Have to agree to disagree here as well plawolf.
There are a multitude of things you can "keep close to your vest," and still test the system. The US does this regularly with its own surface missile tests, as well as its ABM tests.
The fact is, with a system as complex and difficult as this anti-shipping ballistic missile, with the environment it must operate in, with the huge C4ISTAR requirements, with the ECM and defenses (both active and passive) arrayed against it, to indicate that a system like this can be fully operational, or IMHO even initially operational, without numerous full up tests is just rediculous.
Sure they can fire it into the desert at static targets. Sure thy can simulate all sorts of things on a computer.
Who said anything about merely computer testing? Of all the factors you listed, the only thing that cannot be directly simulated on land is the seeker processing. But fundamentally, there is no great difference between a radar guided air to surface missile and a radar guided air to sea missile. The main difference would be one of software.
If needs be, you can test the seeker at sea without needing a carrier sized target to hit. Simply position a few ships, or even just poles with big radar reflectors in a patter that gives off a return roughly the same size as a carrier or large warship, and see if the seeker can detect it and guide the warhead in the bit of water close enough to the poles/ships to have scored a hit if it had been a carrier sized target, and you would have validation without needing to let the whole world know. All the equipment could be removed before anyone else has a chance to snoop.
If you have solved the ground clutter issue with using radar, or the cooling problem with imaging sensors for a surface to surface missile, transitioning that to one of surface to sea is relatively straight forward. Thus, there is no fundamental barrier in terms of seeker tech so long as they have a seeker that can do the job on land.
In terms of hitting a moving target vs a stationary one. Even if a carrier is steaming at full speed, by the time the ASBM seeker has it in its sights, it might as well be stationary for all the difference its movement from the moment the seeker spots it impact will make.
The issue of trying to hit a moving target is ultimately one of midcourse guidance and course corrections and you can perform all the tests needed to validate that using a static target. As I have said multiple times, if they launched the missile at a different set of co-ordinates and then fed the missile a serious a new co-ordinates throughout its flight to simulate the movement of a ship at 30 knots and ultimately redirect the missile to the co-ordinates where the stationary target is. If the missile can successfully change course and then hit the static target, it would be able to hit a moving one.
In terms of C4ISTAR and ECM, well they can also be simulated on land, and moreover, even if the PLA conducted a sea test, one could still bring those up as counter points to argue why the missile might not be effective.
But they will never know what they really have until they actually test it in the envoronment it was designed to operate in, against the type of target they are seeking to hit which is manuevering to avoid being hit. And they have not done that.
They can have a damned good idea. As for maneuverering, well who actually even bothers to test conventional anti ship missiles against moving, never mind maneuverering targets? Even with subsonic AShMs, the speed difference between the missile and the ship makes any last ditch movements by the ship irrelevant. In pretty much all the tests I have seen, they just shoot anti ship missiles at a stationary ship or radar reflector.
In fact, the PRC would provide a much stronger deterence aginst the US Navy by testing it full-up and obliterating several manuevering aircraft carrier sized vessels 1000+ km off shore. That would send the strongest message. What they are doing so far is more apt to send the message that they really can't do it...or at best, they are not sure if they can.
That message will be just as strong whether they send it now or when the US is deciding whether or not to get involved. The psychological impact would be much fresher if the test was conducted during high tensions, and it would not give the US years in the meantime to focus on a counter.
As to somehow keeping the US from spending to defend against it...well, that is clearly not working because the US continues to develope and imporve its ABM capability as it goes. But it has tested it many times, and it is deployed on ships in the potential trouble areas.
Please Jeff, surely you can appreciate that US spending and investment in ABM would be far stronger if there was a proven threat to counter rather than right now, with ABM being increasingly left on the back burner as the sequester starts to bite and the Pentagon is making drastic cuts that have a massive negative impact on the readiness and capabilities of combat units. Units that at present, seem a great deal more useful than ABM.
Unless of course you have a U.S. administration in office that simply will avoid conflict or confrontation at almost all costs which will give them an excuse to do so. Can't guard against that scenario in any case...but I have no doubts part of the PRC's calculation involves that as well.
Whoever said anything about cast iron guarentees? At the end of the day, everyone has their own choices to make and their own cards to play, the most anyone can do is stack the odds and make certain choices as costly as possible for the other guy. If the cost is higher than what he is willing or able to pay, he will back down.
As with any decision, the less time you have to process it and the less time you had to think about it, the greater the chance you will make a mistake.
If on the eve of battle, the PLA demonstrates a game changing capacity that the Pentagon did no predict, then that will raise all sorts of questions about the reliability of casualty projections as well as worries about what else China might have up their sleave. That will cast doubt in the minds of US leaders and commanders, which might be enough to sway the decision.
If would be unwise to assuming that any administration is predisposed to fold or fight no matter what. The decision will be made based on a cost benefit analysis of the situation and the options.
And part of the U.S.'s counter strategy, in addition to the very real defenses it has developed and deployed (and continues to improve), is to allow the bluff and/or misleading information game to proceed...and even play along with it. The longer the PRC does not actually test it...the better it actually is for the US.
Oh come on, at least be consistent. The US ABM tests would hardly pass the kind of rigours criteria you have demanded the PLA ASBM pass. Yet you keep refer to them as if they are battle tested and their capabilities are beyond doubt. They are not.
The Chinese ASBM has not been tested against a carrier sized target out at sea, but neither has the SM3 been tested against a DF21 class IRBM with maneuverering RV and decoys now has it? Never mind trying to intercept multiple incoming missiles at the same time under heavy ECM.
That has not stopped the US from declaring it operational and fielding it on ships, why must you demand the Chinese ASBM pass a higher standard before you will accept the possibility that an ASBM might be operational without having been tested against a sea based target?
Yes, you run additional risks by not testing it in its intended operational environment, but since this is an offensive weapon, you do not need it to hit every single time as you would a defensive weapon. Given the extremely high value of its intended target, you can afford to fire off dozens of ASBMs, and so long as even one of them hits, the program is a success.
And all of the above only deal with a direct hit missile. If the ASBM was designed to release submunitions or a hail or sabots, the technical difficulty is greatly reduced while the hit probability is increased and the chances of successful intercept plummets.