Agree. Meanwhile early warning satellites and radars are also expensive, e.g. a single Cobra Dane radar cost ~$300M.
China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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I am fully aware that document is from that time frame, seeing as how it quite explicitly gives a decade. I am literate, after all. Though, I can understand why this might seem like an impressive achievement through your eyes. In no way shape or form did that document imply or state anything about employment platforms and their roles in nuclear first strikes. All it stated was that the minimum munition quantity attack option was comprised of 25-2600 weapons, and ran down a handful of traits inherent to that attack option.
I would first like you to offer a reasonable counterargument to the notion that US SLBMs do not deliver the majority of employed yield in a first-strike attack profile, due to their inherent lack of fires depth (despite excellent bandwidth and other favorable platform traits); but are instead utilized in a "kicking down the door" role to destroy, disable, or otherwise degrade the capability of the USSR to withstand the larger "volume" of munitions that are on their way courtesy of SAC and land-based delivery platforms. SSBNs pack a hell of a punch in any attack profile, but their most salient advantage is that they can generate prompt, effective fires and employ them against many targets while utilizing launch profiles and ingress axes that can seriously hamper adversary early warning and detection of the systems. And, it can do all of this without an adversary knowing of their presence beforehand.
Thus, it has been (for some time) intended to be employed in that manner if a first-strike attack profile were to be executed, since all of its advantages lend well towards such an employment concept; and the drawbacks it possesses are not nearly so magnified in that kind of role.
But hey, who knows, maybe a single paper from the 70s saying you'd need 25-2600 weapons to conduct a reasonable nuclear strike campaign on the USSR, with no further data, somehow implies that SSBNs totally actually supply the majority of fires and strike the majority of targets despite there being exactly no universe in which even half of that number of weapons would have been remotely possible to employ via SSBNs at any point in the history of nuclear submarines, and maybe the fact that strategic aviation has a jaw-dropping advantage in depth of fires - if not bandwidth - doesn't lend any credence whatsoever to the notion that they would make up an equal or larger portion of the total yield delivered in a strategic nuclear weapon employment campaign.
But I doubt it. So does everyone else who studies escalation dynamics, tactical and operational force employment, and operational strike warfare. Oh, and these guys: (you might know em
)I have to point it out again that SIOP-64 mentioned, although without specific weapon names, 'survivable force' would be used for 2nd strike and 'accurate and rapid reaction force' would be used in 1st strike. Or SIOP-62, please teach me if I'm wrong.
Anyway, silos are way off 'survivable force' and SLBM is way off 'accurate and rapid'(compared with silos.)
All that is about guess but we can always choose better assumptions. Firstly let's fix on 1970s. I mentioned SIOP-64 and NSDM, of course you can always hold your own assumption but there's no evidence for me, anyway it's all about guess so just believe what you believe.All it stated was that the minimum munition quantity attack option was comprised of 25-2600 weapons, and ran down a handful of traits inherent to that attack option.
I would first like you to offer a reasonable counterargument to the notion that US SLBMs do not deliver the majority of employed yield in a first-strike attack profile, due to their inherent lack of fires depth (despite excellent bandwidth and other favorable platform traits); but are instead utilized in a "kicking down the door" role to destroy, disable, or otherwise degrade the capability of the USSR to withstand the larger "volume" of munitions that are on their way courtesy of SAC and land-based delivery platforms. SSBNs pack a hell of a punch in any attack profile, but their most salient advantage is that they can generate prompt, effective fires and employ them against many targets while utilizing launch profiles and ingress axes that can seriously hamper adversary early warning and detection of the systems. And, it can do all of this without an adversary knowing of their presence beforehand.
Thus, it has been (for some time) intended to be employed in that manner if a first-strike attack profile were to be executed, since all of its advantages lend well towards such an employment concept; and the drawbacks it possesses are not nearly so magnified in that kind of role.
But hey, who knows, maybe a single paper from the 70s saying you'd need 25-2600 weapons to conduct a reasonable nuclear strike campaign on the USSR, with no further data, somehow implies that SSBNs totally actually supply the majority of fires and strike the majority of targets despite there being exactly no universe in which even half of that number of weapons would have been remotely possible to employ via SSBNs at any point in the history of nuclear submarines, and maybe the fact that strategic aviation has a jaw-dropping advantage in depth of fires - if not bandwidth - doesn't lend any credence whatsoever to the notion that they would make up an equal or larger portion of the total yield delivered in a strategic nuclear weapon employment campaign.
But I doubt it. So does everyone else who studies escalation dynamics, tactical and operational force employment, and operational strike warfare. Oh, and these guys: (you might know em
Now we are in 2020, and US silos only contain ~400 warheads while most warheads are deployed in SLBMs. How is it possible that "land based ICBMs contribute much of the sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo"(your own words)?
Last but not least, how those stories can be linked with B-21 and LRSO?
