China's strategy in Korean peninsula

delft said:

The solution to the Korean problem is reunification. That would solve the nuclear problem too. But the prime condition for reunification as far as China is concerned is the removal of US forces and that is unacceptable to US because they wants their forces as close to China as possible. So how do you build the necessary trust for whatever in these circumstances.

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There are a number of possible noncombative solutions to the Korea situation. They all require the US to compromise something though.

plawolf said:

American strategists, more than anyone, understands the fickle nature of democracies, which is why they have mounted so many coups world wide.

To accept the 'largess' of US military protection is a double edged sword in that you also need to allow the US to base military personnel on your soil, as well as give their intelligence people effective free rein to do as they like in your territory.

It is a shackle as much as a shield.

The moment anyone steps out of line of what the US wants them to do is the moment they find themselves on the receiving end of the full might of the US state subversion machine.

It will start with the unleashing of US controlled western media attack dogs, which are usually enough to cripple candidates in democracies.

If that fails, you can quickly find US proxy foot soldiers out in force protesting. With social media bots whipping up popular anger with fake news and faker outrage until the whole thing becomes a self-sustaining rage machine.

If you are strong, patient and smart, you can weather that out by exhausting the western foot soldiers and wait for populate oppinion to turn against them (Hong Kong occupy).

If your government is not united, someone might cave and either mount a soft coup and remove the person the US find most offensive (Egypt); or a hard coup to put someone acceptable to the US in charge if elections failed to do that (Egypt again under Sisi).

If your government is strong by the US intelligence machine has a strong presence on the ground in your country. They may well 'help' things along by escalating the violence to force loyalists to turn against their leaders (Ukraine).

If the US doesn't have the field presence to effect regime change by stealth. They can either use radicals to attack the security forces and then use any resulting crack down as a lever to push a country into full blown civil war (Libyia and Syria). And/or use same said radicals to launch false flag operations to create a pretext for them to enter the conflict directly (Libya and Syria).

If you think these underhanded tactics are only used on 'enemies', you only need to look to Turkey, a full fledged NATO member to see how wrong that assumption would be.

I have little doubt that if a South Korean president was seriously considering ditching the US and wanted to host Chinese military bases instead, he/she would either fall from an US black site launched 'popular' protest movement, or find South Korean troops and tanks smashing down his/her door.

The US does not have security 'partnerships' (the sole exception may be Israel, but that's a very special case), it has countries it is still effectively occupying militarily (Germany, Japan and South Korea) and it has protectorates (the rest of NATO).

It tries to play nice and make everyone choose to side with the US by their own free choice, but is ready, able and willing to use any and all of the methods above and more to 'set straight' any leader or supposedly allied 'partner' who dares to do anything that would significantly threaten US interests and plans.

That is the real gaurantee holding US alliances together. And everyone knows it to a certain extent, even if subconsciously.

Many a times, I have heard interviews where former senior British military and political leaders have plainly stated that when the Americans go into full superpower hulk mode, they know they need to either get onboard or get the hell out of the way.

That is not a relationship of partners, but rather of master and pet. And that's the only kind of relationship the US would tolerate with its allies.

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The problem with your argument, as I mentioned earlier, is that it's not essential to democracies. It applies to all nation states, and if we take them to their reductive conclusions there's no point for countries to make agreements.

Summary of some other posts I've made. It's a bit of a rush job given the urgency, but it should cover all pertinent points.

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China's course of action very much depends on what the US does, and if they trigger a war between South Korea and North Korea.

But China should make it clear to Fatty Kim that no matter what happens, he and his family always have the option of a quick exit to China and a comfortable exile. It keeps China from being targeted by North Korean nukes and Kim firing off his nukes in desperation at Korea/Japan/USA.

China has publicly promised to support Kim if he freezes the nuclear programme. Since he already has nukes, it is simply unrealistic for him to give up what he already has, so the best scenario is if the nuclear/missile programme is frozen (like Iran) and North Korea's nuclear arsenal remains at its current limited size.

