Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

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daifo

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Thus creating another front for PLA. India too. It won't attack China proper, but might use Taiwan war as opportunity to grab more land at the border. China needs to be ready for that, a 3 prong crisis. It's not impossible.

Um, this type event where you would yolo and go nuclear.
 

pmc

Major
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I've already hit my 5k words/day self-imposed limit, so I'd direct you Ma Xiu's work for BluePath/CASI entitled "PLARF Executive Summary" if you really want detail.

Also, the PLARF launches (on average) more than that every single week.
what is the range of those missiles?. Cruise and short range ballistic missiles already sent in thousands.
is there example of SLBM salvo launches?
The link i gave from arabic website as these kind of missiles will be demonstrated one way or another in North Africa and Middleast so they cannot deviate too much from specifications in terms of speed, flight profile range, penetration etc. there videos of it going in cruise missile profile.
 

pmc

Major
Registered Member
Geez, you oughta at least glance at the paper you get sent if you ask for it...

I don't mean this in a rude way, but how much experience do you have with this stuff? Just off of how this sounds, I worry that if I were to get into PLARF inventory and CONEMP specifics (and their myriad of massive advantages over RU conventional ballistic missile systems), a good amount of it might go over your head lol.
SLBM/ICBM tests like space launches cannot be hided and they do need tests for manufacturing quality. and adding more platforms MIG-31K/Tu-22M with multiple deployed locations shows they have much more inventory already transported. so it cannot be fraction when platforms are not fraction.
if you still not understand the hint in arabic website i cannot explain. word matter much more there than any one else and it bite in ass even decades later.
 

tphuang

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I just want to explain that the stubbornness of these people is beyond the imagination of ordinary people.
In Taiwan, "being able to defend against invaders" is an undeniable political correctness.

They have made every effort to find reasons to prove that Taiwan can defend itself.Therefore, it is impossible for them to change their mentality and surrender voluntarily.
I think there is probably a huge difference between internet fanboys and DPP supporters vs what a regular person would think. Most educated people (overwhelmingly KMT supporters) i have spoke to don't think Taiwan can last more than a few days and have basically resigned themselves to some form of unification.

How capable is the PLAN of reaching out and touching USN shipbuilding facilities like NNSY, PNSY, PSNS, and Pearl Harbor without using BMs (or at least without using BMs launched from the mainland or close to it, something that would look too much like a nuclear strike)? What about their smattering of commercial shipyards? I have asked around about this recently and no one has been able to give me a clear answer on how far out the PLAN can reach if they've defeated the USN in the western Pacific. The PLAN has 12 replenishment ships right now (based on my casual Wikipedia skimming), and seem to have current plans to roughly double that fleet. The US (based on my casual googling) seems to have 42 replenishment ships, so it's not like there's an order of magnitude difference there (again, this could be one of those things were this isn't comparing like for like and the US is actually massively ahead). If it's not too far off though, with China having an order of magnitude greater shipbuilding capacity I could see that ratio inverting reasonably rapidly.
replenishment ships isn't the right place to look at. PLAN is incapable of encroaching further in Pacific Ocean until they have sufficient number of 095s. 095s would allow them to target Pearl + major naval base/shipyards on the west coast. I wouldn't even think about targets beyond that if I were you.

Maybe the idea is that the US could rapidly convert commercial port facilities into shipyards, making them a naval production powerhouse again in short order? Seems like a stretch to me (machinery, labour, retrofitting... it would take a lot of time, right?), but maybe the PLAN needs to plan for the possibility just in case, "Don't underestimate your enemy" etc.
If it seems crazy, it probably is. America is having a hard enough time just getting its current naval shipyard into being able to build new warships. Just think about what happens to America's military production during war time when it's completely cut off from the Chinese supply chain.

Related question, how capable is the US or Japan of destroying Chinese shipbuilding infrastructure at the start of hostilities to try and prevent a war economy buildup?
US military is certainly able to target shipyards in Shanghai. Those are probably the most vulnerable. I would say the ones in Liaoning, Guangdong and Wuchang are much harder to target. In terms of aircraft production, they are probably all far enough in land that they would be hard to target unless China has already lost much of its naval fleet and military aircraft.

