Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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HighGround

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Even before the conflict started the Russian defense ministry started adding some T-72B3s to VDV units. So I am pretty certain they already had the issue of their lack of hard combat capability in mind. In a lot of countries, not just in Russia, people think having too many soldiers in Special Forces units degrades the ability of the regular army to recruit and retain quality personnel. You could argue that is the case with the VDV. Add to that most of them are still using older lightweight vehicles like the BMD-2 only makes things worse.
Russia has always been confused about the VDV. Michael Kofman's remarks on Zapad 2021 exercise does an excellent job of summarizing VDV's problem of reconciling its operational concepts with practice.

Second, despite its service record, and esprit de corps, the VDV can be seen as an anachronism: yet another piece of Soviet inheritance that Russians might qualify as a “briefcase without a handle”. Rather than parachuting into battle, in practice the VDV has spent most of its time in the role of motor rifle units on lightly armored vehicles. Allegedly, at one point during the New Look reforms, then Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov and then Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov even considered cutting the entire combat arm and handing it over to the land forces. The reasons are not difficult to fathom. Russia’s airborne and Russia’s logistics are woefully misaligned – maintaining an alternate park of airborne infantry fighting vehicles and a host of specialized equipment for the VDV is not cheap – while the force spends much of its time fighting as another form of motor rifle infantry. So it is no surprise that their commander thinks the VDV is due for new operating concepts, and force restructuring.

Quite frankly, VDV's integration of tanks was one of the more positive things Russia did. The VDV is de-facto elite, high-readiness infantry service arm. It has a paratroop division, and several helicopter based air-assault battalions (I haven't really seen them operated in a divisional command).

It honestly makes more sense to integrate the entire VDV into the ground forces, and get rid of all of their unique vehicles. Instead, simply prioritize VDV for all of Russia's high tier kit. T-90s, BMP-3s, and going forward, they should receive priority for Armata based vehicles. The VDV gave a very good accounting of itself after and even during the Kiev disaster.
 

tamsen_ikard

Junior Member
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First of all, Taiwan is much smaller than Ukraine, so these weapons are also more difficult to conceal themselves, which makes them likely not to have the desired effect. Secondly, the Chinese Air Force and Navy are equipped with more advanced training levels than the Russian Air Force and Navy. The annual flying hours of Chinese pilots far exceeds that of Russian pilots. Combining these two points, I think it will be more difficult to replicate the Ukrainian model in Taiwan. Finally, I think the PLA has always regarded the Army as the main force to solve the Taiwan issue. Their request for the Air Force may simply be "don't let Taiwan's military control the skies." As for the navy, judging from the performance in the 2022 exercise, I think their main task in future conflicts is to cover the landing force and blockade the island of Taiwan. China has been preparing for this war for decades. Even if the worst happens, I think they have a way of going to war without adequate air and naval support.

Taiwan maybe small but its also highly urbanized one side, so lots of dense urban jungles to hide these missiles and also a huge mountain range which are basically woodlands, again highly suitable for concealment.

Also, no matter how good the training of Chinese Air Force is, this does not solve the fundamental problem of dense Air Defense Networks. Missiles are super fast and much faster than planes and its much easier to hit something with a missile than it is to evade. So, Taiwan could manage to have HUNDREDS to Thousands of Patriot missile systems, which can be easily donated by the US, So Taiwan will not have to pay for it.

So, how would a PLA Air Force with Just 2000 combat planes of which maybe 5-600 maybe used in a Taiwan Scenario to keep a good reserve for other contingencies, deal with a dense network of Air Defense Systems? Good Training is simply not a good enough answer to this challenge. There has to be some kind of fundamental strategy that can comprehensively defeat this scenario.

Is there any technology that can comprehensively defeat a dense network of Air Defense Missiles? Even Stealth can be detected by Low Frequency Radars.

So far, it seems there is no easy answer for this for China. They have to take huge losses in planes in order to beat these air defense missiles using SEAD, assuming they are very good at SEAD also, but still they will take losses due to the fact that missiles are faster than planes and sensors are very good these days in missiles.

