Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

Petrolicious88 said:

China will militarily intervene on behalf of North Korea if its first attacked by US/South Korea. That’s the extent the defense treaty. Deep down Kim doesn’t trust China.

——-In fact there is a chance that SK with backing from US might take advantage of a Taiwan war to attack NK. Create a two prone war for China. India might do the same along the sino-Indian border—-

Outside of that scenario, the only reason North Korea might attack Japan (and that’s a huge if), is If the regime is facing existential threat Japan/US. It’s not going to Nuke Japan to help China over Taiwan.

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I might miss something about "Russia’s desperate need for military drones and asking for China's help." Can you show me the source? As for "Kim doesn’t trust China," well another source to prove it is well appreciated. For a leader (Kim) took China's airplane to meet Trump in Singapore is not a small matter. In fact, it's a very serious one.

A true leader doesn't need to ask for his friend's help to safeguard his country. He knows his friend will come when the time is right - all agreements are done behind closed door. On the contrary, Europe has opportunists as leaders. One of them even cried to save her plush cushion.

The three leaders of Russia, China and North Korea are well aware that one of their country falls, means all will fall. They try their best to tame an angry savage on the way down to hell with minimal impact as much as possible to the whole world.

Forget about Japan and South Korea, though their leaders seem ignorant, they are far from stupid. They'll use what has been taught to them by their big neighbor - barbarians against barbarians. Then once things settle down, Korea will be one and in peace without war. But if things turn sour, Kim knows what to do.

My oh my..... Reading too many western MSM and believing all the eloquence-yet-verbose rhetoric makes one brain hollow.....

Biscuits said:

Lmao "deep down Kim doesn't trust China" source: my ass

I could also sprout some meaning less platitudes about how "deep down Kishida doesn't trust America" and Japan is actually gonna turn on them or expel their troops when China attacks. Pure copium.

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Why was Jang Song Thaek, Kim's uncle, suddenly executed for treason when Kim first assumed power (when he was most vulnerable). Jang was instrumental in building closer economic relationship between NK and China. A job he did well for decades under Kim's father. China considered Jiang the most pro-china, pro-business figure in North Korea. There were rumors that Jang tried to replace Kim with backing from China. We will never know the truth.

China's main interest is stability in Korea, not in Kim. In the event of conflict Korean conflict, Chinese forces may or may not be involved in coming to North Korea’s defense, but rather would seek to play a significant role in shaping post-Kim Korea peninsula to its liking.

Kim understands that. There are no permanent friends - only permanent interests.

bjj_starter said:

How capable is the PLAN of reaching out and touching USN shipbuilding facilities like NNSY, PNSY, PSNS, and Pearl Harbor without using BMs (or at least without using BMs launched from the mainland or close to it, something that would look too much like a nuclear strike)? What about their smattering of commercial shipyards? I have asked around about this recently and no one has been able to give me a clear answer on how far out the PLAN can reach if they've defeated the USN in the western Pacific. The PLAN has 12 replenishment ships right now (based on my casual Wikipedia skimming), and seem to have current plans to roughly double that fleet. The US (based on my casual googling) seems to have 42 replenishment ships, so it's not like there's an order of magnitude difference there (again, this could be one of those things were this isn't comparing like for like and the US is actually massively ahead). If it's not too far off though, with China having an order of magnitude greater shipbuilding capacity I could see that ratio inverting reasonably rapidly.

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It's a moot point. In that scenario, China can build replenishment ships faster than the US can build CSGs.

bjj_starter said:

maybe the PLAN needs to plan for the possibility just in case, "Don't underestimate your enemy" etc.

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Yep, and that's why you should focus on destroying the USN in-detail first, rather than worrying about striking San Diego.

bjj_starter said:

Related question, how capable is the US or Japan of destroying Chinese shipbuilding infrastructure at the start of hostilities to try and prevent a war economy buildup?

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The US doesn't even have enough firepower to deal with the priority aimpoints on China's mainland, let alone deal with this stuff. You can check the history of this thread to read Patchwork's analysis. It's surprising how ridiculously unprepared the US is in this theater. It's actually insane, given their rhetoric and Pelosi visits etc. The entire West is just going senile at this point imo. It's like the old man on the porch with a shotgun yelling at kids to stay off 'his' lawn.

Petrolicious88 said:

Why was Jang Song Thaek, Kim's uncle, suddenly executed for treason when Kim first assumed power (when he was most vulnerable). Jang was instrumental in building closer economic relationship between NK and China. A job he did well for decades under Kim's father. China considered Jiang the most pro-china, pro-business figure in North Korea. There were rumors that Jang tried to replace Kim with backing from China. We will never know the truth.

