China's strategy in Korean peninsula

taxiya

Brigadier
Registered Member
Tell me about the US/SK "provocations" that werent in response to NK´s actions. Oh sure, the US would ignore its (and its allies) security interests and not create problems for china just because china doesnt agree with that.



Dont be so sure about that. China isnt the same as 1950´s china, totally different. China depends on US europe and japan to exports and know-how. Thats why china is not siding with NK, instead keeping neutral. They may intervene, but not to make war to US/SK, instead to stop US/SK from advancing further after they had advanced north. But then NK would be a divided nation, with only chinese troops keeping in the "border" south, and no longer working as "buffer state". Then whats the point of intervening south if they will end up staring up at US/SK troops anyway? better to get an excuse (for internal consumption) to not aiding NK. It will be painful, but I think that china can live with that, specially if NK causes a lot of SK civilian casualties.


I dont think that the US wants china´s or NK´s trust. The US wants the NK nuclear program to end, thats it. Each nation defends its own interests first.
Thanks for moving the QUOTE tag. I deleted my post 119 after realizing that.

regarding the trust, nobody is expecting "US wants China's trust". Not total and full trust at least. But for cooperation in a specific case at a specific area in specific time, some trust is a must. How could one do business if there is zero trust between one and the other? It is that kind of mistrust that I am talking about (and I assume wolfie was talking about).
 

taxiya

Brigadier
Registered Member
My point in the second paragraph is being a democracy is not what makes disagreements inherently unreliable. Authoritarian regimes, like democratic ones, can renege and backpedal on deals with some consistency. Interests dictate how reliable a deal is, not regime type.
Then I agree.
 

taxiya

Brigadier
Registered Member
I also want to repeat what latenlazy has expressed in post 116 which is a key that many people have missed on the Korean issue.

US want a regime change (1st priority), Nuclear issue is only after that.
China want Nuclear free peninsula and object regime change.

The difference is huge.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
I also want to repeat what latenlazy has expressed in post 116 which is a key that many people have missed on the Korean issue.

US want a regime change (1st priority), Nuclear issue is only after that.
China want Nuclear free peninsula and object regime change.

The difference is huge.
I would actually argue denuclearization, at least in the immediate sense, is a first priority for the US, for both self interested and limited altruistic reasons. However, because regime change is an option to achieve denuclearization, while at the same time denuclearization makes NK more vulnerable to regime change, regime change becomes the sticking point that is the root of the conflict. Even as a secondary priority, it serves as a potential complement to the US's more immediate objectives, thus diverting path outcomes away from peaceable solutions.
 

taxiya

Brigadier
Registered Member
I would actually argue denuclearization, at least in the immediate sense, is a first priority for the US, for both self interested and limited altruistic reasons. However, because regime change is an option to achieve denuclearization, while at the same time denuclearization makes NK more vulnerable to regime change, regime change becomes the sticking point that is the root of the conflict. Even as a secondary priority, it serves as a potential complement to the US's more immediate objectives, thus diverting path outcomes away from peaceable solutions.
Thanks for clarifying that although post 116 gave me the impression of the other way.

Anyways, I hold on the idea of "regime change being 1st priority" as the thought goes this line (IMO) in this order:
  1. US (Bush junior) lable three "evil" states: Iraq, Iran and NK and vowed regime change.
  2. NK is understandbaly scared, so choose the only workable defense: the nuke.
  3. Invasion of Irak and killing of Saddam proved to NK that US is serious about regime change. Without a nuke, Saddam is dead, with a nuke he may have survived.
  4. US use the nuke as an evidence and argument for regime change further.
Now it becomes the question of egg and chicken, which one came first. But we did not hear NK nuke as an issue (that attracted so much attention) back before the early 1980s that was before Bush's "three evil states" theory.

So whether regime change or nuke being the 1st priority is only a question that only US can answer or choose, but not convincing to others' ear, surely not Kim's ears, and probably not Chinese ears either.
 

delft

Brigadier
The solution to the Korean problem is reunification. That would solve the nuclear problem too. But the prime condition for reunification as far as China is concerned is the removal of US forces and that is unacceptable to US because they wants their forces as close to China as possible. So how do you build the necessary trust for whatever in these circumstances.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
Thanks for clarifying that although post 116 gave me the impression of the other way.

Anyways, I hold on the idea of "regime change being 1st priority" as the thought goes this line (IMO) in this order:
  1. US (Bush junior) lable three "evil" states: Iraq, Iran and NK and vowed regime change.
  2. NK is understandbaly scared, so choose the only workable defense: the nuke.
  3. Invasion of Irak and killing of Saddam proved to NK that US is serious about regime change. Without a nuke, Saddam is dead, with a nuke he may have survived.
  4. US use the nuke as an evidence and argument for regime change further.
Now it becomes the question of egg and chicken, which one came first. But we did not hear NK nuke as an issue (that attracted so much attention) back before the early 1980s that was before Bush's "three evil states" theory.

So whether regime change or nuke being the 1st priority is only a question that only US can answer or choose, but not convincing to others' ear, surely not Kim's ears, and probably not Chinese ears either.
The reason I don't rank regime change as a first priority is because unlike denuclearization regime change is not as essential to US interests. It's a "want", not a "need". While the US could be considered instigators who motivated NK's lurch towards nuclearization (the other side will of course argue the US's posture is a necessary answer to NK's threat toward SK, and the counterpoint for that would be SK's threat toward NK—given that both sides were, at the start of NK's nuclear program, still looking at the reunification along their own terms. Nonetheless, I think it's fair to say in subsequent years NK has been more obstinate over forceful reunification than SK), that instigation stems more from an ambition than a necessity. I do think the US could be faulted for entrapping itself with triumphalist objectives defined around Cold War logic, but with three decades behind us now one wonders what the US has to gain with NK regime change beyond a largely immaterial symbolic or ideological victory that will undoubtably come riddled with significant material and strategic costs.

