PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

In4ser

In4ser

Junior Member
China can create an effective blockade by destroying all of Taiwan’s military assets, shipping ports and landing strips. It can then enact an actual blockade. Should the US intervene, the PLAN withdraw behind Chinese air cover and coastal defenses.

Once down sight of its long ranged missiles and other assets, China could bombard the US navy at will. If the first few waves of D-21s and YJ-12, do not sink all of the USN. China can simply keep making more and keep firing until all of the USN’s ships are gone. China will overwhelm the USN’s defense if not by quality, then by sheer quantity of projectiles.

The main problem with the US planning is thinking this will be a quick battle. China can drag out the conflict like Russia is doing in Ukraine. Even if much of the USN fleet is intact, they still need food, fuel and ammo so will either need to push forward and attack the Chinese coastline (and deal with a higher concentration but shorter ranged Chinese firepower), stay and get sniped or allow the PLA reimpose a blockade when they retreat to replenish themselves. But if they do replenish and come back, China just needs to rinse and repeat and the logistics of the operation will make it too much for the US to handle as new ships takes years to build, days to transport and America already has an ammo stockpile problem.

Meanwhile China will not stop ramping continue missile and drone production to prepare future volleys targeting US and allied assets from afar. Eventually the damage and costs of such an intervention untenable and allow a Chinese counter by securing Taiwan and possibly Guam as well.
 
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bebops

Junior Member
Registered Member
Low Cost + Quantity always beat Quality imo

an example would be a cheap Iran drone vs expensive missile interceptor.

U.S doesn't have a large military building capacity. They can only build expensive quality product at a slow pace. If the USN carrier has a total of 500 missiles, then shoot 500 cheap reliable missiles at them to exhaust their missile inventory.
 
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Minm

Junior Member
Registered Member
99PLAAFBalloons said:
I guess the question is what does the PLA gain from rapid ground presence?
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It has multiple benefits. PLA presence blocks American or Japanese forces that might enter the island and the US will hesitate before shooting directly at China.

A series of defeats for the ROC early on will also destroy their morale and make a quick victory easier. Ukraine is only fighting so hard because they managed to defeat the Russians near Kiev. If PLA troops are on the main island and can't be pushed off again, then there will be some calls for surrender. Of course China would need to be careful not to overextend into the island if it can't support the troops logistically yet.

Most importantly, there will be a delay between the war starting and the US potentially intervening. The more territory has fallen, the less likely a US intervention becomes. A long drawn out blockade without troops on the main island is extremely risky because China will have no influence over the political debate in Washington. A war with the US would be a third world war and all attempts to avoid it should be made.
 
BoraTas

BoraTas

Captain
Registered Member
bebops said:
imo missiles and satellite can get the job done without landing on taiwan. whatever is discovered by satellites (missiles, jet, tank, ships), it is easy to destroy them by missile. I would destroy everything excluding population center.

the biggest problem is US come to the aid of Taiwan with submarines. This is why you need type 095/096 badly. According to EurAsian Naval Insight, 095 is quieter than Virginia class. It is a game changer. China has a huge labor pool--4-5x larger than U.S. They can hire many 095 submarine builders. Every year they can build 3-4 submarine easily if they want to.
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Sorry but this is a bad comment with numerous problems.

That kind of long distance missile warfare is not massively damaging. There is a time period between target acquisition and the arrival of the missile. And conventional munitions are significantly less damaging than many people think. Even China would run out of missiles very fast if it tried to destroy an entire military just using long range missiles. There is no such world. You need airpower and ideally ground operation to neutralize an opposing force.

The US can not come to the help of Taiwan using submarines. Submarines going into the strait and sinking ships is a laughable proposition written by people who think submarines are immune from detection.

Sub vs sub is an outdated paradigm that only existed in cold war because of the crappiness of Soviet subs. Subs suck at finding other subs. China doesn't need 095 and 096 badly to counter US sub-threat (which is irrelevant regarding the actual conquest of Taiwan).

Eurasian Naval Insight is a user in this forum. His video on the 095 is based on what we know about submarine quieting and rumors we heard. It is an informed guess.
 
