Luckily I don't rely on satellite imaging because we have on site photos, see below.
- This is not a photograph from the airbase so the image has little or no relation to what happened there.
- The crater on the image is an impact crater formed by kinetic energy and not an explosion.
- The images show very little of the damage to draw conclusions even about the strike shown.
- There is no reliable information about the date of the strike shown on the image. It is a common practice to publish outdated information during the chaotic flood of data following any ongoing event, especially as media outlets fight for attention.
Whatever happened here has very little relevance to estimating effects of the strike at Nevatim AB. If indeed this is an impact from Oct 1st then based on what is shown on the images the most likely explanation is an pressure blast and debris scatter caused by kinetic energy from the impact. It is fairly plausible that it was caused by a missile fragment.
A quick calculation at the other side of the napkin:
The speed of an object falling in Earth's gravity (acceleration g) from an altitude of h is the square root of 2gh [m/s] - irrelevant of mass. Any already possessed momentum will add to the terminal speed - all velocity vectors considered. The speed of an object falling from 1000m is 141m/s. From 10 000m it is 447m/s i.e. supersonic. From higher altitudes even more so.
If the fragment was a relatively dense object with mass of 500kg falling from 10 000m it would strike the ground with kinetic energy of 50MJ. For comparison 1t TNT is 4 184 MJ so the kinetic impact generates a comparative yield of 12 kg tnt. For comparison the explosive filling of M795 155mm shell is 10,8kg. If the missile fell from a higher altitude the energy would be greater as it scales with the square of velocity unlike mass.
1. Which peer power is going to engage Israel in ground warfare? The 2 that come to my mind are both throughly bought by the US and the third is in shambles after a decade of civil war.
You're approaching the problem from the wrong angle.
Wikipedia's IDF equipment list includes 250 M109A5 and small numbers of towed 155mm or M110 203mm. There is a similarly limited number of rocket artillery systems (100?). Similarly they have only about 50 attack helicopters, half of which are old AH-64A. Those assets are support measures for 400 active and 900 stored tanks and a structure consisting in total (active and reserve) of 13 armoured and 20 infantry brigades
IDF Ground Force relies on air support to an extent that is commonly, and incorrectly, attributed to the US Army. 33 brigades in US Army with smilar split (13 armoured, 20 infantry) would constitute 11 divisions commanding 528 attack helicopters, a minnimum of 704 artillery pieces and 198 rocket artillery systems (and 297 in new structure). The number of tanks would match that in IDF but all the fire support assets are completely insufficient.
The over-reliance on the air force is IDF's Achilles' heel. Consider how much harder the intervention in Gaza after 7/10 would be without air support.
Furthermore IDF having specialised in limited military operations in the occupied territories and Lebanon has insufficient numbers of heavy armoured vehicles. M113s are useful for contemporary battlefield - they work in Ukraine because Russia is similarly under-equipped, with old and unergonomic BMPs and BTRs. But in hilly terrains M113s will not provide necessary protection. IDF ground forces will therefore be over-reliant on its tanks and will inevitably have to resort to building fortified areas to protect its infantry.
No air support means that with extremely limited supply of attack helicopters, limited artillery and insufficiently protected APCs any ground war would reduce IDF to a force that would be peer to Arab militias that would be able to generate numbers with greater ease.
This is what I wrote in my posts immediately after 7/10 - in relative terms IDF of 1967 and 1973 is not the IDF of 2023. It is much more an asymmetric conflict occupation force than a full spectrum peer conflict force. The only factor that balances the scales is the air force. Remove that and you don't need state level actors engaging in direct military intervention. All that is necessary is endless stream of people willing to fight like in Syria or Iraq and Israel will be overwhelmed within 6 to 12 months.
Israel would have to replace its air force within months and that's just not possible.
2. How many missiles would Iran need to fire to neutralize the Israeli airforce? If it ever comes to that, Israel knows very well the sites at which Iran’s BMs are stored and sortied out of: they will become high priority targets.
Israel lacks the ability to conduct suppression because they only have 25 F-15E and 40 F-35A. F-16s are great for airstrikes within 500km radius but not for missions at 1000km or more. Furthermore for IDF to conduct those strikes they will likely need support of refuelers, only to fly in a straight line over Syria and Iraq, and they simply don't have enough of them - 7 B707 and 7 KC-130.
Just in terms of geographical space Iran has many more sites capable of hiding and launching missiles than Israel has sites capable of providing security for assets and necessary servicing for the air force to continue fighting.
Look up my Desert Storm thread - all the information necessary to understand a modern air campaign in hard numbers is there. Israel has a force capable of attacking select strategic targets in Iran but not to conduct a suppression campaign.
And that's considering that it would have all the information necessary - Iran is preparing for an American intervention, not an Israeli one. They are considering an operation lasting many days that includes strategic bombers and a massed cruise missile strike e.g. a launch from Ohio SSGN.
3. Could we not assume that should its airfields come under suppressive fire, Israel would relocate its aircraft outside its borders ?
Where exactly? And even if that was feasible the likely outcome of such operation would be
internment of aircraft and pilots. Remember that any IDF pilots is a potential suspect in a war crimes investigation by the ICC so the excuse to intern is extremely convenient as it is a neutral action.
Another takeaway from the strike is that either Israel’s Arrow interceptors have been depleted or they are saving them for a future need. The attempted number of intercepts was clearly less than in April.
In April the intercepts were likely assisted by USN DDGs in theater as well as other systems like the US THAAD battery. The second strike was not announced so only the assets in range were able to respond. THAAD is a terminal phase defense and Arrow 3 would be used only against targets with sufficient flight parameters.
Israel is definitely attempting to preserve the missiles because from what I read it seems that they never intended to fight a prolonged campaign requiring multiple days of exo-atmospheric intercepts.
It may be possible that Iran chose to attack in an unpredictable patterns of limited strikes to exhaust Israeli and allied ABM assets while retaining a somewhat muddy picture of what their intentions are - thus not triggering an all-out US military response.
A lot will depend on what Israel forces through as retaliatory measure. We're only one month away from the most important election in living memory, and arguably since 1940.
The most important factor is the actual number of Iranian missiles. If they have enough of them to neutralise Israeli air force and disrupt any land-based allied operation they may play aggressively because the US has only capabilities allowing it a single full-spectrum operation globally. They can sustain and even expand their operations in Europe because of allies but not elsewhere. So it's either Middle East or West Pacific. And if US gets involved in the Middle East, with all the consequences to global markets resulting from that conflict, then China can take a leisurely stroll to Taiwan and the US won't be able to do anything about it.
And that too is a calculation that must be at the back of the mind of everyone involved - Iranians, Chinese, American, Israeli etc.
