Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics

Brumby said:

It is likely that test of the nature that you talked of are being taken. I think the challenge goes beyond merely detection, and coordination of assets especially just testing separate components of parts. A realistic test requires a complete spectrum of the chain being subject to the necessary conditions it will likely faced. This include live firing on a moving target subject to a suite of ECM's. Such a test as Jeff alluded we have not seen. In other words there is no proof of concept.

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As I've discussed, I'm not sure just how important the "moving target" part of the test is. Assuming the RV is coming in from 100km (altitude) at the beginning of the terminal phase, at Mach 7 (some sources have said Mach 10, but let's try to tilt the scales against the RV), and the carrier is moving at 30 knots, then there is less than 30 seconds in which the carrier can move less than 700 meters from initiation of terminal phase. This is assuming there has been midcourse correction up until terminal phase to keep up with the previous 20 minutes or so of flight -- this of course, can be simulated to a degree by firing AShBM at a fixed land target, but at a realistic distance away from a simulated "initial detection location," and then using C4ISR sensors to datalink with the vehicle, providing its midcourse correction for the 20 minutes x 30 knots = 18.52 km of travel distance a CSG would have made during the flight time. Of course, I've already mentioned how they can use separate exercises to test the C4ISR system's ability to track moving ships at sea.

So the question is how accurately they can test the terminal flight adjustments/target tracking for the RV without firing into the sea, while also realizing the ship probably won't have moved more than 1 km away from the beginning of terminal phase anyway.

Also worth noting the RV will likely use a cluster munition to detonate at optimal altitude to ensure best dispersion of submunitions, so the RV's final CEP doesn't have to be much less than 30m. (Consider 450 kg CBU-87 has a footprint of 200m x 400m)

As for testing against ECM, this is not something we can tell from satellite pictures or our usual sources anyway. But given the PLA's emphasis in operating under realistic EM conditions, I'd be surprised if they don't aim to test the system/components of their system under complex EM if they haven't done so already.

That said, there are always limits to how much countermeasures one should provide their opfor simulators. The recent stride exercises were an excellent demonstration where the opfor blue force was immensely overpowered with near omniscient ISR, tactical nukes, NBC weapons, and uncontested air power.

Participants in relay races spent considerable time on hand offs and we continue to see experienced team stumbles in this area - even at world class levels. There are significant number of handoffs between components for the concept to work at a realistic level. Imagine a dice with 6 faces and numbers. The challenge is not the probability of getting any of the numbers when the dice is thrown but in ensuring the numbers appear in the right succession.

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Yes, I agree with this, but again, this isn't necessarily a problem unique to the AShBM and its associated infrastructure.

Bltizo said:

As I've discussed, I'm not sure just how important the "moving target" part of the test is. Assuming the RV is coming in from 100km at the beginning of the terminal phase, at Mach 7 (some sources have said Mach 10, but let's try to tilt the scales against the RV), and the carrier is moving at 30 knots, then there is less than 30 seconds in which the carrier can move less than 700 meters from initiation of terminal phase. This is assuming there has been midcourse correction up until terminal phase to keep up with the previous 20 minutes or so of flight -- this of course, can be simulated to a degree by firing AShBM at a fixed land target, but at a realistic distance away from a simulated "initial detection location," and then using C4ISR sensors to datalink with the vehicle, providing its midcourse correction for the 20 minutes x 30 knots = 18.52 km of travel distance a CSG would have made during the flight time. Of course, I've already mentioned how they can use separate exercises to test the C4ISR system's ability to track moving ships at sea.

So the question is how accurately they can test the terminal flight adjustments/target tracking for the RV without firing into the sea, while also realizing the ship probably won't have moved more than 1 km away from the beginning of terminal phase anyway.

Also worth noting the RV will likely use a cluster munition to detonate at optimal altitude to ensure best dispersion of submunitions, so the RV's final CEP doesn't have to be much less than 30m. (Consider 450 kg CBU-87 has a footprint of 200m x 400m)

As for testing against ECM, this is not something we can tell from satellite pictures or our usual sources anyway. But given the PLA's emphasis in operating under realistic EM conditions, I'd be surprised if they don't aim to test the system/components of their system under complex EM if they haven't done so already.

That said, there are always limits to how much countermeasures one should provide their opfor simulators. The recent stride exercises were an excellent demonstration where the opfor blue force was immensely overpowered with near omniscient ISR, tactical nukes, NBC weapons, and uncontested air power.




Yes, I agree with this, but again, this isn't necessarily a problem unique to the AShBM and its associated infrastructure.

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Oh Wow, not again, but to throw my two cents out, 6,000 US service men and women are basically living on sovereign US territory. ANY overt act against that territory risks the raining down of the fire of HELL, the US places those sovereign territories in harms way every day, in fact their very presence says we're here to play "hard ball" and we mean business....
A carrier battle group is the de-facto US Calvary, when the US moves a carrier into a theatre, it is a "show of force", the very reason that China's neighbors are "nervous" about the Liaoning and her protégés, and possibly the reason we see a "curtain" coming down around the Liaoning, as well as other "strategic assets".... One of the reasons the crew of the Song class that surfaced near the Kitty Hawk likely had a tremendous chuckle, and why that incident continues to resonate.....

