Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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solarz

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One thing that I noticed from Ukraine: UAVs are still running at low rates. This makes me more and more convinced that foreign intervention is already happening.

Here I focus on UAVs. UAVs still flying means 1 of 2 possibilities:

1. Russian army and air force is so incompetent that they did not strike obvious drone control centers blasting out tons of RF and situated in open areas away near airbases.

2. The drones are not being controlled from Ukrainian soil. The original control centers were taken out, true. But they're not being piloted from there.

I believe that the drones are likely being remote piloted from outside Ukraine. I even doubt Ukrainians are piloting their SAMs or doing more than just pressing a button, as Russian Air Force took out their radar on day 1. It is 100%

#2 makes so much sense it would be illogical if it *wasn't* true.

All you have to do is paint the drone in Ukrainian colors, and who's going to be able to tell where it came from?
 

tphuang

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One thing that I noticed from Ukraine: UAVs are still running at low rates. This makes me more and more convinced that foreign intervention is already happening.

Here I focus on UAVs. UAVs still flying means 1 of 2 possibilities:

1. Russian army and air force is so incompetent that they did not strike obvious drone control centers blasting out tons of RF and situated in open areas away near airbases.

2. The drones are not being controlled from Ukrainian soil. The original control centers were taken out, true. But they're not being piloted from there.

I believe that the drones are likely being remote piloted from outside Ukraine. I even doubt Ukrainians are piloting their SAMs or doing more than just pressing a button, as Russian Air Force took out their radar on day 1. It is 100%
Stop giving Russian army excuses. If the drones are remote piloted from outside of Ukraine, then it should be even easier for Russian EW system to jam communications and make them inoperable. Similarly, if PLA cannot jam up Taiwan air defense and communications after establishing air dominance, that would be its own fault.

Why hasn't Russian Air Force destroyed all the aircraft while they are on the ground? Because they are not making enough sorties. If you are PLA invading Taiwan, you have to expect Taiwan will get help externally. It's up to you as the stronger military to stop all of that.

I can bet you the Chinese military is watching what's happening in Ukraine very carefully, documenting things Russia didn't do and figuring out where PLA need to improve. And that's the point of this thread also. Let's figure out where China needs to improve. It's clearly not ready at the moment to accomplish a quick takeover of Taiwan.
 

FairAndUnbiased

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Stop giving Russian army excuses. If the drones are remote piloted from outside of Ukraine, then it should be even easier for Russian EW system to jam communications and make them inoperable. Similarly, if PLA cannot jam up Taiwan air defense and communications after establishing air dominance, that would be its own fault.

Why hasn't Russian Air Force destroyed all the aircraft while they are on the ground? Because they are not making enough sorties. If you are PLA invading Taiwan, you have to expect Taiwan will get help externally. It's up to you as the stronger military to stop all of that.

I can bet you the Chinese military is watching what's happening in Ukraine very carefully, documenting things Russia didn't do and figuring out where PLA need to improve. And that's the point of this thread also. Let's figure out where China needs to improve. It's clearly not ready at the moment to accomplish a quick takeover of Taiwan.
This is what I mean by Russia is failing to account for all levels of foreign interference. Not an excuse, an objective analysis.

They accounted for no interference. That would be their ideal situation.

They accounted for massive direct intervention. They readied their strategic forces for that.

They did not account for this sort of plausible deniability foreign intervention that they cannot stop without a massive escalation.

This is a gap in their escalation ladder: they prepared only for 2 extremes and not the moderate case.
 

BoraTas

Major
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For tanks and AFVs:
Missile approach warning systems, top armor in form of HEAT specific ERA, Laser and Radar warning receivers and active defense systems are musts for modern AFVs. Any AFV without these is not suitable for front-line roles in the era of drones and top-attack missiles.
 

uinahime.chifune

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Justin Bronk just wrote a piece on the troubles that RuAF have had thus far. I would implore everyone to read this carefully rather than dismiss it as Western propaganda. I can assure you that people inside China are taking similar hard looks at what is happening so far and what type of challenges the current PLA structure might face.