Phead128

Phead128

Captain
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
Brainsuker said:
The twitter doesn't think amphibious landing is very difficult once air superiority is achieved. Comments?

I think the argument that claims that amphibious landing is very difficult come from the invasion of Normandy in World War 2. But at the same time, in a different part of the world in the same war, the isles around Pacific and Asia were easily to be taken by both Japanese and United States.

We should study on how the Japanese were able to take the isles in today Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippine, etc from their colonial governments, easily. At least, not as hard as Normandy. But at the same war, in later time, they were also defeated and easily lose the islands to United States Navy and Marines.

So what is the different between Normandy and the Pacific War? I think the complexity of the beach landing in Normandy was so big, if compared to the Pacific Islands; simply because Normandy had land access with good infrastructure to Berlin. With that connection, German Frontliners got the benefit of reinforcement, resupply, etc from German's central logistic / military command. So when the Allied conducted an amphibious landing, they had to face against the whole power of Germany WW2.

It was different to the small islands in the Pacific and SCS. Because the islands were small, they were separated from Japan mainland. So they required Naval and Air supremacy to connect Japan and the frontliners in the islands. That's why for Japan to guard those island from US Amphibious Landing was more difficult than German against the Allied in Normandy.

So what about Taiwan today?

I think everything depend on the Naval and Air supremacy of both sides. Whoever control the sea and air will rule the battlefield. If Mainland China can cut the logistic to Taiwan, Taiwan will suffer defeat like the Japanese who control the island long time ago; against the United States.

So I think the decided factor would not the beach landing operation ala Normandy, but the most bloody air and sea battle between Mainland China and United States ala Midway and the battle of Philippine sea. Whoever win that battle will win the war.

The problem is, nobody know who will win the war. But everyone know, whoever lose the war, will lose everything in the struggle of world hegemony between United States and China. If United States lose to China in this deciding factor of sea battle around Taiwan, then it is the time when the era of United States is over. They're finished.

That's why the war over Taiwan need the biggest resolve of both Countries. China and United States. As it will become the deciding factor of who will fall and who will raise.
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The idea of US sending F-35s with US pilots to defend Taiwan....while presently refusing to allow F-35s with Taiwanese pilots for fear of defection or inevitable Taiwan conquest by PLAAF and F-35s falling into China's hands...doesn't inspire a lot of confidence that US will fight China over Taiwan. I mean, Korea, Japan, NATO all recieved F-35s, except Taiwan....because Taiwan is a lost cause and US cannot afford an F-35 falling into China's hand. US isn't going to intervene, it's actions doesn't match it's intentions.
 
birdlikefood

birdlikefood

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RobertC said:
birdlikefood made an important observation optimization problem in operations research
China is using formal techniques for analysis including wartime operations. I've cited this article
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to support my assertion that China's response to the US in any Taiwan-related conflict will occur at the edge of the First Island Chain. You may not agree with the Hughes/Tangredi equations but they provide a formal mechanism for appreciating some aspects of naval warfare. And based on my very incomplete survey of US Naval literature the equations are little used by the USN.

Allow me to share a personal story. Over a decade ago a co-worker and I attended a commanders' conference where one of the presenters described Chinese methods for planning fleet composition and associated operations and maintenance of that fleet. At one point he cited the Analytic Hierarchy Process and paused to look at his audience. My co-worker and I, who occasionally used AHP in our work, did the same. Blank faces all around -- Flags and promotion-path-to-Flags. The presenter hurriedly skipped forward to the next topic.

My even more incomplete survey of Chinese literature found China using formal methods in other disciplines such as economics.

My point is China is using the power of mathematically-based formal methods together with computer techniques as one of the foundations of its amazing leap to world leadership in many aspects including poverty elimination.

And that same power will be (has been) applied to any Taiwan-related conflict. Not only does China have the bigger fleet but it also has the bigger brains. I hope my Navy is smart enough to stay pierside.
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I am deeply puzzled by this. It is somewhat impossible. You must know that AHP is a practical engineering and management tool invented by American, and has a history of more than fifty years. There is no reason why the U.S. military cannot use it widely.
 
