This sounds like the British were pretty scared of the Exocet. Another moral of this story? Relying on other countries for your weapons has its downside....
Scared is the wrong word, The RN had a lot of respect for Exocet, after all we had it in service aboard Frigates (Batch 2 Leander class, Type 21 Amazon class and Type 22 Broadsword class, four MM38 box launchers per ship) and Destroyers (Batch 2 County class, again four box launchers per ship). It's strengths and weaknesses were well known throughout the fleet, as were the necessary countermeasures. As soon as the missile is detected, the ship under attack should immediately turn either away or towrds the incoming missile to present the smallest possible radar return (warships tend to have a beam about 10% of their length, so end on they reduce their radar signature by 90%. This was years before stealth became a buzz word!), then as the ship is turning a pattern of chaff rockets are fired to decoy the missile's homing radar. Provided you could detect the missile in time (normal flight time about two minutes from launch to impact) this would work, the missile's primitive by modern standards onboard computer would home in on the largest radar return.
In the Falklands, The exocet was 'lucky', inasmuch as the first hit against HMS Sheffield, a Type 42B1 DDG armed with Sea Dart SAMs, although on the defensive perimiter of the flett and postioned 'up threat' from the carriers along with two other T42B1s (Glasgow and Coventry, all spaced about 20miles apart) was achieved due to te fact that at the time of the attack Sheffields main air search radar, the antiquated type 965AKE2 was switched off as she was sending a message back to fleet headquarters by sattelite transmission. Her radar was only supposed to be off for a few minutes, and indeed her radar operators were not completely blind, they were watching the images from the radar on her sister ship Glasgow being transmitted to her. This did mean her radar picture was offset by twenty miles but was better than nothing. The attacking pair of Super Etendards were spotted by Sheffield but not confirmed, and before confirmation could be achieved the watch officers on the Bridge spotted the missiles smoke trail coming in from the starboard side, called 'Take Cover!' on the tannoy and then were hit. The missile impacted on the starboard side, taking out most of the CIC and lodged in the structure without exploding. The rocket motor continued to burn and set the ship ablaze, the water main was ruptured, emergency generators were either knocked out or were unserviceable and there was insufficient portable fire fighting equipment. Also many furnishings onboard were flammable and made of materials that gave off toxic fumes when burned. After a few hours the ship was abandoned and the crew evacuated to other ships. The fires were put out by the next day and the ship was taken in tow to South Georgia in the hope she could be loaded onto a heavy lift barge for return to the UK. The hole in her starboard side was not patched and she began taking on water during the tow as weather worsened, and six days after the attack she sank in deep water.
The Moral: Don't skimp on defence spending if you are serious about getting into a shooting war! Don't believe the RAF when they say they can provide air defence for the fleet, and never surrender your AEW capability.
As for the other two Exocet casualties, MV Atlantic Conveyor was an unarmed large merchant ship with no radar (other than commercial navigation) so had no chance, as was later proved during the Iran/Iraq war in the gulf. HMS Glamorgan was attacked by an MM38 originally fitted to an Argentine Frigate and remounted on a semi trailer, with a jury rigged fire control (it involved some car batteries and bared wires rubbed together!). Glamorgan detected the launch from the shoreline and began to turn away as described above. She had almost completed the turn when the missile struck, skidding over her helicopter flight deck to port (as the Counties had a high freeboard it shows how much she was heeling over in the turn!) and impacting the helicopter hangar. Again, the warhead appaers to have failed to detonate though the hangar, the wessex helo inside were destroyed and 14 sailors were killed. The ship survived and remained operational, a testement to her damage control crews and her original sturdy design.
So in summary, the Argentines fired four AM39s and one MM38. Two of the former missed completely, two hit but only one exploded. 25% success rate for the AM39 whilst the MM38 hit but failed to explode. The missile emerged from the war with an undeservedly high reputation helped by, as usual the hysterical British tabloid press.