I assume you are talking about dude on the left side?
Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario
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One thing to keep in mind is that the PLAAF has equivalents to nearly every single type of non-powered PGM that the USAF has, but standoff PGMs are generally more flexible especially for moving targets, and Chinese PGMs such as the C-704 (Chinese Maverick equivalent) are still cheaper to procure to boot.
without air dominance, PGMs are useless. ALCMs allow shooting at a safer distance.
The PLAAF does not have equivalents of every type of non-powered PGM the USAF has. In that thread I specifically mention that the PLAAF's only type of non-powered PGM in meaningful service is the 500kg LGB (LT-2/GB500), and that they do not have any other PGMs in service, like the FT family, LS family, or other ones of the LT or GB families.
Those systems are offered for export and have had testing yes, but the PLAAF has definitely not committed to any of them, and we cannot by any reasonable estimate say that the PLAAF "has" them.
Instead, we can say that the Chinese aerospace industry has equivalents of most non-powered PGM types that the US aerospace industry has developed.
But the PLA itself has yet to put its money where its mouth is and to actually buy stocks of PGMs in number.
Buying them in number and possessing them in inventory is a very very very major milestone and isn't something that can just be assumed to be able to easily happen. It requires money to buy the weapons, money to integrate them into the various aircraft types, money to train people to maintain and operate them on the airbase, money to train the pilots to operate them across your entire aircraft fleet.
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I'm not sure what you mean by standoff PGMs. If you're talking about powered standoff PGMs/ALCMs, the PLA has KD-88 in service, which should be an excellent missile with multiple modern variants of it... but it is still a relatively large weapon.
Good for striking targets at standoff range where air control has yet to be attained, yes, and by virtue of being guided with man in the loop options, it can hit moving targets yes.
But unpowered PGMs can also hit moving targets (laser guided PGMs, ImIR guided PGMs, or MMW guided PGMs), they just have to be employed closer to the target.
The main benefit of standoff powered PGMs versus unpowered PGMs is that you can carry much more of the latter in the place of the former.
On a JH-7/A, you can literally carry six 250kg bomb equivalents (i.e.: convertible to six 250kg PGMs) on a multi-ejector rack in the place of one KD-88. That's six targets you can engage in one sortie compared to one target in one sortie. The cost is that you have to get closer to your target with the 250kg unpowered PGM versus one KD-88.
You are trading range of the munition for engaging many more targets.
.... Also, I'm pretty sure C-704 is not in PLA service.
One Liberal Democratic party leading is more than enough (Japan).
What about somebody emerging from the current party that is pro European? If there isn't any, then why are they trying so hard to see him gone?
There's been a lot of discussion in this thread about importance of informational warfare and the need to cut data going in and out of Taiwan during conflict time due to what we're seeing in Ukraine. Consider in the near future satellite internet such as Starlink will increasingly become available and the difficulty of cutting this, it may be difficult to achieve sufficient internet black out.
However today someone pointed out something to me: has achieved something like the effect of an internet blackout, just you know with a real blackout. This blackout came at a time where Pompeo and co were in Taiwan to assure the DPP government of the strength of US backing in light of what's currently happening in Ukraine. Were under normal conditions we would expect a wave of cognitive warfare coming out of Taiwan, instead the blackout has decreased Taiwan's online presence to such a degree that there is notably less traffic across all Chinese social media, particularly of agent provocateurs.
This offers another solution in terms of information warfare - instead of trying to cut undersea cables and jam satellite signals, it may be easier to just disrupt Taiwan's relative fragile electrical grid in a non permanent way to cause a island wide blackout.
However today someone pointed out something to me: has achieved something like the effect of an internet blackout, just you know with a real blackout. This blackout came at a time where Pompeo and co were in Taiwan to assure the DPP government of the strength of US backing in light of what's currently happening in Ukraine. Were under normal conditions we would expect a wave of cognitive warfare coming out of Taiwan, instead the blackout has decreased Taiwan's online presence to such a degree that there is notably less traffic across all Chinese social media, particularly of agent provocateurs.
This offers another solution in terms of information warfare - instead of trying to cut undersea cables and jam satellite signals, it may be easier to just disrupt Taiwan's relative fragile electrical grid in a non permanent way to cause a island wide blackout.
When that happens, the PLA better act quickly to take control of the island's infrastructure at the very least; ppl are more likely to become restless and ornery without electricity and running water and this way, the expeditionary force can selectively cut off power to regions refusing to get with the program and accept reunification.
And when the internet is restarted, block out all western media presence on the island, and there should be a massive propaganda campaign to get the taiwan populace onside, like how american soldiers were aiding and abetting pizzagate american politicians with taiwanese children, that sort of stuff- after all, the western MSM is vicious and underhanded and without conscience.
lcloo
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Blowing out a few grid line towers at strategic points can cause a national level black out that will take weeks to repair. Some establishments and factories do have back-up diesel electricity generators but their supply of diesel will determine how long their generators will work.
Destroying fuel tanks in oil refineries will have to go in tandem with attack on power lines.
Talking about fuel, the Ukraine war shows attacks on Russian frontline fuel convoy has in a certain degree affected the motorised element of Russian army, where tanks and other vehicles ran out of fuel and had to be abandoned. This is a lesson not to be overlooked in Taiwan scenario. Destroying main fuel storage in the island will have immobilized many fighting vehicles after a few days to a week or two.
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I mean, why not both? It's not like PLA lack a dozen of standoff weapon to strike some critical power/comm node.
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