A few more bits of information from Wojciech Szewko's podcast on Friday, 13.10.23. There is nothing substantial to add at this stage of the conflict apart from some clarifications - belw
Options for political alliances for Hamas
Hamas is derived from Muslim Brotherhood with greater emphasis on nationalism (Palestinian) as means of furthering its own interest as a political entity.
Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni
Islamist and
popular movement which orginates from Egypt and has support in Turkey and Qatar. Despite being
popular it is not
democratic as it aims to transform society into a Sharia-based theocracy. This makes Muslim Brotherhood primary threat to Egypt military dictatorship in Egypt or Tunisia and tribal monarchies in Saudi Arabia and UAE. The governments of these countries will never aid Hamas in any way but their citizens may provide support. However Muslim Brotherhood and even more nationalistic Hamas are also rejected by purely jihadist Islamic movements like Islamic State or Al-Qaeda. Therefore according to Szweko the only viable political alliances that Hamas can form directly with another politicaly entity are with Yemen (Houthi) and Afghanistan (Taliban).
A minor but viable potential ally to Hamas are jihadist organisations formerly affiliated with Al-Qaeda but now split due to greater emphasis on nationalism like Al-Nursah Front which consists of fighters from Central Asia and Caucasus, often Russian-speaking e.g. Chechens. Al-Nusrah fought in Syria and was allegedly supported by Qatar by regularly paying for hostages.
Iran provides support for Hamas as political pragmatism. Additionally Iran sees Hamas as a "defeated rival" because Hamas fought against Hezbollah and IRGC in Syria. Any support that Hamas receives from Iran or Iranian proxies like Hezbollah or Iraqi Shia militias are completely outside of Hamas' political initiative. They receive support because they are the most viable and serious threat that can be used against Israel without further escalation. The benefit that Iran receives from Hamas is delaying any Israeli intervention in southern Lebanon. Iran uses Hezbollach as a deterrent against direct confrontation with Israel so they will not want to waste its potential too early. Szewko thinks that Hezbollah will not enter the war until there is clear military and strategic benefit of doing so because it is a formation highly dependent on missiles and exposed logistical routes through Syria. In a way it is a single-shot army.
Foreign minister of Iran met with Hamas leader in Qatar today.
Current political situation for Hamas and public perception
Leadership of Hamas has called for global jihad on last Friday as well as for material support. So far the first failed entirely and the latter is difficult to assess.
Hamas also called for uprising in West Bank where Hamas has significant cells in Nablus and Jenin but those have not reacted beyond minor incidents. This suggests that Hamas is not as monolithic internally as for Hamas there is little benefit from delaying further destabilisation. Blinken also met with Abbas in Amman so Fatah is definitely playing a role as well and WB Hamas may simply decide to turn coat at least temporarily.
Muslim countries stage demonstrations of support of Palestine and not of Hamas because they understand the difference and overwhelmingly do not support Hamas for political reasons. Despite using Palestinian nationalism Hamas considers itself separate from Palestine and therefore demonstrations of support of Palestine (with Palestinian flags) are not to be confused with demonstrations of support for Hamas (with Hamas flag). In the west these two are combined because most people in the demonstrations are useful idiots and most people in the media and governments are shills.
Refugees from Gaza and migration as threat vector
The slowly emerging bans on support for Palestine are likely introduced in anticipation of migrations to Europe via Egypt and Libya when Gazan population is forced into Egypt by Israel. So far everything looks like this is a very likely outcome once it comes to fighting.
Another route that is likely to be exploited is via Russia and Belarus expanding on their previous/ongoing weaponisation of migrants vs Poland.
Lebanese research into migrations and refugees estimates ~5% of population as militants or extremists who are likely recruits.
Refugee camps are highly problematic. Refugee camps in Lebanon were regularly controlled by Islamic State and several sites were made inaccessible by Lebanese military after successful engagements by ISIS militants. Often camps are places of open warfare between rival factions.
Netanyahu has personal interest in extending the war
"[...]86% of respondents, including 79% of coalition supporters, said the surprise attack from Gaza is a failure of the country’s leadership[...](94%) believe the government must bear some responsibility for the lack of security preparedness that led to the assault, with over 75% saying the government holds most of the responsibility. [...]56% said Netanyahu must resign at the end of the war, with 28% of coalition voters agreeing with this view, and 52% of respondents also expect Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to resign. In addition, most respondents said they do not trust the government to lead the war on Gaza, though the poll was conducted before former defense minister Benny Gantz joined an emergency unity government on Wednesday evening."