That limited arsenal still comprises 20-odd warheads with the range to reach Korea, Japan and Hawaii - which should be sufficient to deter and be sufficient comfort to Kim.

But if Kim doesn't agree to freezing the programme, I fear that Trump would be willing to unilaterally trigger a full-scale war between North and South Korea, knowing that the vast bulk of the fighting and suffering will be borne by the Koreans, then by China/Japan, rather than by the USA.

It may well be better to remove North Korea now, rather than wait until North Korea has ICBMs that can reach Los Angeles.

And once the fighting starts, he knows South Korea has no choice but to finish North Korea off.

As for China, well, North Korea has ignored China's offer of protection/support in exchange for a freeze of their nuclear programme.

So if North Korea and South Korea start fighting, I think China should decline to intervene, but if Kim starts offering his full cooperation, China should offer support to keep him in control and maintain order or offer a comfortable exile in China.

Eventually we'll get to a scenario where China sends the army into North Korea (with minimal opposition in the event of securing Kim's approval or in a NK collapse) to:

a) create a buffer zone
b) secure nuclear materials from an accident
c) provide humanitarian relief efforts

Then China simply offers a deal to South Korea. China will remove its soldiers and support the reunification of the Korean peninsula if:

a) Korea becomes neutral, the US-ROK security alliance is terminated and all US troops leave Korea.
b) China will fund the reconstruction of North Korea. China easily has the spare financial and industrial capacity to do this, whilst a fully intact South Korea does not.
c) China will also fund the reconstruction of Seoul which contains half the population and industry of South Korea, but was devastated by North Korea's 11,000 artillery pieces and rocket launchers. But if North Korea has used nukes or chemical weapons, the 20million+ people in Seoul may no longer be alive.

Otherwise Chinese troops will occupy a North Korean buffer zone indefinitely in the name of maintaining order and humanitarian purposes.

And the only way they will leave involuntarily is if the entire Chinese army is defeated in a war, which is not going to happen given US reluctance to go to war with China and a South Korea which is likely to be already hugely traumatised.

Thus the termination of the US-ROK security alliance becomes a choice for Korea rather than abandonment by the USA. Based on previous comments, Trump would probably welcome the return of US troops from Korea and the possibility of fighting a land war against China.

It's very difficult to imagine South Korea choosing to maintain the US alliance in such a situation, as it means the reunification of Korea doesn't happen and Korea can't afford to rebuild by itself anyway. Plus a hostile China would surely be waging economic warfare against South Korea and actively supporting North Korean elements in sabotaging reunification efforts.

In the aftermath, reconstruction of North Korea is going to take at least a decade, and in that time, one would hope South Korea and China develop better relations during reconstruction.

Remember that at a growth rate of 6.5%, in 11 years, the Chinese economy (and presumably influence) will be twice what it is today.

Given how the South Korean economy is already so intertwined with that of a much larger China - China has a lot of economic leverage if required. It will be very difficult for South Korea to avoid falling into China's economic orbit, particularly since Korea and Dongbei are close enough to form a single economic zone with a huge increase in overland trade and movement. From Seoul to Shenyang, it is only 2 hours on a high speed train or 4hours for a truck from factory to a shop.

And if a unified Korea leans towards China, we can expect Korean companies to be treated more favourably in China. Even before the THAAD disagreement, the South Korean electric battery companies were lumped together with the Japanese as targets for Chinese industrial policy as an example. And remember that South Korea and Japan are fierce commercial competitors, so the Korean companies would relish any advantage over their Japanese rivals.

And yes, there is still a risk that a unified Korea may turn to the US in the future, but remember what happened the last time South Korea had a security alliance with the USA.

The Trump administration launched an attack on North Korea (over South Korean protests), and entrapped South Korea into an unwanted war with North Korea.

