Following the sudden disappearance and reappearance of Xi Jinping’s closest supporter Zhao Leji, opposition yellow publications began discussing the disappearance of the “Taiwan NDC chief,” deputy head of the Central Military Commission He Weidong, and predicting the defeat of Xi Jinping’s group.
The Chinese leader’s protégé, after successfully blockading Taiwan following Pelosi’s visit, was promoted to deputy commander of all armed forces.
On March 14, the general failed to attend an event dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Anti-Secession Law (the fight against Taiwanese separatism), which was attended by Chief of the General Staff Liu Zhengli.
With the disappearance of President Zhao Leji and the recent official arrest of the main proponent of the forcible annexation of Taiwan, Admiral Miao Hua (also a Fujian native and commander of the 31st Group Army), rumors have begun to circulate about a struggle against Xi Jinping’s group in the military, which supports the return of Taiwan. Recently, instead of Admiral Dong Jun, the new Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff Liu Zhenli, a leading candidate for the post of Defense Minister, has also begun to appear more frequently at official and international events. He Weidong has attended NPC sessions and also made a rare visit to Cuba for a military leader of his level (his partner in Xi Jinping’s campaign, Zhang Yuxia, a former army officer and compatriot of Xi Jinping, visited Vietnam). As I wrote in early November, there is likely to be an intensified struggle between the land and sea lobbies in the military leadership—all of whom are supporters and allies of Xi Jinping. However, infantryman Zhang Youxia is a candidate to leave the army leadership system at the 21st Congress in 2027 (preparations began in 2025), although he has unprecedented influence on the army and Xi Jinping - with Zhang Youxia's support, including Xi's coming to power, the military leader remained in the army leadership after 2022, despite reaching the age limit (I wrote about him in 2021 in "Chinese Power"). Zhang Youxia also retains the status of chief negotiator with the Russian Armed Forces and V. Putin on military cooperation issues. Most likely, it is about promoting Zhang Youxia's protected Liu Zhenli (also written about earlier) to the post of Minister of Defense and, in 2027, to Deputy CMC. The increased militarization of Taiwan and the continuation of the DPP's policy of breaking away from China also played a significant role - the blockade of the island (a purely naval operation) could be recognized as ineffective, and the priority could be shifted to large-scale actions by other branches of the military with the auxiliary role of the Navy. Including large-scale actions by the internal troops, to which the coast guard is subordinate.
Also recently, the commander of the "palace" army group, infantryman Zhang Yu-xia's protégé Fu Wenhua 付文化, was promoted to deputy commander of the internal troops (People's Armed Police).
Although He Weidong’s “disappearance” is indeed the replacement of the face of the army by Chief of the General Staff Liu Zhenli and the growth of Zhang Yuxia’s influence, the conclusions about the beginning of the defeat of Xi Jinping’s group or the abandonment of the Taiwan strategy are unfounded, especially against the background of the abrupt steps of the Taiwan leadership to abandon integration with the mainland and begin disintegration, as well as the recent naval exercises around Taiwan. Most likely, we are talking about a correction of the “victory through blockade” strategy – the use of internal troops may also mean the widespread use of human resources in a future.