The solution to the Korean problem is reunification. That would solve the nuclear problem too. But the prime condition for reunification as far as China is concerned is the removal of US forces and that is unacceptable to US because they wants their forces as close to China as possible. So how do you build the necessary trust for whatever in these circumstances.
There are a number of possible noncombative solutions to the Korea situation. They all require the US to compromise something though (though even the combative solutions will probably entail a considerable measure of costs).
 
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Gloire_bb

Captain
Registered Member
Anyways, I hold on the idea of "regime change being 1st priority" as the thought goes this line (IMO) in this order:
  1. US (Bush junior) lable three "evil" states: Iraq, Iran and NK and vowed regime change.

As I see it:

There was a proposed nuclear deal back in late Clinton term, between North Korea and the United States.
North Koreans were rather willing to, since w/o Soviet Union, their prospectives were grim: Iraq has shown, just what true superpower can do if left unchecked.
But after rather shameful end of this term, it crumbled: Bush administration decided to walk away entirely, returning to kind of Cold War mindset "there is one Korea to talk with. Not yours."

Partially it was "new president" thing, partially based on assumption what North will just fall(Eastern block collapse wasn't that far in memory back then).
In any case, massive hunger was still recent memory, NK could actually be seen as crumbling, why talk&spend money on something, what you can just push down further?
This point probably was significantly influenced by South Korean intel&political community.

Thus we come to "axis of evil" policy. North was seen as something which will croumble by itself, even w/o any investement. This policy was half-assed for a long time, but stance toughened with time.

Problem is, North Korea actually survived.
And nuclear program was maintained by King Jong-il, as a way to force americans back to the table.
Contest of thickheads wasn't won by anyone in time, and NK just got Nuke.
Then came notorious detoriation of relationship between Koreas, which never was anything better than awful, but 2000s saw stream of economic cooperation. at least. Old Southern policies of "no backdoor for northern elites" were restated.
Here comes yong King Jong-Un, who(as i see it) decided in this situation to just go all in:
best way to get what they wish for(actual deal) isn't nuclear development, in threat of which few actually believed, but fact of stable and able nuclear triad, Carribean style: force your opponent to the table, whenever he wants it or not.

Backside of such plan - it's as provocative as possible, and provocative against opponent who's very capable of bringing Korea down. Plus, well, it's hard to implement, and is inherently dangerous to others(State which can't create truly stable and survivable command link is bound to create backup options. Basically it means to delegate launch permission to lower command levels under certain conditions).
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
If that were the case the US (or any other democracy) wouldn't be able to sustain so many security parternships and alliances, which has clearly not been the case.

American strategists, more than anyone, understands the fickle nature of democracies, which is why they have mounted so many coups world wide.

To accept the 'largess' of US military protection is a double edged sword in that you also need to allow the US to base military personnel on your soil, as well as give their intelligence people effective free rein to do as they like in your territory.

It is a shackle as much as a shield.

The moment anyone steps out of line of what the US wants them to do is the moment they find themselves on the receiving end of the full might of the US state subversion machine.

It will start with the unleashing of US controlled western media attack dogs, which are usually enough to cripple candidates in democracies.

If that fails, you can quickly find US proxy foot soldiers out in force protesting. With social media bots whipping up popular anger with fake news and faker outrage until the whole thing becomes a self-sustaining rage machine.

If you are strong, patient and smart, you can weather that out by exhausting the western foot soldiers and wait for populate oppinion to turn against them (Hong Kong occupy).

If your government is not united, someone might cave and either mount a soft coup and remove the person the US find most offensive (Egypt); or a hard coup to put someone acceptable to the US in charge if elections failed to do that (Egypt again under Sisi).

If your government is strong by the US intelligence machine has a strong presence on the ground in your country. They may well 'help' things along by escalating the violence to force loyalists to turn against their leaders (Ukraine).

If the US doesn't have the field presence to effect regime change by stealth. They can either use radicals to attack the security forces and then use any resulting crack down as a lever to push a country into full blown civil war (Libyia and Syria). And/or use same said radicals to launch false flag operations to create a pretext for them to enter the conflict directly (Libya and Syria).

If you think these underhanded tactics are only used on 'enemies', you only need to look to Turkey, a full fledged NATO member to see how wrong that assumption would be.

I have little doubt that if a South Korean president was seriously considering ditching the US and wanted to host Chinese military bases instead, he/she would either fall from an US black site launched 'popular' protest movement, or find South Korean troops and tanks smashing down his/her door.

The US does not have security 'partnerships' (the sole exception may be Israel, but that's a very special case), it has countries it is still effectively occupying militarily (Germany, Japan and South Korea) and it has protectorates (the rest of NATO).

It tries to play nice and make everyone choose to side with the US by their own free choice, but is ready, able and willing to use any and all of the methods above and more to 'set straight' any leader or supposedly allied 'partner' who dares to do anything that would significantly threaten US interests and plans.

That is the real gaurantee holding US alliances together. And everyone knows it to a certain extent, even if subconsciously.

Many a times, I have heard interviews where former senior British military and political leaders have plainly stated that when the Americans go into full superpower hulk mode, they know they need to either get onboard or get the hell out of the way.

That is not a relationship of partners, but rather of master and pet. And that's the only kind of relationship the US would tolerate with its allies.
 
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