Does China have the numbers to beat an Air Defense Network with 1000+ patriots? I don't think so with Just 2000 planes. They need to increase their number of planes to 6000+ maybe. Or they have to do what Russia did which is to give up on Air Superiority and simply rely on missiles to do strikes.

Moreover, relying on the Army for Taiwan war is a complete non-starter. If China is not able to destroy the Anti-Ship Missiles or Intercept them, then the Army cannot even land on Taiwan without getting sunk by those missiles. China needs to have a huge fleet of Air Defense to intercept these missiles while transporting the invasion force. Again, it becomes a numbers game if Taiwan gets Supersonic or Hypersonic Missiles. China will lose many ships unless they find a good technology to intercept these missiles.

So far, it seems no one has been able to provide a convincing strategy to beat the Porcupine Strategy. Just some wishful thinking that Taiwan is too small or PLA too good in training.
 

tankphobia

Senior Member
Registered Member
It honestly makes more sense to integrate the entire VDV into the ground forces, and get rid of all of their unique vehicles. Instead, simply prioritize VDV for all of Russia's high tier kit. T-90s, BMP-3s, and going forward, they should receive priority for Armata based vehicles. The VDV gave a very good accounting of itself after and even during the Kiev disaster.
With that in mind, does that make the BMD line of vehicles and by extension, BTR (airborne varient) useless? If operational requirements meant that airdropping is highly undesirable due to risk, having specific lightly armored airdroppable vehicles would become redundant. Consolidating current IFVs into heavier BMP platforms would save a lot of logistical headaches while also able to have more then wet paper rags in terms of protection for the troops.
 

HighGround

Senior Member
Registered Member
With that in mind, does that make the BMD line of vehicles and by extension, BTR (airborne varient) useless? If operational requirements meant that airdropping is highly undesirable due to risk, having specific lightly armored airdroppable vehicles would become redundant. Consolidating current IFVs into heavier BMP platforms would save a lot of logistical headaches while also able to have more then wet paper rags in terms of protection for the troops.
In my opinion yes, they are useless, but to be fair to Russia, those vehicles do share parts with their common vehicle park. BMP turrets and engines form the core of various BMD machines. So I don't think you need to get rid of these highly specialized vehicles entirely, but it would make a lot of sense to start re-equipping existing VDV formations on the ground in Ukraine today with the latest high-end Russian kit.

There is really no reason for why the VDV should still be using the BMD-4M instead of a BMP-3M on the Kremennina front for example. And in general, I think this war demonstrates the highly specialized role of airborne forces. Having an entirely separate branch makes little sense to me. Kinda reminds me of the US Marine Corps before the recent re-organization.

I'm not sure what China can learn from this to be honest. If anything, a dedicated airborne branch makes a lot more sense for China than Russia lol.
 

tabu

Junior Member
Registered Member
China has agreed to a Russian intervention in Ukraine to test Western reactions to the prospect of Taiwan joining the Chinese mainland militarily.

It is therefore worth assessing the outcome of Xi's visit to Moscow, but We should distinguish between China's goals as a country and those of President Xi. The former have the broadest planning horizon, but the latter are limited in time to a maximum of 10-12 years. They are limited by the longevity and ambitions of Chairman Xi. A man who is extremely ambitious and wants to go down in Chinese history as a historical figure equal at least to Mao, Deng Xiaoping or the Chinese emperors who reunified China.
It is from this perspective that one should look at Xi's visit to Russia.
Undoubtedly, it was Xi who was interested in the shortest possible blitzkrieg, blowing up the entire world security system and enabling Beijing to resolve the Taiwan problem quickly. But a protracted war was not in China's plans. Too many additional unknowns and players were appearing in the game. Xi was well aware that against a united West in the event of a protracted war, the Russian Federation could not withstand it. Moreover, in this case its plans for the conquest of Taiwan could be put off to a distant drawer, due to the West's cohesive and consolidated response and absence of the element of surprise.