Yes, I am aware that within SIOP-64 there is mention of the need to employ "survivable" forces in second strike operations and to possess "rapid reaction" nuclear delivery mechanisms to conduct prompt counterforce/damage-mitigation. This, however, is much less of a feature of the overall disposition and weaponeering methodology and is FAR more to do with political considerations and US strategic deterrence outlook.
Indeed, the US's second strike capability currently is all but singlehandedly placed upon SSBNs, however that isn't what we were discussing. To jump ahead for a second to your point about the B-21 and LRSO, you initially conceived of a scenario in which the US launches a non-"preemptive" (I make distinction because, since you've read SIOP64, you're probably aware that the scenario considered closest to a true first strike while still remaining plausible was a prompt, pre-emptive counterforce attack on an imminently operating Soviet nuclear delivery system; which is meaningfully different from a "true" first-strike in objective and conduct) first strike attack conducted in a manner that had B-21s making first contact with the PLA counter-air complex before any other platforms had been employed. This, simply, is not a reasonable condition to encounter, and I'll get on to why in a moment.
Back to SIOP-64. One of the most fundamental goals of SIOPs post SIOP62 was to establish multiple response options with flexible target sets, force employment schema, delivery platforms, reserve-thresholds, etc. etc. This is mostly due to the original SAC nuclear attack profiles being horrifically wasteful, and being entirely divorced from other services (often resulting in redundant targeting); while being extremely inflexible in their overkill (per the "Massive Retaliation" doctrine lol). Some of these schemes indeed involved around SLBMs providing the brunt of the yield, but these were always as part of piecemeal profiles and not full "strategic, bandwidth to magazine depth" nuclear attack profiles. In the event of a MAO-1 style bandwidth to magazine depth profile, joint planning is more oriented towards employing SLBMs in that "door-kicker" role throughout most of the cold war.
Where you *are* outright wrong is in the statement that no platforms were specified in these SIOPs. There's a fantastic read that I highly recommend, entitled International Security (vol.7 no.4) from 1983 that discusses the overall nature of US nuclear planning and force employment, as well as delving into more depth about the attack profiles during these periods. On page 4, you will find,
"of approximately 1050 Designated Ground Zeros (DGZs) for nuclear weapons, including 151 urban-industrial targets. Given sufficient warning, the United States would launch its entire strategic force carrying 3500 nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the satellite nations. At the very least, an "alert force" composed of 880 bombers and missiles would attack some 650 DGZs (including 170 defense suppression targets) with over 1400 weapons basing a total yield of 2100 megatons."
This, though tacitly, shows the significantly larger utilization of strategic aviation in "volume" target prosecution. For the overwhelming majority of DGZs, strategic aviation was the platform selected to generate effects (due in no small part to the relative "cheap"ness of gravity bombs compared to SL/ICBMs, and the much larger quantities of which are able to be stored). Throughout the cold war as a whole, the ratios of delivery system were far far different than we see today. At its height, SAC wielded more than 700 B-52s and close to 2,000 B-47s, which could deliver 20 and 4 nuclear weapons per airframe respectively. These numbers were necessary to conduct the multi-thousand-munition attack plans that were envisioned, and were by far the optimal platforms for employing the gargantuan nuclear inventory possessed by the US at the time. That is what I mean by SLCMs being responsible, in a full-bandwidth first strike employment scheme, for initial prompt, minimal-warning fires against crucial targets, which then enable cheaper, less penetration-capable platforms (alongside ICBMs and other land based systems, which would also contribute to the initial counter-nuclear and defense suppression/destruction) to leverage their far greater numbers, ability to return to their basing (nominally) and continue to generate strike sorties, employing many thousands of additional warheads, long after SLBM and ICBM silos are empty of their munitions.
While yes, I absolutely do agree that SSBNs contribute a far larger percentage of the total yield to any given nuclear attack profile these days than they did in the past (if simply due to the massively reduced strategic aviation airframe numbers, and the non-MIRV silo'd ICBMs), it is still worth noting that despite being the highest warhead-count in *active* service, there still are a very large number of air-deliverable warheads in storage, as well as a sizable number of silo-launched ICBMs. This, though, can also be attributed largely to the overall reduction in global nuclear threat scale, as well as a shift in thinking away from a nuclear-oriented mentality stereotypically attributed to Cold Warriors.
Thus, this brings us back to your final question. What does this have to do with B-21 and LRSO. Well, in a nutshell, my point is that due to the employment doctrine, force structure, and requisite mindset inherent to an overt nuclear first strike, it is extremely dubious to suggest that B-21s will form the initial point of contact with the US's nuclear delivery systems, and that slow, large, and highly valuable (albeit far more survivable than its bomber predecessors) airframes such as B-21 will be conducting abject nuclear bombardment without the myriad of other assets (such as those aforementioned SSBNs) ensuring that the PLA's counter-air complex is in shambles by the time the Raider enters the threat environment. At which point, the B-21 is sort of the least of one's worries. It is simply a nonsensical scenario that has no basis in doctrine, sensible employment, nor force design, and I find it ridiculous to even assert that it is plausible.
