An Interim Fighter: The F-16 and other options
Amit Gupta
The Indian Air Force has short listed four planes for its Interim Fighter purchase—the Mirage 2000, the MiG-29, Grippen and, surprisingly, the F-16. There are several issues that need to be understood before determining what would be a viable purchase that satisfies the air force’s needs.
First, interim purchases are a thing of the past. India’s last ‘interim’ purchases were the Iskra trainer, bought to fill a gap in training aircraft, and the MiG-23. Given the high costs of acquiring aircraft, such purchases are a thing of the past. Any aircraft purchased by the air force will be in service for at least two decades. So any procurement will have to take into consideration how the plane fits into the air force’s long-term force structure and evolving air power doctrine. Additionally, the purchase may have to reflect India’s greater strategy of developing economic and political ties with other countries.
Second, the assumption that India can have an interim fighter is based on the belief that the Indian arms industry will be able to provide a viable alternative in the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft. The Tejas has been marked by developmental delays, the lack of an indigenous engine, and now concerns about successfully integrating modern weapons with the plane’s avionics. If the Tejas is unlikely to see induction into service until the end of the decade, and that too in low production numbers, then it will not be able to fill the gap that is being created by the phasing out of the MiG-21s. Further, it is not clear whether the air force will be willing to accept the plane to fill the gaps in its force structure. Instead the Tejas could be turned down by the Indian Air Force as being unable to meet the changing threat environment.
Third, the next generations of fighter aircraft that are being built around the world are too expensive for most countries including India to procure in large numbers. The U.S. F-22 has a flyaway price of about $117 million and the U.S. Air Force will purchase approximately 180 planes. Israel, which would have been a ready customer for an advanced U.S. fighter plane has already stated that the F-22 is too expensive to be purchased by the Israeli Air Force. Other next generation aircraft—like the French Rafale and the Typhoon Eurofighter, are similarly too expensive. As a consequence, the interim fighter purchase has to be one that provides a solid, reliable platform that can be modernized in mid-life with next generation avionics and weaponry thus making it a viable weapon for an advanced combat environment.
Fourth, a weapons purchase can and should also reflect India’s political and strategic interests. Weapons procurement can open up political ties and help cement a country’s strategic interests. For India, which has started to build a new military-strategic relationship with the United States, this may be one consideration in procuring a new weapons system.
Making the choice
Given these factors it is easy to rule out two planes—the Gripen and the MiG-29. The MiG-29 has a poor maintenance record and the erstwhile MiG bureau has had few successes in selling the airplane since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its maintenance record and the poor quality of construction, in fact, led the German air force to scrap the MiG-29s it inherited from the East German air force.
The Gripen is too expensive and has an American engine. Having said that, the plane has been sold to the Swedish, South African, Hungarian, and Czech air forces thus giving the program a market viability and ensuring a fairly steady supply of spares. But the aircraft would require a lengthy period of time to be integrated into the Indian Air Force’s force structure. Politically, purchasing the Gripen does little to enhance India’s global partnerships.
The Mirage 2000 would seem to be the ideal candidate since it has been in service with the Indian Air Force for two decades and performed admirably during the Kargil conflict. For an IAF that is trying to rationalize its force structure by reducing the types of airplanes in its inventory, a large number of Mirages make sense. In terms of maintenance, integration into the force, and pilot familiarity, the plane also fits well into the Indian Air Force’s long term plans.
Which leaves the F-16. The F-16 block 60 has an impressive avionics suite, a proven combat record, and, its proponents contend, is 30% cheaper than the Mirage. Co-production has been carried out in a nonwestern country-Turkey- and Istanbul was allowed to export the plane to Egypt. For India, an F-16 purchase has some positive military and political possibilities.
Militarily, it offers a plane that is comparable to the Mirage 2000 and will allow the Indian Air Force to move into flying and maintaining American aircraft and familiarizing itself with the sales and corporate practices of U.S. defense firms. This would allow India, if it chose, to move seamlessly to a next generation aircraft from the United States—especially the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) which is cheaper and better suited for Indian military interests (the Marine Corps jump jet version of the JSF would be especially suitable for the Indian Navy’s carrier aviation efforts).
Politically, an Indian F-16 production line could well be the test for the validity of the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP) technology transfer effort between the United States and India. If the U.S. is to be a credible supplier of high technology to India the transfer of the F-16 production line becomes an important test case about the sincerity of American intentions. From an Indian perspective, the transfer of the production line, with no restrictions on third party transfers and full access to technology, shows that the United States is sincere about making India into a strategic partner. It also removes lingering Indian doubts about the United States’s value as a guaranteed supplier of weaponry.
From an American perspective, the F-16 could well become the Volkswagen Beetle of fighter aircraft. Brazil had a Beetle production line and continued to build the car well after assembly was stopped in Europe. The F-16 could become the Beetle as cash strapped nations continue to buy the Indian version since it would be a low cost but agile and proven platform that fulfills their airpower requirements.
It will be interesting to see, therefore, if the U.S. and India can work out a mutually beneficial arrangement on this issue.
