PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

drowingfish

Junior Member
Registered Member
Interesting article on the recent exercises. Less noisy but more focused than 'Operation Pelosi', and good reasons not to trust ROCMoDs tallies:

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last years exercise was more hastily pulled together since the Chinese did not actually expect pelosi to go through with the visit. this time they were more prepared.
 

Temstar

Brigadier
Registered Member
last years exercise was more hastily pulled together since the Chinese did not actually expect pelosi to go through with the visit. this time they were more prepared.
I like the analogy from Quanqi:
2022 exercise is a simulation of cold start AR, where redline is crossed completely without warning and AR is immediately triggered
2023 exercise is a simulation of warm start AR, where crossing the redline could be seen month away and prepped accordingly

If there was actually an AR it's much more likely to be a warm start. The way it's usually envisioned is say ROC declares independence referendum in 3 month time. PRC when then start to issue "don't say we didn't warn you" messages and start exercises around Taiwan (and use the exercises as cover to build up troops and supplies for AR) and broadcast to the world that if the referendum does go ahead stay the hell away from the island on the day of the referendum because thing is about to hit the fan. Most of the world would have gotten the message in 3 month time and the battlespace around Taiwan would be very clean by then.

Cold start AR is the one where there's strong risk of civilian traffic getting taken out during the heat of combat as there's little warning for people to get out of the way.
 

drowingfish

Junior Member
Registered Member
I like the analogy from Quanqi:
2022 exercise is a simulation of cold start AR, where redline is crossed completely without warning and AR is immediately triggered
2023 exercise is a simulation of warm start AR, where crossing the redline could be seen month away and prepped accordingly

If there was actually an AR it's much more likely to be a warm start. The way it's usually envisioned is say ROC declares independence referendum in 3 month time. PRC when then start to issue "don't say we didn't warn you" messages and start exercises around Taiwan (and use the exercises as cover to build up troops and supplies for AR) and broadcast to the world that if the referendum does go ahead stay the hell away from the island on the day of the referendum because thing is about to hit the fan. Most of the world would have gotten the message in 3 month time and the battlespace around Taiwan would be very clean by then.

Cold start AR is the one where there's strong risk of civilian traffic getting taken out during the heat of combat as there's little warning for people to get out of the way.
I am betting that China wont wait for an obvious red line to be crossed. it would give away the initiative. Taiwan's leaders arent stupid, if they are going to really do something that drastic, they would be prepared along with the Americans. It would benefit China to just make a move when it feels ready. make up whatever reason, "sorry Ms Tsai you farted and it smells", boom starts firing on all cylinders, would cost a lot less lives than if Taiwan was expecting an attack.
 

Overbom

Brigadier
Registered Member
I like the analogy from Quanqi:
2022 exercise is a simulation of cold start AR, where redline is crossed completely without warning and AR is immediately triggered
2023 exercise is a simulation of warm start AR, where crossing the redline could be seen month away and prepped accordingly

If there was actually an AR it's much more likely to be a warm start. The way it's usually envisioned is say ROC declares independence referendum in 3 month time. PRC when then start to issue "don't say we didn't warn you" messages and start exercises around Taiwan (and use the exercises as cover to build up troops and supplies for AR) and broadcast to the world that if the referendum does go ahead stay the hell away from the island on the day of the referendum because thing is about to hit the fan. Most of the world would have gotten the message in 3 month time and the battlespace around Taiwan would be very clean by then.

Cold start AR is the one where there's strong risk of civilian traffic getting taken out during the heat of combat as there's little warning for people to get out of the way.
Nah. Even in a cold start, China won't respond immediately. Why engage in a hegemonic fight unprepared unless you are as ready as possible?

Say that Taiwan declares independence today, does that mean China has to go AR the next day? No. It can easily wait for a week or a month until it has fully prepared its military.

Giving the initiative to the opponent is easily the worst thing you can do because it makes you predictable and thus can easily fall in your opponent's meticulously prepared trap
 
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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
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View attachment 110878
Welcome to the new normal

This is very surprising if this is the case.

A no fly zone is very different to a ADIZ, and a no fly zone lasting three days in international airspace in a rather crowded area of the region is quite unprecedented.


To be honest if it is actually a no fly zone that they implement, then that would actually be a very major step up of their actions compared to before.
The point of a no fly zone is that it means aircraft within that zone can potentially be shot down, so if they don't enforce it then it ends up looking like weakness and if they do enforce it then they would look varying degrees of unreasonable.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
To be fair, in a Taiwan contingency the Type 22s operating as AShM FACs is one of the viable use cases for their original anti shipping role.

They are able to stay well in the littorals of China's side of the strait and their modern YJ-83 variants can still cover basically the entirety of the width of the Taiwan strait and a good part of its length, against ROCN vessels.

When linked with friendly ISR (which naturally all assets will be), a single Type 22 can provide 8 on call YJ-83 family missiles with relatively short reaction time (perhaps more so than say a JH-7A), with better persistence and endurance than a tactical fighter too.

Of course, strike fighters and bombers will still be major employment anti shipping employment platforms in this contingency.

But I think Type 22s could provide a useful addition to the anti ship fires capacity, at least in this context. It doesn't necessarily need to do anything more exotic.

