China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[Kalec]

That being said, all three Uranium Centrifuge Facilities are expanding their production lines again between 2021 and 2022. I haven't got the time to write a detailed list of them yet. Too busy recently.

30 minutes' work based on the chart from "China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?"

China has approximately 10.85 Million SWU by now, will increase to 13.65M once current expansion complete in next few years.

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[antiterror13]

30 minutes' work based on the chart from "China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?"

China has approximately 10.85 Million SWU by now, will increase to 13.65M once current expansion complete in next few years.
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Thanks @Kalec ... in layman term, what "10.85 Million SWU" would translate of producing WgPu and HEU in tons per year? please educate us

 

[Kalec]

Thanks @Kalec ... in layman term, what "10.85 Million SWU" would translate of producing WgPu and HEU in tons per year? please educate us

Honestly I don't think it has that much to do with warhead production. Nuclear warhead only needs HEU as part of sparkplug or tamper over the secondary, around 10-20kg per warhead.

1 Kg of 90% HEU needs 227 SWU from centrifuge and you could do the math on how many percent of total SWU could be military purpose. Even if they only use 1% of centrifuge to produce military HEU, they can still get around 500kg of HEU per year, well enough to produce 25-50 of advanced warheads annually.

As for plutonium, it becomes more complicated than it seems to be. Plant 404 has been expanding their old production site for about five years and no one ever knows what they are doing out here.

Based on my assumption, Plant 404 resumed production of plutonium as early as this year at half capacity of 150kg/year and add more 10kg/yr gradually until the maximum production rate of 300kg/yr.

Jinta has three reprocessing plants, each capable of producing 100kg/yr. They also started with half capacity of 50kg/yr and 10kg more per year. Stage 1 will start in 2023, Stage 2 in 2027 and Stage 3 in 2030.

Cumulative stockpile could reach 1.24t by 2027, 2.4t by 2030, 5t by 2035 and 8t by 2040. Each warhead need about 1.5kg-3kg with different design. Therefore the chart below

	2027	2030	2035	2040
New WgPu stockpile	1240kg	2400kg	4990kg	7960kg
New warhead capacity	620	1200	2500	3980

The highlighted area are the parts containing HEU in the picture below.

 

[nativechicken]

Thanks @Kalec ... in layman term, what "10.85 Million SWU" would translate of producing WgPu and HEU in tons per year? please educate us

The Chinese materials I posted have descriptions
The production capacity of 90% HEU per thousand tons of SWU is 4.41-5.9 tons, depending on the specific operation plan.
China currently has a production capacity of over 10000 tons of SWU (similar to France and half of Russia).
The total production capacity is approximately 44.1-59 tons of HEU per year. Production of HEU at 1% capacity is approximately 500kg.

 

[antiterror13]

The Chinese materials I posted have descriptions
The production capacity of 90% HEU per thousand tons of SWU is 4.41-5.9 tons, depending on the specific operation plan.
China currently has a production capacity of over 10000 tons of SWU (similar to France and half of Russia).
The total production capacity is approximately 44.1-59 tons of HEU per year. Production of HEU at 1% capacity is approximately 500kg.

Thanks @nativechicken and @Kalec

It seems China has enough HEU and WgPu, well at least not a limiting factor. Is there any limiting factor for China in regard to boost the warheads? e.g. Deuterium or Tritium ?

I know that Chinese warhead design is already very advanced, similar to W88 or even better

 

[Biscuits]

Thanks @nativechicken and @Kalec

It seems China has enough HEU and WgPu, well at least not a limiting factor. Is there any limiting factor for China in regard to boost the warheads? e.g. Deuterium or Tritium ?

I know that Chinese warhead design is already very advanced, similar to W88 or even better

Feels like large swathes of attention are being out on conventional weapons, as they have way more practical use.

Nukes are only as good as their delivery platforms. As long as China cannot destroy most of enemy nukes in a short time, building more nukes will not give China any new capabilities, nuclear exchange would still result in MAD.

Currently, China would likely only be able to escape nuclear war mostly intact vs low tier nuclear powers. The gulf in warhead levels and delivery between the low tiers like say India compared to the big 3 is insanely huge, it's unlikely that without major leapfrog advances, China would be able to construct new nukes/ICBM systems which can pressure Washington.

 

[james smith esq]

[...]

Nukes are only as good as their delivery platforms. As long as China cannot destroy most of enemy nukes in a short time, building more nukes will not give China any new capabilities, nuclear exchange would still result in MAD.

Currently, China would likely only be able to escape nuclear war mostly intact vs low tier nuclear powers. The gulf in warhead levels and delivery between the low tiers like say India compared to the big 3 is insanely huge, it's unlikely that without major leapfrog advances, China would be able to construct new nukes/ICBM systems which can pressure Washington.

However, China must achieve a MAD level of deterrence; absent this, the U.S. will always assume that a first-strike could be a successful strategy option. They, certainly, have drawn-up plans for a “decapitation-strike” on CPC/PLA leadership!

 

[Biscuits]

However, China must achieve a MAD level of deterrence; absent this, the U.S. will always assume that a first-strike could be a successful strategy option. They, certainly, have drawn-up plans for a “decapitation-strike” on CPC/PLA leadership!

Everyone (that has a large number of ICBM) draw up these scenarios. Likely at least a medium if not a big amount of plans for decapitating Washington lying around somewhere in Beijing.

But without much faster weapons, much better interceptors, just unrealistic doomsday scenarios.

Not that China isn't putting huge effort into this. Fractional orbital bombardment tests are a good start, going forward, China will hopefully move more towards militarizing space, securing high ground for both nuclear and conventional projects.

 

[james smith esq]

Everyone (that has a large number of ICBM) draw up these scenarios. Likely at least a medium if not a big amount of plans for decapitating Washington lying around somewhere in Beijing.

But without much faster weapons, much better interceptors, just unrealistic doomsday scenarios.

Not that China isn't putting huge effort into this. Fractional orbital bombardment tests are a good start, going forward, China will hopefully move more towards militarizing space, securing high ground for both nuclear and conventional projects.

However, China had a no-first-strike policy, no?
Additionally, a decapitation strike would, most-likely, be carried-out by SLBMs.

 

[Biscuits]

However, China had a no-first-strike policy, no?
Additionally, a decapitation strike would, most-likely, be carried-out by SLBMs.

I mean what would the survivors do? Go to the people's supreme court and sue the PLA on the basis of no first use?

In practice, the only (but very important!) purpose of no first use is to make sure that if you're on Guam and see a bunch of ballistic missiles incoming, you know youre fucked because they're not tactical nukes, and nobody will avenge your passing with MAD.

Besides China has a clause that says they can nuke just based on the suspicion that someone is planning to use WMDs, including chemical weapons or even attacks on civilian centers.

A weapon with hangtime in space would be a more ideal first strike weapon, because it has a little bit of plausible deniability, and it gives almost 0 reaction time.

China is not investing much into SSBN because the budget is stretched thin as it is. And outside of hypotheticals, it would never really come down to nuclear exchanges. But I guess more SSBN and other stuff are coming, for the future generations when nuclear warfare might swing towards winnable.