Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
In terms of hitting a moving target vs a stationary one. Even if a carrier is steaming at full speed, by the time the ASBM seeker has it in its sights, it might as well be stationary for all the difference its movement from the moment the seeker spots it impact will make.

The issue of trying to hit a moving target is ultimately one of midcourse guidance and course corrections and you can perform all the tests needed to validate that using a static target. As I have said multiple times, if they launched the missile at a different set of co-ordinates and then fed the missile a serious a new co-ordinates throughout its flight...
What you are talking about is not a given. Has the PLAN or PRC ever demonstrated a capability to send mid-course changes to a ballistic missile in flight outside of the atmosphere? I am not aware of any documented tests of capabilities of that nature.

If the vessel is 1,500 km out to sea when the missile is launched, and it takes six or seven minutes for the missile to get there, the vessel will have been able to move something over 5 kilometers in any direction. This means there is an 80+ square kilometer area for the seeker to search and locate the target. I am not aware of a capability in the PRCs C4ISTAR to allow them to make course changes above the atmosphere. So, the missile now only has a few seconds to do so, in what is likely to be a very high electronic warfare environment especially designed to defeat the warhead if it survives physically to that point.

As the misile approaches, the vessel will continue to manuever and its escorts, and ultimately itself, will be shooting at the target, beginning with BMD and continuing right down to CIWS. You make the defeat of these electronic and physical defenses sound like a trivial and simple matter, and the re-acquisition of the target and manuevering as well. They are not, nor will they be.

And as a very complicated and sophisticated and difficult system, it simply cries out for full testing.

But, it has never been live, full-up tested to do this very thing. Simulations with the seeker head are one thing...and are required. Hitting static targets in the desert are another...and also required as you step up the testing ladder. Live tests with the entire sequence, going through all of the intricate C4ISTAR components to prove the very things you are asserting in this response are another thing, and in the end, equally and even more important if you want to have any high degree of confidence in the overall system.

Oh come on, at least be consistent. The US ABM tests would hardly pass the kind of rigours criteria you have demanded the PLA ASBM pass. Yet you keep refer to them as if they are battle tested and their capabilities are beyond doubt. They are not.

The Chinese ASBM has not been tested against a carrier sized target out at sea, but neither has the SM3 been tested against a DF21 class IRBM with maneuverering RV and decoys now has it? Never mind trying to intercept multiple incoming missiles at the same time under heavy ECM.

That has not stopped the US from declaring it operational and fielding it on ships, why must you demand the Chinese ASBM pass a higher standard before you will accept the possibility that an ASBM might be operational without having been tested against a sea based target?
Clearly apples and oranges comparisons on your part, plawolf, no matter how you spin it, just as you said...hehehe, both sides can spin it any way they want.

Trying to compare early and mid-level tests with the equally critical final full-up, live fire tests is simply not comparing the same things.

At the end of the day, this consistent comparison stands, as I said earlier on this thread:

The PLAN has not conducted full-up, live fire, documented tests against what they expect the DF-21D to attack, a manuevering carrier-sized vessel at sea. They do not need to conduct five missiles at once at this stage, nor do they need to employ a blizzard of sabot rounds...they will not be able to do those things if they cannot do it with one.

The US has conducted full-up, live fire tests against what they excpect the AEGIS BMD to attack, a BM coming in to attack the vessel...with great regularity and increasing success rates against increasingly diffult targets. That's the nature of testing once you have done it against a single, less sophisticated target.

This is a much more fundamental and basic question, final level, live fire, full up testing. On both systems. It is not related to the multiple threats, sabot rounds, etc., etc. you throw in. Perform a full-up live fire test against a single manuevering target at sea. Very fundamental.

That's the difference and it is a consistant expectation between the two systems. No spin necessary for that, just simple facts.

Now, I have no doubts that the PRC has tested the missile in computer simulations, and against static targets in the desert. I have never denied this. That is good, and necessary. But it is not complete.

The PRC has chosen to deploy the missile at this stage...and that is certainly their perogative, nor have I denied that they have done so. I have just called into question their level of testing.

As to overall deterence, as I said, the best thing the PLAN could do would be to obliterate a manuevering, carrier-sized target 1,000+ km to sea a number of times. Doing so would be a game changer. The US is steadily progressing and increasing an already proven capability in this regard.

But the PRC hasn't cponducted those very important final system tests, not even once, muich less numerous times to establish the systems reliability and consitancy. No spin will change that until they actually do. And until they have done so, the system is more in question by any measure, than if they had done so.

That is my only point. No talk, or explanation, or rationalization will change that until they simply do so.

