Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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FairAndUnbiased

FairAndUnbiased

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5unrise said:
I feel there is so many ways a naval fleet can be detected, even in the middle of the ocean. Obviously, the role of surveillance satellites has been discussed to death, but there seem to be a belief that you need a large number of low-orbit platforms to do the job, given they have individually only a limited hovering time over an area, and high-resolution images naturally cover a smaller area. From my understanding, to monitor a specific area continuously (not to establish a viable kill-chain), high-orbit geostationary satellites can do the job despite the relatively low fidelity of the optical information from a high altitude. Once the movement of an opposing force has been identified, the available low-orbit platforms will know where to look, and these should be able to collect higher-resolution data more suitable for weapon guidance.

In an age where real-time information (and integration of information) is so critical to success in warfare, the normalisation of ostensibly neutral countries providing intel to belligerents opens up a can of worms. It seems the most critical part is not the shooters, but the sensors. If a Russian ship or plane sees a US naval force on its way to lift a PRC siege on Taiwan, what is the US going to do? Sink that ship and broaden the war? Or risk having it communicate that information to Beijing, which will then undoubtedly focus its ISR assets on the right area? How could it even prove the target was giving its location away afterwards?

What about civilian ships crossing paths with a naval force on the move? While commercial shipping or cruise firms probably won't want to get in trouble by supplying information on the whereabouts of military assets, there's no guarantee that every single person on the vessel will abide by the same rule. All it takes is one person - be it a worker or passenger - revealing their whereabouts after seeing a supercarrier and its escorts. Moreover, what if belligerents deliberately send fishing ships (possibly without clear markings) all over the place as part of a civil-military effort to enhance maritime surveillance?

Pondering all these questions lead me to believe that there is nowhere to hide.
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China can detect opposing fleet but the opposing fleet has a much harder time detecting the Chinese fleet. Some regime only has 6 active optical recon satellites and 1 active SAR satellite. This is insufficient for constant overwatch of moving targets. They have more ELINT satellites in the NOSS constellation (24) but RF listening is much less precise than imaging.

China has 100+ Yaogan satellites (split 1/3 between optical, SAR and ELINT) and 70+ Jilin satellites (all optical imaging). Nowhere is beyond the sight of the PLA.
 
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ACuriousPLAFan

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5unrise said:
I feel there is so many ways a naval fleet can be detected, even in the middle of the ocean. Obviously, the role of surveillance satellites has been discussed to death, but there seem to be a belief that you need a large number of low-orbit platforms to do the job, given they have individually only a limited hovering time over an area, and high-resolution images naturally cover a smaller area. From my understanding, to monitor a specific area continuously (not to establish a viable kill-chain), high-orbit geostationary satellites can do the job despite the relatively low fidelity of the optical information from a high altitude. Once the movement of an opposing force has been identified, the available low-orbit platforms will know where to look, and these should be able to collect higher-resolution data more suitable for weapon guidance.

In an age where real-time information (and integration of information) is so critical to success in warfare, the normalisation of ostensibly neutral countries providing intel to belligerents opens up a can of worms. It seems the most critical part is not the shooters, but the sensors. If a Russian ship or plane sees a US naval force on its way to lift a PRC siege on Taiwan, what is the US going to do? Sink that ship and broaden the war? Or risk having it communicate that information to Beijing, which will then undoubtedly focus its ISR assets on the right area? How could it even prove the target was giving its location away afterwards?

What about civilian ships crossing paths with a naval force on the move? While commercial shipping or cruise firms probably won't want to get in trouble by supplying information on the whereabouts of military assets, there's no guarantee that every single person on the vessel will abide by the same rule. All it takes is one person - be it a worker or passenger - revealing their whereabouts after seeing a supercarrier and its escorts. Moreover, what if belligerents deliberately send fishing ships (possibly without clear markings) all over the place as part of a civil-military effort to enhance maritime surveillance?

Pondering all these questions lead me to believe that there is nowhere to hide.
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FairAndUnbiased said:
China can detect opposing fleet but the opposing fleet has a much harder time detecting the Chinese fleet. Some regime only has 6 active optical recon satellites and 1 active SAR satellite. This is insufficient for constant overwatch of moving targets. They have more ELINT satellites in the NOSS constellation (24) but RF listening is much less precise than imaging.

China has 100+ Yaogan satellites (split 1/3 between optical, SAR and ELINT) and 70+ Jilin satellites (all optical imaging). Nowhere is beyond the sight of the PLA.
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Indeed. To be frank, naval battles like Jutland, Guadalcanal, Samar and San Bernardino Strait would be rare to happen again today and in the future. The battlefield will now become mostly clear and through for both sides of the conflict.

