Your anecdotes are meaningless. Every statistical study of Chinese public opinion has shown overwhelming support of the government and the country's direction.
Chinese Internal Politics
- Thread starter FairAndUnbiased
- Start date
I don't see any value in his input. I considered debunking his non-factual assessments earlier, but there were just so many that I couldn't even be bothered to waste my time. It is pretty obvious that most of it is informed by distorted Western spins on Chinese events. His opinion is the kind you get when someone is educated enough to read, but not educated enough to read between the lines of Western media. This extends both to text and "data" (charts/graphs/stats). The latter also gets heavily distorted and misinterpreted (by design), in order to contribute to the "correct" narrative propagated by the West, so it's understandable.
Anyone following the politics of Taiwan province ? Can someone explain why Lai Ching-te (DPP candidate) is riding so high in polls right now ? From Nov 2022 to Feb 2023 him and Hou-You Yi (likely KMT candidate) were running neck and neck, but March polls are now showing Lai having substantial lead. Did KMT commit a blunder of some sorts ?
Why not, if Tsai could win a second term with lackluster performance by simply inciting fear through her support of Hong Kong rioters, then why wouldn't DPP win again and again. The question is why people still believe that Taiwanese can be won over and peaceful unification is possible.
I figured tides have turned after last year's local election and that Taiwanese electorate have stopped respoding to DPP's anti-China rhetoric and fearmongeringing but I guess I overestimated their intelligence. In any event, China should be prepared to make the long anticipated move next year.
Interesting long thread on communist leader publications in China. Not sure about the political slant of the author (US university academic) but the thread seems decent.
Likely a liberal/on the side of the US lol.
Think if he doesn't even know what the ruling party of the world's no1 economy is called, his knowledge as it concerns geopolitics is F tier.
The Lenin and Stalin books looks nice though. Notice how there is no books for Khrushchev and onwards.
I think there needs to be a book of the failures to remind peopoe what to not do.
Informative read
The elections are set to be a tight race among three candidates – current Vice President Lai Ching-te of the DPP, New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-Ih of the KMT and the TPP’s Mr. Ko. All three are well-known in Taiwan and popular among their respective constituencies.
Lai Ching-te has considerable appeal among DPP voters. Historically associated with the party’s more radical “deep green” faction, he unsuccessfully challenged Ms. Tsai for the party’s nomination in 2020 and alienated many of her supporters. However, since becoming vice president in 2020, he has moderated his policies and pledged to continue President Tsai’s course. In 2022, Mr. Lai was elected DPP chairman with 99 percent of the vote, and his bid for nomination as the party’s candidate for 2024 went unopposed.
However, political insiders caution that behind the veil of party unity, not everyone in the DPP welcomes the prospect of a Lai presidency. In addition, many voters fear Mr. Lai’s previous boasts of being a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” make him toxic from Beijing’s perspective, and his election would further exacerbate cross-strait tensions.
Furthermore, no party has ever won three consecutive presidential elections in Taiwan, and there’s little reason to believe Vice President Lai will be the one to break that trend. Following eight years of DPP rule, public dissatisfaction with the government is rising, and many feel it is time for a change of party. Growing economic uncertainty, as well as a series of sexual harassment scandals involving DPP officials, will likely further reinforce this view as the election approaches.
Hou Yu-ih’s popularity has surged since he became mayor of New Taipei in 2018. Mr. Hou is seen as a down-to-earth leader who works hard to improve the lives of his constituents. Furthermore, as a local Taiwanese whose family has been on the island for generations, he appeals to parts of the population who view the old-guard KMT figures – whose parents or grandparents arrived from China in the 20th century – as outsiders.
His initial challenge is to consolidate the support of the KMT’s “deep blue” elements, some of whom are angry the party chose him over the electronics manufacturer Foxconn’s founder Terry Gou, who had also sought the nomination. Overall, however, Mr. Hou’s greatest challenge will be the KMT’s abysmal image among young voters and moderates who are increasingly skeptical of the party’s continued acceptance of the 1992 Consensus – even after China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping began conflating it with Beijing’s vision for unification. (The KMT rejects Mr. Xi’s interpretation.)
Ko Wen-je is the biggest wild card in this election. He is a serious candidate with a viable path to victory. Though his main support base has always been in Taipei, recent studies have found him to be the most popular politician among young voters throughout the island, and momentum is currently in his favor. The most recent polls show him slightly behind Mr. Lai and ahead of Mr. Hou. While any number of factors could shift the race decisively in favor of one of the other candidates, he currently appears poised to remain competitive through election day.
Even if Mr. Ko’s fortunes reverse and he comes in a distant third, his performance will likely decide the election. He will take votes from both the DPP and the KMT, but it’s hard to predict which party he will affect the most. Mr. Ko has traditionally sided with the pan-green coalition and was endorsed by the DPP during his first run as Taipei mayor. But his more pragmatic approach to China alienated the deep green part of the movement, and many in that group now perceive him as someone closer to the KMT mold.