He listed a few pretty important item on the issues thus far:
1) lack of coordination between RuAF, ground forces and SAMs. This is something imo that could be a huge problem with PLA also. Historically, the 3 services of PLA have not been very well coordinated. I have no idea the level of coordinations they have now. But if they wanted to have quick successful campaign, there will need to be great coordination in joint force actions between PLAAF, PLA LH and amphibious landing forces and also between PLAAF and PLAN in attacking ROC Navy. I haven't seen enough joint exercises to know the answer to these things.

2) friendly fire incidents between aircraft and SAMs. This is one area that may or may not be an issue for PLAAF. I'd imagine they will not be carrying a lot of mobile SAMs into Taiwan if they are expecting total air dominance before amphibious landing. The main concern would be between the Air Force and the Navy, especially if there is a USN intervention. Again, I would expect there to be improving level of date linking and coordination between the 2 services, but I don't know how well coordinated they are. After all, PLAN has its own Air Force.

3) Lack of training. This is one area that Shilao's podcast has pointed to as a place where PLAAF has significantly surpassed RuAF. I don't know if we can say they are at USAF level, but we are certainly seeing level of sophistication and realistic training level with PLAAF than we have not seen before. It comes back to the original point that we are seeing much higher sustained tempo from J-16s, H-6Ks and Y-8/9s. To me, being able to sustain tempo would be a major factor in a real war scenario. Especially as more J-16/20s enter service.

4) Lack of PGM strikes. Again, we've also discussed this as a major problem with RuAF so far. As we discussed in flanker thread before, J-16s are been better than Su-34 in ground strikes. Whether it's targeting or the abundance of PGMs, PLAAF should have a huge advantage here. Only sustained sorties can keep air bases and runways and SAMs out of action. As we discussed earlier, they will need to add a lot of UCAVs to sustain sorties after they already gain control of air space. You cannot expect J-16s and JH-7As by themselves to sustain high tempo day after day. It wears out the airframe and the pilots. Modern technology is here and PLAAF should add them in large numbers. Shilao's podcast also stated TB-2 performance in these battles despite not being very advanced. The idea is just by having a lot of UCAVs, you could cause a lot of damage without draining your high valued fighter jets.

Again, we talk bout PLA having greater precision strike capabilities with missiles and fighter jets. However, Taiwan does have a better air defense than Ukraine and is more well prepared than Ukraine. We should not dismiss the possibilities that there will be a lot of mobile SAM and Manpad operators facing the initial assaults but also past the initial phases. If you are PLA, you need to be prepared to take a lot of losses in UCAVs and helicopters. You need to add more helicopters and UCAVs. You need to do more comprehensive training between Z-10s, Z-20s and Z-8s, which would be the helicopters best suited for transporting troops and equipments to front line and providing protections.

Just imagine if they can sustain a few hundred Z-20 sorties and Z-8s sorties a day carrying 200 Lynx ATVs and 1500 troops to the East and south of Taipei in order to encircle Taipei. That alone with UCAV and helicopter protection would make quite the difference. Shilao's podcast cannot stop talking about helicopters and Lynx ATVs. These are basically the only major items that the Army has really spent money on in the recent years. These are clearly things they find to be very instrumental in a possible Taiwan invasion.
I think 1) and 2) should not be a big problem. China gained some knowledge of the data link from the US military in the 1980s, and completed the implementation of the army around 2013. China's main strategic pressure is the southeast. The equipment deployed here should be comparatively advanced, or equipment that has already been networked. In fact, I believe that many of the problems of the Russian military in military operations come from the lack of sufficient coordination. The PLA may be inexperienced, but it can also be achieved through more training makes up for this.
I think the biggest shortfall between China and Russia is precisely the opposite. Russia's shortfall comes from the lack of coordination capabilities brought by technology, while China's shortfall comes from the lack of support from the target area. In fact, before China hosted the 2008 Olympics, people's livelihood in Taiwan were generally better than in mainland China; after that, China made rapid progress with the influx of investment, while Taiwan steadily lost its competitiveness. Hatred of the wealthy is a common mentality, especially when this man was poorer than you ten years ago.
Before the 1980s, the people in Taiwan were KMT troops who had been defeated and their descendants. The two sides of the strait regarded each other as the enemy of rebellion, but they never thought of independence. In this case, both sides will be more apt to admit their own failures. With the death of this group of people and the intervention of the Americans, they no longer think that the mainland is the enemy of the rebellion, it is another country, which is actually effortless to create a gap in identity. With the help of the Americans, it is easy to create strong hostility. This will bring endless trouble in the course of the war. Particularly students and young people, people are readily incited at this stage. They are likely to be willing to sacrifice themselves to damage infrastructure or other important facilities, or even use their bodies to block bullets that would not have been fired.
In fact, it is tough for the mainland to create more recognition for these people, which is why China's ideological battle is at a disadvantage. Unlike the West, China has missed the last great plunder that does not require to follow any rules. The West has plundered for a hundred years, and China has been plundered for nearly a hundred years. Ordinary people are not willing to research who is the real democracy or what liberty, but only care about how much money they have. With such advantages, the West is easy to blame their superior life because of some political factors rather than plundering others, or being on a gigantic island, the enemy cannot attack the mainland. And this is also a classic example of the Matthew effect, which can easily create the zeal of the convert.
 

