plawolf
Lieutenant General
What you are talking about is not a given. Has the PLAN or PRC ever demonstrated a capability to send mid-course changes to a ballistic missile in flight outside of the atmosphere? I am not aware of any documented tests of capabilities of that nature.
Well, for starters, this is more like it. These are the questions that we should be asking and discussing rather than getting hung up on insisting on seeing a very public show test.
How about the Chinese ASAT test? Unless you want to suggest that China managed to fire off such an unimaginably perfect shot that no course corrections whatsoever was needed in order to hit that weather satellite, some pretty precise extro atmospheric course corrections were pretty much a given.
China also tested a micro satellite during the last manned Shenzhou flight that demonstrated some pretty remarkable meneuvering capabilities which would have significant implications for both China's future ballistic missiles as well as ASAT or even SM3 like ABM programmes.
If the vessel is 1,500 km out to sea when the missile is launched, and it takes six or seven minutes for the missile to get there, the vessel will have been able to move something over 5 kilometers in any direction. This means there is an 80+ square kilometer area for the seeker to search and locate the target. I am not aware of a capability in the PRCs C4ISTAR to allow them to make course changes above the atmosphere. So, the missile now only has a few seconds to do so, in what is likely to be a very high electronic warfare environment especially designed to defeat the warhead if it survives physically to that point.
Well, the Chinese managed automatically dock spacecraft multiple times in orbit. I think that is pretty conclusive proof that China has the C4ISTAR capability to allow them to make course corrections above the atmosphere. OTH radars, AWACS, MPAs, long endurance UAVs and even SAR and electro optic earth observations satellites can all be used to detect and track a carrier sized target that far out to sea. Marrying that locational data with extra atmospheric maneuverering should hardly present an insurmountable technical challenge given everything else China has managed to achieve in these fields of late.
As the misile approaches, the vessel will continue to manuever and its escorts, and ultimately itself, will be shooting at the target, beginning with BMD and continuing right down to CIWS. You make the defeat of these electronic and physical defenses sound like a trivial and simple matter, and the re-acquisition of the target and manuevering as well. They are not, nor will they be.
We can argue about how survivable those surveillance assets might be in maintaining contact with the carrier long enough to successful direct an ASBM or ECM, or hard kill defences, but then we would be discussing the KP of the missile rather than the possibility of it being operational.
I am not really interesting in discussing the KP of an ASBM or the effectiveness or not of various counters, because for one thing, we don't know enough about the ASBM or the various soft kill and hard kill defence to hope to come to any remotely reliable conclusions, and secondly, because I fear that any attempt to engage in such a discussion will simply end up as a massive pissing contest with all the nonsense and ugliness that goes with it.
And as a very complicated and sophisticated and difficult system, it simply cries out for full testing.
Indeed it does, but as I pointed about in my last post. It is perfectly feasible to disguises a full test or test various elements separately.
A moving target can be easily simulated by firing the missile off target and then having it adjust its trajectory to move in on target before impact as you would do if you chasing a moving target.
The terminal maneuverering can be testing by the kinds of land tests against large fixed objects that we have seen satellite photos of in the past.
The seeker's ability to lock on to a target at sea can be tested by mounting the seeker on a conventional ballistic missile and firing it at a pattern of radar reflectors on top of poles in the sea, which can be quickly put up and removed again afterwards before anyone else can get a chance to divert assets to snoop. Hell, they could even conduct a full test against radar reflectors and how would anyone know it was an ASBM test and not just another normal ballistic missile test? The missile will only be in the air for a few minutes. It would be a simple thing to find a window of opportunity large enough to set up and conduct the test when no foreign satellites or other assets are close enough to get a good look. And the radar illuminators could all be taken down within seconds if needs up be setting up remote charges on them and the poles holding them up could all be cut with the flick of a switch and leave no traces.
Clearly apples and oranges comparisons on your part, plawolf, no matter how you spin it, just as you said...hehehe, both sides can spin it any way they want.
Tushay.
The US has conducted full-up, live fire tests against what they excpect the AEGIS BMD to attack, a BM coming in to attack the vessel...with great regularity and increasing success rates against increasingly diffult targets. That's the nature of testing once you have done it against a single, less sophisticated target.
Right, as I said, I have no interest in getting into a X v Y debate, so my mistake for bring up SM3, lets just drop it and focus on the ASBM.
This is a much more fundamental and basic question, final level, live fire, full up testing. On both systems. It is not related to the multiple threats, sabot rounds, etc., etc. you throw in. Perform a full-up live fire test against a single manuevering target at sea. Very fundamental.
As I already asked, how can you be so absolutely sure they have not conducted a full on test at sea? They might not have used some super-carrier sized piece of floating metal, but radar illuminators set up to present the same sized radar return to the seeker would serve just as well in terms of validating the weapon.
All of that can be done in relative secrecy and easily disguised as just another regular ballistic missile test.
As I have already pointed out before, the speed difference between even subsonic sea skimmers and a warship is such that hardly anyone even bother to test subsonic sea skimmers against moving, let alone maneuverering targets. A DF21 missile's speed is an order of magnitude greater than a sea skimmer, thus making the maneuverering target requirement even more redundant.
That's the difference and it is a consistant expectation between the two systems. No spin necessary for that, just simple facts.
Since when did we hold all the facts?
As to overall deterence, as I said, the best thing the PLAN could do would be to obliterate a manuevering, carrier-sized target 1,000+ km to sea a number of times. Doing so would be a game changer. The US is steadily progressing and increasing an already proven capability in this regard.
Best for whom? The US is making progress on ABM, but slow progress, and there is very chance funding for ABM will be frozen or even cut during the sequester.
Now why would China want to throw the USN this massive bone by proving beyond all possible doubt that it has an ASBM capability and helping the USN to secure all the funding it needs to develop a counter?
Conducting the kind of show testing you described is as much, if not more about sending a message as it is about the science and validating the weapon.
China does not want to send America a message by openly testing an ASBM just yet. They will save that bombshell for when they really need it.
But the PRC hasn't cponducted those very important final system tests, not even once, muich less numerous times to establish the systems reliability and consitancy. No spin will change that until they actually do. And until they have done so, the system is more in question by any measure, than if they had done so.
As you said, no spin necessary. As I already pointed out above, how could you be sure they have not conducted full tests disguised as regular missile tests?
As I have also pointed out, open, public testing like what the US is doing with its ABM tests is as much about sending messages as it is about the science. The US tested the likes of the F117 in total secrecy, yet did not negatively impact on the operational effectiveness of the weapon?