shen
Senior Member
Wall Street is bigger than everyone else combined
Check out the background of the Peterson Institute mentioned earlier.
Chinese Economics Thread
- Thread starter Norfolk
- Start date
Wall Street is bigger than everyone else combined
Check out the background of the Peterson Institute mentioned earlier.
AssassinsMace
Lieutenant General
broadsword
Brigadier
What they need now is to score 5 stars in the Australasian New Car Assessment Program (ANCAP).
I think the author tries very hard to spin the positive development of China-Japan relation. I don't think it will be negative for PLA. What do you think?
By Russell Leigh Moses
The surprise news out of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on Friday that China and Japan had decided to move closer to dialogue on disputed islands in the East China Sea is a sign that diplomacy may not be dead in the region after all.
Nearly everyone involved is likely to be cheered by the development, with one notable exception: the People’s Liberation Army.
China’s military is arguably the biggest beneficiary of the territorial tensions that have hovered over the East and South China Seas these past two years, with China’s navy and air force acting as the vanguard in confrontations with Japanese and other powers. Media coverage of their exploits (in Chinese) has provided the PLA with ample justification for added budgetary outlays and an argument that it should be an indispensable in policy discussions about the region
If this diplomatic initiative gains traction, the Chinese military stands to lose influence — at the very time when it is under heavy attack for not preventing corruption in its senior ranks.
On Thursday, Xi Jinping announced that the PLA’s auditing office would be taken out of the hands of the PLA General Logistics Department and placed directly under the management of the Central Military Commission, which is headed by Xi. That move came a week after Xi addressed a major meeting of commission where he reminded commanders (in Chinese) that the Communist Party retained “absolute leadership” over China’s armed forces and that the military needed to do far more to “punish corruption and develop greater discipline.”
When Xi first came to power, many believed he would leverage close connections inside the PLA to make the military a base of political power, particularly after it became clear that he intended to launch an anti-corruption crusade. With many in the party likely to be upset at the campaign, the theory went, he would need the military’s backing to bolster his authority. The pay-off for the military would be increased influence in Beijing.
Except that’s not at all what happened. Indeed, Xi’s anti-graft drive has hit the military hard, taking out Gen. Xu Caihou, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, as well as Gu Junshan, a former deputy head of logistics.
State media have also taken jabs at the military, condemning endemic graft in its ranks (in Chinese) and noting how the allegations of corruption had undermined its national image (in Chinese). Even the leading military newspaper PLA Daily conceded (in Chinese) that “there’s an unhealthy atmosphere in military circles making it easier for corrupt elements to persist.”
In battling the attacks on its reputation, the PLA has been able to draw courage from the country’s territorial disputes, particularly those with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. As long as the specter of conflict existed, military leaders could be reasonably confident, not only that would they continue to have a voice in Beijing, but that they would be spared the worst of Xi’s anti-corruption wrath.
Their situation now appears to be less certain.
Xi’s renewed effort to halt corruption in China’s military shows that he’s unafraid of running the political risk of pushing the armed forces back from the policy-making table. Combined with the potential for even a limited détente between Beijing and Tokyo over the East China Sea, some Chinese commanders might be wondering if they’re suddenly in danger of being shoved out of the room.
By Russell Leigh Moses
The surprise news out of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on Friday that China and Japan had decided to move closer to dialogue on disputed islands in the East China Sea is a sign that diplomacy may not be dead in the region after all.
Nearly everyone involved is likely to be cheered by the development, with one notable exception: the People’s Liberation Army.
China’s military is arguably the biggest beneficiary of the territorial tensions that have hovered over the East and South China Seas these past two years, with China’s navy and air force acting as the vanguard in confrontations with Japanese and other powers. Media coverage of their exploits (in Chinese) has provided the PLA with ample justification for added budgetary outlays and an argument that it should be an indispensable in policy discussions about the region
If this diplomatic initiative gains traction, the Chinese military stands to lose influence — at the very time when it is under heavy attack for not preventing corruption in its senior ranks.
On Thursday, Xi Jinping announced that the PLA’s auditing office would be taken out of the hands of the PLA General Logistics Department and placed directly under the management of the Central Military Commission, which is headed by Xi. That move came a week after Xi addressed a major meeting of commission where he reminded commanders (in Chinese) that the Communist Party retained “absolute leadership” over China’s armed forces and that the military needed to do far more to “punish corruption and develop greater discipline.”