China's main interest is stability in Korea, not in Kim. In the event of conflict Korean conflict, Chinese forces may or may not be involved in coming to North Korea’s defense, but rather would seek to play a significant role in shaping post-Kim Korea peninsula to its liking.

Kim understands that. There are no permanent friends - only permanent interests.

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I don't care about it. Kim Jong Un suddenly visited China before meeting Trump (more than once)，I think he knows very well who can protect him.

A big reason for the change in attitude toward North Korea is that South Korea.
The THHAD incident means that the efforts to win over South Korea have finally failed，it is necessary to properly enhance the presence of allies.

So how much support North Korea can get depends on the attitude of South Koreans. If they continue to resolutely obey the Americans, North Korea will surely get more "new toys".
Although you can see that Kim Jong Un's attitude is very tough, the North Korea is actually adopting a defensive strategy.The calculation of the amount of fuel used to assist them is very accurate.

Petrolicious88 said:

——-In fact there is a chance that SK with backing from US might take advantage of a Taiwan war to attack NK. Create a two prone war for China. India might do the same along the sino-Indian border—-

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Sounds like a reddit take. South Korea will risk Seoul being vaporized, destroy economy, and suffer millions of casualties to help the US defeat China/N Korea to only be further pushed around by the only superpowa US and it's ally Japan(if successful). I believed it was already mention that the probability of S Korea involvement is calculated as closer to 0% than a coin flip.

IMO the most important things that China needs in a Taiwan scenario are as follows - in order of importance:

1. Ensure neutrality among China's neighbors in order to prevent others from seeking opportunities to strike against China
   • The PLA has arguably already failed this most important point. There's a reason why the CCP continues to emphasize that the party controls the guns throughout the years - it is because at the local level, commanders operate with near impunity and would frequently escalate situations to get noticed for promotion
   • Chinese coast guard captains in the South China Sea have the freedom to improvise, and there have been incidents of them taking actions that are more aggressive than necessary for the sake of promotion. These aggressive actions tend to not be reported up to the CMC and is detrimental to China's foreign policy vis-a-vis her Southeast Asian neighbors.
   • The same is true on the Indian border, brigade and battalion commanders have a lot more freedom to simply improvise on their interpretation of the loosely defined orders of "defend the borders" to respond aggressively, creating crises that make India feel the need to respond to.
   • Within the foreign ministry, "wolf warrior" diplomats are aggressive for the same reason - hopes of being noticed by superiors for promotion.
   • Taken together, local tactical victories can become strategic blunders, as they foster an image of China that is much more aggressive than what the central party intends.
2. Generate high sortie production across all ETC airbases in order to achieve and maintain air superiority:
   • Seeing the PLAAF send 60+ airframes for a single day only tells part of the story. We can use the ROCMOD accounting of PLAAF cross-strait ops as a baseline for estimating sortie generation, and the only concrete details we can get is that they can put up 15+ airframes daily
   • But, we don't know if these are being generated by multiple bases or even multiple theater commands, which means we don't know if the PLAAF can maintain the constant sorties
   • We do know that each time they surge the number to 50+ or 30+, there will be a couple of days when they scale things back, which suggests that there is still quite a large hurdle to maintain a high sortie rate
   • The USAF is capable of 12 turn 12, and even 14 turn 12 ops on a regular basis (X turn Y means launching X amount of jets, then 1-1.5 hours later, launching Y number of jets - I mistakenly thought it was a pre-noon, after-noon difference in another thread)
   • This ability relies on ground crews, ground service equipment, air traffic control, and other "hidden" factors rather than pilot skill or funding. It is incredibly difficult to pull off and is very taxing on the entire force structure
   • As recently as 2012, PLAAF had difficulties performing 12 turn 12 ops without needing days before and after to achieve that
3. Identify and erode critical nodes of operation for US reinforcements approaching the region:
   • China must assume that the US will come to Taiwan's aid, and must seek to disrupt this operation.
   • This means China must identify likely avenues of approach, maintain constant ISR on inbound US forces, and target critical nodes that tie it all together.
   • Examples:
     • If the US is streaming in reinforcements by air, then the PLAAF needs to target aerial refueling tankers and strategic airlift assets to deny them the chance of landing on the island
     • If the US is bringing additional naval groups from Europe towards the Taiwan Strait, then the PLAN needs to interdict them at critical crossings near the South China Sea to deny them access to the AO
     • If the US is putting up BARCAP to help the Taiwanese contest the skies above Taiwan, then the PLAAF and PLANAF needs to find and target the carriers that are putting the jets up so that they can be taken off the board
     • If the US is exercising in WESTPAC, then the PLAN needs to identify and shadow the exercising forces so that they can be targeted for attack should the situation demands
4. Concentrate fires at point of impact rather than point of origin in order to mitigate potential counter-battery fires:
   • Conventional artillery doctrine dictates that artillery should be grouped together for mass fires, but the war in Ukraine has given rise to a new approach: rather than concentrating fires at the POO, fires are concentrated at POI
   • This is because traditional counter-battery effort seeks to prioritize neutralizing as much fire as possible. By dispersing fire support assets with a focus on POI, you can achieve an effect where counter-battery missions will disregard what they see as a single gun, not realizing that this single gun is networked to fire with other single guns much further away to achieve the same effect
5. Maintain logistical elements in order to sustain long term operations, including second echelon forces and beyond:
   • This is not so much about generating sea-lift capabilities or ensuring that there's enough ammo to shoot, but something far less sexy:
   • The Russian thunder run on Kiev failed because the Russian army's poor maintenance of truck tires caused many of their supply units and second echelon troops to become separated from the main spearhead, which allowed the Ukrainians to turn breakthroughs into encirclements
   • In a cross strait operation, getting the first 3 brigades across means nothing if there isn't a steady stream of ammunition, manpower, equipment being streamed to the beachhead from China, and a steady stream of casualties being brought back across the strait from the beachheads
   • At 160km wide, ships traveling at 20 knots (37kph) will take 4 hours to make the initial trip across and another 4 hours to make the trip back - and that's not taking the time to unload, refuel, and swap out crew so that they can sustain operations. It can reasonably be assumed that it'll take 12 hours for a complete round trip, so any landing operation will need to be conducted in a way that takes this tyranny of time into account
   • The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that you can bring in as many troops as you want, but if you are incapable of supporting them beyond the first 12 hours of combat, you will get bogged down and be destroyed.