But, once again, we are in a circular arguement that is not going to change one way or another until those types of criteria are filled. Until then, things are simply what they are. I accept that, while pointing out the incomplete nature of the tests.

J-XX said:
Pretty clear now the Df-21D is real and is operational. This is definitely a game changer. No wonder the US military is scared, they have no counter for this.
I agree that the PRC has deployed a missile system. I have never denied it.

How effective a system can be gauged based on the level of tests. They are missing the final, most critical system level tests.

As to the US having no counter. That is simply not true. The US has been developing BMD against this type of threat for years, and has conducted full-up live fire tests against such missiles on a regular basis, with an overall 75% success rate over the life of 70+ such tests, and a more recent success rate against more difficult missiles of 90% or more.
 
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thunderchief

Senior Member
About DF-21D and SM-3 : I don't know if DF-21D is operational or not , but do not expect from SM-3 to stop it , especially if fired in salvos . Reason for that is simple : SM-3 and whole Aegis ABM system were designed to intercept ballistic missiles - and DF-21D ballistic missile is not ! Instead , DF-21D is quasi-ballistic missile with MARVs (maneuverable reentry vehicles ) . In practice this means that DF-21D and similar missiles do not follow ballistic trajectory . Instead , they make maneuvers in flight , fly at lower trajectory etc ... Even worse , their reentry vehicles also make course changes during their part of the flight .

What that means for ABM systems , including Aegis § SM-3 ? All ABM systems work on a simple principle : they try to measure position and velocity vector of the missile they need to intercept . With such information they calculate approximate path of the missile and then try to guide their interceptor to a certain point of that path in a certain moment of time . Even without any counter-measures this a very tricky task: you need to measure said position and velocity of the missile as accurate as you can and as often as you can . Even small errors with speeds in question would create hundreds of meters misses .

And then you have quasi-ballistic missiles : just a few minutes of angle change in course and you would need to reposition your interceptor completely . SM-3 is not a small and light missile and it would need a lot of energy to quickly reverse its course . And just as it does that , intercepted missile again changes its course - you have to repeat whole thing again . In the end , probability of kill is small . IMHO , currently there is no reliable method to stop weapons like DF-21D except by jamming and deploying decoys . Maybe in a decade or two we could see some form of CIWS lasers or rail-guns , but for now if and when DF-21D gets deployed it would be a game-changer in naval warfare indeed .
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
About DF-21D and SM-3 : I don't know if DF-21D is operational or not , but do not expect from SM-3 to stop it , especially if fired in salvos . Reason for that is simple : SM-3 and whole Aegis ABM system were designed to intercept ballistic missiles - and DF-21D ballistic missile is not ! Instead , DF-21D is quasi-ballistic missile. In practice this means that DF-21D and similar missiles do not follow ballistic trajectory . Instead , they make maneuvers in flight , fly at lower trajectory etc ... Even worse , their reentry vehicles also make course changes during their part of the flight .
Wow...thanks for enlightening us all on how simple it is.

Seriously, you think that such an explanantion suffices.? Do you think that you have just come up with these ideas, and that no one else has considered it, and so just stating such things puts an end to it?

1st, your intial thesis about the AEGIS system and information regarding it is seriously flawed and mistaken. The AEGIS systme was not designed around intercepting ballistic missiles. It was initially designed around intercepting anti-shipping missiles. Low flying, manuevering, with numerous flight profiles, including changing flight profiles.

Multiple mach, sub mach, high elevation, sea skimming, pop-up mauevers, etc., etc., etc. Ballistic missiles have been added in the last 10-15 years because of the necessity of defending against potential launches by rogue nations when a relative small number (meaning not hundreds) need to be stopped.

To that, the US has added the concept of the ballistic missile used for non-nulcear attack missions like te DF-21D. The US has proposed such uses of its own missiles for decades...but never developed one to date because the precision guided weapons it has in its inventories have sufficed for all conventional attacks. But the US has known about and been designing such capabilities for a long time, including how to defend against them. Now, for the last several years, that has been being incorporated into the AEGIS system and the SM.

So, the US has been well aware of these issues you raise for a long time, and has been designing and testing defenses against them. Those designs are constantly being tested, up to and including live-fire tests with increasingly difficult test parameters to do so.

Is it perfec?. No...no man-made system is. Can the Chinese design into their missiles things the US is not prepared for? Posssibly, that is the nature of the technology battle on both sides.

But, please realize that there is nothing SIMPLE about any of this, on either side...and that what you think of here on a public forum has most probably been considered multiple times over and studied and tested long, long before it was ever raised here on SD or other such forum. And, if you do happen to )or believe you have) come up with something absolutely brand new...I would suggest you not voice it here, but rather inform your nation and its officials about it.
 