So, where does that leave us,,, with an amped up concern that any "stupidity" will in and of its own accord ramp up to the next level.... diesel electric boats are very "stealthy" for a first shot, maybe a second, but doubtfull that such a boat or boats would survive the mauling that would inevitably come, as they lack the speed and agility of a nuclear attack boat, yes the nuke boat will make a little more noise, but like a carrier, they themselves remain very elusive, and they cover a lot of ground quietly when they must.

@ Air force brat, while I'm sure we are all aware of the lives onboard with a supercarrier (and yes, it technically is sovereign territory of whatever nation the navy owns it), at the end of the day it is an offensive power projection tool.

I know you didn't challenge this statement, but I want to repeat that it is a little presumptuous (of the article) to equate an attack on a carrier loaded with military personnel and long range strike aircraft, with attacks on actual soil of a country's mainland.

The US would not be willing to tolerate any strikes against its own mainland either, even if the attacks were limited to military targets.

The difference between expeditionary forces and forces deployed at home is entirely a matter of geography and population. Of course, the ability to tolerate and respond to strikes and threats against one's homeland is dependent on national power as well.

and like brumby said, the degree to which a loss is acceptable will entirely depend on the situation at play. Hopefully, we will eventually reach a balance where neither side will be in a situation to willingly risk their forces in a conflict.

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addendum; imho it is very unlikely any AShBM will seek to "sink" a carrier of any kind. Carriers are big ships, with lots of personnel for damage control to bind leaks and compartmentalize water influx. More likely any AShBM will instead seek a mission kill via a cluster/anti runway munition, to irreversibly damage the flight deck's catapults, arrestor gear, and overall surface, and probably heavily damage the vulnerable sensors and the island which are also vital to flight operations as well. Such a shot will never be able to sink a ship of that size, and may not even inflict that many casualties assuming the carrier has foresight to get everyone below decks. But it will probably rip the soft and vulnerable topside equipment inoperable.

ABC Radio Interview from John Bachelor Show, Sitting in for John as the interviewer is Francis Rose. Interview with Robert Haddick, author, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific.
Topics strategies and tactics, expansion and counter reaction to the tactics employed by the USN and PLA

TerraN_EmpirE said:

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ABC Radio Interview from John Bachelor Show, Sitting in for John as the interviewer is Francis Rose. Interview with Robert Haddick, author, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific.
Topics strategies and tactics, expansion and counter reaction to the tactics employed by the USN and PLA

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Now I'm curious, got to check this out.

Bltizo said:

@ Air force brat, while I'm sure we are all aware of the lives onboard with a supercarrier (and yes, it technically is sovereign territory of whatever nation the navy owns it), at the end of the day it is an offensive power projection tool.

I know you didn't challenge this statement, but I want to repeat that it is a little presumptuous (of the article) to equate an attack on a carrier loaded with military personnel and long range strike aircraft, with attacks on actual soil of a country's mainland.

The US would not be willing to tolerate any strikes against its own mainland either, even if the attacks were limited to military targets.

The difference between expeditionary forces and forces deployed at home is entirely a matter of geography and population. Of course, the ability to tolerate and respond to strikes and threats against one's homeland is dependent on national power as well.

and like brumby said, the degree to which a loss is acceptable will entirely depend on the situation at play. Hopefully, we will eventually reach a balance where neither side will be in a situation to willingly risk their forces in a conflict.

--

addendum; imho it is very unlikely any AShBM will seek to "sink" a carrier of any kind. Carriers are big ships, with lots of personnel for damage control to bind leaks and compartmentalize water influx. More likely any AShBM will instead seek a mission kill via a cluster/anti runway munition, to irreversibly damage the flight deck's catapults, arrestor gear, and overall surface, and probably heavily damage the vulnerable sensors and the island which are also vital to flight operations as well. Such a shot will never be able to sink a ship of that size, and may not even inflict that many casualties assuming the carrier has foresight to get everyone below decks. But it will probably rip the soft and vulnerable topside equipment inoperable.

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One point, I think looking to only disable a carrier rather than sink it is a big mistake, at least in the case of attacking an American carrier.

That is very much because of American's collective psychology. As a British journalist once said, Americans are a people who respond most to big wins and big looses. That is true in American sports, and it is also true in war.

Just as The Tet Offensive captured America's collective attention and shaped it decidedly towards an anti-war stance, so did Desert Storm do the opposit.

The slow attritional grind of Iraq and Afghanistan frastrated Americans, but as recent public opinion showed, it did not take all that much to make most of them pro-war again in the case of attacking ISIS.

While I hope the day would never come, if China does fight America, China holding back will not earn any recognition or reciprocity from American generals, and may even be seen as a sign of weakness, that China can only hurt American forces while lacking the power to deliver a knock-out blow.

