PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

birdlikefood

Junior Member
Registered Member
I don’t know if there is any public information or logical reasoning about what kind of energy blockade strategies and codes of conduct the PLA, Coast Guard, and Sea Surveillance will implement against Taiwan in peacetime or quasi-war state.

Just these two days, ROC economic minister announced that ROC's natural gas reserves can last for 11 days (I think this data is suspected of being exaggerated, because some newly built facilities have not yet been put into use). Due to the implementation of the wrong energy policy of the so-called "non-nuclear homeland" by the DPP, Taiwan's current power system is very unhealthy.


In addition, maybe the experience and lessons of the Russia-Ukraine war will also make the PLA pay more attention to the AS capability of the first wave of energy systems.


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Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
View attachment 110836
Controversy from within ROC, soldier responsible for sea searching radar complaining that:
  • officers drinking and playing cards with enlisted men and not paying attention to the radar screen
  • when they see PLAN ships sail past the midline and approaching the coast they just manually edit the position and move it westward and everything is fine
  • rampant nepotism, corporal who's close with the CO plays Switch while on duty and doesn't give a shit
MND is naturally calling this fake news and investigating. It looks like thing we've long suspected is true: those ROCMND maps showing track are not to be trusted. In this case though this guy is seeing the rot at low level.
I don't want to put too much stock into these sort of stories that may or may not be disinformation/misinformation designed to lull the PLA forces and leadership in some sort of complacency and severe underestimation of ROC's forces potential fight against a possible PLA armed reunification with the island. I sure hope that PLA leaders top to bottom will not succumb to such hubris lest it leads to unnecessary hardships down the road.
 

Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
I agree, that it is possible it is true and I wouldn't be surprised if there were elements of incompetence in the ROC military.

But I also think such claims need to be properly vetted and treated with caution. Speaking of them as if they are true or widespread in absence of consistent evidence, is suboptimal.

It is especially for things like this that seem emotionally satisfying to some people here, that it is important to not allow wishful thinking to overrule being even handed.
I couldn't said it better myself. Thank you for always being so on point but you always seem to express your thoughts eloquently.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
One thing I found particularly interesting with these exercises is the use of 022 FACs.

Given the frankly excessive amount of ship killing firepower the PLA would have in and around the Taiwan strait, their inclusion in the exercise does stand out as very unnecessary, if their role was anti-shipping.

One obvious alternative explanation is that the 022s were not their for anti-shipping missions. It would be extremely easy for the PLAN to swap out the AShMs on the 022s for LACS. Especially since the C803 has land attack variants available off the shelf.

Having 022s undertake the land attack part of the mission would free up the PLAN’s principle surface combatants to fill their entire VLS complement with SAMs and AShM/AShBMs, or allow them to reserve their own cruise missile stocks for the highest value time sensitive targets. This would drastically increase PLAN surface fleets combat persistence on the east side of Taiwan if the principle surface combatants are saving their own missile stocks and just focusing on staying safe on station, while packs of 022s zoom back and forth between optimal launch zones east of Taiwan island and home ports to rearm, refuel, re-crew and head back for another salvo.

To be fair, in a Taiwan contingency the Type 22s operating as AShM FACs is one of the viable use cases for their original anti shipping role.

They are able to stay well in the littorals of China's side of the strait and their modern YJ-83 variants can still cover basically the entirety of the width of the Taiwan strait and a good part of its length, against ROCN vessels.

When linked with friendly ISR (which naturally all assets will be), a single Type 22 can provide 8 on call YJ-83 family missiles with relatively short reaction time (perhaps more so than say a JH-7A), with better persistence and endurance than a tactical fighter too.

Of course, strike fighters and bombers will still be major employment anti shipping employment platforms in this contingency.

But I think Type 22s could provide a useful addition to the anti ship fires capacity, at least in this context. It doesn't necessarily need to do anything more exotic.
 

siegecrossbow

General
Staff member
Super Moderator
I don't want to put too much stock into these sort of stories that may or may not be disinformation/misinformation designed to lull the PLA forces and leadership in some sort of complacency and severe underestimation of ROC's forces potential fight against a possible PLA armed reunification with the island. I sure hope that PLA leaders top to bottom will not succumb to such hubris lest it leads to unnecessary hardships down the road.

PLA leadership doesn’t surf the web for information.
 

siegecrossbow

General
Staff member
Super Moderator
View attachment 110836
Controversy from within ROC, soldier responsible for sea searching radar complaining that:
  • officers drinking and playing cards with enlisted men and not paying attention to the radar screen
  • when they see PLAN ships sail past the midline and approaching the coast they just manually edit the position and move it westward and everything is fine
  • rampant nepotism, corporal who's close with the CO plays Switch while on duty and doesn't give a shit
MND is naturally calling this fake news and investigating. It looks like thing we've long suspected is true: those ROCMND maps showing track are not to be trusted. In this case though this guy is seeing the rot at low level.

I listened to Yankee’s most recent podcast and there appears to be some element of truth to this post. The map provided by ROC MND is pretty much bogus as they’ve reiterated multiple times in the past, and the situation seems to have worsened post Joint-Swords with them essentially reporting the same types of aircraft shown on CCTV-7. That seems mighty sus to me. They are very interested in what caused the four sonic booms near Hualien since both ROCAF and ROCN denied that they were responsible.
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
To be fair, in a Taiwan contingency the Type 22s operating as AShM FACs is one of the viable use cases for their original anti shipping role.

They are able to stay well in the littorals of China's side of the strait and their modern YJ-83 variants can still cover basically the entirety of the width of the Taiwan strait and a good part of its length, against ROCN vessels.

When linked with friendly ISR (which naturally all assets will be), a single Type 22 can provide 8 on call YJ-83 family missiles with relatively short reaction time (perhaps more so than say a JH-7A), with better persistence and endurance than a tactical fighter too.

Of course, strike fighters and bombers will still be major employment anti shipping employment platforms in this contingency.

But I think Type 22s could provide a useful addition to the anti ship fires capacity, at least in this context. It doesn't necessarily need to do anything more exotic.
Also, PLAN has a lot of YJ-83s that are not used by many other platforms right now. Given the technical level of ROCN vessels, I would imagine they would be a good target for 022s. Other test case will be against any Japanese or USN ships operating close enough to yellow sea and east china sea.

Aside from that, I suppose they can also augment 056s and coast guards in enforcing selective blockades.
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
Interesting article on the recent exercises. Less noisy but more focused than 'Operation Pelosi', and good reasons not to trust ROCMoDs tallies:

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too many blobs getting interviewed that are still ultimately clueless about how something like this will go down. It boggles my mind why certain people continue to get interviewed.
 
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