There is a reason why China is adding this many warships currently. They need to have enough of them stationed in ECS to protect Shanghai industrial base. I'm actually surprised they have not added more SAM batteries around there.

China will militarily intervene on behalf of North Korea if its first attacked by US/South Korea. That’s the extent the defense treaty. Deep down Kim doesn’t trust China.
You clearly do not understand the relationship between the military forces in the 2 countries. Even SK military recently have said that they do not consider China a threat. Which means, they are not participating in Taiwan conflict. Similarly, the threat of Pakistan military + Himalaya mountain means China does not have to fear Indian participation. I assume they'd still prepare for the remote possibility of Indian or SK incursion, but that would be down in their concerns.

IMO the most important things that China needs in a Taiwan scenario are as follows - in order of importance:
You seemed to have put a lot of effort in this post, so I don't want to be too rude here, but you definitely made a lot of assumptions in 2) that is just not factual. The entire operation in Taiwan recently came all from ETC. ETC can probably easily sustain over 100 4/5th generation aircraft sorties per day, probably closer to 150. There is just no reason for ETC to send all of its aircraft over. After all, there is no war going on. There are a lot of sorties that are not going into Taiwanese ADIZ or in fact picked up by Taiwanese radar. In fact, Chinese analysts (the ones known for balanced/realistic views) believes that they can easily deceive Taiwanese air defense radar with how many aircraft are actually coming. The same Chinese analysts believe that ETC itself has improved so much in the past 3 years, that the air force is able to achieve air dominance over Taiwan air space by themselves without help from PLAGF/PLARF or other TCs. I'd love to hear from @Patchwork_Chimera if he has witnessed similar progress by PLAAF in the last couple of years.
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
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There is a reason why China is adding this many warships currently. They need to have enough of them stationed in ECS to protect Shanghai industrial base. I'm actually surprised they have not added more SAM batteries around there.
All PLA’s SAMs are mobile. They can be moved into position if necessary like they did during Donglang.
AWAC plus fighter CAP is much more effective anyways.
You seemed to have put a lot of effort in this post, so I don't want to be too rude here, but you definitely made a lot of assumptions in 2) that is just not factual. The entire operation in Taiwan recently came all from ETC.
If I was you, I wouldn’t waste my time with some Indian fantasies.
 

XiDada

Banned Idiot
Registered Member
ETC can probably easily sustain over 100 4/5th generation aircraft sorties per day, probably closer to 150. There is just no reason for ETC to send all of its aircraft over. After all, there is no war going on. There are a lot of sorties that are not going into Taiwanese ADIZ or in fact picked up by Taiwanese radar. In fact, Chinese analysts (the ones known for balanced/realistic views) believes that they can easily deceive Taiwanese air defense radar with how many aircraft are actually coming. The same Chinese analysts believe that ETC itself has improved so much in the past 3 years, that the air force is able to achieve air dominance over Taiwan air space by themselves without help from PLAGF/PLARF or other TCs. I'd love to hear from @Patchwork_Chimera if he has witnessed similar progress by PLAAF in the last couple of years.
Here's the ETC PLAAF OOB:
  1. 7th BDE - J-16
  2. 8th BDE - J-10A
  3. 9th BDE - J-20
  4. 78th BDE - J-8DF
  5. 83rd BDE - JH-7A
  6. 95th BDE - J-11B
  7. 25th BDE - J-10C
  8. 40th BDE - J-16
  9. 41st BDE - J-11A
  10. 85th BDE - Su-30MKK
Doctrinal organization of each reformed PLAAF brigade is 24 aircrafts, and given the available OOB and removing the 78th and 83rd BDE, this leaves a total of 192 airframes - again, this is using the assumed doctrinal organization.

If you look at the ROCMOD information about ADIZ incursions, there are airframes like the H-6 that enters as well, which means there are airframes being pulled from other theater commands, most likely STC.

But let's take the assumption that all the aircrafts are coming from the ETC.

