broadsword
Brigadier
But why when it is so far away?
Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario
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But why when it is so far away?
US deploying their upgraded B-52s there (and likely B-21s when they're ready), and in the future they'll be equipped with hypersonic missiles. China currently has limited conventional weapons that we know of that can hit this far out.
The idea is that they can currently blast through everything Guam and closer. The US military realizes that, which is why they are doing an air base expansion at Tindall to accomodate more bombers. The obvious counter move is for China to figure out how they can attack Tindall and keep it offline. H-6K stationed at Spratley don't have to fly very far to launch ALCMs. Given that cruise missiles are relatively easy to intercept, they probably want to station some DF-26s in Spratley Islands or Hainan. Also, WL-3 have 10k range. They could be useful for followup strikes if they can knock air defense initially.
broadsword
Brigadier
Oops, I think you guys were referencing Tindal in Australia.
there's the tyranny of distance and the shallowness of the east China sea and Yellow Sea to contend with. shore based threats are also nothing without sensors. Russia doesn't shoot down Black Sea overflights, China will.
I believe there has been a slight misunderstanding.
There are two air bases with nearly identical spellings. One is Tyndall Air Base in Florida, USA, the other one is RAAF Base Tindal in Northern Territories, Australia.
The base that is being refered to above is Tindal, where the base is expanded in order to station at least 6 B-52 bombers.
DF-26 can reliably strike Tindal air base from mainland China.
Although, if DF-26 launchers are moved to the South China Sea, their coverage could then be expanded to Alice Springs, which is where the Pine Gap satellite and space surveillance base is located close by.
But there is no need for that. DF-31 onwards are fully capable of covering Pine Gap from mainland China.
On another note, hopefully the upcoming DF-27 is capable of achieving the same range as DF-26 - Or even better, the range of DF-31.
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Most likely China won't deploy DF-26s on the Spratlys, they are high value and have limited numbers that they'll need for Guam, Japan, and long range anti-shipping between the 1st and 2nd Island chain. Not too mention there's barely any cover on those islands. I don't think we've seen indication China is turning those islands into offensive missile bases like Japan is doing with their southern Ryukyu Islands. Though it's certainly doable quickly if required.
Depending on the range of the "new" 2PZD-21 missiles, H-6 bombers of various variants may be able to strike Tindal travelling from the Mainland.
Depending on the range of the "new" 2PZD-21 missiles, H-6 bombers of various variants may be able to strike Tindal travelling from the Mainland.
I feel there is so many ways a naval fleet can be detected, even in the middle of the ocean. Obviously, the role of surveillance satellites has been discussed to death, but there seem to be a belief that you need a large number of low-orbit platforms to do the job, given they have individually only a limited hovering time over an area, and high-resolution images naturally cover a smaller area. From my understanding, to monitor a specific area continuously (not to establish a viable kill-chain), high-orbit geostationary satellites can do the job despite the relatively low fidelity of the optical information from a high altitude. Once the movement of an opposing force has been identified, the available low-orbit platforms will know where to look, and these should be able to collect higher-resolution data more suitable for weapon guidance.
In an age where real-time information (and integration of information) is so critical to success in warfare, the normalisation of ostensibly neutral countries providing intel to belligerents opens up a can of worms. It seems the most critical part is not the shooters, but the sensors. If a Russian ship or plane sees a US naval force on its way to lift a PRC siege on Taiwan, what is the US going to do? Sink that ship and broaden the war? Or risk having it communicate that information to Beijing, which will then undoubtedly focus its ISR assets on the right area? How could it even prove the target was giving its location away afterwards?
What about civilian ships crossing paths with a naval force on the move? While commercial shipping or cruise firms probably won't want to get in trouble by supplying information on the whereabouts of military assets, there's no guarantee that every single person on the vessel will abide by the same rule. All it takes is one person - be it a worker or passenger - revealing their whereabouts after seeing a supercarrier and its escorts. Moreover, what if belligerents deliberately send fishing ships (possibly without clear markings) all over the place as part of a civil-military effort to enhance maritime surveillance?
Pondering all these questions lead me to believe that there is nowhere to hide.
In an age where real-time information (and integration of information) is so critical to success in warfare, the normalisation of ostensibly neutral countries providing intel to belligerents opens up a can of worms. It seems the most critical part is not the shooters, but the sensors. If a Russian ship or plane sees a US naval force on its way to lift a PRC siege on Taiwan, what is the US going to do? Sink that ship and broaden the war? Or risk having it communicate that information to Beijing, which will then undoubtedly focus its ISR assets on the right area? How could it even prove the target was giving its location away afterwards?
What about civilian ships crossing paths with a naval force on the move? While commercial shipping or cruise firms probably won't want to get in trouble by supplying information on the whereabouts of military assets, there's no guarantee that every single person on the vessel will abide by the same rule. All it takes is one person - be it a worker or passenger - revealing their whereabouts after seeing a supercarrier and its escorts. Moreover, what if belligerents deliberately send fishing ships (possibly without clear markings) all over the place as part of a civil-military effort to enhance maritime surveillance?
Pondering all these questions lead me to believe that there is nowhere to hide.
That's where drones come in as well. Almost every newer drone shown by China emphasizes their ability to data link.
If China judges that an US invasion is imminent, they would likely adopt a proactive defense by either directly landing on Taiwan first or cordoning off the area.
Satellites would spot the American invasion fleet, they may or may not be reliable enough to work as ISR, but they will at least vector in drones, both stealthy and non stealthy ones.
At this point, America will not have formally declared war yet. If they shoot down a PLA drone that's tracking them over international airspace, they'll have fired the first shot, and there would be more drones including stealthy ones in the area that rapidly vector in a multiple platform strike on the offending fleet.
If China judges that an US invasion is imminent, they would likely adopt a proactive defense by either directly landing on Taiwan first or cordoning off the area.
Satellites would spot the American invasion fleet, they may or may not be reliable enough to work as ISR, but they will at least vector in drones, both stealthy and non stealthy ones.
At this point, America will not have formally declared war yet. If they shoot down a PLA drone that's tracking them over international airspace, they'll have fired the first shot, and there would be more drones including stealthy ones in the area that rapidly vector in a multiple platform strike on the offending fleet.
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