Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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ecaedus

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The biggest thing that I learned is that you need to cut off internet/communication access between Taiwan and rest of the world. The West will demonize you no matter what, so cut off internet access, a complete information block-out, the less information, the better. Let them use their imagination to smear you, they have no shortage of imagination (e.g., genocide), they are going to do that no matter what.

China will not win the "narrative" battle among Western media audiences, but it can reduce the information coming out of Taiwan to nearly zero.
that means cutting off all 20 something cable landing stations simultaneously in a joint precision strike, in addition to somehow blocking all satellite internet capable dishes running off of diesel electric generators in TW to ensure an absolute info blackout. I strongly doubt if the PLA currently has, or if ever will have, this kind of total EM dominance over TW.
 

ecaedus

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on the point of countering the numerous ATGM/SHORADS/MANPADS etc. that TW will now surely order in the thousands after this conflict, would a combination of loitering smart munitions and ISR drones in great numbers be a valid counter?

I'm thinking in between the phase 1 massive precision strikes and the amphibious land assault, multiple swarms of these ISR/suicide drones can be deployed from 075/CVs to provide 24/7 coverage of potential landing zones to either a) attract and waste enemy weapon stockpile b) actively seek out and destroy human operators of such weapons
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
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will have to account of future starlink shenanigans. maybe leverage the tesla plant.
Starlink requires ground stations for backhaul, the satellite is only used as an intermediary to link users to the ground station.

The end user transmitter is also very RF loud (100W total power, 2.4 watt RF = 33 dBm) so let it be known that Starlink transceivers will be considered military communication devices.

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Just as a reminder, radios can pick up -120 dB (10^-12 watts) and Starlink signals are easily studied in peacetime.

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Problem: foreign ships can always act as ground station and do the backhaul. It is better to just consider a Starlink transceiver to be targets.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
that means cutting off all 20 something cable landing stations simultaneously in a joint precision strike, in addition to somehow blocking all satellite internet capable dishes running off of diesel electric generators in TW to ensure an absolute info blackout. I strongly doubt if the PLA currently has, or if ever will have, this kind of total EM dominance over TW.
Don't need to be simultaneously nor need to get all the stations. Why can't you do it one after the other in rapid succession, are they gonna send repair ships out in mined and sub infested waters? Also don't need to get the satellites transceivers as they can be jammed thanks to low SNR for satellite communication. As long as you degrade it enough so that civilians can't use regular internet or phones and only the government can communicate with specialized tools, half the EM battle is won.

Not all cables carry same bandwidth and you can hit the cables where they're underwater then mine it to prevent repair.
 

Ex0

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Your optimism of mass air drops is unrealistic, for a few reasons:

1. The PLA just doesn't have that many strategic and transport aircraft to carry out such drops.
2. Even after the PLA has established air superiority and conducted a SEAD/DEAD campaign, the remaining air defenses of the ROC military will likely still be sufficient to threaten the vulnerable transport aircraft conducting the drops. It will take a long time to carry out the SEAD/DEAD mission to a degree where the airspace is safe for large scale airborne drops.
3. Even if it is safe from the air defense pov to carry out large airdrops, the vulnerability of airborne forces to being surrounded by the enemy and destroyed is very high if you do not have massive ISR and firepower superiority to suppress and annihilate any enemy forces that will move against them. This is especially important in high density population territories like the island of Taiwan.


Your idea about simply using merchant ships to supplement sealift capabilities is also premature. Merchant ships require either a permanent port or a temporary port to be established. Doing so requires you to properly secure a beachhead, which requires a large number of amphibious assault forces (which do not require a port) to be landed and all of the enabling forces to make it a success -- which is very complex and not easy to achieve.


