antiterror13
Brigadier
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
The war would be quick and both would be the losers, including all of us
The war would be quick and both would be the losers, including all of us
Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics
- Thread starter Kampfwagen
- Start date
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
Over 20 years ago (in Feb) the US Navy, during Operation Desert Storm was conducting anti-mine operaions when two capital ships were struck.
The USS Triploi (LPH-10), an amphibious assault ship, and the USS Princeton (CG 59), an AEGIS cruiser which was providing AAW defense for the anti-mining operation.
The USS Tripoli, she was an older (1960s) era LPH:
Here's two pictures of the damage caused on the Tripoli:
Here's a picture of the Princeton:
Here's two pictures of the Princeton mine damage:
As you can see, the aft portion of the Princeton was very nearly torn off.
But, this is where something else comes into play that the US Navy practices all the time and is very good at. Damage control. Both ships suffered no fatalities. Both ships made temporary repairs and were ultimately able to remain on station, mission capable, until relieved. Then both returned to port and were completely repaired and returned to service.
It could have been much worse.
A good description by an NCO of what happened onboard the Tripoli
At the following site, there is a good overall description of the engagement, but in particular is the "Special Note" about the USS Princeton where the
So, mines are very dangerous, but the US Navy and its carriers and large capitol ships are prepared to continue their missions in the face of them...and have gotten much, much better as regards mine warfare since these incidents as you can imagine.
Yes the US Navy does. And with good cause.
Over 20 years ago (in Feb) the US Navy, during Operation Desert Storm was conducting anti-mine operaions when two capital ships were struck.
The USS Triploi (LPH-10), an amphibious assault ship, and the USS Princeton (CG 59), an AEGIS cruiser which was providing AAW defense for the anti-mining operation.
The USS Tripoli, she was an older (1960s) era LPH:
Here's two pictures of the damage caused on the Tripoli:
Here's a picture of the Princeton:
Here's two pictures of the Princeton mine damage:
As you can see, the aft portion of the Princeton was very nearly torn off.
But, this is where something else comes into play that the US Navy practices all the time and is very good at. Damage control. Both ships suffered no fatalities. Both ships made temporary repairs and were ultimately able to remain on station, mission capable, until relieved. Then both returned to port and were completely repaired and returned to service.
It could have been much worse.
A good description by an NCO of what happened onboard the Tripoli
At the following site, there is a good overall description of the engagement, but in particular is the "Special Note" about the USS Princeton where the
So, mines are very dangerous, but the US Navy and its carriers and large capitol ships are prepared to continue their missions in the face of them...and have gotten much, much better as regards mine warfare since these incidents as you can imagine.
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Honestly I've always been an army and infantry fanboy when it came to military history but as I get wiser in my years, I am acquiring a growing appreciation of navies and the US navy in particular. The fact that these ships were able to do this is a testament to organizational strength and professionalism, which are in my opinion, the real sinews of war.
In my opinion there is also the Trafalgar factor at play. The French navy lost at Trafalgar due in a large part to being couped up in in port at Toulon. With no real practice of gunnery or regular demands on seamanship, the French were crushed.
I feel the PLAN sub fleet may face a similar problem. Due to geography Japan essentially seals off the Sub fleet's access to the Pacific, forcing it prowl around in the East China Sea or the Yellow sea as basically a littoral fleet. China is expanding into US and Soviet style long range patrol subs, but if the * hits the fan today, I doubt China can rely on its submarine fleet to deter a carrier.
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plawolf
Lieutenant General
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
History rarely if ever offers the same conditions to allow you to draw direct parallels. Usually people see what they want to see when they draw historical comparisons, and someone with different views and motivations can easily draw completely different conclusions from the same events with the same level of authority.
PLAN SSKs operate extensively within the first and maybe even the second island chains, and that is where a carrier would need to operate if it wants to conduction combat operations against Chinese targets.
And there are some significant tactical advantages to 'merely' prowling the first and second island chains, as the decades of experience of doing so has given the PLAN SSK fleets extensive knowledge of the topography and local conditions in those areas, which could translate into massive tactical advantages against an opponent not familiar with the local area.
The PLAN sub fleet might face geographic bottlenecks, but they are not sitting in port catching the rays all day long either, and it would be a grieve mistake to count them out of any possible conflict.
