Shore based AShM batteries would have range to hit RoCN ships in port. The only thing 022s would bring are maybe quicker reaction times since they would be launching from a more forward position, but that’s basically erased if they stay in the littorals as designed to.
None of RoCN’s principle surface combatants not already out at sea should be able to even get out of port in the event of AR. The main, and frankly only, threat from the RoCN would be their own LO FACS. This may be a factor in the PLAN going with dual seekers on their latest YJ83 missiles.
Now, you can push 022s further out and trust in their own LO, small size and fast speeds to keep them safe, but frankly, in this day and age, the PLAN doesn’t need to use such high risk and low reward tactics. While they won’t be sending their own principle surface combatants into the straits like idiots in the opening hours of AR, the balance, or more accurately, imbalance of power is such that the PLA should gain air and sea dominance in the straits in very quick order. Once that is achieved, it can unleash swarms of medium and heavy UCAVs into the straits and over Taiwan itself as the lowest and most expendable layer of its multi-layer air campaign. UCAVs with smaller AShMs would be the ideal counter against FACs. There is just no need for 022s.
The only naval opponents that the PLAN might want more AShMs against are the USN and JN, but the 022 doesn’t have the range or endurance to get involved in those fights.
Well, the point of having multiple platforms with different fires would be to minimize reaction time and maximize coverage.
In terms of Taiwan strait fires, it would reasonably consist of:
- strike fighters orbiting with YJ-83K family weapons
- H-6K/J orbiting with YJ-12 and YJ-83K family weapons
- small and medium sized surface combatants (and maybe a few large ones) in the strait with organic AShMs
- shore based AShMs across the coast
- submarines (less significant than the others given the nature of the maritime geography of the strait)
- helicopters with light AShMs and/or ATGMs for smaller vessels
Adding on Type 22s to the above just to have even more comprehensive anti shipping coverage makes a fair bit of sense, essentially as more mobile at sea AShM TELs.
The role of Type 22s here wouldn't be to achieve something decisive or do something that other platforms can't, but rather to use its unique and increasingly obsolete nature for a mission where it can actually sort of do what it was meant to do in an environment where it is somewhat survivable due to the disparity of the balance of power.
It's a case of "can these weird platforms do anything in this contingency" and answering with "just add to anti ship fires".