I'm writing up a post summarizing my own thoughts on the lessons of the Ukraine war so far, and one of the takeaways is that conducting airborne drops and even helicopter air assaults against a semblance of a conventional military is very high risk.
And in general war optimism and hand waving away certain complex operations as if they are going to be guaranteed successes, is very very dangerous.
They are just ideas. Of course in reality china would need to ramp up production and do everything in the right order with the right timings(most important). Air drops would only be after flattening the whole island and every area, making Taiwan troops only be able to be scattered and hiding. To surround airdropped troops would mean they show themselves and in numbers, and china could flatten them from sky and sea still etc. Or china could just be continuously flattening area to make space for airborne troops to secure landing site. They just need to provide enough cover to open the floodgates and once open, its game over. So they just need to create a tiny window which I think is easily accomplished, even if some risk and sacrifices will be necessary. It is war after all. But in the big picture it will be a steamroll.

China has the capability to make all these happen if it chose to do so. China could even use civilian transports and airdrop using those also. That is the strength of china and united country. Time is on chinas side, and china is the one that has all the cards. It can choose the exact moment to attack, or not at all. They could even give Taiwan up and allow usa troops to have base there for decades, I mean that's how it used to be when usa was much stronger and china weaker. Doing that today would just be sacrificial bluff by usa(which china would call just like Korea) and serve no real military purpose since they'd all just die if china attacked. So yeah.. if it does choose to attack, it will have everything in place to do any kind of attack they want.
 

Phead128

Captain
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Exactly, this is the kind of discussions PLA will be having. How do you take out mobile short range air defense system. It's not that easy. The put your higher valued fighter jets in danger. Based on the performance that TB-2 is having against SHORAD, maybe the answer is UCAVs. PLA can learn from both Russia and Ukraine here.
On the point of countering SHORADs, all PLA low-altitude assets like UCAVs, helicopters, etc... should have
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-like hard-kill active protection system (APS) in order to bait out SHORADs for target identification and follow-up elimination by other assets (UVACs, missiles, etc...) Is this feasible or possible to develop a hard-kill APS system like Israeli
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, but for Helicopters (attack/transport) and UCAVs? I think such a system would be highly valuable as it can extend the time helicopters can loiter, which can make-or-break a war.
 
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Broccoli

Senior Member
One thing that I noticed from Ukraine: UAVs are still running at low rates. This makes me more and more convinced that foreign intervention is already happening.

Here I focus on UAVs. UAVs still flying means 1 of 2 possibilities:

1. Russian army and air force is so incompetent that they did not strike obvious drone control centers blasting out tons of RF and situated in open areas away near airbases.

2. The drones are not being controlled from Ukrainian soil. The original control centers were taken out, true. But they're not being piloted from there.

I believe that the drones are likely being remote piloted from outside Ukraine. I even doubt Ukrainians are piloting their SAMs or doing more than just pressing a button, as Russian Air Force took out their radar on day 1. It is 100%

TB-2 needs be around 150km away from it's command center as it doesn't have satellite link.

In Taiwan's case they are putting money on naval mines and cruise missiles.
 

FairAndUnbiased

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TB-2 needs be around 150km away from it's command center as it doesn't have satellite link.

In Taiwan's case they are putting money on naval mines and cruise missiles.
150 km away from a ground station but that is line of sight limited, not power limited. E-8s flying at altitude in Poland, Hungary or Romania can direct TB-2s probably halfway into Ukraine... Which is exactly what we're seeing: Kiev push get slowed down while Ukrainian Army is getting encircled and bombarded in the east, far from western territories.
 

Broccoli

Senior Member
I think the biggest mistake China needs to fix is to be cheap. Yes, we all laugh about Chinese fighters using rocket pods to strafe targets during excercises, but seeing how the RuAF in Ukraine is now exactly doing that, endangering their few aviation assets with dumb bombs and rocket runs, this is no laughing matter anymore.

China needs to acquire tens of thousand guided weapons for their aviation forces and train with them regularily in excercises to become proficient with them. We are already seeing some more footages of Chinese PGMs during training, but we are still seeing too many rocket runs as well. China will be ready for Taiwan when we have an entire year of PLA training footages without a single rocket pod run.

When I ask why we don't of then see J-10's or J-16's carrying target pods, people always tell me they aren't needed etc, but clearly this should a wake up call that modern air force needs targeting pods because it's best way to take out targets from air. Or that PLAAF doesn't require such capability because PLARF missiles will take care of the problems.

I've always written that modern air force needs modern targeting capablity and plenty of PGM's.
 
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