You can't estimate blast damage with commercially-available resolution because you can't estimate depth of crater. A rocket with 1000km range travels at 10Ma so its kinetic energy at the moment of impact if very different from that of a slower SRBM or rocket artillery like GMLRS-ER. Blast energy propagates differently depending on where it is at the moment of impact and ground is an excellent shock absorber. Just 1m of depth can make tremendous difference for how the blast is formed and consequently what it can do to the intended target.
As for the satellite images - what you don't see at that scale are all the partitions - curtain walls, windows, etc - blown out (or in this case blown in ) by the explosion. The structure stands and since flat roof is always part of the structure in a concrete frame building it seems that the building is intact. That's because of how structural design in military and civilian buildings is done.
Military structures are built to completely different standards as well as with completely different priorities compared to civilian, especially residential, buildings. Residential buildings, even 10-storey high-rise like the ones destroyed in Ukraine, are the most fragile structural system designed only for static loads. The primary objective in civilian structure is cost reduction within given usability parameters which is defined in building regulations. In contrast the primary objective in military structure is achieving protection parameters which are also defined in a separate set of building regulations for military or other high-security objects. Military bases that are planned as areas of active combat i.e. airbases which are a nominal target, are designed in the highest class for protection for dynamic loads - overpressure from explosion - and in horizontal plane. It means that the entire logic of structural design is different from that in civilian buildings, including those in seismic areas.
This is why the strike on Pentagon on 9/11 created so much confusion. Pentagon is a military structure. WTC was a civilian one.
The attack was a complete failure if we were to measure the physical effects alone. The only reason why it seems more "successful" is because more rockets of sufficient class were fired at the targets compared to April when it was a combined attack using drones, rocket artillery from Lebanon and rockets from Iran. Recent attack was rocket-only and was conducted on short notice without advance warning being given so IDF had to rely on their own and allied recon systems.
April attack was all about testing a psychological barrier and the consequences - what will happen when Iran attacks Israel directly. October attack was a practical test of own readiness, enemy defenses, and actual effectiveness. Iran has the necessary data to plan the next attack although it won't be as effective as most casual observers imagine.
In general long-range missile strikes are not as effective. Let's not forget that CEP indicates 50% probability, not 100%. CEP of 50m doesn't mean much if you don't have sufficient number of warheads because 50% of them will fall outside of the radius. For CEP 50m it means 90% lands within 100m and 100m against hardened military targets with blast deflection considered etc is not enough for conventional warhead. This is the real reason why nuclear warheads are still in use for strategic weapons but not tactical ones. Nuclear warheads are all about ensuring effects for low accuracy systems. Similarly MIRV was developed to improve effectiveness over single warheads - not to improve survivability. Tactical nukes were a costly solution early in the Cold War but as targeting technology improved they were discarded because the cost of nuclear use was unacceptably high when targets could be neutralised by conventional means. (Russia kept tactical nukes due to the relative weakness of their conventional forces post-1991). Civilian "experts" more often than not don't understand the field of their "expertise". But ask any military commander who had the task of planning a potential tactical strike and he will immediately tell you why nukes were used. They simply changed the game of numbers of how much and how long a target was out of consideration after a tactical nuke was deployed.
So the question we should be asking is "what is the point of conducting such an attack" if missiles with nominally (or "officially) small CEP of 50m or 20m still have such poor accuracy.
That's because a conventional ballistic strike against airfields is not intended to damage aircraft. It is means to damage the infrastructure necessary to allow them to land, refuel, rearm and retaliate. The best defense for aircraft is emergency takeoff but the time in the air is limited even with refueler support. The aircraft have to land and they do on civilian airfields or road airstrips. The aim is to survive the incoming OCA (offensive counter-air) waves i.e. airfield bombings. For Iran OCA means further ballistic strikes at those locations where military aircraft are likely to land.
Almost all about attacking airfields is about suppression and neutralisation and not destruction. Long range rocket attacks simply do not have the necessary potential. Even nuclear weapons can be insufficient to prevent a retaliatory strike.
During Desert Storm the first 21 days registered over 100 OCA sorties per day on average (1st day 373 sorties, 2nd day 241) and all that effort caused merely 50% loss for Iraqi Air Force *including destroyed on the ground, destroyed in the air, damaged on the ground and fled to Iran)
Desert Storm - overview, data & statistics
The following is a collection of maps, tables and quotations from publicly available sources with heavy emphasis on Government Accountability Office's report "Operation Desert Storm - Evaluation of the Air Campaign". I divided the whole set into five posts: air superiority over Iraq -...
www.sinodefenceforum.com
Consider that the first two days of DS meant over 600 sorties each carrying an absolute minimum of 500kg and likely 1000kg of ordnance. This is an equivalent of 600 or 1200 rockets against targets which were not in hardened shelters.
So why is Iran doing it? Certainly not to achieve results understood in physical terms because if you are capable of building a rocket with 1000km range you are capable of correctly analysing publicly available data on the effectiveness of air-to-ground operations in 1991.
In all likelihood the recent attack was a test of:
- defensive systems - what would happen if nuclear warhead was to be delivered
- Israeli Air Force resiliency - how much and for how long would Israel lose its primary conventional asset
Remove that factor and it's giant with clay feet. Iran won't need to do anything other than neutralising IsrAF and leaving Israel to fend for itself.
But as data from DS shows it is by no means an easy feat. Volume of attack is necessary. Ability to sustain the attacks is necessary. Iran would need several days of contiuing rocket attacks to ensure that Israeli Air Force is neutralised. All of that needed to be tested and by attacking on 1st October Iran attempted a trial run.
Political theatrics aside IDF understands it and whatever considerations or retaliatory action they plan will be based on the above.
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