I believe most of you guys have already know about the attacks on Russian Black Sea Fleet warships by the Ukrainian USVs just yesterday - the most important target being possibly the Russian frigate Admiral Makarov.
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Although the exact details of damage done to the Black Sea Fleet is still hazy as of current, the methods of how this attack has been conducted reminds me of two particular raids from WW2, i.e. Douda Bay and Alexandria (both in 1941), where the Royal Italian Navy successfully employed motor assault boats and manned torpedoes respectively against Royal Navy warships in shallow waters.
I believe that this event should provide very important takeaways for China, in terms of how the PLA should employ such weaponry and platform against enemy warships and naval installations, alongside corresponding countermeasures against similar weaponry that could potentially be deployed by the enemy side.
There is one particular news just about a year ago where Chinese scientists successfully conducted simulation tests regarding attacks against seaport and naval base by detonating explosives inside a scale model port/naval base.
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If China is equipped with the capability to cripple enemy naval power as soon as possible at the first signs of war even before they could have the chance to move out and fight the PLA, then it would be an absolute plus bonus for China's ultimate war effort. Furthermore, more munitions in the PLAN, PLAAF and PLARF arsenal that are initially allocated for certain land/sea-based targets could then be diverted to other targets, thus granting the PLA wider variety and volume of firepower against the enemy forces.
Therefore, suicide USVs with dual surface-submersible capabilties like the ones employed by Ukraine would do the trick well, as their depth can be adjusted according to the depth of the submerged portions of the targetted enemy warship (i.e. draft), so that warships with very shallow drafts, e.g. corvettes and fast attack crafts can be attacked as well. Unlike normal torpedoes, however, these suicide USVs should be capable of loitering, and travel for longer distances than torpedoes presently available in the PLAN arsenal.
I believe these suicide USVs could serve as
China's underwater version of the missile umbrella that currently extends out into the Pacific with all the variety of anti-ship and land-attack missiles in the PLA arsenal. But of course, for targets at longer ranges, larger suicide USVs, or even the ULR nuclear-powered torpedo previously mentioned would be required instead.
For defense against enemy usage of suicide USVs against PLAN warships, naval bases and shipping ports, there should be both active and passive mthods of defense involved.
Passive defense in my opinion would be underwater-and-surface nets surrounding individual warships, naval base, key shoreline infrastructures and shipping ports.
Active defense, meanwhile, would be shore-based and sea-based defensive platforms with detection and (perferably launch-upon-detection-confirmation) interception capabilities against incoming enemy torpedoes, USVs or UUVs should be given vital consideration. Such systems can be installed on the shoreline, mounted on littorial patrol ships and boats, fitted on specifially-modified buoys, and installed on the seabed.
These defensive systems against enemy torpedoes, USVs and UUVs should thus be installed and lined up along the length of the Chinese coastline, that is, from Liaodong peninsula in the Yellow Sea all the way to the Nansha islands in the South China Sea.