Russia's defeat in the present means China's defeat in the future. Accordingly, Beijing, represented by Xi, will not provide some kind of military assistance to a country suffering a military defeat. We can say without hesitation that the Russian troops in Ukraine have suffered and are suffering a total military defeat today. It is on this basis that China will not supply a single item of military goods, but will continue to siphon as much as possible of all possible resources from Russia at the lowest possible prices. But that is at the first stage. At the second stage Beijing will be most interested in weakening and political isolation of Moscow. Chairman Xi's goal is extremely simple: if it has failed to bring Taiwan back to its harbor, it will increase Siberia.
Moscow has nothing to offer in exchange to Beijing in the hope of some mythical support in the first place, as a buyer of Russia's natural resources. For political support it will have to pay with political steps. But here again the time factor is important. That is why China is interested in ending the war, but in a way that will allow it to achieve its goals, while getting as much warmth as possible from the war. I do not think that Beijing does not know where Pakistan is supplying ammunition.
The main conclusion is that the Russian Federation will not receive military assistance from China.

Or am I wrong?
It seemed equally logical to me that it would be impossible for Russia to attack with the forces it had on hand.
So who knows what goes on in the minds of the overlords of the universe........
Putin acted as a touchstone of discord.
But based on the results of the Xi toss, I realized that the West did not disperse, but united. What is the conclusion?
They won't see Taiwan at all. Because China's going to get whacked... And with gusto.
But the people need something to bring in the form of booty.
It remains to wait for Russia to weaken more and nibble away the pieces.......
Here we go.....
 

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
Taiwan maybe small but its also highly urbanized one side, so lots of dense urban jungles to hide these missiles and also a huge mountain range which are basically woodlands, again highly suitable for concealment.

Also, no matter how good the training of Chinese Air Force is, this does not solve the fundamental problem of dense Air Defense Networks. Missiles are super fast and much faster than planes and its much easier to hit something with a missile than it is to evade. So, Taiwan could manage to have HUNDREDS to Thousands of Patriot missile systems, which can be easily donated by the US, So Taiwan will not have to pay for it.

So, how would a PLA Air Force with Just 2000 combat planes of which maybe 5-600 maybe used in a Taiwan Scenario to keep a good reserve for other contingencies, deal with a dense network of Air Defense Systems? Good Training is simply not a good enough answer to this challenge. There has to be some kind of fundamental strategy that can comprehensively defeat this scenario.

Is there any technology that can comprehensively defeat a dense network of Air Defense Missiles? Even Stealth can be detected by Low Frequency Radars.

So far, it seems there is no easy answer for this for China. They have to take huge losses in planes in order to beat these air defense missiles using SEAD, assuming they are very good at SEAD also, but still they will take losses due to the fact that missiles are faster than planes and sensors are very good these days in missiles.

Does China have the numbers to beat an Air Defense Network with 1000+ patriots? I don't think so with Just 2000 planes. They need to increase their number of planes to 6000+ maybe. Or they have to do what Russia did which is to give up on Air Superiority and simply rely on missiles to do strikes.

Moreover, relying on the Army for Taiwan war is a complete non-starter. If China is not able to destroy the Anti-Ship Missiles or Intercept them, then the Army cannot even land on Taiwan without getting sunk by those missiles. China needs to have a huge fleet of Air Defense to intercept these missiles while transporting the invasion force. Again, it becomes a numbers game if Taiwan gets Supersonic or Hypersonic Missiles. China will lose many ships unless they find a good technology to intercept these missiles.

So far, it seems no one has been able to provide a convincing strategy to beat the Porcupine Strategy. Just some wishful thinking that Taiwan is too small or PLA too good in training.
Patriot batteries are $1B each and missiles are $4M each. So no, it's not easy for the US to donate a thousand of them PLUS the US does not do that; they only hit Taiwan with the highest prices on the market. So the ROC will not be able to field many batteries at all.

Also, Patriots achieved only a 40% interception rate against Scuds in Israel. Against advanced Chinese fighters with AWACS and drones pursuing active electronic suppression and jamming, they would fair much worse.

Lastly, the batteries' search radars give out signals that can be tracked and anti-radiation missiles can be used to take them out. The range for the Patriot missile is quite low, about 70km so they can be tracked to the origin way before they can escape.
 
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