PLAAF operations from the 7th onward:
  • 66 airframes on the 7th
  • 39 airframes on the 8th
  • 45 airframes on the 9th
  • 36 airframes on the 10th
  • 21 airframes on the 11th
  • 24 airframes on the 12th
  • 29 airframes on the 13th
  • 22 airframes on the 14th
  • 30 airframes on the 15th
  • 17 airframes on the 16th
  • 21 airframes on the 17th
  • 51 airframes on the 18th
If the PLAAF is demonstrating that they can perform high intensity ops on a regular basis - i.e. land a jet, refuel, rearm, and relaunch, then they should be able to maintain 50 sorties per day. But they're not.

In fact, after the 9th, they had to reduce ops for 9 days until they can launch another 50+ airframes.

Sortie generation is hard, and most air forces are bad at it. We have little data from the ROC about their sortie generation capabilities and I do suspect that it's probably significantly lower just due to training and budgetary constraints, it's also worth remembering that the PLAAF is not 10 ft tall. They've made great strides in improving their capabilities but they're not there yet.
----
As a general message: it's not a bad thing to point out that there are still deficiencies. And there certainly are deficiencies in the PLAAF.

Remember where they were as recently as 10 years ago. It would be ludicrous to assume that they've not only managed to fix all their institutional problems in the last 10 years (b/c institutional inertia is a thing) but outright surpassed the one country in the world that has been running high intensity ops for decades. That's the height of hubris.

If you know where you're deficient, you know where you can make improvements.

The worst thing anyone can do is to bury their head in the sand and claim that anything that points out PLA/AF/AN deficiencies is "westoid/Indian/wanwan fantasies" or some other brain dead nationalist chestbeating. Otherwise, how are you any different from the ROC claiming a civilian drone hovering over Kinmen is a "high altitude drone using telescope lens" or that "PLARF missiles flew too high for us to intercept"?

Arrogance and hubris loses wars. Honest self-criticism and seeking improvements wins them.
 

tphuang

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Here's the ETC PLAAF OOB:
  1. 7th BDE - J-16
  2. 8th BDE - J-10A
  3. 9th BDE - J-20
  4. 78th BDE - J-8DF
  5. 83rd BDE - JH-7A
  6. 95th BDE - J-11B
  7. 25th BDE - J-10C
  8. 40th BDE - J-16
  9. 41st BDE - J-11A
  10. 85th BDE - Su-30MKK
Doctrinal organization of each reformed PLAAF brigade is 24 aircrafts, and given the available OOB and removing the 78th and 83rd BDE, this leaves a total of 192 airframes - again, this is using the assumed doctrinal organization.
hmm, most PLAAF brigades have at least 28 aircraft. Some of the J-16 ones have close to 40. The 78th brigade is getting replaced by J-16s. We might not have any non ISR J-8 brigades by the end of this year.

If you look at the ROCMOD information about ADIZ incursions, there are airframes like the H-6 that enters as well, which means there are airframes being pulled from other theater commands, most likely STC.

But let's take the assumption that all the aircrafts are coming from the ETC.

PLAAF operations from the 7th onward:
  • 66 airframes on the 7th
  • 39 airframes on the 8th
  • 45 airframes on the 9th
  • 36 airframes on the 10th
  • 21 airframes on the 11th
  • 24 airframes on the 12th
  • 29 airframes on the 13th
  • 22 airframes on the 14th
  • 30 airframes on the 15th
  • 17 airframes on the 16th
  • 21 airframes on the 17th
  • 51 airframes on the 18th
If the PLAAF is demonstrating that they can perform high intensity ops on a regular basis - i.e. land a jet, refuel, rearm, and relaunch, then they should be able to maintain 50 sorties per day. But they're not.

In fact, after the 9th, they had to reduce ops for 9 days until they can launch another 50+ airframes.

Sortie generation is hard, and most air forces are bad at it. We have little data from the ROC about their sortie generation capabilities and I do suspect that it's probably significantly lower just due to training and budgetary constraints, it's also worth remembering that the PLAAF is not 10 ft tall. They've made great strides in improving their capabilities but they're not there yet.
----
As a general message: it's not a bad thing to point out that there are still deficiencies. And there certainly are deficiencies in the PLAAF.