Shore based AShM batteries would have range to hit RoCN ships in port. The only thing 022s would bring are maybe quicker reaction times since they would be launching from a more forward position, but that’s basically erased if they stay in the littorals as designed to.

None of RoCN’s principle surface combatants not already out at sea should be able to even get out of port in the event of AR. The main, and frankly only, threat from the RoCN would be their own LO FACS. This may be a factor in the PLAN going with dual seekers on their latest YJ83 missiles.

Now, you can push 022s further out and trust in their own LO, small size and fast speeds to keep them safe, but frankly, in this day and age, the PLAN doesn’t need to use such high risk and low reward tactics. While they won’t be sending their own principle surface combatants into the straits like idiots in the opening hours of AR, the balance, or more accurately, imbalance of power is such that the PLA should gain air and sea dominance in the straits in very quick order. Once that is achieved, it can unleash swarms of medium and heavy UCAVs into the straits and over Taiwan itself as the lowest and most expendable layer of its multi-layer air campaign. UCAVs with smaller AShMs would be the ideal counter against FACs. There is just no need for 022s.

The only naval opponents that the PLAN might want more AShMs against are the USN and JN, but the 022 doesn’t have the range or endurance to get involved in those fights.
 

Blitzo

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Shore based AShM batteries would have range to hit RoCN ships in port. The only thing 022s would bring are maybe quicker reaction times since they would be launching from a more forward position, but that’s basically erased if they stay in the littorals as designed to.

None of RoCN’s principle surface combatants not already out at sea should be able to even get out of port in the event of AR. The main, and frankly only, threat from the RoCN would be their own LO FACS. This may be a factor in the PLAN going with dual seekers on their latest YJ83 missiles.

Now, you can push 022s further out and trust in their own LO, small size and fast speeds to keep them safe, but frankly, in this day and age, the PLAN doesn’t need to use such high risk and low reward tactics. While they won’t be sending their own principle surface combatants into the straits like idiots in the opening hours of AR, the balance, or more accurately, imbalance of power is such that the PLA should gain air and sea dominance in the straits in very quick order. Once that is achieved, it can unleash swarms of medium and heavy UCAVs into the straits and over Taiwan itself as the lowest and most expendable layer of its multi-layer air campaign. UCAVs with smaller AShMs would be the ideal counter against FACs. There is just no need for 022s.

The only naval opponents that the PLAN might want more AShMs against are the USN and JN, but the 022 doesn’t have the range or endurance to get involved in those fights.

Well, the point of having multiple platforms with different fires would be to minimize reaction time and maximize coverage.

In terms of Taiwan strait fires, it would reasonably consist of:
- strike fighters orbiting with YJ-83K family weapons
- H-6K/J orbiting with YJ-12 and YJ-83K family weapons
- small and medium sized surface combatants (and maybe a few large ones) in the strait with organic AShMs
- shore based AShMs across the coast
- submarines (less significant than the others given the nature of the maritime geography of the strait)
- helicopters with light AShMs and/or ATGMs for smaller vessels

Adding on Type 22s to the above just to have even more comprehensive anti shipping coverage makes a fair bit of sense, essentially as more mobile at sea AShM TELs.

The role of Type 22s here wouldn't be to achieve something decisive or do something that other platforms can't, but rather to use its unique and increasingly obsolete nature for a mission where it can actually sort of do what it was meant to do in an environment where it is somewhat survivable due to the disparity of the balance of power.

It's a case of "can these weird platforms do anything in this contingency" and answering with "just add to anti ship fires".
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Well, the point of having multiple platforms with different fires would be to minimize reaction time and maximize coverage.

In terms of Taiwan strait fires, it would reasonably consist of:
- strike fighters orbiting with YJ-83K family weapons
- H-6K/J orbiting with YJ-12 and YJ-83K family weapons
- small and medium sized surface combatants (and maybe a few large ones) in the strait with organic AShMs
- shore based AShMs across the coast
- submarines (less significant than the others given the nature of the maritime geography of the strait)
- helicopters with light AShMs and/or ATGMs for smaller vessels

Adding on Type 22s to the above just to have even more comprehensive anti shipping coverage makes a fair bit of sense, essentially as more mobile at sea AShM TELs.

The role of Type 22s here wouldn't be to achieve something decisive or do something that other platforms can't, but rather to use its unique and increasingly obsolete nature for a mission where it can actually sort of do what it was meant to do in an environment where it is somewhat survivable due to the disparity of the balance of power.

It's a case of "can these weird platforms do anything in this contingency" and answering with "just add to anti ship fires".

Except that’s not the only thing the 022 can bring to the table is it? They can load up with LACMs as easy as they can with AShMs. Such capabilities are potentially even ready off the shelf.

There has been much talk about PLAN SSGNs and arsenal ships in recent years, but just a modest number of 022s can offer the firepower of such assets, while being essentially cost free to implement since it’s using existing platforms and munitions that are increasingly unnecessary in their original intended role and functions.

Why send the 022s in for no clear reason or purpose other than because they exist and that’s the role they were originally designed to do, when you can very easily, quickly reconfigured them for a critical mission at minimal to no cost?
 
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