tphuang

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I think 1) and 2) should not be a big problem. China gained some knowledge of the data link from the US military in the 1980s, and completed the implementation of the army around 2013. China's main strategic pressure is the southeast. The equipment deployed here should be comparatively advanced, or equipment that has already been networked. In fact, I believe that many of the problems of the Russian military in military operations come from the lack of sufficient coordination. The PLA may be inexperienced, but it can also be achieved through more training makes up for this.
I think the biggest shortfall between China and Russia is precisely the opposite. Russia's shortfall comes from the lack of coordination capabilities brought by technology, while China's shortfall comes from the lack of support from the target area. In fact, before China hosted the 2008 Olympics, people's livelihood in Taiwan were generally better than in mainland China; after that, China made rapid progress with the influx of investment, while Taiwan steadily lost its competitiveness. Hatred of the wealthy is a common mentality, especially when this man was poorer than you ten years ago.
Before the 1980s, the people in Taiwan were KMT troops who had been defeated and their descendants. The two sides of the strait regarded each other as the enemy of rebellion, but they never thought of independence. In this case, both sides will be more apt to admit their own failures. With the death of this group of people and the intervention of the Americans, they no longer think that the mainland is the enemy of the rebellion, it is another country, which is actually effortless to create a gap in identity. With the help of the Americans, it is easy to create strong hostility. This will bring endless trouble in the course of the war. Particularly students and young people, people are readily incited at this stage. They are likely to be willing to sacrifice themselves to damage infrastructure or other important facilities, or even use their bodies to block bullets that would not have been fired.
In fact, it is tough for the mainland to create more recognition for these people, which is why China's ideological battle is at a disadvantage. Unlike the West, China has missed the last great plunder that does not require to follow any rules. The West has plundered for a hundred years, and China has been plundered for nearly a hundred years. Ordinary people are not willing to research who is the real democracy or what liberty, but only care about how much money they have. With such advantages, the West is easy to blame their superior life because of some political factors rather than plundering others, or being on a gigantic island, the enemy cannot attack the mainland. And this is also a classic example of the Matthew effect, which can easily create the zeal of the convert.

Again, please keep political commentary out of this. There is a Taiwan thread for that already. What is wrong with people? Can we just have a thread of military strategy talk without talking about which country you hate?
 

uinahime.chifune

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Again, please keep political commentary out of this. There is a Taiwan thread for that already. What is wrong with people? Can we just have a thread of military strategy talk without talking about which country you hate?

Well, I think military occupation also includes effective control of areas on the move. It is impossible for the military to halt and give everyone a room, and this is the biggest shortcoming of China. The overly restrained behavior of the Russian army has already caused them trouble, and the PLA will only face more trouble. But the Chinese also like to focus on comments, and it is difficult to evaluate whether they will become ruthless through the experience of the Russian army.
 