Many analysts expect the KMT will be the greatest casualty of Mr. Ko’s run, particularly given their overlapping power base in Taipei and the appeal Mr. Ko has among “light blue” voters who only vote for KMT because they do not trust the DPP to keep the peace with China. If Mr. Ko eats away at Mr. Hou’s support base, then the KMT will be unlikely to win this election. That could be a boon to Vice President Lai.
On the other hand, moderate DPP voters wary of Mr. Lai’s radical history may be more inclined to vote for Mr. Ko than stick with their party’s pick. Moreover, Mr. Ko’s popularity among young voters will almost certainly hurt the DPP. This demographic constitutes a key DPP constituency, and it is hard to imagine Mr. Lai winning without the youth vote.
If Mr. Hou clinches the presidency, tensions with China will likely decrease as Beijing dials down its pressure on Taiwan to bolster the KMT’s domestic legitimacy and to work toward recommencing cross-strait dialogue. This scenario would mean less frequent military provocations and increased space for Taiwan to operate internationally, possibly including as an observer in international bodies. The short-term risk of war would subside, though the long-term threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty will remain.
The extent of the thaw will depend on Beijing’s assessment of Mr. Hou’s reliability as a dialogue partner. If mainland China expects Mr. Hou to be as flexible as former President Ma, it will likely be disappointed. With the 1992 Consensus increasingly unpopular and Taiwanese distrust of Beijing at record levels, a Hou administration would be more constrained. That, in turn, raises the risk of Beijing concluding the KMT is no longer useful, an outcome that would see tensions skyrocket and could cause Beijing to recognize the futility of hoping for an eventual peaceful unification.
If Vice President Lai is elected, the cross-strait tensions will almost certainly continue for at least another four years. Beijing may further intensify the pressure to rein in Mr. Lai’s overtly pro-independence impulses. While his adoption of President Tsai’s more moderate China policy may help allay the concerns of many Taiwan voters, Beijing doesn’t recognize Ms. Tsai’s approach as moderate. Furthermore, Mr. Lai and Ms. Tsai represent different factions of the DPP. Political insiders caution that Mr. Lai’s most trusted advisors are hardline figures that might not be aligned with the more cautious approach.
Interestingly, there are signs that CCP leaders may be trying to come to terms with Taiwan’s changing political dynamics. Reports that Beijing is developing a new approach to enable high-level dialogue with Taiwan could result in a politically viable way to engage a DPP administration in dialogue. But Beijing has not yet confirmed what changes it is willing to make, and there is no guarantee they will work at reducing tensions.
While Mr. Ko was generally well-received in China as Taipei’s mayor, it is unclear whether CCP will trust a Ko presidency enough to ease off on its military threats. Nevertheless, Mr. Ko is not a member of an officially pro-independence party and has no ideological impediment to modifying his policy, which could place him in a position to set cross-strait relations on a more sustainable track. However, Mr. Ko, a relative political newcomer, may see his efforts challenged by his lack of a sizeable cadre of seasoned foreign policy advisors.
The elections are set to be a tight race among three candidates – current Vice President Lai Ching-te of the DPP, New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-Ih of the KMT and the TPP’s Mr. Ko. All three are well-known in Taiwan and popular among their respective constituencies.
Lai Ching-te has considerable appeal among DPP voters. Historically associated with the party’s more radical “deep green” faction, he unsuccessfully challenged Ms. Tsai for the party’s nomination in 2020 and alienated many of her supporters. However, since becoming vice president in 2020, he has moderated his policies and pledged to continue President Tsai’s course. In 2022, Mr. Lai was elected DPP chairman with 99 percent of the vote, and his bid for nomination as the party’s candidate for 2024 went unopposed.
However, political insiders caution that behind the veil of party unity, not everyone in the DPP welcomes the prospect of a Lai presidency. In addition, many voters fear Mr. Lai’s previous boasts of being a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” make him toxic from Beijing’s perspective, and his election would further exacerbate cross-strait tensions.
Furthermore, no party has ever won three consecutive presidential elections in Taiwan, and there’s little reason to believe Vice President Lai will be the one to break that trend. Following eight years of DPP rule, public dissatisfaction with the government is rising, and many feel it is time for a change of party. Growing economic uncertainty, as well as a series of sexual harassment scandals involving DPP officials, will likely further reinforce this view as the election approaches.
Hou Yu-ih’s popularity has surged since he became mayor of New Taipei in 2018. Mr. Hou is seen as a down-to-earth leader who works hard to improve the lives of his constituents. Furthermore, as a local Taiwanese whose family has been on the island for generations, he appeals to parts of the population who view the old-guard KMT figures – whose parents or grandparents arrived from China in the 20th century – as outsiders.