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RobertC

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birdlikefood said:
I am deeply puzzled by this. It is somewhat impossible. You must know that AHP is a practical engineering and management tool invented by American, and has a history of more than fifty years. There is no reason why the U.S. military cannot use it widely.
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I did a quick search of AHP at the Naval War College and found three papers, one in 1993 and two in 2013. The third paper was actually from the Naval Postgraduate School and involved two real-life case studies. The student (a LtCdr) observed in his thesis
1.1.5 AHP in the United States
Aside from a few instances in the U.S. Army, the United States Department of Defense (DoD)
does not use the AHP often. This is not due to any perceived flaw in the AHP, but because of a
difference in decision-making fundamentals. The DoD prefers the use of methods that leverage
its experience in operational matters, using experience as a guide in predicting operations. This
leads to the use of simulation, both computer-aided and not, or Courses of Action (COA) development, which also involves the use of simulation. Simulation has its own set of pros and cons.
Among the pros are the ability to consider many options in a single simulation, and to change
the input parameters easily in order to view many different situations at once. The con is the
pitfall of believing the output of the simulation to be truth and not possibilities. This misplaced
belief can still lead to mirror imaging, which we have shown to be a dangerous decision-making
method.
Although the DoD does not currently use the AHP often in decision-making, many Foreign
Government Defense Organizations (FGDO) do. This difference in decision-making processes
between the DoD and FGDO is one which can aid the DoD in gaining an understanding of them.
By being aware of FGDO’s processes, the DoD can improve future cooperative or competitive
engagements. Therefore, a deep understanding of the AHP and of the decisions that are made
using this process is essential in understanding the capabilities and thought processes of many
FGDOs. This understanding will aid in both cooperating with our allies and in competing with
our adversaries.
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My attendance at the conference was about the same time frame as this thesis and the blank faces indicated no understanding much less deep understanding. I will also note China has a strong presence in the econometrics research realm. One may argue the relevance of analytic methods but my Navy's ignorance of them is unacceptable.
 
R

RobertC

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Alfred McCoy at TomDispatch summarizes
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before concluding
The Future of Geopolitical Power

Projecting such political trends a decade into the future, Taiwan’s fate would seem, at best, uncertain. Instead of the “shock and awe” of aerial bombardments, Washington’s default mode of diplomatic discourse in this century, Beijing prefers stealthy, sedulous geopolitical pressure. In building its island bases in the South China Sea, for example, it inched forward incrementally — first dredging, then building structures, next runways, and finally emplacing anti-aircraft
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— in the process avoiding any confrontation over its functional capture of an entire sea.

Lest we forget, Beijing has built its formidable economic-political-military power in little more than a decade. If its strength continues to increase inside Eurasia’s geopolitical substrate at even a fraction of that head-spinning pace for another decade, it may be able to execute a deft geopolitical squeeze-play on Taiwan like the one that drove the U.S. out of Afghanistan. Whether from a
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, incessant naval patrols, or some other form of pressure, Taiwan might just fall quietly into Beijing’s grasp.

Should such a geopolitical gambit prevail, the U.S. strategic frontier along the Pacific littoral would be broken, possibly pushing its Navy back to a “
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” from Japan to Guam — the last of Brzezinski’s criteria for the true waning of U.S. global power. In that event, Washington’s leaders could once again find themselves sitting on the proverbial diplomatic and economic sidelines, wondering how it all happened.
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HighGround

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The article said,

"At the same time, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has turned a
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to the Biden administration’s attempts to restart high-level talks of any sort while, as the New York Times reported recently, his country has begun a
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of its nuclear arsenal."

I find this characterization problematic. Blinken canceled the trip over a balloon incident that Washington chose to make a big deal out of (still don't have any actual details or confirmation of the "spy" payload), spent the last two months, along with the rest of US Foreign policy establishment, lambasting China about the balloon, Taiwan, and any other issue they could think of, and they are now surprised that China doesn't want to talk to Washington.

Umm, what does any of this have to do with China "turning a cold shoulder"? It's absurd that people just go along with Washington's framing completely uncritically. Regardless of how false that framing actually is.
 
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