Blitzo

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Of course it will only be done when there's air and sea dominance. Before that you can do air drops of thousands or even tens of thousands of troops and tanks. The millions is only for mop up to stop any chance of insurgency and wipe out all remaining hostile forces and also to police the country.

Those airborne troops will secure landing spots for the amphibious transport ships. It won't even be contested in my example, china could even use merchant transport ships at that point like those massive oil tanker ships and even cruise liners.

Before that there might be a chance of a few lucky/stray anti air or anti ship missile sites that PLA missed, but how many can they really do? Once they do it, they will be wiped out afterwards. Even if they get a few, it won't change anything in terms of the big picture and will only be delaying the inevitable. China won't do contested landing like dday style, china would have total air dominance and 24/7 eyes in the sky with satellites and loitering and surveillance drones.

To actually take out the massive amphibious transport's or the Y20 air drops, they would actually need infrastructure and not just manpads where they can just hide easily etc. They would be taken out easy and china could just keep dropping airborne troops and tanks nonstop from Y20 alone, the amphibious landing ships will mainly be used to spread Taiwan out and thin them out, all china needs is one breakthrough and secure one landing spot which I don't think will be that hard.

I don't think it will be hard at all for china to secure landing sites, and even if they don't, why can't they just keep air dropping troops, light tanks, mortars etc using Y20 until they can secure landing spots? China needs to up it's production of transport planes for this very purpose. Also train every infantry to be able to do a drop, which imo shouldn't be hard if it's an emergency and they want to drop tens or even hundreds of thousands. Of course all these drops will be done in conjunction with air and sea dominance and nonstop attacks to spread Taiwan out and create gaps and cover for the drops. I don't think it will be hard for china to achieve air and sea dominance vs just Taiwan by itself.

The problem would be after securing the landing site, and Taiwan army then launching missiles or whatever from hiding spots, but even then, that is not a long term solution and china would quickly expand their safe zone and establish more and more landing spots, at which point the floodgates will be completely open and trying to keep chinese troops out would no longer be a viable option since just surviving and staying hidden would be the only thing they can do.

The "hard" part wouldn't be beating Taiwan army in head to head conventional fights, but them hiding among civilian populations and fighting guerilla war. That's why china needs to be 100% committed and ready to overwhelm them and not care about infrastructure etc. That's why I said to do leaflet drops and set up a safe zone for civilians, and anyone who does not go there within a certain time limit will be considered fair game.

Your optimism of mass air drops is unrealistic, for a few reasons:

1. The PLA just doesn't have that many strategic and transport aircraft to carry out such drops.
2. Even after the PLA has established air superiority and conducted a SEAD/DEAD campaign, the remaining air defenses of the ROC military will likely still be sufficient to threaten the vulnerable transport aircraft conducting the drops. It will take a long time to carry out the SEAD/DEAD mission to a degree where the airspace is safe for large scale airborne drops.
3. Even if it is safe from the air defense pov to carry out large airdrops, the vulnerability of airborne forces to being surrounded by the enemy and destroyed is very high if you do not have massive ISR and firepower superiority to suppress and annihilate any enemy forces that will move against them. This is especially important in high density population territories like the island of Taiwan.


Your idea about simply using merchant ships to supplement sealift capabilities is also premature. Merchant ships require either a permanent port or a temporary port to be established. Doing so requires you to properly secure a beachhead, which requires a large number of amphibious assault forces (which do not require a port) to be landed and all of the enabling forces to make it a success -- which is very complex and not easy to achieve.


I'm writing up a post summarizing my own thoughts on the lessons of the Ukraine war so far, and one of the takeaways is that conducting airborne drops and even helicopter air assaults against a semblance of a conventional military is very high risk.
And in general war optimism and hand waving away certain complex operations as if they are going to be guaranteed successes, is very very dangerous.
 

Mohsin77

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Can we just have a thread of military strategy talk without talking about which country you hate?

Not enough intel yet. Unless you have the PLA's analysis & assessment reports to share.

The only thing we know for sure right now, is that whichever side has more videos is always 'winning,' according to Twitter.

But then again, even if you had all the videos, FOX's 'greatest hits' playlist is very selective, so...
 
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