Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
if there is a war between US/western, i don't think japan/US/europe will import/export stuff to china? US CAN live without chinese import its HARD but US were fine before china start the economic development. .
long range defense against anti-ship missiles can be electronically jammed, medium range you have SM-2 & SM-3 missiles, point defense there is gattling gun and other stuff. but those missiles HAS to get through the defense of Entire battle group made up by dozens US cruiser, destroyers, sub, airborne ELint/sgint platform, and other varies of weapon system. few anti-ship missiles is NOT goona work, china has to send waves upon wave of anti-ship
You can leave Japan out for the foreseeable time Japan has neither the mean nor the will to engage in disastrous confrontation with China. Japan will be busy rebuilding the country.
All your defense measures is not going to be any good against ASBM hurtling at 8-10 time of the speed sound from the top of your head . Even if they managed successful hit the kinetic energy will keep hitting the sensitive sensor rendering it operational ineffective. As far as I know there is nothing in US arsenal that can defeat the ASBM.
Just illustration, in Falkland war the Argentinian only has 8 Exocet at their disposal because they just recently get it from France . See how much havoc it create to the the British fleet .
Read this gloomy assesment by Rand organization about the state of Taiwan- China imbalance Here what rand has to say
Executive Summary of Taiwan-China Question of Balance
Today, the job of defending Taiwan is getting harder. As discussed above, the combat
effectiveness of Taiwan’s air force is seriously imperiled by China’s growing force of modern
SRBMs, but other changes are afoot as well. China’s force of modern surface combatants and
submarines will make it difficult and costly for Taiwan’s navy to operate in the Strait, while
advanced SAMs and modern fighters will confront any Taiwanese or American aircraft that
manage to become airborne with a highly lethal environment. U.S. Navy carriers and other
warships will soon be at risk not just from PLAN submarines equipped with supersonic anti-ship
missiles but from the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a version of China’s DF-21
(CSS-5) medium range ballistic missile (MRBM). When integrated with the appropriate
surveillance and targeting capabilities—provided by satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
or long range “over-the horizon” radars, all of which China has or is developing—the ASBM will
threaten U.S. carriers operating closer than about 1,000nm from China’s coast. Finally, if China
can suppress Taiwan’s air force and air defenses, the increasingly modern PLAAF will be able to
strike many target classes with PGMs. These changes lay hard strategic, operational, and
programmatic decisions before both Washington and Taipei, and they obviously do not bode well
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for the future stability of the situation along the Taiwan Strait. There is no quick, easy, or
inexpensive way out.
In the longer term, the United States and Taiwan may confront an even more fundamental
strategic dilemma, one inherent in the basic geography of the situation. Taiwan lies only a few
hundred miles from the military might of the PLA; Taipei, meanwhile, is about 1,500nm from the
nearest U.S. territory on Guam; it is nearly 4,400nm from Honolulu, and about 5,600nm from the
West Coast of the United States. This geographic asymmetry combined with the limited array of
forward basing options for U.S. forces—and China’s growing ability to mount sustained and
effective attacks on those forward bases—calls into question Washington’s ability to credibly
serve as guarantor of Taiwan’s security in the long run