Salted bomb is not dirty bomb.AFAIK, no country has ever seriously treated such a weapon. That’s about terrorism.
The russian "Poseidon" is a salted bomb.
Salted bomb is a nuclear device with enhanced fallouts
Salted bomb is not dirty bomb.AFAIK, no country has ever seriously treated such a weapon. That’s about terrorism.
I mean no country seriously treats any radiological dispersal device/weapon, if you prefer this name. In my memory there’s no test for such devices with or without criticality in any country (and in Russia). Perhaps you are talking about Burevestnik rather than Poseidon? It’s designed as an vehicle and fallout is just by-effect.Salted bomb is not dirty bomb.
The russian "Poseidon" is a salted bomb.
Salted bomb is a nuclear device with enhanced fallouts
I doubt they know much at all, in both signal and human intelligence, China should have a sizeable edge, and the nuclear program is something China is very very secretive about.Lol absolute state of shitshow here.
The September report told us that "a document describing a foreign government’s military defenses, including its nuclear capabilities, was found by FBI agents who searched former president Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence."
Now we can be 99% sure that it is related to China.
Meanwhile the DIA 2020 China report says "Over the next decade, China’s nuclear warhead stockpile—currently estimated to be in the low- 200s—is projected to at least double in size as China expands and modernizes its nuclear forces."
I wonder how much they actually knew about Chinese nuclear program because the report in same year made a fool of itself after the massive buildup began next year. Not to mention China is estimated to already have 350 deliverable warheads in 2021.
U.S. public report on Chinese nuclear weapon has been so inaccurate throughout the entire history that it failed to predict the actual size of Chinese nukes every single time, either too high or too low.
IIRC some had talked about using Gold isotope as a salted device and of course a cobalt enhanced device is real although from what I recall of all things from movie"Beneath the planet of the apes" where the mutants were worshipping a huge US super cobalt enhanced "Alpha Doom device-hated monkeys ever since.But I've always hated the idea of demated separated warheads as it just reduces one's readiness for a surprise attack although I'm sure PLA's planners have taken this in account.I mean no country seriously treats any radiological dispersal device/weapon, if you prefer this name. In my memory there’s no test for such devices with or without criticality in any country (and in Russia). Perhaps you are talking about Burevestnik rather than Poseidon? It’s designed as an vehicle and fallout is just by-effect.
Civilian reactor plutonium cannot be made weapons grade with chemical separation because of contamination with Pu-240 (which occurs when Pu-239 absorbs a neutron as is likely to happen if the fuel spends a long time exposed to neutrons as it is in a civilian reactor). Pu-240 is a problem for several reasons - it has a high rate of spontaneous fission which prematurely detonates the bomb, its decay products damage the bomb, and it produces a lot of heat.
All of these issues can be worked around. The premature detonation can be mitigated by clever implosion designs, the bomb can be cooled and the pit replaced more frequently. However, all of this increases maintenance costs and reduces reliability and readiness. Nobody who has a choice in the matter would use reactor grade plutonium to make weapons.
It should be possible to purify reactor grade plutonium to weapons grade using laser isotope separation. Unfortunately, there's very little publicly accessible about this topic, and what little information there is discusses it in the context of uranium enrichment. The predominant isotope separation technology, centrifugation, isn't used with plutonium because the mass difference between Pu-239 and Pu-240 is too small (in comparison to U-235 and U-238).
Yes. In China's case this was done in Plant 404 at Jiuquan. There's been some activity there and at a nearby industrial park
The reprocessing facilities are being expanded; however, the reactor itself remains idle.
I expect that what China is doing in expanding its nuclear arsenal is sequencing construction such that the most unambiguous (and thus most provocative) actions are done last. For example, expanding plutonium reprocessing facilities is necessary and has dual civilian/military use (so China can bullshit about it), therefore it's done first. However, refurbishing a graphite moderated production reactor very clearly telegraphs one's intent, so China would do this near the end.
I appreciated their work on de-mystifing PLARF structure, saving many time to check designation code every time. What they wrote on prospect is completely wrong: the silo number is outdated, still shell game cliche and one base per silo field.I doubt they know much at all, in both signal and human intelligence, China should have a sizeable edge, and the nuclear program is something China is very very secretive about.
Beijing's nuclear posture, including public lowball statements on how many nukes are "active", should be considered mainly political theater vis a vis local nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan, to discourage a warhead numbers arms race that could erode Chinese missile defense advantages.
It is not hard for China to keep a huge number of warheads separated from the launch vehicles and/or partially dissembled.
The question of how many nukes is not as important as how advanced the nukes are. A few dozen airburst HGVs on FOBS can strike almost without warning and create an EMP that knocks out electricity over a whole continent, while China cannot be immediately pinned as the culprit.
Pushing the response time to the shortest possible while increasing missile defense at home is what I predict the new modernization term means. That means not necessarily any new nukes, although more nukes may be taken out of mothball to be added to the active count.
I don't see any evidence that China has more WGPu than when it stopped production in the '90s. It's difficult to produce Pu in secret since reactors require cooling and that's generally conspicuous. However, that doesn't exclude other routes like purchasing it from Russia or laser isotope separation of civilian reactor waste. In addition, Pu is not strictly required for a viable bomb. Pu is used in one small part of the bomb (the primary stage) and a small quantity is used (2kg); it's replaceable by U-235 or composite uranium/plutonium cores.Thank you. Do you think China now has more PU-239 weapon grade than let's say 10yrs ago? if the case, by how much based on your estimate
I am wondering that it seems China is expanding ICBM fleets quite aggressively but there is no credible news about expanding the number of nukes