In fact, the only warships that could still reliably hide and remain challenging to find today are small-sized/submersible crafts and submarines. But even that could be gradually coming to an end as soon as underwater reconnaisance and detection technologies and networks have matured enough, such that submarines and small/submersible crafts can be easily discovered and tracked.

Therefore, I think the focus should be geared towards enhancing and securing the integration, cooperation, integrity and survival of warfare networks and systems across warzones and theaters of war.
 
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drowingfish

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pulling back to tindal is a good force protection measure, and yes B52s can still strike targets along Chinese coast. but this doesnt resolve the issue of battlefield surveillance. satellites cannot be relied upon for real time targeting at least in the near term, and if you cant base bombers out of bases closer to China then why would you be able to base other airborne enablers there?
 
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AndrewS

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drowingfish said:
pulling back to tindal is a good force protection measure, and yes B52s can still strike targets along Chinese coast. but this doesnt resolve the issue of battlefield surveillance. satellites cannot be relied upon for real time targeting at least in the near term, and if you cant base bombers out of bases closer to China then why would you be able to base other airborne enablers there?
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The big problem is that B-52s will have to fly through Indonesian airspace to get to China.

But Indonesia really doesn't want its domestic airspace to be a battleground between Chinese and American aircraft.
 
ZeEa5KPul

ZeEa5KPul

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tphuang said:
The idea is that they can currently blast through everything Guam and closer. The US military realizes that, which is why they are doing an air base expansion at Tindall to accomodate more bombers. The obvious counter move is for China to figure out how they can attack Tindall and keep it offline. H-6K stationed at Spratley don't have to fly very far to launch ALCMs. Given that cruise missiles are relatively easy to intercept, they probably want to station some DF-26s in Spratley Islands or Hainan. Also, WL-3 have 10k range. They could be useful for followup strikes if they can knock air defense initially.
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H-20.
 
Sinnavuuty

Sinnavuuty

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Chilled_k6 said:
Most likely China won't deploy DF-26s on the Spratlys, they are high value and have limited numbers that they'll need for Guam, Japan, and long range anti-shipping between the 1st and 2nd Island chain.
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China has many options for the targets you described in addition to the DF-26 and other long-range missiles in the PLARF portfolio.

To be quite frank, I don't think the number of DF-26s is that limited, there was a statement from a PLA commander published here in the SDF that ballistic missiles had their productions expanded, in fact, I don't know if this statement was with regard to ballistic missiles themselves, or hypersonic missiles like the DF-17, regardless, there is an expansion of the PLARF's missile arsenal.

If China wants to obtain a denial of access to US and allied forces operating from bases and facilities far from the PLARF's arsenal, the PLA must necessarily create a no-fly zone to some extent where Indonesia's territory lies and dispatch DF-26 and other conventional IRBMs and ICBMs missiles at facilities in the South China Sea, because they fail to have the required range from mainland China, with the exception of ICBMs, I would say that both impositions are essential to successful denial.
Chilled_k6 said:
Not too mention there's barely any cover on those islands. I don't think we've seen indication China is turning those islands into offensive missile bases like Japan is doing with their southern Ryukyu Islands. Though it's certainly doable quickly if required.
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This coverage is being created even because of the land-based anti-ship systems being installed on the islands. If there wasn't enough confidence in this IADS layer being assembled, they wouldn't dispatch KJ-500 AEW, SAM HQs, CIWS and other types of air defense on the islands and would implant anti-ship ground launch systems, that would be a waste of resources, by the way, that I could see being set up on the islands are clearly military use materials and not bait and decoys to attract missiles.
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Chilled_k6 said:
Depending on the range of the "new" 2PZD-21 missiles, H-6 bombers of various variants may be able to strike Tindal travelling from the Mainland.
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This is just one more option among the others. The fact is, the PLA will never only trust this one form of attack when the enemy is also able to impose the same type of air-to-air engagement that the PLA is able to. Personally I hope the PLA actually deploys DFs ballistic systems on the islands to extend the range and impose more of an active defense condition against the potential enemy.
 
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Barefoot

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ACuriousPLAFan

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AndrewS said:
The big problem is that B-52s will have to fly through Indonesian airspace to get to China.

But Indonesia really doesn't want its domestic airspace to be a battleground between Chinese and American aircraft.
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China should fully expect the US and Australia to either bordering on intruding Indonesian airspace, or ouright disregard Indonesian airspace sovereignty, or both, in times of war with China.

To counter this, China should start working towards striking backdoor deals with Indonesia, which would allow Indonesia to play as a vital defensive barrier along China's southern frontier, while refrained from becoming an active participant of the war itself.
 
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