Yes you mentioned the Cold War is a long period of history, so are you sure when “SAC wielded more than 700 B-52s and close to 2,000 B-47s”, Trident had already existed in the world?(not to speak of accurate versions)
The long history also introduces some other paradox. You can say “now Chinese has AMAZING anti stealthy IADS(for me it’s still vulnerable because of the fundamental asymmetric between air attacks and air defense, which introduces much more vulnerability to IADS, e.g. cyber or EW, compared with bombers. But after all I cannot convince you so just leave it alone)”, but how about the time when stealthy platforms emerged for the first time? Do you REALLY believe B-2 needs any ‘doors knocking support’ from other platforms in 1997? For me any such kind of suggestions are nothing but inter service rivalry.
(Do you really think B-2(and other stealthy platforms before F-35) are designed to work with other platforms?? USAAF repeated many times that they were designed to work lonely and agreed it’s a weakness in 21st century)
you also mentioned warheads in storage are air deliverable, (although for me the situation of those non-active warheads is doubtful) so why don’t just install them in LRSOs and launch them to IADS(I don’t why you ignored them) as well as silos? On the other hand, Navy is also pursuing SLCM-N, even though this missile highly restricted their roles in conventional wars, so where do you think they may aiming at, should they be the SAME as LRSO? I cannot find a self-consistent answer from your theory.
I reviewed your response and found you also mentioned SLCM. That makes me confused, Why do you think SLCM is an ideal platform for 1st strike while LRSO is not? B-21 is dangerous not only because they can destroy tunnel exits and TELs on the road with B-61, but also the ability to launch LRSO.
Another try to guess DF-45 specification based on 2020 data (when engine for SD-3 got its first hot test)
Diameter 2.64m lift off mass ~135,000 kg throw weight ~5,400 kg, equipped with 8 * 650 kt warheads each 360 kg and many decoys on 12,000 km without sacrificing too much MIRV capability.
This estimation source: many rounds of discussion on . through out years.
It is very interesting that people instantly complained about the inability of new missiles to reach US East coast from old DF-5 launch sites. (They don't know about silos development at that time) It make much more sense. All of three massive silos site can cover nearly all of US homeland except for Florida, Louisiana and south Texas. Missile can still hit these areas with PBV acceleration but it also means much less RV capability.
Yield = 650kt * 8 * 360 = 1872 Mt and 2,880 warheads
Cost will be higher since it needs better propellant -- H16 for first stage, S17 for second stage and X18 for third stage, compared with DF-41 which has N15B for first stage, N15B for second stage and N15 for third stage. The same applies for shell, which DF-45 supposedly uses T800 fiber as DF-41 uses T700.
The bottom line is that at least 6 * 650 kt or 10 * 250kt for a similar range on assumption that DF-45 still uses N15B for first & second stage and H16 for third stage.
first
Diameter 2.64m lift off mass ~135,000 kg throw weight ~5,400 kg, equipped with 8 * 650 kt warheads each 360 kg and many decoys on 12,000 km without sacrificing too much MIRV capability.
This estimation source: many rounds of discussion on . through out years.
It is very interesting that people instantly complained about the inability of new missiles to reach US East coast from old DF-5 launch sites. (They don't know about silos development at that time) It make much more sense. All of three massive silos site can cover nearly all of US homeland except for Florida, Louisiana and south Texas. Missile can still hit these areas with PBV acceleration but it also means much less RV capability.
Yield = 650kt * 8 * 360 = 1872 Mt and 2,880 warheads
Cost will be higher since it needs better propellant -- H16 for first stage, S17 for second stage and X18 for third stage, compared with DF-41 which has N15B for first stage, N15B for second stage and N15 for third stage. The same applies for shell, which DF-45 supposedly uses T800 fiber as DF-41 uses T700.
The bottom line is that at least 6 * 650 kt or 10 * 250kt for a similar range on assumption that DF-45 still uses N15B for first & second stage and H16 for third stage.
first
escobar
Brigadier
Is there any credible source on the existence of DF-45?
All we can confirm that CASC have successfully tested a 2.65m-diameter solid-propellant rocket engine in 2019 and a 3.5m-diameter solid-propellant rocket engine in 2021. And given that we know JL-3 is a CASIC product, so the new ICBM should be a CASC product, therefore either 2.65m or 3.5m. Otherwise China won't be able to test new ICBM until at least 2026 & can't fill up silos until 2030.
3.5m is too large and less cost-effective for ICBM. 2.65 m will still be the hugest solid fueled ICBM. For comparison, MX Peacekeeper has a 2.3m diameter and 88 tons weight, SS-24 Scalpel has a 2.41m diameter and 104 tons weight.
It really doesn't matter whether the true code name is DF-45 or not, the diameter has determined that it can't be a small ICBM.
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