Remember where they were as recently as 10 years ago. It would be ludicrous to assume that they've not only managed to fix all their institutional problems in the last 10 years (b/c institutional inertia is a thing) but outright surpassed the one country in the world that has been running high intensity ops for decades. That's the height of hubris.

If you know where you're deficient, you know where you can make improvements.

The worst thing anyone can do is to bury their head in the sand and claim that anything that points out PLA/AF/AN deficiencies is "westoid/Indian/wanwan fantasies" or some other brain dead nationalist chestbeating. Otherwise, how are you any different from the ROC claiming a civilian drone hovering over Kinmen is a "high altitude drone using telescope lens" or that "PLARF missiles flew too high for us to intercept"?

Arrogance and hubris loses wars. Honest self-criticism and seeking improvements wins them.
You do realize that the war games only lasted 3 days, right? I'm not sure why you think ETC should be sending all of its sorties to Taiwan when there is no conflict or military exercise going on. During the war games, China reported it was generating triple digit in sorties a day. There is no reason to believe that all of those sorties actually need to enter the ROCMOD reported area. I don't quite understand why ETC needs to crowd 150 aircraft in a small air space during a war game.

ROCMOD is an unreliable source. For example, they reported that DF-15s didn't fly over their air space when it clearly did. On one of the days, they was reported that 3 H-6 entered ADIZ when there was photograph showing more than that.
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
ROCMOD is an unreliable source. For example, they reported that DF-15s didn't fly over their air space when it clearly did. On one of the days, they was reported that 3 H-6 entered ADIZ when there was photograph showing more than that.
You forgot to mention the commercial drone that was reported to be flying at 3000 feet
 

Blitzo

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But let's take the assumption that all the aircrafts are coming from the ETC.

PLAAF operations from the 7th onward:
  • 66 airframes on the 7th
  • 39 airframes on the 8th
  • 45 airframes on the 9th
  • 36 airframes on the 10th
  • 21 airframes on the 11th
  • 24 airframes on the 12th
  • 29 airframes on the 13th
  • 22 airframes on the 14th
  • 30 airframes on the 15th
  • 17 airframes on the 16th
  • 21 airframes on the 17th
  • 51 airframes on the 18th
If the PLAAF is demonstrating that they can perform high intensity ops on a regular basis - i.e. land a jet, refuel, rearm, and relaunch, then they should be able to maintain 50 sorties per day. But they're not.

In fact, after the 9th, they had to reduce ops for 9 days until they can launch another 50+ airframes.


Sortie generation is hard, and most air forces are bad at it. We have little data from the ROC about their sortie generation capabilities and I do suspect that it's probably significantly lower just due to training and budgetary constraints, it's also worth remembering that the PLAAF is not 10 ft tall. They've made great strides in improving their capabilities but they're not there yet.


I've bolded a specific part of your post that I want to address.
My question to you, is why do you think the PLAAF is demonstrating that they can perform high intensity ops on a regular basis?

From my perception, all they are demonstrating is a low to moderate intensity operation on a regular basis, which utilizes only a fraction of their overall order of battle and combat capability within the ETC.


Putting it another way, do you think that their sortie rates over the last few weeks is one that represents something near the peak of what ETC can sustain? Because if so, that is certainly the first time I've come across anyone with that sort of suggestion before.


In fact, the overall PLA pattern of behaviour over the last few weeks after the Pelosi visit has been one of relative low to moderate intensity, with the only major difference being:
- the initial exercises in the first few days after the Pelosi visit was one characterized by joint/multiple arms of the military exercising together in a high profile way around Taiwan island, which is "new"
- the subsequent aerial sorties which "cross the midline" are slightly more consistently near the centre part of the ADIZ geographically closer to population/economic centers on Taiwan (whereas previously they were mostly to the southwestern corner of the ADIZ which was far more geographically isolated), which of course is part of the increased signaling intention


But in terms of dialing up the signaling intensity, they have a lot more rungs on the ladder they can work with even in terms of only air sorties alone.
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
Putting it another way, do you think that their sortie rates over the last few weeks is one that represents something near the peak of what ETC can sustain? Because if so, that is certainly the first time I've come across anyone with that sort of suggestion before.
Want to add ETC probably achieved their sortie rate with very little preparation time.
 
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