In the future, suppose China and the USA end up in conflict over Taiwan, the South China Sea or the East China Sea with Japan? Will Korea be trapped into fighting an unwanted war on America's behalf?

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Some also argue that it is in China's interest to back North Korea fully, but this is most definitely the wrong course of action.

Kim allowing the Chinese army into North Korea means he accepts Chinese control over him, which is completely at odds with the assassination of his brother who was under Chinese protection. And why has North Korea been adamant about obtaining nukes? To prevent anyone dictating regime change or control over North Korea and the Kim dynasty.

So he will only invite in China once he feels he has no choice.

But let's run with the scenario where China backs North Korea to the utmost, and sends in the Chinese army with Kim's consent. This means Kim now has the opportunity of a lifetime to deliberately start a war and have Chinese soldiers dying (instead of North Korean soldiers) to conquer South Korea. I think he would almost certainly take this opportunity, given his previous actions.

And a Korea unified under the control of Kim is far more dangerous, unpredictable and poorer than if South Korea was in charge.

Plus China will end up in a war with the USA which is not in China's interest, as it may very well turn nuclear and will certainly derail China's economic plans.

Remember that at a growth rate of 6.5%, in 11 years, the Chinese economy will be twice what it is today and should be reflected in wages for the peasantry.

So at the end of the day, what is the best course of action for the people living in China, North Korea and South Korea?

latenlazy said:

The problem with your argument, as I mentioned earlier, is that it's not essential to democracies. It applies to all nation states, and if we take them to their reductive conclusions there's no point for countries to make agreements.

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This is true. Turkey, which is technically a democracy but in practice a fairly authoritarian dictatorship, reneges on various deals and agreements made with Russia/Iran/Syria over the course of the Syrian war.

I think plawolf's point is that democracies codify this volatility. Almost by definition, the governments of democracies will change every few years or so. If the incoming administration is from an opposing political group, they may have deep disagreements about any foreign-policy agreements signed by their predecessors, and may even have made it a part of their campaign. If they won the election, they will have a strong argument for reneging on the agreements as a duty to their voters.

With authoritarian governments, the next administration is seen as essentially the direct descendant of the previous. The tendency then is for the new administration to follow-on on previously made deals, agreements, policy. Not doing so suggests a huge rift in opinion within the governmental structure that has spilled into the public scene; but it is my view that this is relatively rare, and that it's always easier to get a small group of people to compromise on something as opposed to a whole nation.

Ultimately, the way I see it is that only the track record is important. Most else is semantics.

Regarding the Trump administration and North, South Korea:

Before the missile strike on Syria, I would have ignored Trump's tweets and speeches as typical grandstanding for an American audience, but now there exists a small possibility that the White House will impulsively order a similar strike on North Korea, and that the strike will spiral into a larger war between the two Koreas.

It is worth noting that the Chinese-North Korean border regions are mountainous; in the case of a war, this may help to slow down a refugee flow. Nonetheless, refugees will go over the border in some numbers; my guess is that they will be handled similarly to how Myanmese refugees are handled in Yunnan province right now, i.e. tent cities under Chinese martial law on Chinese territory.

I just don't see China getting overtly involved in this war; a lot to lose, not much to gain. North Korea may get weapons and ammo delivery, medical supplies, etc over land routes; but I think China will only send in the armies if the American/SK forces advance hugely into NK territory like in 1950s.

N00813 said:

This is true. Turkey, which is technically a democracy but in practice a fairly authoritarian dictatorship, reneges on various deals and agreements made with Russia/Iran/Syria over the course of the Syrian war.

I think plawolf's point is that democracies codify this volatility. Almost by definition, the governments of democracies will change every few years or so. If the incoming administration is from an opposing political group, they may have deep disagreements about any foreign-policy agreements signed by their predecessors, and may even have made it a part of their campaign. If they won the election, they will have a strong argument for reneging on the agreements as a duty to their voters.