History rarely if ever offers the same conditions to allow you to draw direct parallels. Usually people see what they want to see when they draw historical comparisons, and someone with different views and motivations can easily draw completely different conclusions from the same events with the same level of authority.
PLAN SSKs operate extensively within the first and maybe even the second island chains, and that is where a carrier would need to operate if it wants to conduction combat operations against Chinese targets.
And there are some significant tactical advantages to 'merely' prowling the first and second island chains, as the decades of experience of doing so has given the PLAN SSK fleets extensive knowledge of the topography and local conditions in those areas, which could translate into massive tactical advantages against an opponent not familiar with the local area.
The PLAN sub fleet might face geographic bottlenecks, but they are not sitting in port catching the rays all day long either, and it would be a grieve mistake to count them out of any possible conflict.
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
The Chinese area denial strategy includes ashbm and SSKs among others... It won't be a one fit all solution. Though ashbm, if it is real, will definitely be the long arm for the PLA, with it's supposed 2500+ km range.
The Chinese area denial strategy includes ashbm and SSKs among others... It won't be a one fit all solution. Though ashbm, if it is real, will definitely be the long arm for the PLA, with it's supposed 2500+ km range.
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
I don't see an actual contradiction against my argument beyond that the PLAN is being pragmatic (which I agree with).
I am merely offering my reservations about certain areas of PLAN expansion.
I don't see an actual contradiction against my argument beyond that the PLAN is being pragmatic (which I agree with).
I am merely offering my reservations about certain areas of PLAN expansion.
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Pointblank
Senior Member
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
1. SSK's don't have the performance to catch a carrier on the open seas. To have a naval strategy that is reliant on blind hope that your enemy might just blunder into range is not a solid strategy.
And the USN is also undergoing modernization as well; USN technology in many areas vastly exceeds that of the Chinese. By 2050, you will probably see USN warships armed with rail guns.
2. Mines create a hazard for neutral shipping as well. I imagine the Chinese economy won't do so well for at least a decade as the East China Sea will be deemed too hazardous for commercial shipping until every mine has been accounted for and destroyed.
A major factor at play will be the professionalism of the crew. USN professionalism is extremely high. If one looked at your example, the Battle of Trafalgar, the French and the Spanish on paper had more ships, had more guns, and had more personnel. Yet they still lost despite having a major numerical superiority against a force that was better handled, had better crews and seamanship.
The main test will be the professionalism and seamanship skills of the Chinese, which is sorely lacking in comparison to some of the Western navies. USN and other Western navies go to sea very often for training and exercise, and they constantly drill and prepare for war. The Chinese don't go to sea as often, which has an effect on the capabilities and performance of their fleet.
1. SSK's don't have the performance to catch a carrier on the open seas. To have a naval strategy that is reliant on blind hope that your enemy might just blunder into range is not a solid strategy.
And the USN is also undergoing modernization as well; USN technology in many areas vastly exceeds that of the Chinese. By 2050, you will probably see USN warships armed with rail guns.
2. Mines create a hazard for neutral shipping as well. I imagine the Chinese economy won't do so well for at least a decade as the East China Sea will be deemed too hazardous for commercial shipping until every mine has been accounted for and destroyed.
A major factor at play will be the professionalism of the crew. USN professionalism is extremely high. If one looked at your example, the Battle of Trafalgar, the French and the Spanish on paper had more ships, had more guns, and had more personnel. Yet they still lost despite having a major numerical superiority against a force that was better handled, had better crews and seamanship.
The main test will be the professionalism and seamanship skills of the Chinese, which is sorely lacking in comparison to some of the Western navies. USN and other Western navies go to sea very often for training and exercise, and they constantly drill and prepare for war. The Chinese don't go to sea as often, which has an effect on the capabilities and performance of their fleet.
Re: The End of the Carrier Age?
I disagree. ASBM offers aN uncounterable offensive ability that SSKs do not. For all the plans about countering anti-ship missiles, the math just doesn't work out.
Precisely my point. Thank you.
My only advice is to not to count the PLAN out, if history is any guide.
I disagree. ASBM offers aN uncounterable offensive ability that SSKs do not. For all the plans about countering anti-ship missiles, the math just doesn't work out.
Precisely my point. Thank you.
My only advice is to not to count the PLAN out, if history is any guide.