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thunderchief

Senior Member
Wow...thanks for enlightening us all on how simple it is.

Seriously, you think that such an explanantion suffices.? Do you think that you have just come up with these ideas, and that no one else has considered it, and so just stating such things puts an end to it?

Of course they consider it , and of course they know very well that Aegis BMD doesn't offer good protection against quasi-ballistic missiles . That is way they never claimed it could do that .

1st, your intial thesis about the AEGIS system and information regarding it is seriously flawed and mistaken. The AEGIS systme was not designed around intercepting ballistic missiles. It was initially designed around intercepting anti-shipping missiles. Low flying, manuevering, with numerous flight profiles, including changing flight profiles.

Yes I know that . I was talking about SM-3/Aegis ABM system , not about SM-2 or SM-1 combination (different missiles with completly different role)



Multiple mach, sub mach, high elevation, sea skimming, pop-up mauevers, etc., etc., etc. Ballistic missiles have been added in the last 10-15 years because of the necessity of defending against potential launches by rogue nations when a relative small number (meaning not hundreds) need to be stopped.

They were not "added" . Intercepting cruise missiles and aircraft is completely different ball game then intercepting ballistic missiles . SM-3 would be a poor choice for the first task .


To that, the US has added the concept of the ballistic missile used for non-nulcear attack missions like te DF-21D. The US has proposed such uses of its own missiles for decades...but never developed one to date because the precision guided weapons it has in its inventories have sufficed for all conventional attacks. But the US has known about and been designing such capabilities for a long time, including how to defend against them. Now, for the last several years, that has been being incorporated into the AEGIS system and the SM.

You are wrong . Of course , US has known about quasi-ballistic missiles (researched and fielded some themselves ) . But currently there doesn't exist technology to effectively counter this threat . SAMs are simply not good enough . You would need something like lasers or rail-guns .
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
Yes I know that . I was talking about SM-3/Aegis ABM system , not about SM-2 or SM-1 combination (different missiles with completly different role)
But you did not say that. You said the entire AEGIS sysem was built around intercepting ballistic missiles. It was not. I cannot go on what you meant to say, only on what you said.

They were not "added" . Intercepting cruise missiles and aircraft is completely different ball game then intercepting ballistic missiles . SM-3 would be a poor choice for the first task .
They were added. SM-3 is relaively new with AEGIS, added long after AEGIS was developed for the various SM-2 missiles.


You are wrong . Of course , US has known about quasi-ballistic missiles (researched and fielded some themselves ) . But currently there doesn't exist technology to effectively counter this threat . SAMs are simply not good enough . You would need something like lasers or rail-guns .
No, I am not wrong. They are doing so as we speak. You may not want to believe it...but it is nonetheless what they are doing.

Clearly we are not going to agree. No sense in any further discourse to simply go around and around.

As to Lasers, and Rail Guns, the US is working on those too and will field them relatively soon (within ten years). we have threads here on SD about both. Intial lasers are already being fieled, but not strong enough for anti-missile work yet...but with the new reactors on the Ford class that will change.

As to rail guns, most of the planned deployment at this stage are directed at bombarment and long range fire support and not anti-aircraft or antimissile.
 

shen

Senior Member
Interesting discussion. A couple of questions.

As far as I know, both SM-3 and SM-2IV are designed to engage short to medium range ballistic missiles (from Iran North Korea).
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Are they even capable of intercepting a target with the speed of IRBM?

SM-2IV is the terminal interceptor, a last ditch weapon should the mid-course (SM-3) interception fails. The only test of SM-2 block IV I'm aware of is this
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Against a short range missile. So is DF-21D even in its engagement envelop?

SM-3 is the mid-course interceptor. Can a SM-3 shooter stay close to the target it is suppose to protect or does it need to be forward deployed hundreds of kilometers along the axis of likely attack?
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Lion

Senior Member
I found some interested video of Iran UAV flying on top of USN CVN and filming it interrupted. Does USN allows foreign UAV to fly on top of them filming it?

[video=youtube;z-HupBlIryw]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-HupBlIryw[/video]
 

Skywatcher

Captain
You can spin all you want as to the motivation behind the DOD report. But it doesn't change the fact that China report is an official document of DOD mandated by the congress As such it deserve more respect. To assume that DOD purposely misled,"puff up" or embellish any report for its own gain , is tantamount to perjury as such it will be treated as criminal act. You can have your own believe that ASBM is fiction but you just delude yourself. It is real for sure

Another thing what gain did you expected from puffing up the report? budget gain? No such luck the budget will cut irrespective of the China threat!