With authoritarian governments, the next administration is seen as essentially the direct descendant of the previous. The tendency then is for the new administration to follow-on on previously made deals, agreements, policy. Not doing so suggests a huge rift in opinion within the governmental structure that has spilled into the public scene; but it is my view that this is relatively rare, and that it's always easier to get a small group of people to compromise on something as opposed to a whole nation.

Ultimately, the way I see it is that only the track record is important. Most else is semantics.

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On the surface I get the point about codification, but historically speaking democracies have been no more or less likely to renege on agreements, and this is for a reason. Whether countries shift on prior agreements have less to do with changing ruling parties and heads of states and more to do with changing interests. There are always costs to backing out of agreements, and democratic countries, just like authoritarian ones, are ruled by the logic of signal credibility. Regardless of regime type, countries shift out agreements primarily when the cost of following them outweigh the harm to their credibility.

latenlazy said:

THAAD was in part a result of China not being able to deliver more on NK. Assuming that it's also not a sign that we are quickly approaching an endgame with the NK situation, it won't necessarily have long term implications for the China-SK relationship. The decision over the US military in SK actually rests with SK. The US military is only allowed there under SK's consent, but the US will continue to have that consent so long as NK is a danger.

China is for sure bereft of a viable strategy that won't incur major penalties given their diminished influence on NK, but that can be said of pretty much everyone locked in this tussle now, except NK and maybe Japan.

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Technically, of course, but the same could be said with east Germany -- does anyone really believe that DDR leadership could ask the soviets to leave, with any success?

Look at the history of South Korea, two dictators step down under immerse U.S. pressure, one dictator murdered by an American agent, one democratically elected president heavily smeared by U.S.-backed conservatives and died under most mysterious circumstances. Even the Park scandal is viewed by many Koreans as a deal between the Americans and the Anti-Park opposition. Washington pulls the string and Seoul is in turmoil - it has been so for more than 60 years. I can’t see how South Korea could voluntarily leave the American sphere of influence, unless Washington itself is wavering or there is a regime change in Seoul.

The point is not democracy vs. Authoritarian government. It’s the fact that the Seoul regime was never fully independence from Washington. The most anti-America government in its history, the Roh administration, experienced five years of domestic turmoil (including a near-impeachment) and met a fairly miserable end. Park was not even anti-America (despite been pro-china) and we all know what happen to her.

schlieffen said:

The point is not democracy vs. Authoritarian government. It’s the fact that the Seoul regime was never fully independence from Washington. The most anti-America government in its history, the Roh administration, experienced five years of domestic turmoil (including a near-impeachment) and met a fairly miserable end. Park was not even anti-America (despite been pro-china) and we all know what happen to her.

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The Korean right and the Korean left both juggle between China and the US in their own ways, but the point is sustained US influence in SK is not the foregone conclusion if NK is either neutralized as a security threat or ceases to exist. SK is being pulled into China's gravity over time. China is already far more influential in SK today than it was even a decade ago. The US maintains its influence in SK due to a mix of legacy and security ties. Remove the necessity of the security ties, which is almost entirely defined around NK, and you get a very different picture.

plawolf said:

The moment anyone steps out of line of what the US wants them to do is the moment they find themselves on the receiving end of the full might of the US state subversion machine.

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The UK told the US to bugger off a couple of years ago when it wanted the UK to do more in Syria.

Can Downing street expect American tanks rumbling to it's doorstep?

The French and Germans regularly tell the American's they are not interested... can they expect similar?

Your statement is patently false.

You trust someone when you believe that the person is convinced that working with you is to his advantage. SK trusts the U.S. because they believe that the Americans are convinced that helping SK is to the Americans advantage. They'll trust China when it's in China's best interest to help SK, such as when Kim's regime falls and China has incentives to keep the peninsula stable, keep the refugees south the border, export its excess industrial capacity and expertise, all in exchange for the Americans to leave the peninsula.