His initial challenge is to consolidate the support of the KMT’s “deep blue” elements, some of whom are angry the party chose him over the electronics manufacturer Foxconn’s founder Terry Gou, who had also sought the nomination. Overall, however, Mr. Hou’s greatest challenge will be the KMT’s abysmal image among young voters and moderates who are increasingly skeptical of the party’s continued acceptance of the 1992 Consensus – even after China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping began conflating it with Beijing’s vision for unification. (The KMT rejects Mr. Xi’s interpretation.)
Ko Wen-je is the biggest wild card in this election. He is a serious candidate with a viable path to victory. Though his main support base has always been in Taipei, recent studies have found him to be the most popular politician among young voters throughout the island, and momentum is currently in his favor. The most recent polls show him slightly behind Mr. Lai and ahead of Mr. Hou. While any number of factors could shift the race decisively in favor of one of the other candidates, he currently appears poised to remain competitive through election day.
Even if Mr. Ko’s fortunes reverse and he comes in a distant third, his performance will likely decide the election. He will take votes from both the DPP and the KMT, but it’s hard to predict which party he will affect the most. Mr. Ko has traditionally sided with the pan-green coalition and was endorsed by the DPP during his first run as Taipei mayor. But his more pragmatic approach to China alienated the deep green part of the movement, and many in that group now perceive him as someone closer to the KMT mold.
Many analysts expect the KMT will be the greatest casualty of Mr. Ko’s run, particularly given their overlapping power base in Taipei and the appeal Mr. Ko has among “light blue” voters who only vote for KMT because they do not trust the DPP to keep the peace with China. If Mr. Ko eats away at Mr. Hou’s support base, then the KMT will be unlikely to win this election. That could be a boon to Vice President Lai.
On the other hand, moderate DPP voters wary of Mr. Lai’s radical history may be more inclined to vote for Mr. Ko than stick with their party’s pick. Moreover, Mr. Ko’s popularity among young voters will almost certainly hurt the DPP. This demographic constitutes a key DPP constituency, and it is hard to imagine Mr. Lai winning without the youth vote.
Scenarios
A KMT victory
If Mr. Hou clinches the presidency, tensions with China will likely decrease as Beijing dials down its pressure on Taiwan to bolster the KMT’s domestic legitimacy and to work toward recommencing cross-strait dialogue. This scenario would mean less frequent military provocations and increased space for Taiwan to operate internationally, possibly including as an observer in international bodies. The short-term risk of war would subside, though the long-term threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty will remain.
The extent of the thaw will depend on Beijing’s assessment of Mr. Hou’s reliability as a dialogue partner. If mainland China expects Mr. Hou to be as flexible as former President Ma, it will likely be disappointed. With the 1992 Consensus increasingly unpopular and Taiwanese distrust of Beijing at record levels, a Hou administration would be more constrained. That, in turn, raises the risk of Beijing concluding the KMT is no longer useful, an outcome that would see tensions skyrocket and could cause Beijing to recognize the futility of hoping for an eventual peaceful unification.
Continued DPP rule under Lai Ching-te
If Vice President Lai is elected, the cross-strait tensions will almost certainly continue for at least another four years. Beijing may further intensify the pressure to rein in Mr. Lai’s overtly pro-independence impulses. While his adoption of President Tsai’s more moderate China policy may help allay the concerns of many Taiwan voters, Beijing doesn’t recognize Ms. Tsai’s approach as moderate. Furthermore, Mr. Lai and Ms. Tsai represent different factions of the DPP. Political insiders caution that Mr. Lai’s most trusted advisors are hardline figures that might not be aligned with the more cautious approach.
Interestingly, there are signs that CCP leaders may be trying to come to terms with Taiwan’s changing political dynamics. Reports that Beijing is developing a new approach to enable high-level dialogue with Taiwan could result in a politically viable way to engage a DPP administration in dialogue. But Beijing has not yet confirmed what changes it is willing to make, and there is no guarantee they will work at reducing tensions.
Upset victory by TPP’s Ko Wen-je
The impact of a Ko presidency on cross-strait relations is hard to predict due to the confusing nature of his China policy. Mr. Ko visited China 18 times during his eight years as mayor and angered many pan-green voters by saying the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same family. However, Mr. Ko rejects the 1992 Consensus and routinely calls the political concept of one China “impossible.”While Mr. Ko was generally well-received in China as Taipei’s mayor, it is unclear whether CCP will trust a Ko presidency enough to ease off on its military threats. Nevertheless, Mr. Ko is not a member of an officially pro-independence party and has no ideological impediment to modifying his policy, which could place him in a position to set cross-strait relations on a more sustainable track. However, Mr. Ko, a relative political newcomer, may see his efforts challenged by his lack of a sizeable cadre of seasoned foreign policy advisors.
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