PRC will go for reunification, proactively if an opportunity doesn't naturally present itself. The PLA video aside I'll present one more evidence:
View attachment 116744

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Here there's a railway link across the strait to Taipei. If such a cross strait link is to be completed by 2035 it would seem to me that latest point that reunification needs to be completed would be 2027, to allow 8 years to surveying and construction of the link. Here's details from the state council about this plan specifically mentioning a Fujian to Taipei link:
View attachment 116745
These plans were released in 2021.

But when it comes to defending this I do ask myself "am I seeing things because I want them to be there?" and I'm not sure if there's a good answer to this. Before 24/02/2022 for example my feeling on Ukraine-Russia was something like "war seems unlikely but I wouldn't rule it out". There were plenty of people here on this forum that held the opposite opinion and they were sure that Russia was about to invade and they could present evidence like Russia building field hospitals near the border and transporting blood supplies there. Yet others could easily argue that by making exercises seem more "real" Russia is applying pressure in order to fool people into thinking they're about to start a war and so get favourable outcome during negotiation.

When the shoe is on the other foot and I think reunification is likely in 2027, I also realize that any evidence I present could also be waved off as "China is bluffing to try to get Taiwan to come to the negotiation table" and I just don't think there's a way to defend it in a way that someone will say "okay I agree, you've removed all doubt in my mind" until the day it actually happens.

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In the Russia example only the blood supply is a solid evidence. Blood supply are very hard to transport, and expire quickly. Other constructions could mean preparing, but not immediate invasion.