daifo said:

Sounds like a reddit take. South Korea will risk Seoul being vaporized, destroy economy, and suffer millions of casualties to help the US defeat China/N Korea to only be further pushed around by the only superpowa US and it's ally Japan(if successful). I believed it was already mention that the probability of S Korea involvement is calculated as closer to 0% than a coin flip.

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Who’s going to vaporize Seoul? If anything China will try to restrain North Korea.

The chance of SK attempting to decapitate Kim is not 0%. They have trained and planned for that. The best time to do it might just be when China is tied up in a Taiwan war. Sk is not attacking China in that scenario.

Once Kim and his inner circle are gone, NK soldiers are going to fight to the death? Most prob want to defect anyway.

Petrolicious88 said:

Who’s going to vaporize Seoul? If anything China will try to restrain North Korea.

The chance of SK attempting to decapitate Kim is not 0%. They have trained and planned for that. The best time to do it might just be when China is tied up in a Taiwan war.

Once Kim and his inner circle are gone, NK soldiers are going to fight to the death? Most prob want to defect anyway.

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Why would NK be restrained if South Korea is attacking a treaty ally?

SK will find it harder to take NK than Russia does in taking Ukraine. In a ground war in terrain that offers cover and concealment, numbers and morale is what really matters.

FairAndUnbiased said:

Why would NK be restrained if South Korea is attacking a treaty ally?

SK will find it harder to take NK than Russia does in taking Ukraine. In a ground war in terrain that offers cover and concealment, numbers and morale is what really matters.

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If attacked first, China will help NK defend itself. Push the invaders back to the 38th parallel. It won’t allow NK to nuke Seoul. It’s interested in stability and prevent Kim’s regime from collapsing. That’s it.

If South Korea wanted to attack NK during a Taiwan crisis, it’s not going to start a ground war. Take out Kim and his inner circle, the entire country falls apart. Kim is paranoid about decaptating strikes, esp drone strikes. He should be.

XiDada said:

IMO the most important things that China needs in a Taiwan scenario are as follows - in order of importance:

1. Ensure neutrality among China's neighbors in order to prevent others from seeking opportunities to strike against China
   • The PLA has arguably already failed this most important point. There's a reason why the CCP continues to emphasize that the party controls the guns throughout the years - it is because at the local level, commanders operate with near impunity and would frequently escalate situations to get noticed for promotion
   • Chinese coast guard captains in the South China Sea have the freedom to improvise, and there have been incidents of them taking actions that are more aggressive than necessary for the sake of promotion. These aggressive actions tend to not be reported up to the CMC and is detrimental to China's foreign policy vis-a-vis her Southeast Asian neighbors.
   • The same is true on the Indian border, brigade and battalion commanders have a lot more freedom to simply improvise on their interpretation of the loosely defined orders of "defend the borders" to respond aggressively, creating crises that make India feel the need to respond to.
   • Within the foreign ministry, "wolf warrior" diplomats are aggressive for the same reason - hopes of being noticed by superiors for promotion.
   • Taken together, local tactical victories can become strategic blunders, as they foster an image of China that is much more aggressive than what the central party intends.

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What a load of crap!