The only issue I have with this projection is that it assumes current production rates will continue long term and are not part of a surge effort responding to specific policy objectives, after the achievement of which production may slow or halt altogether. That said, preducting the future is hard, especially since a lot of previously reliable patterns seem to no longer hold true vis a vis military production.
To elaborate, over the past several decades it was normal to see test craft and other equipment developed iteratively, and produced in certain volumes but not really with the intention of replacing the full fleet of whatever craft they may be an improvement over. The presumed reason being that although each individual iteration was definitely an improvement over what was already in service, there was sufficient confidence on the part of policymakers that an even better product was immediately over the horizon, and that investing fully in the current technology would not be prudent. In my mind, that pattern has proven wise and served China well up to now.
However, recent years has seen a shift toward ever greater investment in generational replacement. To a certain extent this is to be expected in light of aging equipment, but it also somehow feels to me like a shift in decision making. Leadership seems to on the one hand be confident that they are either approaching some acme of R&D or seeing diminishing R&D returns, and thereby feel confident that current state of the art are a good investment to roll out wholesale. On the other hand it may be that they are responding to pressure from one or a small number of individuals.
All that was a long explanation of why I feel it is hard to say if we will reach 1000, or if it may very quickly jumpt to 350 or some other number and then stop.
is there any reason to reduce production of j-20 just so that you can increase production of J-35A? After all, Air Force has clearly made a huge investment in J-20 infrastructure and WS-10 engine infrastructure.
Since CAC factory space has expanded significantly, it would appear more likely for J-20 production to go up further rather than dropping. In fact, since J-35 production has yet to start, there is no reason for J-20 production to drop.
Has there ever been a case in PLA history where it just suddenly stops buying a new aircraft type that it put significant investment in?
This may surprise people, but I've been around watching PLA for a good 20 years and their behavior is pretty consistent.
Why? Their roles differ and so are their respective range requirements.
Let's compare apples with apples and oranges with oranges.
Okay, so why don't we discuss this then. What do you see is the role of J-35A vs J-20 in the near term? And how does that affect PLA's procurement decisions.
Well, PLAAF went head on into j-35a, not me(you may in fact remember I was kinda surprised). With all respect to podcasts.
So i don't think it's me in a disagreement here. Not now at least.
The more CCA heavy the fleet is, the less capable the control node needs to be. But, the more nodes you need.
In a way, if you're ready to drop all independent capability altogether, one may say that the best controller node is something like Northrop model 437.
And, vise versa, the more onboard capabilities there is, the less vulnerable and passively capable it is, the more such platform can operate independently ...
The higher the ratio of unmanned vs manned, the more capable your central node needs to be in order to process the additional data and give command.
If there is 1 to 1 ratio of drones to manned fighter, why does the manned fighter need to be that capable?
Again, PLA themselves see two-seat aircraft as ideal for being the QB in MUMT. So I don't get the argument here of pushing J-35A into a role that it is not the most well suited for.