That is because American generals would never consider leaving the job half done. Firing warning shots is one thing, but once they engage, they won stop until their opponent is complete destroyed unless called off. Case in point, the highway of death during desert storm.

If you are faced with an American carrier battle group, not only should you aim to sink the carrier, but also every single other combat ship in the group.

During the battle is not the time to show restraint or mercy, that is for after. So after the warships had all been killed, send in transports to drop life rafts and hospital ships to pick up survivors.

plawolf said:

One point, I think looking to only disable a carrier rather than sink it is a big mistake, at least in the case of attacking an American carrier.

That is very much because of American's collective psychology. As a British journalist once said, Americans are a people who respond most to big wins and big looses. That is true in American sports, and it is also true in war.

Just as The Tet Offensive captured America's collective attention and shaped it decidedly towards an anti-war stance, so did Desert Storm do the opposit.

The slow attritional grind of Iraq and Afghanistan frastrated Americans, but as recent public opinion showed, it did not take all that much to make most of them pro-war again in the case of attacking ISIS.

While I hope the day would never come, if China does fight America, China holding back will not earn any recognition or reciprocity from American generals, and may even be seen as a sign of weakness, that China can only hurt American forces while lacking the power to deliver a knock-out blow.

That is because American generals would never consider leaving the job half done. Firing warning shots is one thing, but once they engage, they won stop until their opponent is complete destroyed unless called off. Case in point, the highway of death during desert storm.

If you are faced with an American carrier battle group, not only should you aim to sink the carrier, but also every single other combat ship in the group.

During the battle is not the time to show restraint or mercy, that is for after. So after the warships had all been killed, send in transports to drop life rafts and hospital ships to pick up survivors.

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Well in any situation a, hard confirmed kill would be preferred over a mission kill.

But carriers are so big that trying to sink (especially with something like an AShBM) will be quite difficult. The reason I think a mission kill (i.e.: aiming to neutralize the flight deck and its associated soft vital parts like catapults, traps, and island/radars) would be preferred is that it will fulfill the PLA's counter intervention aims most succinctly, it isn't out of any desire to "hold back".

The idea for disabling a carrier will be to either make a USN intervention task force turn back, or to make the remaining ships much more vulnerable to further air, sea, or AShBM strikes, given a carrier is not only an offensive strike tool but also provides a very capable defensive role for any taskforce (via CAP and fixed wing AEW specifically).

I don't want to comment about how the psychology of the public may work in a potential conflict -- there are so many interesting and frightening things to consider, personally I'm surprised no one in the military establishment has considered the societal possibilities of such a scenario -- but I agree that it will be unpredictable. Media and PR will be as strong deciders of whether to continue as material losses.

The only hope would be that sending the two world's largest economic powers against each other would be a show down no one wants, and that either the two country's leaders or the international community will assist in brokering a political resolution to whatever crisis we are talking about (most likely Taiwan related).

Brumby said:

It is likely that test of the nature that you talked of are being taken. I think the challenge goes beyond merely detection, and coordination of assets especially just testing separate components of parts. A realistic test requires a complete spectrum of the chain being subject to the necessary conditions it will likely faced. This include live firing on a moving target subject to a suite of ECM's. Such a test as Jeff alluded we have not seen. In other words there is no proof of concept.

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Show me that it is an universal requirement for systems to be tested from start to finish. Many systems don't go through such rigorous requirement anyway. ICBMs aren't tested with functional nuclear warheads. Does it mean those tests aren't realistic and that ICBMs aren't operational? Satellites are tested in parts, not as whole. Does it make satellites any less operational?

When you have a chain A->B->C, proving A->B works and B->C works is sufficient. That's the nature of a chain. It's a sequence, not simultaneous occurrences.

Engineer said:

Show me that it is an universal requirement for systems to be tested from start to finish. Many systems don't go through such rigorous requirement anyway. ICBMs aren't tested with functional nuclear warheads. Does it mean those tests aren't realistic and that ICBMs aren't operational? Satellites are tested in parts, not as whole. Does it make satellites any less operational?

When you have a chain A->B->C, proving A->B works and B->C works is sufficient. That's the nature of a chain. It's a sequence, not simultaneous occurrences.

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The concept's success or failure requires the components of the chain to work both collectively and successively and not independently or individually. Until there is demonstration that the product can deliver its end result you don't have a product - just components of a product.

Brumby said:

The concept's success or failure requires the components of the chain to work both collectively and successively and not independently or individually. Until there is demonstration that the product can deliver its end result you don't have a product - just components of a product.

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Semantics.

His ICBM example is a perfect example of why that rule cannot be blindly applied. Just because ICBM test fires do not involve detonating a nuclear warhead doesn't mean it is not a finished and operational product.

In AShBMs case, I think I've already made my case for how the individual components can be tested in varying scenarios of realism and integration, and that the only thing they can't really test without firing at a target at sea is the terminal phase in hitting a slowly moving target, and I've already described how that may be tested indirectly. Post 2411 in this thread.

You were right that tests should be realistic, and that the organisation of a system"s components is as important as their ability to successful interact with each other — but again, those are challenges all systems face.