Israel committing to ground offensive so quickly suggests that Israel sees a limited window of opportunity despite the extensive psy-op in the media. Szewko in his podcast noted that he had expected that those efforts would enable
at least several weeks of siege and shelling. He is convinced that Israel has more time, and that rushing into Gaza may be a mistake and could play into Hamas' hands. Note that he means political fallout as he is not a military analyst and doesn't cover that aspect.
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So far the operation was supposed to start "after Saturday" but there were news of delays of a few days allegedly due to weather complicating aerial support but if it is not a misdirectio it can be also connected with the second USN carrier requiring time to arrive in theater as well as Vinson being recently sent out from Ca. to Indian Ocean - however even at high cruise speed it takes 1 day to cover ~1000km.
A quick look at possible naval strength being deployed in Eastern Med. The exact number and type of ships is not confirmed just based on the information I could find from reports.
CSG12
- CVN-78 (Ford) + CAW 8 [sqn: 3x F/A-18E, 1x F/A-18F, 1x EA-18G, 1x E-2D 1x C-2A, 2x SH-60S/R]
- CG-60 (Normandy) [122 VLS]
- DDG-61 (Ramage) (I) [90 VLS]
- DDG-74 (McFaul) (II) [90 VLS]
- DDG-116 (Hudner) (IIA-TI) [96 VLS]
SNMG2 (joined CSG12)
- HMS Duncan (Type 45)
- ITS Carlo Margottini (FREMM)
- ESPS Mendez Nunez (Alvaro de Bazan)
- FS Surcouf (Lafayette)
COMDESRON 60 (joined CSG12)
Already in theater:
- 1 Greek frigate
- 1 Turkish frigate
- 1 Italian frigate
- 1 Canadian frigate
- 1 UK destroyer
- 1 US destroyer
in transit to Med:
CSG2
- CVN-69 (Eisenhower) + CAW 3 [sqn: 3x F/A-18E, 1x F/A-18F, 1x EA-18G, 1x E-2D 1x C-2A, 2x SH-60S/R]
- CG-58 (Philippine Sea) [122 VLS]
- DDG-57 (Mitscher) (I) [90 VLS]
- DDG-58 (Laboon) (I) [90 VLS]
- DDG-72 (Mahan) (II) [90 VLS]
A single carrier can sustain ~120 sorties over 3-4 days or 80-100 sorties over a period of 1-2 weeks. Two carriers will be able to surge ~240 sorties over 3-4 days which combined with 788+ VLS cells and a number of additional escorts may successfully blunt offensive operation by Hezbollah. However according to John Kirby Eisenhower will not join Ford in theater but will stay behind in reserve.
Also:
F-15E from 494th squadron USAF were deployed to Jordan. Exact number of aircraft is unknown. Public trackers showed 3 but they depend on transponders being on.
All of this is definitely aimed at forcing de-escalation from Hezbollah which suggests that there must be factors validating such strong response. With all it's arsenal Hezbollah is not a sustainable threat vector. Once they fire their rockets they are unable to effectively engage IDF in offensive action on Israeli territory and are mostly vulnerable to air attacks. Once that happens Iran loses its most potent and actionable deterrent. That combined with the fact that Hamas is not an Iranian proxy or even an ally suggests that IDF is in a weaker position than numbers suggest because otherwise Hezbollah would not pose such a threat. Currently it is not obvious to me what that weakness is.
Any reliable info on AShM stockpile size/composition of Hezbollah? Supposedly they have the P-800 and others now. What are the chances they score a hit if they tango with the US CSGs?
Zero.
People need to stop littering this thread with fantasy scenarios.
USN CSG has tremendous defensive capability against such attacks because it has been preparing for them since the 1970s.
Russians use P-800 in combination with other modes of attack
simultaneously even against less capable targets. Coastal defenses have a role but it is one of many elements.
I suggest you look up what Soviet Union had prepared for confronting carrier groups in the 1980s and then it will be more obvious why it is a ridiculous notion.
