IMO the most important things that China needs in a Taiwan scenario are as follows - in order of importance:
- Ensure neutrality among China's neighbors in order to prevent others from seeking opportunities to strike against China
- The PLA has arguably already failed this most important point. There's a reason why the CCP continues to emphasize that the party controls the guns throughout the years - it is because at the local level, commanders operate with near impunity and would frequently escalate situations to get noticed for promotion
- Chinese coast guard captains in the South China Sea have the freedom to improvise, and there have been incidents of them taking actions that are more aggressive than necessary for the sake of promotion. These aggressive actions tend to not be reported up to the CMC and is detrimental to China's foreign policy vis-a-vis her Southeast Asian neighbors.
- The same is true on the Indian border, brigade and battalion commanders have a lot more freedom to simply improvise on their interpretation of the loosely defined orders of "defend the borders" to respond aggressively, creating crises that make India feel the need to respond to.
- Within the foreign ministry, "wolf warrior" diplomats are aggressive for the same reason - hopes of being noticed by superiors for promotion.
- Taken together, local tactical victories can become strategic blunders, as they foster an image of China that is much more aggressive than what the central party intends.
- Generate high sortie production across all ETC airbases in order to achieve and maintain air superiority:
- Seeing the PLAAF send 60+ airframes for a single day only tells part of the story. We can use the ROCMOD accounting of PLAAF cross-strait ops as a baseline for estimating sortie generation, and the only concrete details we can get is that they can put up 15+ airframes daily
- But, we don't know if these are being generated by multiple bases or even multiple theater commands, which means we don't know if the PLAAF can maintain the constant sorties
- We do know that each time they surge the number to 50+ or 30+, there will be a couple of days when they scale things back, which suggests that there is still quite a large hurdle to maintain a high sortie rate
- The USAF is capable of 12 turn 12, and even 14 turn 12 ops on a regular basis (X turn Y means launching X amount of jets, then 1-1.5 hours later, launching Y number of jets - I mistakenly thought it was a pre-noon, after-noon difference in another thread)
- This ability relies on ground crews, ground service equipment, air traffic control, and other "hidden" factors rather than pilot skill or funding. It is incredibly difficult to pull off and is very taxing on the entire force structure
- As recently as 2012, PLAAF had difficulties performing 12 turn 12 ops without needing days before and after to achieve that
- Identify and erode critical nodes of operation for US reinforcements approaching the region:
- China must assume that the US will come to Taiwan's aid, and must seek to disrupt this operation.
- This means China must identify likely avenues of approach, maintain constant ISR on inbound US forces, and target critical nodes that tie it all together.
- Examples:
- If the US is streaming in reinforcements by air, then the PLAAF needs to target aerial refueling tankers and strategic airlift assets to deny them the chance of landing on the island
- If the US is bringing additional naval groups from Europe towards the Taiwan Strait, then the PLAN needs to interdict them at critical crossings near the South China Sea to deny them access to the AO
- If the US is putting up BARCAP to help the Taiwanese contest the skies above Taiwan, then the PLAAF and PLANAF needs to find and target the carriers that are putting the jets up so that they can be taken off the board
- If the US is exercising in WESTPAC, then the PLAN needs to identify and shadow the exercising forces so that they can be targeted for attack should the situation demands
- Concentrate fires at point of impact rather than point of origin in order to mitigate potential counter-battery fires:
- Conventional artillery doctrine dictates that artillery should be grouped together for mass fires, but the war in Ukraine has given rise to a new approach: rather than concentrating fires at the POO, fires are concentrated at POI
- This is because traditional counter-battery effort seeks to prioritize neutralizing as much fire as possible. By dispersing fire support assets with a focus on POI, you can achieve an effect where counter-battery missions will disregard what they see as a single gun, not realizing that this single gun is networked to fire with other single guns much further away to achieve the same effect
- Maintain logistical elements in order to sustain long term operations, including second echelon forces and beyond:
- This is not so much about generating sea-lift capabilities or ensuring that there's enough ammo to shoot, but something far less sexy:
- The Russian thunder run on Kiev failed because the Russian army's poor maintenance of truck tires caused many of their supply units and second echelon troops to become separated from the main spearhead, which allowed the Ukrainians to turn breakthroughs into encirclements
- In a cross strait operation, getting the first 3 brigades across means nothing if there isn't a steady stream of ammunition, manpower, equipment being streamed to the beachhead from China, and a steady stream of casualties being brought back across the strait from the beachheads
- At 160km wide, ships traveling at 20 knots (37kph) will take 4 hours to make the initial trip across and another 4 hours to make the trip back - and that's not taking the time to unload, refuel, and swap out crew so that they can sustain operations. It can reasonably be assumed that it'll take 12 hours for a complete round trip, so any landing operation will need to be conducted in a way that takes this tyranny of time into account
- The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that you can bring in as many troops as you want, but if you are incapable of supporting them beyond the first 12 hours of combat, you will get bogged down and be destroyed.
WRT to point 1.
Did you miss this?
Wolf warrior was western media BS. The most aggressive foreign policy is the USA, all of SEA has been bombed by them or even invaded and colonized.
South Korea FM did not meet with Pelosi and ended up going to China the next week. This is after the new administration was projected to be “tough on China”.
All the other points I think you will find that the PLA has already thought of too.
Striking tankers or ISR - J-20 and VLRAAM on J-16
Striking carriers - Carriers, Hypersonic missiles, AShBM
Counterbattery - Wide variety of drones and improved attack helicopters
Logistics - Civil-military dual use ships