Then why didn't they say that the PRC nuclear arsenal above 1000+ warheads? ;)
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Then why didn't they say that the PRC nuclear arsenal above 1000+ warheads? ;)

And you point is?. At least I am not the one who claim to be the final arbiter on the issue of ASBM who can decide what is a hoax and real. And come out with this post on the other forum

The AShBM was essentially a psychological weapon (seems to have already worked admirably in Taipei though).

The real unpleasantness for the USN is going to come with hypersonic cruise missiles and YJ-12/derivative equipped 5th generation fighter bombers.


My point is nobody know the extent of Chinese nuclear arsenal since she doesn't publish it

The assertion of western "expert"( if you want to call it) seem odd since they have no privy to the inner secret of 2nd artillery and based their estimate on dubious study that is clearly outdated

China have come a long way in weapon development and there is no barrier whatsoever financial or otherwise, yet somehow the Chinese nuclear arsenal stuck at 300 .When she surrounded by potential foe that try to contain , retard , roll back whatever progress she has made.

Yet she seem somehow oblivious to the danger and keep their most potent weapon at 300? You be the judge

This come from the same regime whose claim on legitimacy rest on the narrative that they alone can claim to reunite China and maintain their territorial integrity.

DoD estimate on the number of Chinese warhead is less convincing because what they did based on?. I am not sure if China is signatory of nuclear oversight But most of the plutonium production doesn't come from civilian nuclear plant and China have developed H bomb which more powerful than plutonium based weapon

Missile test can be tracked and verify thru listening post in Kyrgyzstan and they can verify the result from observation satellite and make assessment based on the available technology
 
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thunderchief

Senior Member
But you did not say that. You said the entire AEGIS sysem was built around intercepting ballistic missiles. It was not. I cannot go on what you meant to say, only on what you said.
I mentioned SM-3 and Aegis ABM . Maybe I wasn't clear enough , but discussion is already about intercepting ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles , not sea-skimming missiles.

They were added. SM-3 is relaively new with AEGIS, added long after AEGIS was developed for the various SM-2 missiles.

Aegis system goes back to 70s . Aegis ABM is a new system , not based on previous part of regular Aegis system . Even SM-3 (supposedly based on SM-2 ER) is completely different thing . Basically , you cannot just upgrade previous versions of Aegis to intercept ballistic missiles .

No, I am not wrong. They are doing so as we speak. You may not want to believe it...but it is nonetheless what they are doing.

Well , they are not doing it , nor did anyone ever claimed they will do it . SM-3 was developed to intercept Scud-like missiles from so called rouge nations like Iran and North Korea . To intercept more advanced and faster missiles , US is developing this (system obviously cannot fit on the ship ) :
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. Difference is huge : for example , Russians never had any complaints about Aegis ABM and SM-3 , and they threatened preemptive strikes on parts off GMD


As to Lasers, and Rail Guns, the US is working on those too and will field them relatively soon (within ten years). we have threads here on SD about both. Intial lasers are already being fieled, but not strong enough for anti-missile work yet...but with the new reactors on the Ford class that will change.

As to rail guns, most of the planned deployment at this stage are directed at bombarment and long range fire support and not anti-aircraft or antimissile.

US Navy is interested in lasers and rail guns (and yes they are planning to use rail guns for air defense
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) , precisely because they fear weapons like DF-21D and some future Russian hypersonic anti-ship weapons . They are fully aware that SAM technology has its limits .

Interesting discussion. A couple of questions.

As far as I know, both SM-3 and SM-2IV are designed to engage short to medium range ballistic missiles (from Iran North Korea).
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Are they even capable of intercepting a target with the speed of IRBM?

Theoretically , SM-3 should be able to attack and defeat single warhead IRBM . SM-2 RIM-174 (SM-6 , SM-2 Block 4 , SM-2 ERAM ... ) is designed to be versatile SAM . As such , it could engage shorter and slower ranged ballistic missiles , but main emphasis is on aircraft and fast (supersonic) cruise missiles . It is something like Russian S-400 for naval purpose .


SM-2IV is the terminal interceptor, a last ditch weapon should the mid-course (SM-3) interception fails. The only test of SM-2 block IV I'm aware of is this
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Against a short range missile. So is DF-21D even in its engagement envelop?

Not really , SM-2 should be regarded as general-purpose SAM . You can read that between the lines , when they mention blast fragmentation device instead of kinetic interceptor (in other words same as any other SAM ;) )



SM-3 is the mid-course interceptor. Can a SM-3 shooter stay close to the target it is suppose to protect or does it need to be forward deployed hundreds of kilometers along the axis of likely attack?
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ABM defense in general works best when intercepting missiles in climbing part of trajectory . That is the theory . In practice , you cannot always achieve that . SM-3 should be able to intercept missiles even in the reentry phase.
 
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