When Xi first came to power, many believed he would leverage close connections inside the PLA to make the military a base of political power, particularly after it became clear that he intended to launch an anti-corruption crusade. With many in the party likely to be upset at the campaign, the theory went, he would need the military’s backing to bolster his authority. The pay-off for the military would be increased influence in Beijing.
Except that’s not at all what happened. Indeed, Xi’s anti-graft drive has hit the military hard, taking out Gen. Xu Caihou, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, as well as Gu Junshan, a former deputy head of logistics.
State media have also taken jabs at the military, condemning endemic graft in its ranks (in Chinese) and noting how the allegations of corruption had undermined its national image (in Chinese). Even the leading military newspaper PLA Daily conceded (in Chinese) that “there’s an unhealthy atmosphere in military circles making it easier for corrupt elements to persist.”
In battling the attacks on its reputation, the PLA has been able to draw courage from the country’s territorial disputes, particularly those with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. As long as the specter of conflict existed, military leaders could be reasonably confident, not only that would they continue to have a voice in Beijing, but that they would be spared the worst of Xi’s anti-corruption wrath.
Their situation now appears to be less certain.
Xi’s renewed effort to halt corruption in China’s military shows that he’s unafraid of running the political risk of pushing the armed forces back from the policy-making table. Combined with the potential for even a limited détente between Beijing and Tokyo over the East China Sea, some Chinese commanders might be wondering if they’re suddenly in danger of being shoved out of the room.
broadsword
Brigadier
Absolutely, the author is guided by the China threat ideology. Most of them are not able to write about China objectively anyway. In this case, the author is over reaching.
Previously, one side said that there were serious issues that needed to be discussed and resolved, while the other side said that there was no issue and therefore no need to discuss or resolve anything.
That side have now conceded that there are indeed issues and that dialogue is required to resolve them.
In other words, the Islands are no longer "none negotiable"
How this impacts on the PLA is a strange question to ask, given that the PLA were hardly playing a significant role before and are unlikely to play a significant role now.
As to the impact it will have on the Chinese and Japanese Coastguards or indeed the Crab Fishing Industry.......
That side have now conceded that there are indeed issues and that dialogue is required to resolve them.
In other words, the Islands are no longer "none negotiable"
How this impacts on the PLA is a strange question to ask, given that the PLA were hardly playing a significant role before and are unlikely to play a significant role now.
As to the impact it will have on the Chinese and Japanese Coastguards or indeed the Crab Fishing Industry.......
Skywatcher
Captain
The U.S. military industrial complex gets paid big bucks, TPP or no TPP.
And it's not just the dairy industry, it's also airliners (Boeing makes more money off its airliners than its defense business), GE and other heavy industry machinery/power generators/nuclear reactor makers, the agricultural lobby as a whole, auto, Apple, etc.
AssassinsMace
Lieutenant General
If TPP was so great, why didn't it happen earlier? Obama wants it because he didn't want China starting a free trade zone in Asia without the US. It wasn't because it's a great idea. He did it out of necessity. He didn't want the US in a position where it had to make concessions to join so he turned it around on China. But the thing is it really needs China to support it. Right now at least Japan and South Korea are putting obstacles up because they can. TPP has always been about China. Without it and if Obama needs all these other countries on board, he will have to make concessions that dull the teeth to the bite Obama wanted the US to have that would've softened fears of free trade critics. All these export-driven countries dependent only on the US? It's the same thing the anti-free trade groups in the US have been arguing all along and that it will be a one-way trade with money leaving the US. All these Asian state members have China as their number one customer. Trade gets hit with China and it's more money being sucked out of the US who they'll be all dependent on. And when you read about the obstacles between the US and Japan and South Korea... that isn't free trade by definition because it's all about Japan and South Korea protecting and excluding certain industries from TPP rules. So it's really all political.
broadsword
Brigadier
China is 54th.
Hong Kong is ranked separately, as usual, at 20th. The kicker is that in the category of Safety & Security, it is #1 despite being used to be known for corruption in its police force. I can understand corruption is not the only determinant in social order, but then to be ranked #1, it goes to show...
Hong Kong is ranked separately, as usual, at 20th. The kicker is that in the category of Safety & Security, it is #1 despite being used to be known for corruption in its police force. I can understand corruption is not the only determinant in social order, but then to be ranked #1, it goes to show...