this is what people don't understand. Taiwan is just 6 percent of total Ukraine's area.
few squadrons of J-20 and J-16 can overwhelm entire island
View attachment 109599
It is much worse than that.
this is what people don't understand. Taiwan is just 6 percent of total Ukraine's area.
few squadrons of J-20 and J-16 can overwhelm entire island
View attachment 109599
Looks like people just cannot respect my comment to not go off topic about semiconductor stuff. Please stay on topic
Russia has always been confused about the VDV. Michael Kofman's remarks on Zapad 2021 exercise does an excellent job of summarizing VDV's problem of reconciling its operational concepts with practice.Even before the conflict started the Russian defense ministry started adding some T-72B3s to VDV units. So I am pretty certain they already had the issue of their lack of hard combat capability in mind. In a lot of countries, not just in Russia, people think having too many soldiers in Special Forces units degrades the ability of the regular army to recruit and retain quality personnel. You could argue that is the case with the VDV. Add to that most of them are still using older lightweight vehicles like the BMD-2 only makes things worse.
Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.
First of all, Taiwan is much smaller than Ukraine, so these weapons are also more difficult to conceal themselves, which makes them likely not to have the desired effect. Secondly, the Chinese Air Force and Navy are equipped with more advanced training levels than the Russian Air Force and Navy. The annual flying hours of Chinese pilots far exceeds that of Russian pilots. Combining these two points, I think it will be more difficult to replicate the Ukrainian model in Taiwan. Finally, I think the PLA has always regarded the Army as the main force to solve the Taiwan issue. Their request for the Air Force may simply be "don't let Taiwan's military control the skies." As for the navy, judging from the performance in the 2022 exercise, I think their main task in future conflicts is to cover the landing force and blockade the island of Taiwan. China has been preparing for this war for decades. Even if the worst happens, I think they have a way of going to war without adequate air and naval support.
With that in mind, does that make the BMD line of vehicles and by extension, BTR (airborne varient) useless? If operational requirements meant that airdropping is highly undesirable due to risk, having specific lightly armored airdroppable vehicles would become redundant. Consolidating current IFVs into heavier BMP platforms would save a lot of logistical headaches while also able to have more then wet paper rags in terms of protection for the troops.It honestly makes more sense to integrate the entire VDV into the ground forces, and get rid of all of their unique vehicles. Instead, simply prioritize VDV for all of Russia's high tier kit. T-90s, BMP-3s, and going forward, they should receive priority for Armata based vehicles. The VDV gave a very good accounting of itself after and even during the Kiev disaster.
In my opinion yes, they are useless, but to be fair to Russia, those vehicles do share parts with their common vehicle park. BMP turrets and engines form the core of various BMD machines. So I don't think you need to get rid of these highly specialized vehicles entirely, but it would make a lot of sense to start re-equipping existing VDV formations on the ground in Ukraine today with the latest high-end Russian kit.With that in mind, does that make the BMD line of vehicles and by extension, BTR (airborne varient) useless? If operational requirements meant that airdropping is highly undesirable due to risk, having specific lightly armored airdroppable vehicles would become redundant. Consolidating current IFVs into heavier BMP platforms would save a lot of logistical headaches while also able to have more then wet paper rags in terms of protection for the troops.
Patriot batteries are $1B each and missiles are $4M each. So no, it's not easy for the US to donate a thousand of them PLUS the US does not do that; they only hit Taiwan with the highest prices on the market. So the ROC will not be able to field many batteries at all.Taiwan maybe small but its also highly urbanized one side, so lots of dense urban jungles to hide these missiles and also a huge mountain range which are basically woodlands, again highly suitable for concealment.
Also, no matter how good the training of Chinese Air Force is, this does not solve the fundamental problem of dense Air Defense Networks. Missiles are super fast and much faster than planes and its much easier to hit something with a missile than it is to evade. So, Taiwan could manage to have HUNDREDS to Thousands of Patriot missile systems, which can be easily donated by the US, So Taiwan will not have to pay for it.
So, how would a PLA Air Force with Just 2000 combat planes of which maybe 5-600 maybe used in a Taiwan Scenario to keep a good reserve for other contingencies, deal with a dense network of Air Defense Systems? Good Training is simply not a good enough answer to this challenge. There has to be some kind of fundamental strategy that can comprehensively defeat this scenario.
Is there any technology that can comprehensively defeat a dense network of Air Defense Missiles? Even Stealth can be detected by Low Frequency Radars.
So far, it seems there is no easy answer for this for China. They have to take huge losses in planes in order to beat these air defense missiles using SEAD, assuming they are very good at SEAD also, but still they will take losses due to the fact that missiles are faster than planes and sensors are very good these days in missiles.
Does China have the numbers to beat an Air Defense Network with 1000+ patriots? I don't think so with Just 2000 planes. They need to increase their number of planes to 6000+ maybe. Or they have to do what Russia did which is to give up on Air Superiority and simply rely on missiles to do strikes.
Moreover, relying on the Army for Taiwan war is a complete non-starter. If China is not able to destroy the Anti-Ship Missiles or Intercept them, then the Army cannot even land on Taiwan without getting sunk by those missiles. China needs to have a huge fleet of Air Defense to intercept these missiles while transporting the invasion force. Again, it becomes a numbers game if Taiwan gets Supersonic or Hypersonic Missiles. China will lose many ships unless they find a good technology to intercept these missiles.
So far, it seems no one has been able to provide a convincing strategy to beat the Porcupine Strategy. Just some wishful thinking that Taiwan is too small or PLA too good in training.